Chapter 4 Labour-1
Chapter 4 Labour-1
Chapter 4 Labour-1
• Introduction
• Why determining wag is very necessary?
• More than 60% of national GDP came from workers wage.
• Consumers purchasing power determined by their wage.
• Firms profit is determined by the level of wage that they pay.
• Governments goal of achieving higher level of development is
determine by wage.
Wage Determination
A. Under perfectly Competitive (on both Markets)
• Ch
U=-X
X=1 if the work is risky and = 0 otherwise
W = 36 for safe work
• Find wage for risky job.
• Find compensating wage differential.
3. The Market for Risky Jobs
The Supply of Labor to Risky Jobs (function of utility)
• Different workers have different attitudes toward risk.
• The supply curve tells us how many workers are willing to offer their services to
the risky job as a function of the wage differential between the risky job and the
safe job.
• The greater the worker’s dislike for risk, the greater the bribe required for
switching from the safe job to the risky job, and the greater the reservation price.
• As the wage differential between the risky job and the safe job keeps increasing,
more and more workers are bribed into the risky occupation, and the number of
workers who choose to work in risky jobs keeps rising.
• The supply curve to the risky job, therefore, is upward sloping.
The Demand for Labor by Risky Firms (function of profit)
• Profits depend on whether the firm offers a safe or a risky environment.
Both revenues and costs are affected by the firm’s decision.
The DD curve tells us how many employers are willing to hire labour
services to the risky job as a function of the wage differential between
the risky job and the safe job.
• If the wage gap between risky and safe firms is very large, no firm
would choose to become a risky firm and the demand for risky workers
is zero.
• If the wage differential between the risky job and the safe job keeps
falling, the number of workers demanded by risky firms rises.
• The labor demand curve for risky jobs, therefore, is downward
sloping.
Equilibrium
Hedonic Wage Theory
• The term hedonic derives from the philosophical concept of hedonism, which
hypothesizes that people pursue utility (pleasure), say, wage income, and avoid
disutility (pain).
• The worker’s Indifference Map
Employer’s Isoprofit Curve
• Employers can act to reduce the probability of job injury (increase the
safety of the workplace).
• This action will increase cost of the employer, thus, the employer faces a
tradeoff between the wages offered and the degree of job safety provided to
workers.
• To maintain any given level of profits, the firm can either
(1) pay lower wages and provide a higher degree of job safety or
(2) pay higher wages and take fewer actions to reduce the risk of job related
accidents.
Matching Workers with Jobs
• The optimal allocation of wage rate and job safety can be found by
combining workers indifference curve and firms’ isoprofit curves.
3. Labor Market Discriminations
• For instance:-
Employers: might care about the gender of their workers they hire;
(Employer discrimination)
Workers: might care about the race of their coworkers (Employee
discrimination); and
Customers: might care about the race and gender of the seller
(Customer discrimination)
The Discrimination Coefficient
1. Employers (white)
Suppose there are two types of workers in the labor market: white workers
and black workers.
• A competitive employer faces constant prices for these inputs; wW is the
wage rate for a white worker and wB is the wage rate for a black worker.
• If the employer is prejudiced against blacks, the employer gets disutility
from hiring black workers.
• In other words, even though it costs only wB dollars to hire a black
worker, the employer will act as if it costs wB(1 + d) dollars, where d is
a positive number and is called the discrimination coefficient.
2. Employer (black)
Some employers might prefer to hire blacks. This type of behavior, called nepotism,
implies that an employer’s utility-adjusted cost of hiring a favored worker equals
wB(1 − n) dollars, where the “nepotism coefficient” n is a positive number.
3. Worker (white)
White workers, for instance, might dislike working alongside black workers. If a
prejudiced white worker’s wage equals wW, she will act as if her wage equals
wW(1 − d) when she has to work alongside a black worker (where d is a positive
number).
4. Customer (white)
white customers might dislike purchasing goods and services from black sellers.
The white customer would act as if the price of the good is not p dollars, but instead
equals p(1 + d).
Policy Application: Safety and Health Regulations
Hedonic
Wa ge
π * Function
P
w *
− Q
w
−
ρ ρ * Probability of Injur y
• Prior to the regulation, the worker chose the employment package at point P.
• The government sets a ceiling of ¯ρ on the probability of injury, shifting the worker and the firm to point
Q. The worker gets a lower wage (from w* to w¯ ), has less utility (from U* to U¯) , and the firm earns
lower profits (from π* to π¯ ).
Impact of Regulations When Workers Are Unaware of the Risks
Wa ge U 0
− *
U U
Hedonic
w * Wa ge
Function
−
ρ 0 ρ ρ * Probability of Injur y
• Workers earn a wage of w* and incorrectly believe that their probability of injury is ρ0. The
probability is actually ρ*. The government can mandate that firms do not offer a probability
of injury higher than ¯ ρ , increasing the worker’s actual utility from U* to
U ¯.