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- Albert, Steven M, & Duffy, John. 2012. Differences in risk aversion between young and older adults. Neuroscience and neuroeconomics, 2012(1).
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- Average Log Change in Tax Paid 40 60 80 100 120 140 160 180 200 220 240 260 280 300 Rank in Year t 2006−08 2009−11 2012−14 B: Pre-program Vs. Post-program −2 −1 0 1 Average Log Change in Tax Paid 40 60 80 100 120 140 160 180 200 220 240 260 280 300 Rank in Year t Pre−reform Post−Reform Notes: The figure explores the response to the TPHC program. We rank taxpayers in each of the four categories—self-employed, wage-earners, partnerships, and corporations—on the basis of tax paid by them in period t, group them into 20 rank bins, and plot the average log change in tax paid from period t to t + 1 in the bin as a function of the rank in period t. Panel A takes the average over three-year periods; Panel B over the entire pre- and post-program periods. The upper bound of the bin is always included in the bin. For example, the bin indicated by 40 includes 21-40 ranked taxpayers of each category. The vertical line demarcates the eligibility cutoff of the program.
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- Figure A.I: Google Search Interest 0 25 50 75 100 Relative Search Interest Jan12 Jan13 Jan14 Jan15 Jan16 Jan17 Jan18 Time − Month/Year FBR Tax Directory Tax Directory Notes: The figure plots Google Trends data for the monthly search interest in Pakistan for the terms “FBR Tax Directory†and “Tax Directory†from January 2012 to January 2018. The data is normalized by time and location and scaled on a range of 0 - 100 to compare relative popularity. The data point with the highest search queries within the specified time and location is given a score of 100 and other points are scored relative to it. Vertical lines demarcate the months in which the tax directories were released. Directories for tax years 2012, 2013, 2014 and 2015 were released in April 2014, April 2015, September 2016 and August 2017 respectively.
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- Figure A.II: Special Immigration Counter for TPHC Holders Notes: The figure shows the picture of special immigration counter at the Allama Iqbal International Airport, Lahore. The picture was taken in the summer of 2018.
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- In columns (6) and (7) we drop the middle part of the distribution: the middle two quartiles in column (6) and the deciles 2-9 in column (7). Panel B reports the results from parallel placebo regressions, where the sample is restricted to tax years 2006 to 2011, with the last two years defined as the post-program years. Standard errors are in parenthesis.
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- Instead of defining Name Frequency as the number of times a full name appears in the four years of disclosed data (2012-2015), we define it as 4 × the number of times a full name appears in the 2012 disclosed data. We multiply the number of occurrences of a name in 2012 by four to make this alternative definition of Name Frequency more compatible with the one in our baseline specification. Other than this change of definition, the table is constructed exactly similar to Table III. We obtain similar results if we use any other post-disclosure year 2013-2015 in place of 2012 used here to define Name Frequency.
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- Table A.V: Intensive Margin Response to the Public Disclosure Program – Alternative Definition of Name Frequency Treat: Name Frequency ≤ 10 ≤ 20 ≤ 30 ≤ 40 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) A: Main Regression (2006-2015) treat × after 0.098 0.094 0.093 0.092 0.092 0.091 0.091 0.088 (0.006) (0.009) (0.005) (0.008) (0.005) (0.008) (0.005) (0.008) Observations 2,394,847 764,796 2,621,675 837,306 2,704,406 863,405 2,792,270 891,420 B: Placebo Regression (2006-2011) treat × after 0.014 0.010 0.018 0.014 0.018 0.014 0.017 0.013 (0.007) (0.008) (0.006) (0.008) (0.006) (0.008) (0.006) (0.008) Observations 1,288,038 723,868 1,406,460 789,856 1,449,905 814,280 1,496,374 840,469 Sample: Balanced Panel No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes Individual Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Notes: The table reports the estimates from equation (3). We replicate Table III using an alternative definition of the variable Name Frequency.
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- Table A.X: Intensive Margin Response to the Public Disclosure Program – By Baseline Taxable Income Baseline Taxable Income: ∈ (0, 100k] ∈ (100k, 200k] ∈ (200k, 300k] ∈ (300k, 400k] ∈ (400k, 500k] ∈ (500k, 600k] (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) A: Main Regression (2006-2015) treat × after 0.075 0.083 0.061 0.058 0.014-0.026 (0.059) (0.018) (0.009) (0.010) (0.028) (0.056) Observations 26,071 197,583 575,312 447,856 60,784 14,442 B: Placebo Regression (2006-2011) treat × after 0.058 0.019 0.005-0.029-0.072-0.069 (0.046) (0.010) (0.021) (0.024) (0.036) (0.078) Observations 44,234 760,496 104,403 38,149 21,214 5,214 Individual Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Notes: The table explores how the intensive margin response to the public disclosure program varies across the taxable income distribution.
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- Table A.XIII: Extensive Margin Response to the Public Disclosure Program – Baseline Frequency Treat: Name Frequency ≤ 10 ≤ 20 ≤ 30 ≤ 40 ≤ Median ≤ 1st Quartile ≤ 1st Decile (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) A: Main Regression (2006-2015) treat × after 0.054 0.046 0.043 0.041 0.039 0.070 0.125 (0.012) (0.011) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.014) (0.022) B: Placebo Regression (2006-2011) treat × after 0.000-0.000-0.000-0.000-0.001 0.005 0.021 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.010) Notes: The table conducts a robustness check on our extensive margin results. We replicate Table V using an alternative definition of Name Frequency, measuring it as the number of times a full name appears among the tax filers in the six baseline years 20062011.
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- Table V: Extensive Margin Response to the Public Disclosure Program Treat: Name Frequency ≤ 10 ≤ 20 ≤ 30 ≤ 40 ≤ Median ≤ 1st Quartile ≤ 1st Decile (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) A: Main Regression (2006-2015) treat × after 0.0117 0.0106 0.0101 0.0097 0.0094 0.0163 0.0265 (0.0027) (0.0024) (0.0023) (0.0022) (0.0022) (0.0041) (0.0089) B: Placebo Regression (2006-2011) treat × after 0.0027 0.0027 0.0026 0.0025 0.0024 0.0038 0.0026 (0.0018) (0.0017) (0.0017) (0.0016) (0.0016) (0.0026) (0.0027) Notes: The table reports the estimates from equation (6). The equation is estimated on a sample of all self-employed individuals.
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- The definition of the treatment variable is provided in the title of each column. The dummy variable takes the value 1 if the Name Frequency of an individual does not exceed the cutoff indicated in the title. To maintain a fixed control group across columns (1)-(4), we drop taxpayers with the Name Frequency between 10 and 40 in columns (1) to (3). In columns (6) and (7) we drop the middle part of the distribution: the middle two quartiles in column (6) and the deciles 2-9 in column (7). Panel B reports the results from parallel placebo regressions, where the sample is restricted to tax years 2006 to 2011, with the last two years defined as the post-program years. Standard errors are in parenthesis.
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- The dummy variable takes the value 1 if the Name Frequency of an individual does not exceed the cutoff indicated in the title. To maintain a fixed control group across all columns, we drop taxpayers with Name Frequency between 10 and 40 in Columns (1) to (6). Even-numbered columns restrict the sample to a balanced panel of taxpayers, who file in all years included in the sample. Panel B reports the results from parallel placebo regressions, where the sample is restricted to tax years 2006 to 2011, with the last two years defined as the post-program years. Standard errors are in parenthesis, which have been clustered at the individual level.
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- The outcome variable here is the log number of filers in group g in year t. Panel A estimates the equation on the period 2006-2015.
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- Waseem, Mazhar. 2019. Does Cutting the Tax Rate to Zero Induce Behavior Different from Other Tax Cuts? Evidence from Pakistan. Working Paper, University of Manchester.
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- We multiply this measure of Name Frequency with a factor of 4/6 to make it compatible with the definition used in Table V and our other results. The table reports the estimates from equation (6). The equation is estimated on a sample of all self-employed individuals. The outcome variable here is the log number of filers in group g in year t. Panel A estimates the equation on the period 2006-2015. The definition of the treatment variable is provided in the title of each column. The dummy variable takes the value 1 if the normalized value of Name Frequency of an individual does not exceed the cutoff indicated in the title. To maintain a fixed control group across columns (1)-(4), we drop taxpayers with the Name Frequency between 10 and 40 in columns (1) to (3).
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- We replicate the specification in Column (7) of Table III restraining the sample to taxpayers whose taxable income in the baseline year (2011) was within the interval indicated in the heading of each column. The treatment variable takes the value 1 if the Name Frequency of an individual does not exceed 40. Panel B reports the results from parallel placebo regressions, where the sample is restricted to tax years 2006 to 2011, with the last two years defined as the post-program years. The baseline year for these regression is 2009. Standard errors are in parenthesis, which have been clustered at the individual level.
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