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Central Bank Independence, Accountability and Transparency: Complements or Strategic Substitutes?. (2006). Libich, Jan ; Hughes Hallett, Andrew.
In: CEPR Discussion Papers.
RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:5470.

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Cited: 32

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  1. Transparence des Banques Centrales et efficacité de la politique monétaire : quelles implications pour la Banque des Etats de l’Afrique Centrale ?. (2020). Ngomba Bodi, Francis ; Soulemanou, Soulemanou ; Wemba, Dessy-Karl Tadadjeu.
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  2. BEHAVIORAL MONETARY POLICYMAKING: ECONOMICS, POLITICAL ECONOMY AND PSYCHOLOGY. (2019). Romelli, Davide ; masciandaro, donato.
    In: BAFFI CAREFIN Working Papers.
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  3. Central bank transparency and inflation (volatility) – new evidence. (2018). Weber, Christoph.
    In: International Economics and Economic Policy.
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  4. To Be or not to Be a Euro Country? The Behavioural Political Economics of Currency Unions. (2018). Romelli, Davide ; masciandaro, donato.
    In: BAFFI CAREFIN Working Papers.
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  5. Central Bank Transparency and Inflation (Volatility) – New Evidence. (2016). Weber, Christoph S.
    In: Working Papers.
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  6. Ups and downs of central bank independence from the Great Inflation to the Great Recession: theory, institutions and empirics. (2015). Romelli, Davide ; masciandaro, donato.
    In: Financial History Review.
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  7. Ups and Downs. Central Bank Independence from the Great Inflation to the Great Recession: Theory, Institutions and Empirics. (2015). Romelli, Davide ; masciandaro, donato.
    In: BAFFI CAREFIN Working Papers.
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  8. The link between transparency and independence of central banks. (2014). Spyromitros, Eleftherios.
    In: Journal of Risk & Control.
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  9. Market anticipation of monetary policy actions and interest rate transmission to US Treasury market rates. (2013). Papadamou, Stephanos.
    In: Economic Modelling.
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  10. Monetary and fiscal policy interactions with central bank transparency and public investment. (2011). Sidiropoulos, Moise ; Dai, Meixing.
    In: Research in Economics.
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  11. Monetary and fiscal policy interactions with central bank transparency and public investment.. (2010). Sidiropoulos, Moise ; Dai, Meixing.
    In: Working Papers of BETA.
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  12. Monetary and fiscal policy interactions with central bank transparency and public investment. (2010). Sidiropoulos, Moise ; Dai, Meixing.
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  13. Public investment, distortionary taxes and monetary policy transparency.. (2009). Sidiropoulos, Moise ; Dai, Meixing.
    In: Working Papers of BETA.
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  14. Fiscal Policy in a Monetary Union in the Presence of Uncertainty about the Central Bank Preferences.. (2009). Sidiropoulos, Moise ; Dai, Meixing.
    In: Working Papers of BETA.
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  15. Public investment, distortionary taxes and monetary policy transparency. (2009). Sidiropoulos, Moise ; Dai, Meixing.
    In: MPRA Paper.
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  16. Fiscal Policy in a Monetary Union in the Presence of Uncertainty about the Central Bank Preferences. (2009). Sidiropoulos, Moise ; Dai, Meixing.
    In: MPRA Paper.
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  17. The economic impact of central bank transparency. (2008). Cruijsen, Carin ; van der Cruijsen, C. A. B., .
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  18. Independence and Accountability of Monetary and Fiscal Policy Committees. (2008). Ullrich, Katrin.
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  19. Classifying Monetary Economics: Fields and Methods from Past to Future. (2008). Arestis, Philip.
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  20. Financial Supervisory Independence and Accountability–Exploring the Determinants. (2008). masciandaro, donato ; Taylor, Michael W ; Quintyn, Marc G.
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  21. Inside and outside the central bank: Independence and accountability in financial supervision: Trends and determinants. (2008). Taylor, Michael ; Quintyn, Marc ; masciandaro, donato.
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  22. An explicit inflation target as a commitment device. (2008). Libich, Jan.
    In: Journal of Macroeconomics.
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  23. Uncertainty and Fiscal Policy in an Asymmetric Monetary Union. (2008). ZIMMER, Blandine ; Hefeker, Carsten.
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  24. Independence and Accountability of Monetary and Fiscal Policy Committees. (2007). Ullrich, Katrin ; Mihailov, Alexander.
    In: ZEW Discussion Papers.
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  25. The Economic Impact of Central Bank Transparency : A Survey. (2007). Eijffinger, Sylvester ; Cruijsen, Carin ; Eijffinger, S. C. W., ; van der Cruijsen, C. A. B., .
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  26. The Economic Impact of Central Bank Transparency : A Survey. (2007). Eijffinger, Sylvester ; Cruijsen, Carin ; Eijffinger, S. C. W., ; van der Cruijsen, C. A. B., .
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  27. Introducing Instruments of Central Bank Accountability in a Monetary Union. (2007). Ullrich, Katrin.
    In: Open Economies Review.
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  28. INCORPORATING RIGIDITY IN THE TIMING STRUCTURE OF MACROECONOMIC GAMES. (2007). Libich, Jan ; Stehlik, Petr.
    In: CAMA Working Papers.
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  29. The Economic Impact of Central Bank Transparency: A Survey. (2007). Eijffinger, Sylvester ; Cruijsen, Carin.
    In: CEPR Discussion Papers.
    RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:6070.

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  30. INFLEXIBILITY OF INFLATION TARGETING REVISITED: MODELING THE ANCHORING EFFECT. (2006). Libich, Jan.
    In: CAMA Working Papers.
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  31. EMU Enlargement, Policy Uncertainty and Economic Reforms. (2006). Hefeker, Carsten.
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  32. .

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