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2. Testing the single-peakedness of other-regarding preferences. (2014). Nicholas, Aaron ; Levati, Maria ; Rai, Birendra .
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3. Self-Serving Use of Equity Rules in Bargaining with Asymmetric Outside Options. (2013). Walkowitz, Gari ; Rilke, Rainer ; Hennig-Schmidt, Heike ; Irlenbusch, Bernd.
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4. How sensitive are bargaining outcomes to changes in disagreement payoffs?. (2013). Feltovich, Nick ; Anbarci, Nejat.
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5. Self-Serving Use of Equity Rules in Bargaining with Asymmetric Outside Options. (2013). Walkowitz, Gari ; Rilke, Rainer ; Hennig-Schmidt, Heike ; Irlenbusch, Bernd.
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1. Can learning cause shorter delays in reaching agreements?. (2015). Weng, XI.
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2. Invader strategies in the war of attrition with private information. (2014). Metzger, Lars Peter .
   In: Journal of Mathematical Economics.
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3. A Theory of Bargaining Deadlock. (2013). Hwang, Ilwoo.
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4. Delays and partial agreements in multi-issue bargaining. (2013). Ortner, Juan ; Acharya, Avidit.
   In: Journal of Economic Theory.
   RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:148:y:2013:i:5:p:2150-2163.

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5. Behavioral aspects of arbitrageurs in timing games of bubbles and crashes. (2013). Matsushima, Hitoshi.
   In: Journal of Economic Theory.
   RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:148:y:2013:i:2:p:858-870.

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6. A two-sided reputation result with long-run players. (2013). Ekmekci, Mehmet ; Atakan, Alp.
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   RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:148:y:2013:i:1:p:376-392.

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7. Optimism, delay and (in)efficiency in a stochastic model of bargaining. (2013). Ortner, Juan.
   In: Games and Economic Behavior.
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8. Optimal value commitment in bilateral bargaining. (2013). Britz, Volker .
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   RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:77:y:2013:i:1:p:345-351.

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9. Reputation in multi-unit ascending auction with common values. (2013). Kwiek, Maksymilian.
   In: Economics Letters.
   RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:118:y:2013:i:1:p:216-218.

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10. Bargaining with revoking costs. (2012). Dutta, Rohan.
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    RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:74:y:2012:i:1:p:144-153.

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11. Behavioral Aspects of Arbitrageurs in Timing Games of Bubbles and Crashes. (2012). Matsushima, Hitoshi.
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12. A war of attrition with endogenous effort levels. (2011). Sahuguet, Nicolas ; Hörner, Johannes ; Horner, Johannes.
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13. Costs of implementation: Bargaining costs versus allocative efficiency. (2011). wernerfelt, birger ; Maciejovsky, Boris.
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14. The role of strategic uncertainty in games: An experimental study of cheap talk and contracts in the Nash demand game. (2011). Feltovich, Nick ; Swierzbinski, Joe.
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    RePEc:eee:eecrev:v:55:y:2011:i:4:p:554-574.

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15. Optimal Value Commitment in Bilateral Bargaining. (2010). Volker, Britz .
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16. Optimal Value Commitment in Bilateral Bargaining. (2010). Volker, Britz .
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17. Dominance solvability of dynamic bargaining games. (2010). Tyson, Christopher.
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18. Generosity in bargaining: Fair or fear?. (2010). Tan, Jonathan ; Breitmoser, Yves ; Tan, Jonathan H. W., .
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19. Optimal stalling when bargaining. (2010). Thanassoulis, John.
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20. Bargaining with Arrival of New Traders. (2010). Skrzypacz, Andrzej ; Fuchs, William.
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21. Dominance Solvability of Dynamic Bargaining Games. (2009). Tyson, Christopher.
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22. Leadership by Confidence in Teams. (2008). Kobayashi, Hajime ; Suehiro, Hideo .
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23. The Dynamics of Bargaining Postures: The Role of a Third Party. (2008). Lee, Jihong ; Liu, Qingmin.
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24. In Bargaining We Trust. (2007). Saran, Rene.
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25. Disagreement and Authority. (2007). Miettinen, Topi ; Ellingsen, Tore.
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26. Bargaining. (2007). Serrano, Roberto.
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27. Multilateral bargaining with concession costs. (2007). Caruana, Guillermo ; Quint, Daniel ; Einav, Liran.
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28. THE EVOLUTION OF BIDDING BEHAVIOR IN PRIVATE-VALUES AUCTIONS AND DOUBLE AUCTIONS. (2007). Saran, Rene.
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29. Collusion with Persistent Cost Shocks. (2007). Bagwell, Kyle ; Athey, Susan.
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30. Bargaining, Reputation and Equilibrium Selection in Repeated Games with Contracts. (2006). Pearce, David G. ; Abreu, Dilip.
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31. Reputational Wars of Attrition with Complex Bargaining Postures. (2006). Pearce, David G. ; Abreu, Dilip.
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32. Bargaining with a Possibly Committed Seller. (2005). Inderst, Roman.
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34. Renting Goodwill in International Marketing Channels: An Analysis of Pricing Strategies and Bargaining Power. (2005). .
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36. Iterative Dominance and Sequential Bargaining. (2004). Tyson, Christopher.
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37. Bargaining with History Dependent Preferences. (2004). Li, Duozhe .
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38. Stakeholders in Bilateral Conflict. (2003). Ponsati, Clara ; Manzini, Paola.
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39. Mediation: incomplete information bargaining with filtered communication. (2003). Sákovics, József ; Ponsati, Clara ; Jarque, Xavier .
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40. Evolutionary stability in a reputational model of bargaining. (2003). Sethi, Rajiv ; Abreu, Dilip.
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41. A Behavioral Model of Bargaining with Endogenous Types. (2003). Pearce, David ; Abreu, Dilip.
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42. Aspirational Bargaining. (2002). Smith, Lones ; Stacchetti, Ennio .
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43. Private Politics and Private Policy: A Theory of Boycotts. (2002). Baron, David P..
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44. Uncertainty about Uncertainty and Delay in Bargaining. (2002). Skyzypacz, Andrzej ; Feinberg, Yossi .
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45. Bargaining with Interdependent Values. (2001). Liang, Meng-Yu ; Deneckere, Raymond .
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46. Mediation: Incomplete information bargaining with filtered communication. (2001). Sákovics, József ; Ponsati, Clara ; Jarque, Xavier .
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47. Private Politics. (2001). Baron, David P..
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48. Mediation: Incomplete information bargaining with. (2001). Sákovics, József ; Ponsati, Clara ; Jarque, Xavier .
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49. Why Every Economist Should Learn Some Auction Theory. (2000). Klemperer, Paul.
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50. Bargaining, Reputation and Equilibrium Selection in Repeated Games. (2000). ABREU, D. ; Pearce, D..
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