HAZOP

Fundamental
16/11/21
 A scenario…

 You and your family are on a road trip by using a car in the middle of
the night. You were replying a text message while driving at 100
km/h and it was raining heavily. The car hits a deep hole and one of
your tire blows. You hit the brake, but due to slippery road and your
car tire thread was thin, the car skidded and was thrown off the road.

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 Points to ponder

What is the cause of the accident?

What is the consequence of the event?

What can we do to prevent all those things to happen in the first place?

(5 minutes for brainstorming ideas)

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 What other possible accidents might happen on the
road trip?

Can we be prepared before the accident occurs?

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 Can we make it more systematic?

Parameter Guideword Possible Consequences Action Safeguard

Causes

Car speed Too fast Rushing Skidded when - Slow down -ABS brake system
Too slow emergency brake - Speed up -Safety belt
- Air bag
Tire No thread Tire too old, often Car skidded - Check frequently
Less thread speeding and - Have spare tire
emergency break

Window Low Rain Cannot see the road

visibility Very low

Car light Dim -Stop car

No light -Go to nearest garage
-Use emergency signal
Road With holes Breaks the car tire - Put a signboard
Rocky -Street lights

Travel time Night No street light -Travel during daylight

Foggy

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 What is HAZOP?
• Systematic technique to IDENTIFY potential HAZard and
OPerating problems
• A formal systematic rigorous examination to the process and
engineering facets of a production facility
• A qualitative technique based on “guide-words” to help provoke
thoughts about the way deviations from the intended operating
conditions can lead to hazardous situations or operability problems
• HAZOP is basically for safety
- Hazards are the main concern
- Operability problems degrade plant performance (product quality,
production rate, profit)
• Considerable engineering insight is required - engineers working
independently could develop different results
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 Origin of HAZOP
 Initially prepared by Dr H G Lawley and associates of
ICI at Wilton in 1960’s.
 Subsequently C J Bullock and A J D Jenning from ChE
Dept. Teeside Polytechnic under supervision of T.A.
Kletz applied the method at higher institution (post-
graduate level).
 In 1977, Chemical Industries Association published the
edited version.

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 Later Development - HAZOP
 ICI expanded the procedure called HAZARD STUDY steps 1 to
6.
 The ICI six steps :
 Project exploration / preliminary project assessment – to identify
inherent hazards of process chemicals, site suitability and probable
environmental impact.
 Project definition – to identify and reduce significant hazards
associated with items and areas, check conformity with relevant
standards and codes of practices.
USE CHECK LISTS

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 Later Development - HAZOP

 Design and procurement – to examine the PID in detail for

identification of deviations from design intent capable of causing
operability problems or hazards.
 During final stages of construction – to check that all recommended
and accepted actions recorded in steps i, ii and iii implemented.
 During plant commissioning – to check that all relevant statutory
requirements have been acknowledges and all installed safety
systems are reliably operable.

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 Later Development - HAZOP
 During normal operation, some time after start-up – especially
if any modification been made. To check if changes in
operation has not invalidated the HAZOP report of step iii by
introducing new hazards.

This procedures are adopted fully or partly by many

companies around the world.

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 Objective of HAZOP

• For identifying cause and the consequences of

perceived mal operations of equipment and associated
operator interfaces in the context of the complete
system.

• It accommodates the status of recognized design

standards and codes of practice but rightly questions
the relevance of these in specific circumstances where
hazards may remain undetected.

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How and Why HAZOP is Used
• HAZOP identifies potential hazards , failures and operability
problems.
• Its use is recommended as a principal method by professional
institutions and legislators on the basis of proven capabilities for
over 40 years.
• It is most effective as a team effort consists of plant and prices
designers, operating personnel, control and instrumentation
engineer etc.
• It encourages creativity in design concept evaluation.
• Its use results in fewer commissioning and operational problems
and better informed personnel, thus confirming overall cost
effectiveness improvement.

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How and Why HAZOP is Used
• Necessary changes to a system for eliminating or reducing the
probability of operating deviations are suggested by the analytical
procedure.

• HAZOP provides a necessary management tool and bonus in so far

that it demonstrates to insurers and inspectors evidence of
comprehensive thoroughness.

• HAZOP reports are an integral part of plant and safety records

and are also applicable to design changes and plant modifications,
thereby containing accountability for equipment and its associated
human interface throughout the operating lifetime.

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How and Why HAZOP is Used
• HAZOP technique is now used by most major companies handling
and processing hazardous material, especially those where
engineering practice involves elevated operating parameters :
- oil and gas production
- flammable and toxic chemicals
- pharmaceuticals etc

• Progressive legislation in encouraging smaller and specialty

manufacturing sites to adopt the method also as standard
practice.

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Purpose of HAZOP
• It emphasizes upon the operating integrity of a system, thereby
leading methodically to most potential and detectable deviations
which could conceivably arise in the course of normal operating
routine
- including "start-up " and "shut-down" procedures
- as well as steady-state operations.
• It is important to remember at all times that HAZOP is an
identifying technique and not intended as a means of solving
problems nor is the method intended to be used solely as an
undisciplined means of searching for hazardous scenarios.

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 HAZOP - Hazard and operability

HAZOP keeps all team

members focused on the
same topic and enables
them to work as a team
1+1=3

NODE: Concentrate on one location in the process

PARAMETER: Consider each process variable individually
(F, T, L, P, composition, operator action, corrosion,
etc.)
GUIDE WORD: Pose a series of standard questions about deviations
from normal conditions. We assume that we know a safe “normal”
operation.
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 HAZOP - Hazard and operability

NODE: Pipe after pump and splitter

PARAMETER*: Flow rate

GUIDE WORD*: Less (less than normal value)

• DEVIATION: less flow than normal
A group
• CAUSE: of deviation, can be more than one members focus
on the same
• CONSEQUENCE: of the deviation/cause issue
simultaneously
• ACTION: initial idea for correction/
prevention/mitigation
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Relevant Question About HAZOP

Question : How can one be certain to identify all possible deviations ?

Answer : No absolute certainty as the study is subjective and 100 %

achievement in this context can have no significance. Any individual or
corporate effort will yield results directly proportional to the
appropriate background experience of those taking part.

However, with the appropriate levels of individual project-related

expertise , such a procedure is fully capable of identifying at least 80
% of potential deviations which could rise during normal operation.

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Relevant Question About HAZOP
Separate consideration is demanded for other operating modes,
such as commissioning, emergency shut-down procedures and
isolation of equipment for maintenance or modification.

Once an installation is endorsed by a properly-conducted HAZOP

study, it is these non-steady state circumstances which benefit
particularly from the technique throughout the life time of the
installation.

' Operability' must also consider the human factors involved as well
as the prediction of equipment behavior.

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Relevant Question About HAZOP
Apart from the uniformity of day-to-day activities , hazards which
could cause major production interruptions and loss, possibly
leading to costly incidents, need to be identified :
• Are there chemicals used in the plant which have not been
classified as hazard because they are handled in small quantities,
are assumed harmless, or are not considered to have long-term
toxic effect upon employees?
• What hazardous materials are transported to or from the site ?
• What routes are taken ?
• What would be the consequences of accidental release?
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Relevant Question About HAZOP

• What effluents are generated by the operation being carried out or

contemplated ? What regulations require to be honored for their
disposal?
• Are chemicals properly packaged & labeled?
• Are the consequences of product misuse made absolutely clear?
• Have all potential God-made events and man-made incidents (e. g
breaches of security, sabotage, electric power failure ) been
considered?
• Are the codes and standards applicable to each facility and relating
to its design , sitting and construction complied with? For example, in
pressure vessel design.

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 Features of HAZOP Study
Subsystems of interest line and valve, etc
Equipment, Vessels

Modes of operation Normal operation

Start -up mode
Shutdown mode
Maintenance /construction /
inspection mode

Trigger events Human failure

Equipment /instrument/component
failure
Supply failure
Emergency environment event
Other causes of abnormal operation,
including instrument disturbance

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 Features of HAZOP Study

Effects within plant Changes in chemical conditions

Changes in inventory
Change in chemical physical conditions

Hazardous conditions Release of material

Changes in material hazard characteristics
Operating limit reached
Energy source exposed etc.

Corrective actions Change of process design

Change of operating limits
Change of system reliability
Improvement of material containment
Change control system
Add/remove materials

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 Features of HAZOP Study

How would hazardous During normal operation

conditions detected ? Upon human failure
Upon component failure
In other circumstances

Contingency actions Improve isolation

Improve protection

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 Documents Needed for HAZOP Study

 For Preliminary HAZOP

 Process Flow Sheet ( PFS or PFD )
 Description of the Process

 For Detailed HAZOP

 Piping and Instrumentation Diagram ( P & ID )
 Process Calculations
 Process Data Sheets
 Instrument Data Sheets
 Interlock Schedules
 Layout Requirements
 Hazardous Area Classification
 Description of the Process

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 Before Detailed HAZOP
 The development of the detailed P&I Diagram is the last stage of
the process design.

 The development will follow a normal standard procedure and

include the following considerations :
 Basic process control system - this is a closed loop control to maintain
process within an acceptable operating region.
 Alarm system - this is to bring unusual situation to attention of a person
monitoring the process in the plant
 Safety interlock system - this is to stop operation or part of the process
during emergencies.
 Relief system - this is to divert material safely during emergencies.

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 P&ID
 A Piping and Instrumentation Diagram - P&ID, is a schematic illustration of functional
relationship of piping, instrumentation and system equipment components.

 P&ID represents the last step in process design.

 P&ID shows all of piping including the physical sequence of branches, reducers,
valves, equipment, instrumentation and control interlocks. 
 P&ID is normally developed from process flow diagram (PFD).
 The P&ID are used to operate the process system.
 A process cannot be adequately designed without proper P&ID.

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 P&I D
A P&ID should include: (Basically every mechanical aspect of the plant with some exceptions)
 Instrumentation and designations
 Mechanical equipment with names and numbers
 All valves and their identifications
 Process piping, sizes and identification
 Miscellaneous - vents, drains, special fittings, sampling lines, reducers, increasers and swagers
 Permanent start-up and flush lines
 Flow directions
 Interconnections references
 Control inputs and outputs, interlocks
 Interfaces for class changes
 Seismic category
 Quality level
 Annunciation inputs
 Computer control system input
 Vendor and contractor interfaces
 Identification of components and subsystems delivered by others
 Intended physical sequence of the equipment

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 P&I D

A P&ID should not include:

 Instrument root valves
 control relays
 manual switches
 equipment rating or capacity
 primary instrument tubing and valves
 pressure temperature and flow data
 elbow, tees and similar standard fittings
 extensive explanatory notes

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 P&ID and Safety

 P&I Diagram
 ISA Standard
 DIN Standard
 Layers of protection

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 HAZOP Study Procedure

• Procedure in HAZOP study consist of examining the process

and instrumentation (P&I) line diagram , process line by process
line .
• A list of guide words is used to generate deviations from
normal operation corresponding to all conceivable possibilities.
• Guide words covering every parameter relevant to the system
under review :i.e. flow rate and quality, pressure, temperature,
viscosity, components etc.
• Flowchart for application of HAZOP is shown in figure.

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 HAZOP Study Flow Chart
Select Line

Select deviation
e. g more flow

Move on to next Is more flow possible

deviation

Is it hazardous or does it Consider other

prevent efficient operation ? causes of
more flow

What change in plant Will the operator know that

will tell him ? there is more flow ?

What changes in plant or method Consider other

will prevent the deviation or make change(s) or
it less likely or protect against the agreed to accept
consequences ? hazard

Is the cost of the change justified

?

Agree change (s)

Agree who is responsible for
action

Follow up to see action has been

taken
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 Guidelines for Division into Sections

 Choices of lines – P&ID must be divided logically. Not too many

sections. Factors to be considered :
 Each section should contain active components, which gives rise to
deviations. E.g piping which contains control valves can give rise to
flow deviations, heat exchangers can cause T deviations.
 Materials in section – contain significant amount of hazardous
materials.
 Section based on process and states of materials. Only 1 process
operation per 1 section.

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 Guidelines for Division into Sections

 General guidelines :
 Define each major process component as a section. Usually
anything assigned equipment number should be considered a major
process component.
 Define one line section between each major process component.
 Define additional line sections for each branches off the main
process flow.
 Define a process section at each connection to existing equipment.

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 Guidelines for Division into Sections

 Supplementary guidelines
 Define only one process section for equipment in identical service.
However, pumps in different service with a common spare must be
treated separately.
 Define only one line at the end of a series of components if there are no
other flow paths.
 Define only one additional line section if there are alternative flow
paths, regardless of how many branches there are.

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 Guidelines for Division into Sections

 Do not define line between major equipment items if there are no

single active components that could cause deviations.
 Do not define sections for existing equipment that is upstream of
new or modified equipment. Address malfunctions of such
upstream equipment as deviations in the new or modified
equipment.

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 HAZOP Study Procedure
GUIDE WORDS *

POSSIBLE CAUSES DEVIATION ( FROM DESIGN AND/OR

OPERATING INTENT )

CONSEQUENCES

ACTION(S) REQUIRED OR RECOMMENDEED

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 Guide Words

NONE No forward flow when there should be

MORE More of any parameter than there should be,
e.g more flow, more pressure, more
temperature, etc.
LESS As above, but "less of" in each instance
PART System composition difference from what it
should be
MORE THAN More "components" present than there should
be for example, extra phase, impurities
OTHER What needs to happen other than normal
operation, e.g. start up,shutdown, maintenance

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 Guide Words
NONE e.g., NO FLOW caused by blockage; pump failure;
valve closed or jammed : leak: valve open ;suction
vessel empty; delivery side over - pressurized :
vapor lock ; control failure
REVERSE e.g., REVERSE FLOW caused by pump failure : NRV
failure or wrongly inserted ; wrong routing; delivery
over pressured; back- siphoning ; pump reversed
MORE OF e.g., MORE FLOW caused by reduced delivery
head ; surging ; suction pressurised ; controller
failure ; valve stuck open leak ; incorrect instrument
reading.

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 Guide Words
MORE OF MORE TEMPERATURE, pressure caused by external
fires; blockage ; shot spots; loss of control ; foaming;
gas release; reaction;explosion; valve closed; loss of
level in heater; sun.
LESS OF e.g., LESS FLOW caused by pump failure; leak; scale in
delivery; partial blockage ; sediments ; poor suction
head; process turndown.
LESS e.g., low temperature, pressure caused by Heat loss;
vaporisation ; ambient conditions; rain ; imbalance of
input and output ; sealing ; blocked vent .
PART OF Change in composition high or low concentration of
mixture; additional reactions in reactor or other
location ; feed change. 
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 Guide Words

MORE THAN Impurities or extra phase Ingress of contaminants

such as air, water, lube oils; corrosion products;
presence of other process materials due to internal
leakage ; failure of isolation ; start-up features.
OTHER Activities other than normal operation start-up and
shutdown of plant ; testing and inspection ;
sampling ; maintenance; activating catalyst; removing
blockage or scale ; corrosion; process emergency ;
safety procedures activated ; failure of power, fuel,
steam , air, water or inert gas; emissions and lack of
compatibility with other emission and effluents.

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HAZOP STUDY REPORT FORM
TITLE :
Sheet 1 of

HAZOP Study Form

LINE 1 :

CAUSES CONSEQUENCES EXISTING PROVISIONS ACTIONS, QUESTIONS OR

DEVIATION RECOMMENDATIONS

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 HAZOP Study
HAZOP study are applied during :

• Normal operation

• Foreseeable changes in operation, e.g. upgrading, reduced

output, plant start-up and shut-down

• Suitability of plant materials, equipment and instrumentation

• Provision for failure of plant services, e. g . steam, electricity,

cooling water

• Provision for maintenance.

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 Strength of HAZOP
• HAZOP is a systematic, reasonably comprehensive and flexible.
• It is suitable mainly for team use whereby it is possible to
incorporate the general experience available.
• It gives good identification of cause and excellent identification
of critical deviations.
• The use of keywords is effective and the whole group is able to
participate.
• HAZOP is an excellent well-proven method for studying large
plant in a specific manner.
• HAZOP identifies virtually all significant deviations on the plant,
all major accidents should be identified but not necessarily their
causes.
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 Weakness of HAZOP
• HAZOP is very time consuming and can be laborious with a
tendency for boredom for analysts.
• It tends to be hardware-oriented and process-oriented, although
the technique should be amenable to human error application.
• It tends to generate many failure events with insignificance
consequences and generate many failure events which have the
same consequences.
• It stifles brainstorming although this is not required at the late
stage of design when it is normally applied.
• HAZOP does not identify all causes of deviations and therefore
omits many scenarios.

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 Weakness of HAZOP
• It takes little account of the probabilities of events or
consequences, although quantitative assessment are sometime
added. The group generally let their collective experiences decide
whether deviations are meaningful.
• HAZOP is poor where multiple-combination events can have
severe effects.
• It tends to assume defects or deterioration of materials of
construction will not arise.
• When identifying consequences, HAZOP tends to encourage
listing these as resulting in action by emergency control measures
without considering that such action might fail. It tends to ignore
the contribution which can be made by operator interventions

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 Managing HAZOP

How to manage HAZOP

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 Preliminary HAZOP Example
Cooling Coils
Refer to reactor system shown.
Monomer
Feed The reaction is exothermic. A cooling system is provided to
remove the excess energy of reaction. In the event of cooling
function is lost, the temperature of reactor would increase. This
Cooling Water to Sewer would lead to an increase in reaction rate leading to additional
energy release.

Cooling The result could be a runaway reaction with pressures exceeding

Water In the bursting pressure of the reactor. The temperature within the
reactor is measured and is used to control the cooling water flow
rate by a valve.

Perform HAZOP Study

T
C Thermocouple

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 Preliminary HAZOP on Reactor - Example
Guide Word Deviation Causes Consequences Action

NO No cooling Temperature increase in

reactor

REVERSE Reverse cooling flow Failure of water source

resulting in backward
flow

MORE More cooling flow Instruct operators on

procedures

AS WELL AS Reactor product in Check maintenance

coils procedures and
schedules

OTHER THAN Another material Water source

besides cooling contaminated
water

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 Preliminary HAZOP on Reactor – Answer
Guide Word Deviation Causes Consequences Action

NO No cooling Cooling water valve malfunction Temperature increase in Install high temperature alarm
reactor (TAH)

REVERSE Reverse cooling flow Failure of water source Less cooling, possible runaway Install check valve
resulting in backward flow reaction

MORE More cooling flow Control valve failure, operator Too much cooling, reactor cool Instruct operators on
fails to take action on alarm procedures

AS WELL AS Reactor product in More pressure in reactor Off-spec product Check maintenance
coils procedures and
schedules

OTHER THAN Another material Water source May be cooling inefffective and If less cooling, TAH will
besides cooling contaminated effect on the reaction detect. If detected, isolate
water water source. Back up water
source?

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 Case Study – Shell & Tube Heat Exchanger

 Using relevant guide works, perform HAZOP study on shell & tube heat exchanger

Process
fluid

Cooling water

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 HAZOP on Heat Exchanger – Answer 1
Guide Word Deviation Causes Consequences Action

Less Less flow of cooling Pipe blockage Temperature of process fluid High Temperature Alarm
water remains constant

More More cooling flow Failure of cooling water Temperature of process fluid Low Temperature Alarm
valve decrease

More of More pressure on tube Failure of process fluid Bursting of tube Install high pressure alarm
side valve

Contamination Contamination of Leakage of tube and Contamination of process fluid Proper maintainance and
process fluid line cooling water goes in operator alert

Corrosion Corrosion of tube Hardness of cooling water Less cooling and crack of tube Proper maintainence

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 HAZOP on Heat Exchanger – Answer 2
Guide Word Deviation Causes Consequences Action

NONE No cooling water flow Failure of inlet cooling water Process fluid temperature is not Install Temperature indicator
valve to open lowered accordingly before and after the process fluid
line
Install TAH

MORE More cooling water flow Failure of inlet cooling water Output of Process fluid temperature Install Temperature indicator
valve to close too low before and after process fluid line
Install TAL

LESS Less cooling water Pipe leakage Process fluid temperature too low Installation of flow meter

REVERSE Reverse process fluid flow Failure of process fluid inlet Product off set Install check valve (whether it is
valve crucial have to check?)

CONTAMINATION Process fluid contamination Contamination in cooling water Outlet temperature too low Proper maintenance and operator
alert

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 HAZOP - Hazard and Operability
ATTITUDE CHECK

All of these terms! This stupid table! Consequence

I hate HAZOPS. Why don’t we just
learn the engineering?

Guide
Nodes HA
ZO
P words

Parameters

Deviation
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 I suppose that I
should have done that
HAZOP Study!

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 HAZOP - Hazard and Operability
You are
responsible for the
safety team.

Without HAZOP
How will you focus all
members of a team on the
key issues in a systematic
manner?
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 HAZOP Management
08.01.2012
 Planning for HAZOP Study
What is required?

• Define objectives and scope – define TOR and scope of work.

•To new design – applied to a detailed design.
•To existing design – identify hazards not previously
identified probably because not being HAZOPED.
•To plant modification

• Select team members. Two types of person needed :

•Detailed technical knowledge of the process.
•Those with knowledge and experience of applying highly
structured, systematic HAZOP approach.

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 Planning for HAZOP
• Prepare for the study. Need sufficient information :

− Process Flow Sheet ( PFS or PFD )

− Piping and Instrumentation Diagram ( P & ID )
− Process Calculations
− Process Data Sheets
− Instrument Data Sheets
− Interlock Schedules
− Layout Requirements
− Hazardous Area Classification
− Operating instructions

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 Planning for HAZOP

• Prepare for the study. Need sufficient information :

− Safety procedures documents
− Relief/venting philosophy
− Chemical involved
− Piping specifications
− Previous HAZOP report

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 Planning for HAZOP
 Carry out the study
 Record the results (may need a secretary)
 Follow-up of actions noted
 final report contain resolution of all recommended actions
 must appoint someone as leader to check progress of action
 team may meet again if answers to questions do not simply lead
to an action
 team may meet again if significant design changes in interim
report

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 Team Characteristics
 Members share common objectives.
 Everybody contributes and knows his/her roles, not leader
dependent too much.
 Each members values and respects contribution of others.
 Members learn while they work.
 Over a period of time, individual contribution level are more or less
equal.
 Disagreement are worked through by discussion.
 The use of voting procedures is sparing and normally only last
resort if highly necessary.
 Members enjoy team meetings.

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 Questioning Techniques
 Open questions
 Help person being asked to think – use words how, what and
why.
 Closed questions
 To focus on an issue or problem. Start with words who, when,
where.
 Required answer yes or no only.
 Question mix
 Mix between open and closed questions.

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 Questioning Techniques
 Things to avoid
 Ambiguous or vague questions.
 Double barelled/multiple questions.
 Long complicated questions.
 Interrogation type of questions.
 A loaded questions – implied judgement.

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 Responsibility of HAZOP Team Members

HAZOP leader

• Plan sessions and timetable

• Control discussion
• Limit discussion
• Encourage team to draw conclusion
• Ensure secretary has time for taking note
• Keep team in focus
• Encourage imagination of team members
• Motivate members
• Discourage recriminations
• Judge importance issues
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 Checklist for HAZOP Leader
 Always prepare study program in advance.
 Agree on the format or form to be used.
 Prepare follow up procedures.
 Brief members about HAZOP during first meeting.
 Stop the team trying to redesign the process.
 HAZOP is a team exercise. Do not let anybody
(including the leader himself to dominate).

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 Checklist for HAZOP Leader
 If conflict arises, handle with care.
 Avoid long discussions by recording areas which need
to be resolved outside meeting.
 Leader must be strong, yet diplomatic.
 Speak clearly. Make you point.
 Better have experience working as team member
previously.
 Do not skip anything….some time small things may
cause big accident.

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 Responsibility of HAZOP Team Members

HAZOP Secretary

• Take adequate notes

• Record documentations
• Inform leader if more time required in taking notes
• If unclear, check wording before writing
• Produce interim lists of recommendations
• Produce draft report of study
• Check progress of chase action
• Produce final report

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 Responsibility of HAZOP Team Members

Process Engineer

• Provide a simple description

• Provide design intention for each process unit
• Provide information on process conditions and design conditions
• Provide a simple description
• Provide design intention for each process unit
• Provide information on process conditions and design conditions

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 Responsibility of HAZOP Team Members

Mechanical Design Engineer

• Provide specification details

• Provide vendor package details
• Provide equipment and piping layout information

Instrument Engineer

• Provide details of control philosophy

• Provide interlock and alarm details
• Provide info on shutdown, safety features
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 Responsibility of HAZOP Team Members

Plant Engineer or Manager

• Provide information on compatibility with any existing adjacent
plant
• Provide details of site utilities and services
• Provide (for study on existing plant) any update on maintenance
access and modifications
Shift Operating Engineer or Supervisor
• Provide guidance on control instrumentation integrity from an
operating experience view point
• Provide (for study on existing plant) information on plant stability
at the specified control parameters
• Provide information on experienced operability deviations of
hazard potential
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 Responsibility of HAZOP Team Members

Chemist

• Provide details of process chemistry

• Provide details of process hazards (polymerisations, byproducts,
corrosion etc)

Project Engineer

• Provide details of cost and time estimation and also budget

constraints.
• Ensure rapid approval if required
6/06/2010