ABSTRACT This paper examines the effect of state-level monitoring on municipal governance, focusing on outcomes in financial reporting quality, local corruption, political entrenchment, and municipal financial soundness. I exploit the staggered adoption of fiscal monitoring policies that entail a regular review of municipal financial reports for signs of fiscal distress. I find that introducing these monitoring policies is associated with an increase in the proxies for reporting quality, a decrease in the number of corruption convictions, and a reduction in re-election likelihood for incumbent politicians. Consistent with the purpose of the policies, my evidence shows that fiscal health ratios of municipalities improve after initiating state monitoring. Collectively, my results are consistent with state fiscal monitoring improving several important aspects of municipal governance. Data Availability: Data are available from the public sources cited in the text. JEL Classifications: G18; G38; H1; H11; H7; H83; M4.

中文翻译：

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财政监控能让政府变得更好吗？来自美国市政当局的证据


摘要本文探讨了国家级监督对城市治理的影响，重点关注财务报告质量、地方腐败、政治巩固和城市财务稳健性等方面的成果。我利用了财政监督政策的交错实施，这些政策需要定期审查市政财务报告以发现财政困境的迹象。我发现引入这些监督政策与报告质量代理的提高、腐败定罪数量的减少以及现任政客连任可能性的降低有关。与政策的目的一致，我的证据表明，在启动国家监测后，城市的财政健康比率有所改善。总的来说，我的结果与国家财政监测改善城市治理的几个重要方面是一致的。数据可用性：数据可从文中引用的公共来源获得。 JEL 分类：G18； G38； H1； H11； H7； H83； M4。