- ALLARD, M., JELOVAC I. & LÉGER P.-T. (2009) Treatment and referral decisions under different payment mechanisms, mimeo.
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
ALLARD, M., LÉGER P.-T. & ROCHAIX L. (2008) Provider competition under a dynamic setting. Journal of Economics and Management Strategy, Forthcoming.
- ARROW, K. (1963) Uncertainty and the welfare economics of medical care. American Economic Review 53, 941-969.
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
BLOMQVIST, A. & LEGER, P. T. (2005) Information asymmetry, insurance, and the decision to hospitalize. J Health Econ, 24, 775-93.
CEBUL, R. D., REBITZER, J. B., TAYLOR, L. J. & VOTRUBA, M. E. (2008) Organizational fragmentation and care quality in the U.S healthcare system. J Econ Perspect, 22, 93-113.
DEVLIN, R. A. S. S. (2008) Do physician remuneration schemes matter? The case of Canadian family physicians. Journal of Health Economics 27, 1168-1181.
DUMONT, E., FORTIN, B., JACQUEMET, N. & SHEARER, B. (2008) Physicians multitasking and incentives: empirical evidence from a natural experiment. J Health Econ, 27, 1436-50.
ELLIS, R. P. & MCGUIRE, T. G. (1986) Provider behavior under prospective reimbursement. Cost sharing and supply. J Health Econ, 5, 129-51.
ELLIS, R. P. & MCGUIRE, T. G. (1990) Optimal payment systems for health services. J Health Econ, 9, 375-96.
EVANS, R. G. (1974) Supplier-induced demand: some empirical evidence and implications., London, MacMillan.
- FELDSTEIN, P. J. (2004) Health Care Economics, Thomson Delmar Learning GOSDEN, T., FORLAND, F., KRISTIANSEN, I. S., SUTTON, M., LEESE, B., GIUFFRIDA, A., SERGISON, M. & PEDERSEN, L. (Eds.) (2004) Capitation, salary, fee-for-service and mixed systems of payment: effects on the behaviour of primary care physicians, Chichester, UK, John Wiley Sonds Ltd.
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
- GREMBOWSKI, D. E., COOK, K., PATRICK, D. L. & ROUSSEL, A. E. (1998) Managed care and physician referral. Med Care Res Rev, 55, 3-31.
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
GRUBER, J. & OWINGS, M. (1996) Physician financial incentives and cesarean section delivery. Rand J Econ, 27, 99-123.
- HICKSON, G. B., ALTEMEIER, W. A. & PERRIN, J. M. (1987) Physician reimbursement by salary or fee-forservice: effect on physician practice behavior in a randomized prospective study. Pediatrics, 80, 344-50.
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
- HOLMSTROM, B. & MILGROM, P. (1990) Regulating trade among agents. Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics 146, 85-105.
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
- HUSKAMP, H. A. (1999) Episodes of mental health and substance abuse treatment under a managed behavioral health care carve-out. Inquiry, 36, 147-61.
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
- ICIS (2008) National Health ExpenditureTrends, 1975—2008. Ottawa, Canadian Institute for Health Information.
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
- INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE (U.S.). COMMITTEE ON QUALITY OF HEALTH CARE IN AMERICA (2001) Crossing the quality chasm : a new health system for the 21st century, Washington, D.C., National Academy Press.
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
- LÉGER, P.-T. (2000) Quality control mechanisms under capitation payment for medical servcies. Canadian Journal of Economics, 33 564-588.
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
MA, C. & MCGUIRE, T. G. (1997) Optimal health insurance and provider payment. American Economic Review, 87 685-704.
MANNING, W. G., NEWHOUSE, J. P., DUAN, N., KEELER, E. B., LEIBOWITZ, A. & MARQUIS, M. S. (1987) Health insurance and the demand for medical care: evidence from a randomized experiment. Am Econ Rev, 77, 251-77.
MCGUIRE, T. G. (2000) Physician agency. . IN B.V., E. S. (Ed.) In A. J. Culyer and J. P. Newhouse, The Handbook of Health Economics.
- NEWHOUSE, J. P. (2002) Pricing the priceless : a health care conundrum, Cambridge, Mass., MIT Press.
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
- NEWHOUSE, J. P. & RAND CORPORATION. INSURANCE EXPERIMENT GROUP. (1993) Free for all? : lessons from the Rand Health Insurance Experiment. Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press.
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
QUAST, T., SAPPINGTON, D. E. & SHENKMAN, E. (2008) Does the quality of care in Medicaid MCOs vary with the form of physician compensation? Health Econ, 17, 545-50.
- RESCHOVSKY, J. & HADLEY, J. (2007) Physician financial incentives: use of quality incentives inches up, but productivity still dominates. Issue Brief Cent Stud Health Syst Change, 1-4.
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
- ROLAND, M. (2004) Linking physicians pay to the quality of care--a major experiment in the United kingdom. N Engl J Med, 351, 1448-54.
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
- ROSENTHAL, M. B., FERNANDOPULLE, R., SONG, H. R. & LANDON, B. (2004) Paying for quality: providers incentives for quality improvement. Health Aff (Millwood), 23, 127-41.
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
- ROSENTHAL, M. B., LANDON, B. E., HOWITT, K., SONG, H. R. & EPSTEIN, A. M. (2007) Climbing up the payfor -performance learning curve: where are the early adopters now? Health Aff (Millwood), 26, 1674-82.
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
ROTHSCHILD, M. & STIGLITZ, J. (1976) Equilibrium in competitive insurance markets: An essay on the economics of imperfect information. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 90, 630—649.
SELDER, A. (2005) Physician reimbursement and technology adoption. J Health Econ, 24, 907-30.
- SKINNER, J., CHANDRA, A., GOODMAN, D. & FISHER, E. S. (2009) The elusive connection between health care spending and quality. Health Aff (Millwood), 28, w119-23.
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
YIP, W. C. (1998) Physician response to Medicare fee reductions: changes in the volume of coronary artery bypass graft (CABG) surgeries in the Medicare and private sectors. J Health Econ, 17, 675-99.