This document has not been cited yet.

1. ——— (1994): “Foreign direct investment and the risk of expropriation,” The Review of Economic Studies, 61, 81–108.
   Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
   
2. ——— (2015): “Investing in a Relationship,” The RAND Journal of Economics, 46, 165–185.
   Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
   
3. ——— (2016): “Relational incentive contracts with persistent private information,” Econometrica, 84, 317–346.
   Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
   
4. ——— (2021): “Uncertainty, investment and productivity with relational contracts,” Tech. rep.
   Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
   

5. Andrews, I. and D. Barron (2016): “The allocation of future business: Dynamic relational contracts with multiple agents,” American Economic Review, 106, 2742–59.

6. Bailey, D. (1859): The Truck System: A Book for Masters and Workmen, Fred Pitman.
   Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
   

7. Barron, D. and M. Powell (2019): “Policies in relational contracts,” American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 11, 228–49.

8. Barron, D., J. Li, and M. Zator (2021): “Morale and debt dynamics,” Management Science.
   Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
   

9. Board, S. (2011): “Relational contracts and the value of loyalty,” American Economic Review, 101, 3349–67.

10. brahám, . and S. Laczó (2018): “Efficient risk sharing with limited commitment and storage,” The Review of Economic Studies, 85, 1389–1424.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
    

11. brahám, A. and N. Pavoni (2005): “The efficient allocation of consumption under moral hazard and hidden access to the credit market,” Journal of the European Economic Association, 3, 370–381.

12. brahám, A., S. Koehne, and N. Pavoni (2011): “On the first-order approach in principal– agent models with hidden borrowing and lending,” Journal of Economic Theory, 146, 1331– 1361.

13. Bull, C. (1987): “The existence of self-enforcing implicit contracts,” The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 102, 147–159.

14. Chassang, S. (2010): “Building routines: Learning, cooperation, and the dynamics of incomplete relational contracts,” American Economic Review, 100, 448–65.

15. Chien, Y. and J. Song (2014): “A note on using excessive perks to restrain the hidden saving problem,” Macroeconomic Dynamics, 18, 480–496.

16. Cole, H. L. and N. R. Kocherlakota (2001): “Efficient allocations with hidden income and hidden storage,” The Review of Economic Studies, 68, 523–542.

17. Di Tella, S. and Y. Sannikov (2021): “Optimal asset management contracts with hidden savings,” Econometrica, 89, 1099–1139.

18. Edmans, A., X. Gabaix, T. Sadzik, and Y. Sannikov (2012): “Dynamic CEO compensation, ” The Journal of Finance, 67, 1603–1647.

19. Englmaier, F. and M. Fahn (2019): “Size Matters: How Over-Investments Relax Liquidity Constraints in Relational Contracts,” The Economic Journal, 129, 3092–3106.

20. Fahn, M., V. Merlo, and G. Wamser (2019): “The commitment role of equity financing,” Journal of the European Economic Association, 17, 1232–1260.

21. Fong, Y.-f. and J. Li (2017): “Relational contracts, limited liability, and employment dynamics, ” Journal of Economic Theory, 169, 270–293.

22. Fournier, S. (1991): “A Meaning-Based Framework for the Study of Consumer-Object Relations. ” Advances in Consumer Research, 18.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
    

23. Fuchs, W. (2007): “Contracting with repeated moral hazard and private evaluations,” American Economic Review, 97, 1432–1448.

24. Fudenberg, D., B. Holmstrom, and P. Milgrom (1990): “Short-term contracts and long-term agency relationships,” Journal of Economic Theory, 51, 1–31.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
    

25. Garicano, L. and L. Rayo (2017): “Relational knowledge transfers,” American Economic Review, 107, 2695–2730.

26. Garrett, D. F. and A. Pavan (2015): “Dynamic managerial compensation: A variational approach,” Journal of Economic Theory, 159, 775–818.

27. Halac, M. (2012): “Relational contracts and the value of relationships,” American Economic Review, 102, 750–79.

28. He, Z. (2012): “Dynamic compensation contracts with private savings,” The Review of Financial Studies, 25, 1494–1549.

29. Henderson, M. T. and J. C. Spindler (2004): “Corporate heroin: A defense of perks, executive loans, and conspicuous consumption,” Georgetown Law Journal, 93, 1835.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
    
30. Hennessy, C. A. and D. Livdan (2009): “Debt, bargaining, and credibility in firm–supplier relationships,” Journal of Financial Economics, 93, 382–399.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
    

31. Hilton, G. W. (1957): “The British truck system in the nineteenth century,” Journal of Political Economy, 65, 237–256.

32. Kehoe, P. J. and F. Perri (2002): “International business cycles with endogenous incomplete markets,” Econometrica, 70, 907–928.

33. Kocherlakota, N. R. (2004): “Figuring out the impact of hidden savings on optimal unemployment insurance,” Review of Economic Dynamics, 7, 541–554.

34. Lambert, R. A. (1983): “Long-term contracts and moral hazard,” The Bell Journal of Economics, 441–452.

35. Levin, J. (2003): “Relational incentive contracts,” American Economic Review, 93, 835–857.

36. Li, J. and N. Matouschek (2013): “Managing conflicts in relational contracts,” American Economic Review, 103, 2328–51.

37. Li, J., N. Matouschek, and M. Powell (2017): “Power dynamics in organizations,” American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 9, 217–41.

38. Ligon, E., J. P. Thomas, and T. Worrall (2000): “Mutual insurance, individual savings, and limited commitment,” Review of Economic Dynamics, 3, 216–246.

39. MacLeod, W. B. (2007): “Reputations, relationships, and contract enforcement,” Journal of Economic Literature, 45, 595–628.

40. MacLeod, W. B. and J. M. Malcomson (1989): “Implicit contracts, incentive compatibility, and involuntary unemployment,” Econometrica, 447–480.

41. Malcomson, J. M. (2015): “Relational incentive contracts,” in Handbook of Organizational Economics, ed. by R. Gibbons and J. Roberts, Wiley Online Library.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
    

42. Marcet, A. and R. Marimon (1992): “Communication, commitment, and growth,” Journal of Economic Theory, 58, 219–249.

43. Mitchell, M. and Y. Zhang (2010): “Unemployment insurance with hidden savings,” Journal of Economic Theory, 145, 2078–2107.

44. Phelan, C. and R. M. Townsend (1991): “Computing multi-period, informationconstrained optima,” The Review of Economic Studies, 58, 853–881.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
    

45. Postlewaite, A. (1998): “The social basis of interdependent preferences,” European Economic Review, 42, 779–800.

46. Ray, D. (2002): “The time structure of self-enforcing agreements,” Econometrica, 70, 547–582.

47. Rey, P. and B. Salanie (1990): “Long-term, short-term and renegotiation: On the value of commitment in contracting,” Econometrica, 597–619.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
    

48. Rogerson, W. P. (1985): “Repeated moral hazard,” Econometrica, 69–76.

49. Sannikov, Y. (2008): “A continuous-time version of the principal-agent problem,” The Review of Economic Studies, 75, 957–984.

50. Spear, S. E. and S. Srivastava (1987): “On repeated moral hazard with discounting,” The Review of Economic Studies, 54, 599–617.

51. Thomas, J. and T. Worrall (1990): “Income fluctuation and asymmetric information: An example of a repeated principal-agent problem,” Journal of Economic Theory, 51, 367–390.

52. Voena, A. (2015): “Yours, mine, and ours: Do divorce laws affect the intertemporal behavior of married couples?” American Economic Review, 105, 2295–2332.

53. Wahhaj, Z. (2010): “Social norms and individual savings in the context of informal insurance,” Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 76, 511–530.

54. Werning, I. (2002): “Optimal unemployment insurance with unobservable savings,” University of Chicago and UTDT, 4.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
    

55. Williams, N. (2015): “A solvable continuous time dynamic principal–agent model,” Journal of Economic Theory, 159, 989–1015.

1. What are the priorities of bureaucrats? Evidence from conjoint experiments with procurement officials. (2024). Tukiainen, Janne ; Sieppi, Antti ; Luukinen, Ari ; Jskelinen, Jan ; Giuffrida, Leonardo M ; Bohne, Albrecht ; Blesse, Sebastian.
   In: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization.
   RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:227:y:2024:i:c:s0167268124003305.

   Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

2. Simple relational contracts and the dynamics of social capital. (2024). Leduc, Mathieu V.
   In: Games and Economic Behavior.
   RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:145:y:2024:i:c:p:27-53.

   Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

3. Trust in Vertical Relations. (2024). Spagnolo, Giancarlo ; Koenen, Johannes ; Felli, Leonardo ; Calzolari, Giacomo ; Stahl, Konrad.
   In: CRC TR 224 Discussion Paper Series.
   RePEc:bon:boncrc:crctr224_2024_530.

   Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

4. Relational contracts: recent empirical advancements and open questions. (2023). Morjaria, Ameet ; Macchiavello, Rocco.
   In: LSE Research Online Documents on Economics.
   RePEc:ehl:lserod:123003.

   Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

5. Dynamic supplier competition and cooperation for buyer loyalty on service. (2023). Benioudakis, Myron ; Liberopoulos, George ; Deligiannis, Michalis.
   In: International Journal of Production Economics.
   RePEc:eee:proeco:v:255:y:2023:i:c:s0925527322002882.

   Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

6. When (not) to publicize inspection results. (2023). Zhao, Chang ; Solan, Eilon.
   In: Journal of Economic Theory.
   RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:210:y:2023:i:c:s0022053123000637.

   Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

7. What Are the Priorities of Bureaucrats? Evidence from Conjoint Experiments with Procurement Officials. (2023). Giuffrida, Leonardo M. ; Sieppi, Antti ; Luukinen, Ari ; Jaaskelainen, Jan ; Bohne, Albrecht ; Blesse, Sebastian ; Tukiainen, Janne.
   In: CESifo Working Paper Series.
   RePEc:ces:ceswps:_10199.

   Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

8. Teaching an old dog a new trick: Reserve price and unverifiable quality in repeated procurement. (2023). Iozzi, Alberto ; Cesi, Berardino ; Albano, Gian Luigi.
   In: Journal of Economics & Management Strategy.
   RePEc:bla:jemstr:v:32:y:2023:i:2:p:377-399.

   Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

9. Relational Contracts and Hierarchy. (2022). Ishiguro, Shingo ; Choe, Chongwoo.
   In: Monash Economics Working Papers.
   RePEc:mos:moswps:2022-08.

   Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

10. Morale and Debt Dynamics. (2022). Zator, Micha ; Li, Jin ; Barron, Daniel.
    In: Management Science.
    RePEc:inm:ormnsc:v:68:y:2022:i:6:p:4496-4516.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

11. Optimal supplier inventory control policies when buyer purchase incidence is driven by past service. (2022). Deligiannis, Michalis ; Liberopoulos, George.
    In: European Journal of Operational Research.
    RePEc:eee:ejores:v:300:y:2022:i:3:p:917-936.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

12. Relational Contracts: Public versus Private Savings. (2022). Garrett, Daniel ; Dilme, Francesc.
    In: ECONtribute Discussion Papers Series.
    RePEc:ajk:ajkdps:192.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

13. .

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

14. Prizes versus Contracts as Incentives for Innovation. (2021). Rey, Patrick ; Iossa, Elisabetta ; Che, Yeon-Koo.
    In: Review of Economic Studies.
    RePEc:oup:restud:v:88:y:2021:i:5:p:2149-2178..

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

15. Prizes versus Contracts as Incentives for Innovation. (2021). Rey, Patrick ; Iossa, Elisabetta ; Che, Yeon-Koo.
    In: Post-Print.
    RePEc:hal:journl:hal-03544026.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

16. Dynamic monitoring under resource constraints. (2021). Zhao, Chang ; Solan, Eilon.
    In: Games and Economic Behavior.
    RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:129:y:2021:i:c:p:476-491.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

17. Relational Contracts and Trust in a High-Tech Industry. (2021). Calzolari, Giacomo ; Spagnolo, Giancarlo ; Koenen, Johannes ; Felli, Leonardo ; Stahl, Konrad O.
    In: CESifo Working Paper Series.
    RePEc:ces:ceswps:_9362.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

18. Theoretical Foundations of Relational Incentive Contracts. (2021). Watson, Joel.
    In: University of California at San Diego, Economics Working Paper Series.
    RePEc:cdl:ucsdec:qt19f9w2xf.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

19. Pricing and Quality Provision in a Supply Relationship: A Model of Efficient Relational Contracts. (2020). Selove, Matthew ; Nistor, Cristina .
    In: Marketing Science.
    RePEc:inm:ormksc:v:39:y:2020:i:5:p:939-955.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

20. Precontractual investment and modes of procurement. (2020). De Chiara, Alessandro.
    In: European Economic Review.
    RePEc:eee:eecrev:v:124:y:2020:i:c:s0014292120300362.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

21. Trust, Investment and Competition: Theory and Evidence from German Car Manufacturers. (2019). Stahl, Konrad O ; Spagnolo, Giancarlo ; Koenen, Johannes ; Felli, Leonardo ; Calzolari, Giacomo.
    In: CEPR Discussion Papers.
    RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:13750.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

22. Organizational Culture as Equilibrium? Rules Versus Principles in Building Relational Contracts. (2019). Zehnder, Christian ; Herz, Holger ; Grieder, Manuel ; Gibbons, Robert S.
    In: CESifo Working Paper Series.
    RePEc:ces:ceswps:_7871.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

23. Relational Contracts, Competition and Innovation: Theory and Evidence from German Car Manufacturers. (2017). Spagnolo, Giancarlo ; Felli, Leonardo ; Calzolari, Giacomo ; Stahl, Konrad ; Koenen, Johannes .
    In: CEPR Discussion Papers.
    RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:12267.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

24. The Use and Misuse of Coordinated Punishments*. (). Guo, Yingni ; Barron, Daniel.
    In: The Quarterly Journal of Economics.
    RePEc:oup:qjecon:v:136:y::i:1:p:471-504..

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

Report date: 2025-03-04 21:37:09 || Missing content? Let us know