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2. The proper scope of government reconsidered: Asymmetric information and incentive contracts. (2023). Schmitz, Patrick.
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3. Completely relationship-specific investments, transaction costs, and the property rights theory. (2023). Schmitz, Patrick.
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4. How (Not) to Purchase Novel Goods and Services: Specific Performance Versus At-Will Contracts. (2022). Schmitz, Patrick.
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5. The competitive and welfare effects of long-term contracts with network externalities and bounded rationality. (2021). Tian, Guoqiang ; Meng, Dawen.
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6. A signaling-based theory of contractual commitment to relationships. (2017). Vasconcelos, Luis.
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7. The Competitive Effect of Exclusive Dealing in the Presence of Renegotiation Breakdown. (2015). Lee, Dongyeol.
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1. Exclusion through speculation. (2011). Willems, Bert ; Argenton, Cédric.
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2. Reforms, Entry and Productivity: Some Evidence from the Indian Manufacturing Sector. (2006). Bhaumik, Sumon ; Krishnan, Shagun ; Gangopadhyay, Shubhashis.
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3. The optimal length of contracts with application to outsourcing. (2006). Ellman, Matthew.
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4. Star Wars: Exclusive Superstars and Collusive Outcomes. (2006). Vasconcelos, Luis ; Selvaggi, Marianao.
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5. Contractual signalling, relationship-specific investment and exclusive agreements. (2006). Vasconcelos, Luis.
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6. Exclusive dealing, entry, and mergers. (2006). Persson, Lars ; Motta, Massimo ; fumagalli, chiara.
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7. Information Spillovers in the Market for Recorded Music. (2006). Sorensen, Alan ; Hendricks, Ken .
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8. Reforms, Entry and Productivity: Some Evidence from the Indian Manufacturing Sector. (2006). Bhaumik, Sumon ; Krishnan, Shagun ; Gangopadhyay, Shubhashis.
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9. Exclusive Quality. (2006). Argenton, Cédric.
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10. Upstream market foreclosure. (2006). Gabszewicz, Jean ; Skerdilajda, ZANAJ.
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11. NETWORK SIZE AND NETWORK CAPTURE. (2006). .
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12. Network Size and Network Capture. (2006). Manove, Michael ; Llobet, Gerard.
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13. Termination Clauses in Partnerships. (2005). Tedeschi, Piero ; Nicolo', Antonio ; comino, stefano.
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14. Vertical Integration, Collusion Downstream, and Partial Market Foreclosure. (2005). Mendi, Pedro.
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15. Determinants of Vertical Integration: Finance, Contracts, and Regulation. (2005). Johnson, Simon ; Acemoglu, Daron ; Mitton, Todd.
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16. How do Incumbents Respond to the Threat of Entry? Evidence from the Major Airlines. (2005). Syverson, Chad ; Goolsbee, Austan.
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17. Exclusive Dealing, Entry and Mergers. (2005). Persson, Lars ; Motta, Massimo ; fumagalli, chiara.
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18. Contracting on Time. (2005). Kvasov, Dmitriy ; Guriev, Sergei.
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19. Artfilms, Handicrafts and Other Cultural Goods: The Case for Subsidy. (2004). Dayton-Johnson, Jeff ; Bardhan, Pranab ; AUBERT, Cécile.
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20. Missing Contracts: On the Rationality of not Signing a Prenuptial Agreement. (2004). Tedeschi, Piero ; Nicolo', Antonio.
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21. Legal Restrictions on Buyout Fees: Theory and Evidence from German Soccer. (2004). Feess, Eberhard ; Frick, Bernd ; Muehlheusser, Gerd.
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22. Backward Stealing and Forward Manipulation in the WTO. (2004). Staiger, Robert ; Bagwell, Kyle.
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23. Legal Restrictions on Buyout Fees: Theory and Evidence from German Soccer. (2004). Feess, Eberhard ; Frick, Bernd ; Muehlheusser, Gerd.
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24. Strategic Ex-ante Contracts: Rent-Extraction and Opportunity Costs. (2004). Hua, Xinyu .
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25. A Rent Extraction Theory of Right of First Refusal. (2004). Choi, Albert.
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26. Vertical Contracting When Competition for Orders Precedes Procurement. (2004). Gans, Joshua.
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27. Exclusive Contracts Foster Relationship-Specific Investment. (2004). de Meza, David ; Selvaggi, Mariano .
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28. Backward stealing and forward manipulation in the WTO. (2004). Staiger, Robert ; Bagwell, Kyle.
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29. Merchant Transmission Investment. (2003). Tirole, Jean ; Joskow, Paul.
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30. Merchant Transmission Investment. (2003). Tirole, Jean ; Joskow, Paul.
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31. Please Hold me Up: Why Firms Grant Exclusive Dealing Contracts. (2003). de Meza, David ; Selvaggi, Marianno.
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32. Mercado de TV Paga no Brasil: Competição Normal Ou Infracionária?. (2003). Vasconcelos, Silvinha.
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33. Endogenous Games and Mechanisms: Side Payments Among Players. (2002). Wilkie, Simon ; Jackson, Matthew.
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34. Softening Competition by Enhancing Entry: An Example from the Banking Industry. (2002). Degryse, Hans ; Bouckaert, Jan.
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35. Corporate Governance and Control. (2002). Bolton, Patrick ; Becht, Marco ; Roell, Alisa.
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36. Information and Control in Alliances and Ventures. (2002). Dessein, Wouter.
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37. An Economists Guide to U.S. v. Microsoft. (2001). Katz, Michael ; Gilbert, Richard.
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38. An Economists Guide to U.S. v. Microsoft.. (2001). Katz, Michael ; Gilbert, Richard.
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39. Exclusive Contracts and Market Power: Evidence from Ocean Shipping. (2001). Marin Uribe, Pedro L, .
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41. Collusion, Exclusion, and Inclusion in Random-Order Bargaining. (2000). Segal, Ilya.
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42. Toward a Quantification of the Effects of Microsofts Conduct. (2000). Hall, Robert.
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43. Naked Exclusion: Comment. (2000). Whinston, Michael ; Segal, Ilya R..
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44. Golden Cages for Showy Birds: Optimal Switching Costs in Labour Markets. (1999). Caminal, Ramon ; burguet, roberto ; Matutes, Carmen .
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46. Free entry does not imply zero profits. (1997). Hurkens, Sjaak ; Vulkan, Nir.
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49. Exploring New Markets: Direct Investment, Contractual Relations and the Multinational Enterprise. (1995). Markusen, James ; Horstmann, Ignatius.
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50. Long Term Contracts, Arbitrage, and Vertical Restraints. (1995). Ellingsen, Tore.
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