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Forever: de Beers and U.S. Antitrust Law

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Forever: De Beers and

U.S. Antitrust Law


History Of De Beers
Significant events

1874 1880

Cecil Rhodes rented Using it’s profits, it


out steam powered bought small claims
water and pumped and formed the De-
to miners of the Beers Mining
Kimberly mines. Company

Bought all the other


Diamond Syndicate
claim holders and
was created to keep
gained full control
prices high.
over the production

1890 1887
Courses for Emergence Of De Beers’ Monopoly

Lack Of Competition
Stake Holders were bought

Coalition
Singular Producer and Distributor

Control Over Production


Major Producers were South Africa
De beers’ production share was 95%
and Brazil

Continued
Regulation of Production & Supply
Controlled Distribution Carats, Supply, Price & Competition

International Agreements
Contracts with most diamond Ability to dictate terms in market
producing states and set prices

Stockpiling
Bought the excess diamonds in the Incurred Losses for the sake of long
market term stability
Evolution of the Cartel

1902 1929

• Diamond empire taken up by Ernst • Oppenheimer presided as Chairman of


Oppenheimer De beers and the Diamond
• Oppenheimer entailed a monopoly of Corporation
distribution as well as of supply
• Ensured uniform prices across the industry
and retail level
• Concern about the diamond syndicate being
independent, resolved to create a “New
Syndicate”
Cartel in Action
In mid 1950s, De Beers was no longer alone in the market

By 1960,South African Diamonds accounted for 19% of the total gem stone
production and by 1999,11%

De Beers urged other producers to sell their production to them

Realising benefits, states signed contracts, but Prices were set by De Beers

Countries agreed to accept low sales and Traditional returns were reaped by
the producers.
Diamond Pipeline

Preferences of All these have


Sent Diamonds
stake holders enabled De
to London
were conveyed No Cherry beers to
Office of CSO Held sites to the company Picking was control
(Syndicates)
5 weeks prior permitted Diamond
Market
Stockpiling

Whenever market weakened, De Beers bought the excess


gemstones

Whatever gemstones outside diamonds found their way into the


market, De Beers would buy them.

Always ensured supply demand balance didn’t falter


Challenges to De Beers’ Monopoly

Double blow of Russian


Zaire threatened and Angolan defections,
to destabilize the who leaked diamonds
industry onto the world market

1977 1981 1990 1992 1997

Trouble from Israel's Soviets and Russians


soaring inflation threatened Asian crisis
who hoarded their periodically to swept through
diamonds and withdraw from the De the far East
drove prices up Beers structure
• Diamond sales in Japan fell from 33% to 18% between 1997 and 1998
• Depressed De Beers sales and the share price
• Brought a new wave of value investors from the united states who saw opportunity
for financial gain in the depressed share prices.
• Accountants started prying into De Beer’s financial management and scrutinized
the ever growing weight of the stock piles.
• March 1998, De beers and Anglo-American became two distinct firms.
• After isolation, it moved to the world market
Strategic Review

• Criticism received from investors (Outside perspective)


1. New investors criticized De Beers
2. Its accounting methods could not be understood
3. Heavily invested in Anglo-American
4. Significant legal issues in US
5. Followed traditional business model
6. Stockpiling
Strategic Review

• Analysis also revealed some strengths within the company


1. Tremendous brand name – one of the world’s best recognized
2. Brilliant history of marketing
3. Spent less than 1% on advertising
4. Advertised diamonds on behalf of the entire industry
Millennial Campaign

• Company’s first attempt to brand gems, to sell a “De Beers diamond” rather
than a regular diamond
• Occurred at a time of rapid change at the closely-held corporation
• The campaign was centered in the US
Power of the brand
• Innovative branding strategy
• Emphasized the De Beers name in advertisements
• Etched microscopic logo on to the stones
• Branding offered a seductive route out of its financial troubles
• De Beers was estimated to be worth anywhere from $175m in rough stones up to
$1.25b at retail jewelry level
• Create a De Beers luxury store or a line of high end fashion assessments
• Potentially, branding also promised to help reduce its stockpile
• De Beers “single channel marketing” brought social goals and benefits to all
involved
U.S. Anti-trust
law
A brief history
• From the rail roads to sugar and oil companies, monopolies dominated the
early US landscape.
• They used their market power to stifle competition, influence trade through
organizations called trust.
• De Beers was following in their footsteps by violating the fundamental
underpinnings of capitalism as practiced in US
1890 The Sherman Antitrust Act
• It tried to level the playing field by making the monopolistic behavior in the
market illegal.
• It made illegal “Every contract, combination in the form of trust or
otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce” 1914: Clayton
Act
• It broadened the definition of unacceptable behavior and prohibiting any
illegal behavior that might “substantially lessen competition or tend to
create a monopoly in any line of commerce”
De Beers : Tryst with Justice system
• The US justice department had tried to implicate De Beers for violating
US antitrust law on several occasions.
• In 1945, investigation ordered against De Beers failed as the latter was
smart enough to circumvent law through a technicality(owning a bank
account does not justify “doing of business” to warrant jurisdiction)
• 1976: civil and criminal suit was filed against the firm but they merely
paid a small fine and signed a consent agreeing to forego monopolistic
practices
• In 1984, Justice Department filed a case suing De Beers and GE, for price
fixing in diamonds industry
• Spring of 1992, GE and De Beers raised their prices on industrial diamonds
• The government argued that the exchange of price information between GE
and De Beers was a part of conspiracy to fixed prices
• But there was no evidence of collusion
• GE got acquitted and De Beers never appeared in court to defend itself
• De Beers had simply come up with series of ingenious strategies for
remaining beyond the departments’ grasp
Thank you!

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