General Exceptions
General Exceptions
EXCEPTIONS
Konina Mandal
Assistant Professor
Chapter IV of IPC
The general rule is that man is presumed to know the
nature and consequences of his act and is therefore
held responsible for it. This chapter gives situations
which are exceptions to this rule.
General
31 Sections which can be divided into following 8
Exceptions heads-
1. Mistake of fact and mistake of law (Section 76,79)
2. Privileged and Judicial Acts (Section 77,78)
3. Accidental Acts (Section 80)
4. Necessity (Section 81)
5. Incapability to commit crime (Section 82-86)
6. Acts done with consent (Sections 87-90); or without
consent (Section 92)
7. Triviality or Trifles (Section 95)
8. Private Defence (Section 96-106)
General The above categories may be further divided into
Exceptions excusable exceptions and justifiable exceptions.
In excusable exceptions there will be a lack of mens
rea due to reasons for example an accident.
While in justifiable exceptions the circumstances under
which the offence was committed furnish legal
justification for its commission like act done in
pursuance of orders of a court.
Excusable Act Justifiable Act
Necessity
Incapability
Consent
Accident Trifles
Private Defence
This comes within the category of ‘excusable acts’
Section 76 and 79 IPC are the key provisions for the
topic.
by lawful accused and deceased agreed to wrestle with each other, there was an implied
consent on each part to suffer any accidental injuries. The injury was accidental and
there was no foul play on part of the accused and hence is to be given the benefit
means under section 80 and section 87.
Besides the defense of section 87(consent), benefit was also given under Section 80
due to the fact that there was no foul play by the deceased and both friends impliedly
agreed to accidental injuries while going for a wrestling bout with each other.
A woman who in order to discipline her child, hits him with an iron rod but the rod
hits another child and causes injury will not be entitled to the defence of accident as
the act itself lacks lawfulness and cannot be said to be in a lawful manner and by
lawful means.
For example, if A, a workman, while throwing down sand
from the roof gives a proper warning but B, a passer-by is
nevertheless killed, the act is accidental and A is not liable.
Proper care and caution must be taken. For example, if A
picks up a gun, not knowing that it is loaded or not, and
Accidental shoots in the air, killing B- here he would be liable for
causing death by negligence under Section 304A IPC.
Acts The act must be legal and done in a legal manner. But it was
held that when A, while shooting a jackal in the jungle with
an unlicensed gun, by accident kills a man who was hiding
behind a bush, he would not be liable for murder just
because the gun was unlicensed and it would still be an
accident. (State v. Rangaswami, AIR 1952 Nag 268)
Section 81 of IPC-
“81. Act likely to cause harm, but done without criminal intent, and to
prevent other harm.—Nothing is an offence merely by reason of its being
done with the knowledge that it is likely to cause harm, if it be done
without any criminal intention to cause harm, and in good faith for the
purpose of preventing or avoiding other harm to person or property.
Dudley and 3. There is no necessity that justifies private homicide (to conserve
one’s life), as distinguished from public necessity or even necessity
Stephens when it is a justification.
A temptation to murder cannot be held to be legal according to
the court and therefore the sailors were held guilty of murder.
In certain circumstances where, for example, A stole
food from B in extreme famine and when he couldn’t
have bought it with money and needed it to survive,
theft has been seen as a necessity.
In exceptional cases the necessity of appeasing hunger is
seen as a valid defence.
Necessity and For example, D is a miner trapped by a fall of rock while
of waiting to be dug out, eats rations left behind by other
theft members of his party, as his only means of survival.
It applies even in cases other than hunger, for example if
D’s house is on fire and he takes P’s fire extinguisher to
stop the fire, this would be an act done in necessity and
would be excused unless P’s house was also on fire or
was in danger and D’s act unreasonably increased this
danger.
Certain people are assumed under law as incapable of committing
a crime. These are listed under Sections 82-86 IPC.
CHILDREN – Doli Incapax
Section 82 says that nothing done by a child under 7 years of age
will be an offence. This is a total immunity and a child below 7 is
Incapacity to deemed to be incapable of distinguishing between right and
wrong.
commit crime Section 83 gives partial immunity to children between ages 7 to 12
and says-
“83. Act of a child above seven and under twelve of immature
understanding.—Nothing is an offence which is done by a child above
seven years of age and under twelve, who has not attained sufficient
maturity of understanding to judge of the nature and consequences of
his conduct on that occasion.”
An inability to understand actions of the child must be proven. For
example, if a child of 9 years find a necklace at his friends’ place
and goes and sells it for Rs. 20 to misappropriate the money; he
will be liable for theft since he can understand the nature and
consequences of his actions.
When consent The consent given must be free from any fear or misconception or
such misconception of the fact that arises out of
is not a misrepresentation, fraud, etc. Any consent which is obtained
illegally or unlawfully is no consent under the law.
defence – In short, consent can not be used as a defence under the following
Section 90 IPC cases:
1. Consent that is given by a person under fear of injury.
2. Consent given under misconception of fact.
3. Consent given by a child under 12 years of age.
4. Consent given by a person of unsound mind.
5. Consent given by an intoxicated or drunken person.
Section 95 states that “Nothing is an offence by reason that it causes, or that
it is intended to cause, or that it is known to be likely to cause, any harm, if
that harm is so slight that no person of ordinary sense and temper would
complain of such harm.”
The meaning of this is evident from the plain reading and the section exists
Triviality or to prevent case load from trivial complaints.
Trifles (Section The word ‘harm’ has not been defined by the Indian Penal Code under this
section or elsewhere and, therefore, the Court has the authority to
95) determine as to whether harm has resulted. The harm may be in the form of
physical or even mental injury and may include financial or reputational loss.
For example, during the course of exchange of high tempers and abusive
words between A and B, the latter threw a file of papers at the former which
hit the A causing a scratch on her elbow. Here the harm is so little that
Section 95 can be argued to apply.
Section 96- 106 of IPC deal with the right to private
defence.
Section 96 says that “ Nothing is an offence which is
done in the exercise of right of private defence.”
It therefore establishes private defence, which is
commonly known as self- defence.
Private Everyone has the right to defend his or her body and
Defence property or the body or property of another.
But this cannot be used as an excuse to justify causing
harm to another, not for causing more harm than is
necessary.
“97. Right of private defence of the body and of property.—Every
person has a right, subject to the restrictions contained in section 99,
to defend—
First— His own body, and the body of any other person, against any
offence affecting the human body;
Secondly—The property, whether movable or immovable, of himself
Section 97 or of any other person, against any act which is an offence falling
under the definition of theft, robbery, mischief or criminal trespass, or
which is an attempt to commit theft, robbery, mischief or criminal
trespass.”
The right doesn’t just extend to a person’s own body or property
but to even a stranger’s. This right does not exist in English law
and only own or other, if related.
An aggressor cannot use self-defence to get out of liability. For
example, if A and B had a fight and A had aggressive weapons
during this fight, then A cannot use self defence if he was the one
attacking.
Section 97 The right of self defence is purely preventive and not punitive, it is
thus established on the prosecution evidence. The defendant can
establish the plea by reference to circumstances though.
99. Acts against which there is no right of private defence.—There is no right of private defence
against an act which does not reasonably cause the apprehension of death or of grievous hurt, if
done, or attempted to be done, by a public servant acting in good faith under colour of his office,
though that act, may not be strictly justifiable by law.
There is no right of private defence against an act which does not reasonably cause the
apprehension of death or of grievous hurt, if done, or attempted to be done, by the direction of a
public servant acting in good faith under colour of his office, though that direction may not be
strictly justifiable by law.
There is no right of private defence in cases in which there is time to have recourse to the
protection of the public authorities.
Section 99 Extent to which the right may be exercised.—The right of private defence in no case extends to
the inflicting of more harm than it is necessary to inflict for the purpose of defence.
Explanation 1.—A person is not deprived of the right of private defence against an act done, or
attempted to be done, by a public servant, as such, unless he knows or has reason to believe,
that the person doing the act is such public servant.
Explanation 2.—A person is not deprived of the right of private defence against an act done, or
attempted to be done, by the direction of a public servant, unless he knows, or has reason to
believe, that the person doing the act is acting by such direction, or unless such person states
the authority under which he acts, or if he has authority in writing, unless he produces such
authority, if demanded.
This section lays down conditions and limits within which the right of private
defence can be exercised.
There is no private defence-
1. Against acts of a public servant acting in good faith; and
2. Against acts of those acting under their authority or direction;
3. Where there is sufficient time for recourse to public authorities; and
Section 99 4. The quantum of harm that may be caused in all cases of private defence
shall in no case be in excess of harm tat may be necessary for the purpose
of defence.
However the protection given here to public servants is not absolute and is
subject to restrictions. The acts cannot be wholly illegal and he has to acting
representing his office. When the act is not authorised, it must be such that it
must not cause reasonable apprehension of death or serious hurt.
For example, if X, a policeman, goes to Y’s house based on
suspicion and asks Y’s wife, Z, for certain documents and on Z
telling X to wait for her husband he beats her up. When Y sees this
he goes to defend Z but X started beating up Y too. During this
fight Y took a stick from X and hit X twice on the head which
proved to be fatal.
Here Y can use the right to private defence since the act of the
Section 99 policeman was illegal and was not done in good faith. Causing death
or grievous hurt is not covered by this Section.
The force used must be proportionate to the appropriate force in
need to defend in the situation. For example, when a policeman
stabbed and killed a thief trying to escape custody cannot use
private defence as he did used more force than was necessary to
take him into custody.
“100. When the right of private defence of the body extends to causing
death.—The right of private defence of the body extends, under the
restrictions mentioned in the last preceding section, to the voluntary
causing of death or of any other harm to the assailant, if the offence
which occasions the exercise of the right be of any of the descriptions
hereinafter enumerated, namely:—
(First) — Such an assault as may reasonably cause the apprehension that
Section 100 death will otherwise be the consequence of such assault;
(Secondly) —Such an assault as may reasonably cause the apprehension
that grievous hurt will otherwise be the consequence of such assault;
(Thirdly) — An assault with the intention of committing rape;
(Fourthly) —An assault with the intention of gratifying unnatural lust;
(Fifthly) — An assault with the intention of kidnapping or abducting;
(Sixthly) — An assault with the intention of wrongfully confining a person,
under circumstances which may reasonably cause him to apprehend that
he will be unable to have recourse to the public authorities for his release.
Seventhly.- An act of throwing or administering acid or an
attempt to throw or administer acid which may reasonably cause
the apprehension that grievous hurt will otherwise be the
consequence of such act.”
This section has the following ingredients-
1. The person exercising the right of private defence must be
Section 100 free from fault in bringing about the encounter;
2. There must be present an impending peril to life or of great
bodily harm, either real or so apparent as to create an
honest belief of exceeding necessity;
3. There must be no safe or reasonable mode of escape by
retreat;
4. There must have been a necessity for taking the life.
CASE LAWS
ISSUE: Considering the circumstances in which the young boy Parker
was killed, whether necessity was a defense to the charge of murder?
Dudley and Stephens (the two defendants) along with Brooks and
Parker(victim) became shipwrecked by a storm.
They were forced to abandon their ship and were stranded in a small
R v. Dudley emergency boat.
They had been stranded for 18 days. The food had ran out 7 days earlier
and Stephens and they had had no water for five days.
(1884) 14 QBD Dudley and Stephens decided to draw straws so that one person
sacrifices himself in order to save the rest. Brooks dissented while
273 DC Dudley and Stephens decided to kill Parker since he was the weakest
and had no family.
Dudley and Stephens cut the boys (Parker’s) throat. He was too ill to put
up any resistance. All the three men fed on the boy.
Four days later a vessel rescued them and on their return to England,
Dudley & Stephens were charged with the boy’s murder.
Lord Coleridge CJ quotes:
“It would be a very easy and cheap display of commonplace
learning to quote from Greek and Latin authors, from Horace,
REASONING: from Juvenal, from Cicero, from Euripides, passage after passage,
in which the duty of dying for others has been laid down in
glowing and emphatic language as resulting from the principles of
heathen ethics; it is enough in a Christian country to remind
ourselves of the Great Example [Jesus Christ] whom we profess to
follow.”
"Now it is admitted that the deliberate killing of this unoffending and unresisting boy
was clearly murder, unless the killing can be justified by some well-recognized excuse
admitted by the law. It is further admitted that there was in this case no such excuse,
unless the killing was justified by what has been called 'necessity'. But the temptation
to the act which existed here was not what the law has ever called necessity. Nor is
this to be regretted. Though law and morality are not the same, and many things may
be immoral which are not necessarily illegal, yet the absolute divorce of law from
Judgement morality would be of fatal consequence; and such divorce would follow if the
temptation to murder in this case were to be held by law an absolute defense of it….."
"It is not needful to point out the awful danger of admitting the principle which has
been contended for. Who is to be the judge of this sort of necessity? By what measure
is the comparative value of lives to be measured? Is it to be strength, or intellect or
what? It is plain that the principle leaves to him who is to profit by it to determine the
necessity which will justify him in deliberately taking another's life to save his own. In
this case the weakest, the youngest, the most unresisting, was chosen. Was it more
necessary to kill him than one of the grown men? The answer must be 'No'”
Lord Coleridge CJ states :
“It must not be supposed that in refusing to admit temptation to
be an excuse for crime it is forgotten how terrible the temptation
was; how awful the suffering; how hard in such trials to keep the
judgment straight and the conduct pure. We are often compelled
to set up standards we cannot reach ourselves, and to lay down
rules which we could not ourselves satisfy. But a man has no right
Judgement to declare temptation to be an excuse, though he might himself
have yielded to it, nor allow compassion for the criminal to change
or weaken in any manner the legal definition of the crime. It is
therefore our duty to declare that the prisoners’ act in this case
was willful murder, that the facts as stated in the verdict are no
legal justification of homicide; and to say that in our unanimous
opinion the prisoners are upon this special verdict guilty of
murder.”
The defendants were convicted of murder.
The defense of necessity was not allowed.
There is no defense of necessity (while killing another’s life to save
one’s own even under extreme necessity of hunger) to the charge of
murder
A communal riot broke out in a town between some Sindhi refugees and the local
Muslims. The trouble started in a locality where most of the shopkeepers were
Sindhis.
Amjad Khan v. The goods in the Muslim shops there were scattered and some Muslims lost their
lives. Alarm spread to another locality where the shops of appellant and his brother
The State (both Muslims) were situated and the people there, including the appellant, started
closing their shops.
The family of the appellant's brother had taken shelter in the appellant's portion of
the building through a hole in the wall between the two portions of the building in
which the two shops were situated.
A mob collected there and approached the appellant's locality and looted his
brother's shop and began to beat the doors of his shop with lathis. The appellant fired
two shots from his gun which caused the death of one Sindhi and injured three other
Sindhis.
A communal riot broke out at Katni on the 5th of March, 1950,
between some Sindhi refugees resident in the town and the local
Muslims.
The trouble started in a locality where most of the shopkeepers
were Sindhis. The goods in the Muslim shops there were scared
and some Muslims lost their lives.
FACTS A communal riot broke out at Katni on the 5th of March, 1950,
between some Sindhi refugees resident in the town and the local
Muslims.
The trouble started in a locality where most of the shopkeepers
were Sindhis. The goods in the Muslim shops there were scared
and some Muslims lost their lives.
Section 97 of IPC: the right extends not only to the defense of one’s own body
against any offence affecting the human body but also, to defend the body of any
other person. This right also talks about the protection of property, whether one’s
own or another person’s.
The learned Judges Mr. Faizal Ali and Bose stated that there was no time for the
defendant to approach the authorities in order to protect himself and feared
getting gravely injured due to the activities of the mob. (S 100, 101, 102)
He had not done more than necessary for self defense as, the judges noted, shots
fired by him were aimed very low and caused injury to 4 Sindhis, implying that
there was Sindhi activity ongoing within the defendants vicinity.
Amjad Khan can exercise his right of private defense as he saw reasonable
apprehension of threat towards himself and his family and property. The mob had
already looted his brothers shop and now they had gathered infront of his shop. By
shooting he did NOT exceed his right of private defense.
So, according to a reasonable man’s perception, Amjad Khan acted to protect his
family and property. (Section 99)
The facts of the case afforded a right of private defence to the appellant
under the provisions of the Indian Penal Code.
Amjad Khan saw reasonable apprehension of threat towards himself and
his family and property. There was no way that he could reach out for help.
Therefore, his right of private defense wasn’t exceeded by him and the
defense was availed successfully.
The circumstances in which he was placed were amply sufficient to give
DECISION: him a right of private defense of the body even to the extent of causing
death as the appellant had no time to have recourse to the authorities and
has reasonable grounds for apprehending that either death or grievous hurt
would be caused either to himself or to his family.
These things could not be weighed in too fine a set of scales or "in
golden scales."
The appeal was admitted and conviction of the accused was set aside.
ISSUE: Did the Appellant exceed the Right of Private Defense as laid down
by § 100 of the Indian Penal Code 1860?
Was the Appellant within the restrictions of § 99 of the Indian Penal Code
1860?
The deceased, Gopal, was married to the sister of appellant.
Vishwanath v. The sister was at this time living with the appellant as she did not wish to stay with
State of U.P., Gopal.
The father and brother (Vishwanath) were of the opinion that she should stay with
(1960) 1 SCR them and not go and live with Badri.
Gopal wanted his wife to return home with because of the fact that she was his
646 lawfully wedded wife but also believed that she had an extra marital affair with a
person called Moti.
Gopal along with the help of others went to take his wife back home. He dragged
her out of the house and in the words of the court a “tug-of-war” ensued.
Enraged by the conduct of Gopal, the father, asked that Gopal should be beaten.
Upon hearing these words from this father, the appellant (Vishwanath) pulled out a
knife from his pocket and stabbed Gopal once.
Unfortunately the knife pierced his heart and subsequently he died to this injury.
The force used by the appellant under a reasonable apprehension was in
proportion with the fear caused by the attempted ‘abduction’ by the deceased.
The courts looked at Section 97 of IPC which gives the right of private defense
against any offence affecting the human body.
Section 99 was used by the courts and they stated that the right of private
defense in any case should not extend to inflicting more harm than required to
REASONING defend one self from the incoming harm.
AND Analysis: The case at hand deals with Section 100. This section lays down six instances
where the right of private defense can extend to that of causing death.
As long as the assault is “aggravated in nature” the right extends to causing
of death.
The courts further clarified that even though many of the occasions are
offences which are defined, the accused need not have the exact mens rea for
that offence.
The courts laid down a simple requirement of an offence which is one of
assault with the intention of abduction simpliciter.
The definition of abduction in this case should of the first type where “a
person is compelled by force to go from any place”
The law states that the “right of private defense never extends to causing
Analysis AND more harm that necessary for the purpose of defending.”
CONCLUSION The bench stated that “one blow” with a kitchen knife did not cross that
threshold where it became unreasonable.
: The circumstances along with the fact it was an ordinary knife, made the
courts conclude that it was unfortunate for Gopal that the one blow
pierced his heart and resulted in his death.
The Courts allowed the S.100 of the IPC to be used in this case.
They explicitly stated that because such situations cannot be weighed in
golden scales, one blow to save his sister cannot be judged harshly.