Automatic Profile-Aware Debloating of Bluetooth Stacks

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




Background

- Bluetooth devices are everywhere
- Support different use cases
 - Audio streaming
 - Printing
 - Smart home
 - Health care


Total Annual Bluetooth Device Shipments






Motivation - Bluetooth is bloated

- Multiple profiles
 - GATT (Generic Attribute Profile)
 - PAN (Personal Area Network), etc.
- Diverse protocols
 - L2CAP, BNEP, etc.
- Two components
 - Host code
 - Firmware



Motivation - Example








Objectives

- Debloating unneeded code so that the vulnerabilities within the unneeded code are no longer exploitable.
- Automatic
 - LightBlue should automatically removes unneeded code
- Flexible
 - LightBlue should support debloating different profiles
- Full stack debloating
 - Debloating across different components (host code and firmware)



LightBlue workflow

- 1. Identify needed profiles
- 2. Identify and remove code not used by the needed profile in the host (host code debloating)
- 3. Identify and remove unused HCI command handlers in the firmware (firmware debloating)





Step 1. Profile identification

- Scan for APIs used to invoke a profile's functionalities
 - E.g., getProfileProxy() on Android



Step 2. Host code debloating (source code)

- Profile aware dependence analysis
 - Profiles might be coupled
 - Per-profile data analysis



Step 2. Host code debloating (source code) cont.

- Profile aware dependence analysis (cont.)
 - One profile has multiple entry functions
 - Data analysis cannot directly apply
 - Transform multiple-entry interface into a single-entry interface
 - Divide profile entries into 3 categories (initiating, functioning, and ending)
 - Create a dummy function mimicking the profile life-cycle

```
Initiating (e.g., src_connect_sink(), disconnect())

Functioning (e.g., ending (e.g., cleanup_src())
```

Code removal and HCI commands extraction



static const btav_interface_t bt_av_src_interface = {

sizeof(btav interface_t),


src connect sink

disconnect.

cleanup_src


Step 3. Firmware debloating (binary code)

- HCl dispatcher identification
 - Dispatcher candidate scanning
 - Scan for functions with the bitwise operation pattern
 - Dispatcher candidate verification
 - HCI command semantics
 - Symbolically execute each candidate
 - Check whether expected value is accessed
- HCI handler identification and debloating



7.4.6 Read BD_ADDR command

Command	OCF	Command Parameters	Return Parameters
HCI_Read_BD_ADDR	0x0009		Status, BD_ADDR





Implementation and Evaluation

- Implementation
 - Host code analysis
 - LLVM pass
 - Firmware analysis
 - o angr
- Evaluation platform
 - Host code
 - Android 6 (Bluedroid), Android 9 (Fluoride), Linux (BlueZ), Embedded system (BlueKitchen)
 - Firmware
 - O BCM4335, BCM43430A1, CYW20735B1



Host code debloating

- Keep each of the possible profiles on 4 platforms
 - BlueDroid (6 profiles): average ~40% code reduction
 - Fluoride (7 profiles): average ~33.7% code reduction
 - BlueZ (5 profiles): average ~31.7% code reduction
 - BlueKitchen (8 profiles): average ~49.1% code reduction
- Keep 5 common profile combinations
 - A2DP & HFP, GATT & HFP, A2DP & GATT & HFP, A2DP & GATT, A2DP & HID
 - Code reduction drops slightly (~5%) compared with keeping one profile



Firmware debloating

- BCM4339
 - ~65% of the HCI command handlers are debloated
- BCM43430A1
 - ~57% of the HCI command handlers are debloated
- CYW20735B1
 - ~83% of the HCI command handlers are debloated



Security improvement

- Prevented vulnerabilities
 - 20 known vulnerabilities can be prevented by debloating different profiles
 - 15 of them can be triggered over-the-air
- Prevented attacks
 - BlueBorne attack (Armis'2017)
 - BadBluetooth attack (NDSS'2019)

Vul. Loc.	Related Profile	Platform	# of Vul. Functions	CVE Number
A2DP & (AVRCP) HO PAN MAP HSP/HFP		Plt. 1	4	CVE-2018-9542*
				CVE-2018-9450*
				CVE-2017-13266*
	4.2DD 8.			CVE-2018-9453
				CVE-2019-2227*
	(AVKCF)			CVE-2018-9588*
	Plt. 4	7	CVE-2018-9507*	
			L	CVE-2018-9506*
				CVE-2019-2049
		Plt. 1	7	CVE-2017-0783*
				CVE-2017-0782*
				CVE-2017-0781*
	PAN			CVE-2018-9436*
				CVE-2018-9356*
				CVE-2018-9357
				CVE-2017-13269
	MAP	Plt. 4	1	CVE-2018-9505*
	HSP/HFP	Plt. 4	5	CVE-2018-9583*
,	N/A	Plt. 4	1	CVE-2019-2226
FM	GATT	Plt. 3	1	CVE-2019-13916*
. ~	COT 1 . 1			

^{*:} CVEs that can be triggered by over-the-air attacks.



Summary

- We develop a new technique to identify the unneeded code in a Bluetooth stack with a given Bluetooth app
- We build LightBlue to automatically debloat unneeded code in Bluetooth host source code and firmware binary
- We evaluate LightBlue on 4 platforms
 - 31% 49% host code reduction and 57% 83% firmware reduction
 - Prevention of 20 known CVEs
- LightBlue is open-source
 - https://github.com/purseclab/lightblue



Thank you!

Questions? wu1220@purdue.edu

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