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Why do Politicians Delegate?. (2005). Tabellini, Guido ; Alesina, Alberto.
In: Levine's Bibliography.
RePEc:cla:levrem:784828000000000470.

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  1. .

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  2. Undeflected pressure? The protectionist effect of political partisanship on US antidumping policy. (2018). Aquilante, Tommaso .
    In: European Journal of Political Economy.
    RePEc:eee:poleco:v:55:y:2018:i:c:p:455-470.

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  3. Bureaucrats or Politicians? Political Parties and Antidumping in the US. (2015). Aquilante, Tommaso.
    In: MPRA Paper.
    RePEc:pra:mprapa:70359.

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  4. Allocation of Resources in Educational Production: The Budget Puzzle. (2014). Hatsor, Limor .
    In: Journal of Public Economic Theory.
    RePEc:bla:jpbect:v:16:y:2014:i:6:p:854-883.

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  5. Presidential Election, Checks and Balances, and Allocation of Public Expenditures in Taiwan. (2013). Huang, Chiung-Ju ; Ho, Yuan-Hong.
    In: Journal of Economics and Management.
    RePEc:jec:journl:v:9:y:2013:i:1:p:31-53.

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  6. Populist fiscal policy. (2008). Wane, Waly ; Khemani, Stuti.
    In: Policy Research Working Paper Series.
    RePEc:wbk:wbrwps:4762.

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  7. Elected Versus Appointed School District Officials. (2008). Hoover, Gary.
    In: Public Finance Review.
    RePEc:sae:pubfin:v:36:y:2008:i:5:p:635-647.

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  8. Delegation versus communication in the organization of government. (2008). Olofsgard, Anders ; olofsgård, anders ; Ludema, Rodney.
    In: Journal of Public Economics.
    RePEc:eee:pubeco:v:92:y:2008:i:1-2:p:213-235.

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  9. Multiple safety net regulators and agency problems in the EU: Is Prompt Corrective Action partly the solution?. (2008). Wall, Larry ; Mayes, David ; Nieto, Maria J..
    In: Journal of Financial Stability.
    RePEc:eee:finsta:v:4:y:2008:i:3:p:232-257.

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  10. Essays on Learning and Macroeconomics. (2008). Ordonez, Guillermo.
    In: Levine's Working Paper Archive.
    RePEc:cla:levarc:122247000000002250.

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  11. Who pays for Banking Supervision?. (2007). Prast, H M.
    In: Other publications TiSEM.
    RePEc:tiu:tiutis:2ef7a617-610e-4d00-a072-f14eb2def9a9.

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  12. Who pays for banking supervision? Principles and practices. (2007). Prast, Henriette ; masciandaro, donato ; Nieto, Maria .
    In: DNB Working Papers.
    RePEc:dnb:dnbwpp:141.

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  13. Multiple safety net regulators and agency problems in the EU : is Prompt Corrective Action a partial solution. (2007). Wall, Larry ; Mayes, David ; Nieto, Maria J.
    In: Research Discussion Papers.
    RePEc:bof:bofrdp:2007_007.

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  14. Dont Ask Why Things Went Wrong: Nested Reputation and Scapegoating Inefficiency. (2005). Ordonez, Guillermo.
    In: Levine's Working Paper Archive.
    RePEc:cla:levarc:618897000000000988.

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References

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