This study considers consumers' environmental awareness (CEA) and examines firms' managerial delegation contracts between sales and environmental performance incentives under different competition modes. Under sales delegation contracts, quantity competition yields higher sales incentives and better environmental performance, whereas welfare depends on marginal environmental damage. Under environmental delegation contracts, however, price competition yields higher environmental incentives and welfare, whereas environmental performance depends on CEA. Then, we discover that environmental delegation contracts result in higher abatement levels and better environmental and social performances than sales delegation contracts, regardless of competition modes; bilateral environmental (sales) delegation contracts can be an equilibrium in an endogenous delegation choice game when CEA is high (low). Finally, we examine a successive endogenous competition mode choice game and determine that unless CEA is sufficiently high, firms choose a quantity contract followed by either sales or environmental delegation contracts, leading to socially undesirable outcomes.

中文翻译：

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消费者的环境意识与销售与环境激励之间的内生管理授权选择


本研究考虑了消费者的环境意识（CEA），并考察了不同竞争模式下企业销售与环境绩效激励之间的管理委托契约。根据销售委托合同，数量竞争会带来更高的销售激励和更好的环境绩效，而福利则取决于边际环境损害。然而，在环境委托合同下，价格竞争会带来更高的环境激励和福利，而环境绩效则取决于CEA。然后，我们发现，无论竞争模式如何，环境委托合同比销售委托合同带来更高的减排水平以及更好的环境和社会绩效；当 CEA 高（低）时，双边环境（销售）授权合同可以是内生授权选择博弈中的均衡。最后，我们研究了连续的内生竞争模式选择博弈，并确定除非 CEA 足够高，否则企业会选择数量合同，然后选择销售或环境委托合同，从而导致社会不良结果。