I take it that liberal justice recognises special protections against the restriction of speech a... more I take it that liberal justice recognises special protections against the restriction of speech and expression; this is what I call the Free Speech Principle. I ask if this Principle includes speech acts which might broadly be termed ‘hate speech’, where ‘includes’ is sensitive to the distinction between coverage and protection, and between speech that is regulable and speech that
Constitutional democracies unilaterally enact the laws that regulate immigration to their territo... more Constitutional democracies unilaterally enact the laws that regulate immigration to their territories. When are would-be migrants to a constitutional democracy morally justified in breaching such laws? Receiving states also typically enact laws that require their existing citizens to participate in the implementation of immigration restrictions. When are the individual citizens of a constitutional democracy morally justified in breaching such laws? In this article, I take up these questions concerning the justifiability of noncompliance with immigration law, focusing on the case of nonviolent – or mere – noncompliance. Dissenting from Javier Hidalgo’s view, I argue that the injustice of an immigration law is insufficient to make mere noncompliance justified. Instead, I contend that only if an immigration law lacks legitimate authority are individuals justified in breaching it, since the subjects of an institution with legitimate authority are under a content-independent moral duty to comply with its rules. I further argue that a constitutional democracy’s regimes of law regulating immigration and requiring its citizens’ participation in implementing these regulations have legitimate authority. Nevertheless, when a particular immigration law is egregiously unjust, its legitimacy is defeated.
While liberal democracies currently do not recognize a general right among all would-be immigrant... more While liberal democracies currently do not recognize a general right among all would-be immigrants to freely immigrate, they confer preferential admission eligibility on would-be immigrants who are related by family ties to current citizens, and sometimes, to permanent residents. I examine two recent accounts by Luara Ferracioli and Matthew Lister that seek to justify such family migration schemes, arguing that these two accounts err by assuming a convergence in evaluative conceptions of the family that cannot be expected among the citizens of a liberal society. I propose an alternative account that appeals to duties of justice to institutionally support intimate caring relationships among dependents and their carers, and between independent adults. Since the justification I offer for family migration schemes makes no essential appeal to the importance of family relationships as such, my arguments suggest that preferential immigration eligibility should be extended beyond family relationships to all relevantly similar intimate caring relationships.
I take it that liberal justice recognises special protections against the restriction of speech a... more I take it that liberal justice recognises special protections against the restriction of speech and expression; this is what I call the Free Speech Principle. I ask if this Principle includes speech acts which might broadly be termed ‘hate speech’, where ‘includes’ is sensitive to the distinction between coverage and protection, and between speech that is regulable and speech that should be regulated. I suggest that ‘hate speech’ is too broad a designation to be usefully analysed as a single category, since it includes many different kinds of speech acts, each of which involves very different kinds of free speech interests, and may cause very different kinds of harm. I therefore propose to disaggregate hate speech into various categories which are analysed in turn. I distinguish four main categories of hate speech, namely (1) targeted vilification, (2) diffuse vilification, (3) organised political advocacy for exclusionary and/or eliminationist policies, and (4) other assertions of fact or value which constitute an adverse judgment on an identifiable racial or religious group. Reviewing these categories in the light of the justifications for the Free Speech Principle, I will argue that category (1) is uncovered by the Principle, categories (2) and (3) are covered but unprotected, and that category (4) is protected speech.
Existing accounts of why racially or ethnically selective immigration policies (RESIPs) are norma... more Existing accounts of why racially or ethnically selective immigration policies (RESIPs) are normally wrongful are unsatisfactory. I develop a novel account – the Pluralist Account – that recognizes three objections to RESIPs. The Unjustifiability Objection claims that RESIPs are normally unjustifiable because they fail to be effective and morally permissible means of advancing permissible policy goals. The implementation of unjustifiable RESIPs wrongs excluded would-be migrants as well as current citizens who dissent from these policies. The Group Defamation Objection claims that RESIPs that send defamatory messages about the racial or ethnic groups they disfavor wrongfully harm current citizens and residents of the receiving state who are members of those groups. The Stigmatizing Treatment Objection claims that RESIPs are wrong when they treat certain would-be migrants as bearing a racial or ethnic stigma. Taken together, I argue, these objections can account for our major pretheoretical moral judgments about RESIPs.
I take it that liberal justice recognises special protections against the restriction of speech a... more I take it that liberal justice recognises special protections against the restriction of speech and expression; this is what I call the Free Speech Principle. I ask if this Principle includes speech acts which might broadly be termed ‘hate speech’, where ‘includes’ is sensitive to the distinction between coverage and protection, and between speech that is regulable and speech that
Constitutional democracies unilaterally enact the laws that regulate immigration to their territo... more Constitutional democracies unilaterally enact the laws that regulate immigration to their territories. When are would-be migrants to a constitutional democracy morally justified in breaching such laws? Receiving states also typically enact laws that require their existing citizens to participate in the implementation of immigration restrictions. When are the individual citizens of a constitutional democracy morally justified in breaching such laws? In this article, I take up these questions concerning the justifiability of noncompliance with immigration law, focusing on the case of nonviolent – or mere – noncompliance. Dissenting from Javier Hidalgo’s view, I argue that the injustice of an immigration law is insufficient to make mere noncompliance justified. Instead, I contend that only if an immigration law lacks legitimate authority are individuals justified in breaching it, since the subjects of an institution with legitimate authority are under a content-independent moral duty to comply with its rules. I further argue that a constitutional democracy’s regimes of law regulating immigration and requiring its citizens’ participation in implementing these regulations have legitimate authority. Nevertheless, when a particular immigration law is egregiously unjust, its legitimacy is defeated.
While liberal democracies currently do not recognize a general right among all would-be immigrant... more While liberal democracies currently do not recognize a general right among all would-be immigrants to freely immigrate, they confer preferential admission eligibility on would-be immigrants who are related by family ties to current citizens, and sometimes, to permanent residents. I examine two recent accounts by Luara Ferracioli and Matthew Lister that seek to justify such family migration schemes, arguing that these two accounts err by assuming a convergence in evaluative conceptions of the family that cannot be expected among the citizens of a liberal society. I propose an alternative account that appeals to duties of justice to institutionally support intimate caring relationships among dependents and their carers, and between independent adults. Since the justification I offer for family migration schemes makes no essential appeal to the importance of family relationships as such, my arguments suggest that preferential immigration eligibility should be extended beyond family relationships to all relevantly similar intimate caring relationships.
I take it that liberal justice recognises special protections against the restriction of speech a... more I take it that liberal justice recognises special protections against the restriction of speech and expression; this is what I call the Free Speech Principle. I ask if this Principle includes speech acts which might broadly be termed ‘hate speech’, where ‘includes’ is sensitive to the distinction between coverage and protection, and between speech that is regulable and speech that should be regulated. I suggest that ‘hate speech’ is too broad a designation to be usefully analysed as a single category, since it includes many different kinds of speech acts, each of which involves very different kinds of free speech interests, and may cause very different kinds of harm. I therefore propose to disaggregate hate speech into various categories which are analysed in turn. I distinguish four main categories of hate speech, namely (1) targeted vilification, (2) diffuse vilification, (3) organised political advocacy for exclusionary and/or eliminationist policies, and (4) other assertions of fact or value which constitute an adverse judgment on an identifiable racial or religious group. Reviewing these categories in the light of the justifications for the Free Speech Principle, I will argue that category (1) is uncovered by the Principle, categories (2) and (3) are covered but unprotected, and that category (4) is protected speech.
Existing accounts of why racially or ethnically selective immigration policies (RESIPs) are norma... more Existing accounts of why racially or ethnically selective immigration policies (RESIPs) are normally wrongful are unsatisfactory. I develop a novel account – the Pluralist Account – that recognizes three objections to RESIPs. The Unjustifiability Objection claims that RESIPs are normally unjustifiable because they fail to be effective and morally permissible means of advancing permissible policy goals. The implementation of unjustifiable RESIPs wrongs excluded would-be migrants as well as current citizens who dissent from these policies. The Group Defamation Objection claims that RESIPs that send defamatory messages about the racial or ethnic groups they disfavor wrongfully harm current citizens and residents of the receiving state who are members of those groups. The Stigmatizing Treatment Objection claims that RESIPs are wrong when they treat certain would-be migrants as bearing a racial or ethnic stigma. Taken together, I argue, these objections can account for our major pretheoretical moral judgments about RESIPs.
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