Chemical Process Safety: Kathmandu University

Kathmandu University
Chemical Process Safety

Risk Assessment
Dr. Ziaul Haque Ansari
Department of
Chemical Science and Engineering
Table of Contents
Review of Probability Theory
 Interactions between Process Units
 Revealed and Unrevealed Failures
 Probability of Coincidence
 Redundancy
 Common Mode Failures
2 Event Trees
3 Fault Trees
4 QRA and LOPA
 Quantitative Risk Analysis
 Layer of Protection Analysis
 Consequence
 Frequency
Introduction
 Risk assessment includes incident identification and consequence
analysis. Incident identification describes how an accident occurs.
 It frequently includes an analysis of the probabilities.
 Consequence analysis describes the expected damage.
 This includes loss of life, damage to the environment or capital

equipment, and days outage.
Introduction
In this chapter we will
 review probability mathematics, including the mathematics of

equipment failure,
 show how the failure probabilities of individual hardware
components contribute to the failure of a process,
 describe two probabilistic methods (event trees and fault trees),
 describe the concepts of layer of protection analysis (LOPA),
and
 describe the relationship between quantitative risk analysis
(QRA) and LOPA.
Introduction
Equipment failures or faults in a process occur as a result of a
complex interaction of the individual components.
The overall probability of a failure in a process depends highly on

the nature of this interaction.
In this section we define the various types of interactions and

describe how to perform failure probability computations.
Data are collected on the failure rate of a particular hardware

component.
With adequate data it can be shown that, on average, the component

fails after a certain period of time.
Introduction
This is called the average failure rate and is represented by  with units
of faults/time.
The probability that the component will not fail during the time
interval (0, t) is given by a Poisson distribution:
where R is the reliability. Equation assumes a constant failure rate .

As t , the reliability goes to 0.
The speed at which this occurs depends on the value of the failure
rate .
Introduction
The complement of the reliability is called the failure probability (or
sometimes the unreliability), P, and it is given by
The time interval between two failures of the component is called the
mean time between failures (MTBF) and is given by the first moment
of the failure density function:
Equation is valid only for a constant failure rate .

Introduction
Typical plots of the functions , f , P, and R are shown in Figure 11-1.
Introduction
Many components exhibit a typical bathtub failure rate, shown in Figure.
The failure rate is highest when the component is new (infant mortality) and
when it is old (old age).
Between these two periods (denoted by the lines in Figure 11-2), the failure
rate is reasonably constant.
Interactions between Process Units
Accidents in chemical plants are usually the result of a complicated
interaction of a number of process components.
The overall process failure probability is computed from the

individual component probabilities.
Process components interact in two different fashions.
In some cases a process failure requires the simultaneous failure of a

number of components in parallel.
This parallel structure is represented by the logical AND function.

This means that the failure probabilities for the individual
components must be multiplied:
n : the total number of components and
Pi : the failure probability of each component.
The total reliability for parallel units is given by

Ri : the reliability of an individual process component
Process components also interact in series.
This means that a failure of any single component in the series of

components will result in failure of the process.
The logical OR function represents this case.
For series components the overall process reliability is found by

multiplying the reliabilities for the individual components:
The overall failure probability is computed from

Example 11-1
The water flow to a chemical reactor cooling coil is controlled by the
system shown in Figure 11-4. The flow is measured by a differential
pressure (DP) device, the controller decides on an appropriate control
strategy, and the control valve manipulates the flow of coolant.
Determine the overall failure rate, the unreliability, the reliability, and
the MTBF for this system. Assume a 1-yr period of operation.
Solution
These process components are related in series. Thus, if any one of the
components fails, the entire system fails. The reliability and failure
probability are computed for each component using Equations 11-1
and 11-2. The results are shown in the following table. The failure
rates are from Table 11-1.
Solution
Revealed and Unrevealed Failures
Emergency alarms and shutdown systems are used only when a
dangerous situation occurs.
It is possible for the equipment to fail without the operator being

aware of the situation. This is called an unrevealed failure.
Without regular and reliable equipment testing, alarm and emergency

systems can fail without notice. Failures that are immediately obvious
are called revealed failures.
Figure 11-6 shows the nomenclature for revealed failures.
The time that the component is operational is called the period of
operation and is denoted by 0.
After a failure occurs, a period of time, called the period of inactivity
or downtime (1), is required to repair the component.
The MTBF is the sum of the period of operation and the downtime, as
shown.
For unrevealed failures the failure becomes obvious only after regular
inspection. This situation is shown in Figure 11-7.
It is convenient to define an availability and unavailability.
The availability A is simply the probability that the component or

process is found functioning.
The unavailability U is the probability that the component or process

is found not functioning. It is obvious that
It demonstrates that, on average, for unrevealed failures the process or

component is unavailable during a period equal to half the inspection
interval.
A decrease in the inspection interval is shown to increase the

availability of an unrevealed failure.
Example 11-3
Compute the availability and the unavailability for both the alarm and
the shutdown systems of Example 11-2. Assume that a maintenance
inspection occurs once every month and that the repair time is
negligible.
Solution
Both systems demonstrate unrevealed failures. For the alarm system
the failure rate is  = 0.18 faults/yr. The inspection period is 1/12 =
0.083 yr. The unavailability is computed using Equation 11-25:
Solution
for unrevealed failures
The alarm system is available 99.2% of the time. For the shutdown
system  = 0.55 faults/yr. Thus
The shutdown system is available 97.7% of the time.

Probability of Coincidence
All process components demonstrate unavailability as a result of a
failure.
For alarms and emergency systems it is unlikely that these systems

will be unavailable when a dangerous process episode occurs.
The danger results only when a process upset occurs and the
emergency system is unavailable.
This requires a coincidence of events. Assume that a dangerous

process episode occurs pd times in a time interval Ti.
The mean time between coincidences (MTBC) is the reciprocal of the

average frequency of dangerous coincidences:
Example 11-4
For the reactor of Example 11-3 a high-pressure incident is expected

once every 14 months. Compute the MTBC for a high-pressure
excursion and a failure in the emergency shutdown device. Assume
that a maintenance inspection occurs every month.
Solution
The frequency of process episodes is given by Equation 11-26:
 = 1 episode / [(l4 months)(l yr/12 months)] = 0.857/yr.

Solution
It is expected that a simultaneous high-pressure incident and failure of

the emergency shutdown device will occur once every 50 yr.
Redundancy
Systems are designed to function normally even when a single
instrument or control function fails.
This is achieved with redundant controls, including two or more

measurements, processing paths, and actuators that ensure that the
system operates safely and reliably.
The degree of redundancy depends on the hazards of the process and

on the potential for economic losses.
An example of a redundant temperature measurement is an additional

temperature probe.
An example of a redundant temperature control loop is an additional

temperature probe, controller, and actuator (for example, cooling
water control valve).
2 Event Trees
Event trees begin with an initiating event and work toward a final
result.
This approach is inductive.
The method provides information on how a failure can occur and the
probability of occurrence.
When an accident occurs in a plant, various safety systems come into

play to prevent the accident from propagating.
These safety systems either fail or succeed.
The event tree approach includes the effects of an event initiation

followed by the impact of the safety systems.
2 Event Trees
The typical steps in an event tree analysis are:
i. identify an initiating event of interest,

ii. identify the safety functions designed to deal with the initiating
event,
iii. construct the event tree, and
iv. describe the resulting accident event sequences
If appropriate data are available, the procedure is used to assign

numerical values to the various events.
This is used effectively to determine the probability of a certain

sequence of events and to decide what improvements are required.
2 Event Trees
Consider the chemical reactor system shown in Figure 11-8.
A high-temperature alarm has been installed to warn the operator of a

high temperature within the reactor.

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Kathmandu University

Chemical Process Safety

Dr. Ziaul Haque Ansari

 It frequently includes an analysis of the probabilities.

 Consequence analysis describes the expected damage.

 This includes loss of life, damage to the environment or capital

 review probability mathematics, including the mathematics of

The overall probability of a failure in a process depends highly on

In this section we define the various types of interactions and

Data are collected on the failure rate of a particular hardware

With adequate data it can be shown that, on average, the component

where R is the reliability. Equation assumes a constant failure rate .

Equation is valid only for a constant failure rate .

The overall process failure probability is computed from the

Process components interact in two different fashions.

In some cases a process failure requires the simultaneous failure of a

This parallel structure is represented by the logical AND function.

The total reliability for parallel units is given by

Process components also interact in series.

This means that a failure of any single component in the series of

For series components the overall process reliability is found by

The overall failure probability is computed from

It is possible for the equipment to fail without the operator being

Without regular and reliable equipment testing, alarm and emergency

The availability A is simply the probability that the component or

The unavailability U is the probability that the component or process

It demonstrates that, on average, for unrevealed failures the process or

A decrease in the inspection interval is shown to increase the

The shutdown system is available 97.7% of the time.

For alarms and emergency systems it is unlikely that these systems

This requires a coincidence of events. Assume that a dangerous

The mean time between coincidences (MTBC) is the reciprocal of the

For the reactor of Example 11-3 a high-pressure incident is expected

The frequency of process episodes is given by Equation 11-26:

 = 1 episode / [(l4 months)(l yr/12 months)] = 0.857/yr.

It is expected that a simultaneous high-pressure incident and failure of

This is achieved with redundant controls, including two or more

The degree of redundancy depends on the hazards of the process and

An example of a redundant temperature measurement is an additional

An example of a redundant temperature control loop is an additional

This approach is inductive.

When an accident occurs in a plant, various safety systems come into

These safety systems either fail or succeed.

The event tree approach includes the effects of an event initiation

i. identify an initiating event of interest,

If appropriate data are available, the procedure is used to assign

This is used effectively to determine the probability of a certain

Consider the chemical reactor system shown in Figure 11-8.

A high-temperature alarm has been installed to warn the operator of a

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