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Political Selection under Alternative Electoral Rules. (2015). Nannicini, Tommaso ; Galasso, Vincenzo.
In: Working Papers.
RePEc:igi:igierp:545.

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Cited: 3

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Cites: 28

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Cocites: 50

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Coauthors: 0

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Citations

Citations received by this document

  1. Legal conflicts of interest of the revolving door. (2017). Brezis, Elise.
    In: Journal of Macroeconomics.
    RePEc:eee:jmacro:v:52:y:2017:i:c:p:175-188.

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  2. Legal Conflicts of Interest of the Revolving Door. (2017). Brezis, Elise.
    In: Working Papers.
    RePEc:biu:wpaper:2017-05.

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  3. Are we witnessing a paradigm shift in the analysis of political competition?. (2013). Padovano, Fabio.
    In: Public Choice.
    RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:156:y:2013:i:3:p:631-651.

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References

References cited by this document

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  3. Besley, Timothy (2005). “Political Selection,” Journal of Economic Perspectives 19, 43–60.

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  5. Cox, Gary W. (1997). Making Votes Count. Strategic Coordination in the World’s Electoral Systems, Cambridge University Press.
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  6. Fearon, J. D. (1999). “Electoral Accountability and the Control of Politicians: Selecting Good Types Versus Sanctioning Poor Performance.” Cambridge: Cambridge University Press Funk, Patricia, and Christina Gathmann (2013). “How do Electoral Systems Affect Fiscal Policy? Evidence from State and Local Governments, 1890 to 2005,” Journal of the European Economic Association, 11, 1178–1203.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
  7. Gagliarducci, Stefano, and Tommaso Nannicini (2013). “Do Better Paid Politicians Perform Better? Disentangling Incentives from Selection,” Journal of the European Economic Association 11, 369–398.

  8. Gagliarducci, Stefano, Tommaso Nannicini, and Paolo Naticchioni (2011). “Electoral Rules and Politicians’ Incentives: A Micro Test,” American Economic Journal: Economic Policy 3, 144–174.

  9. Hirano, Shigeo and James M. Snyder Jr. (2014), ‘Primary Elections and the Quality of Elected Officials,” Quarterly Journal of Political Science 9, 473-500.

  10. Iaryczower, Matias, and Andrea Mattozzi (2013). “On the Nature of Competition in Alternative Electoral Systems,” Journal of Politics, 75: 743-756.

  11. Jacobson, G.C., 1989. Strategic Politicians and the Dynamics of U.S. House Elections, 1946– 86. American Political Science Review 83(3), 773–793.

  12. Kotakorpi, Kaisa, and Panu Poutvaara (2011). “Pay for Politicians and Candidate Selection: An Empirical Analysis,” Journal of Public Economics 95, 877–885.

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  14. Kunicova, Jana, and Susan Rose-Ackerman (2005). “Electoral Rules as Constraints on Corruption, ” British Journal of Political Science, Vol. 35(4), pp. 573–606.
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  15. Kunicova, Jana, and Thomas F. Remington (2008). “Mandates, Parties, and Dissent: The Effect of Electoral Rules on Parliamentary Party Cohesion in the Russian State Duma, 1994-2003,” Party Politics 14(5), 555–574.
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  22. Norris, Pippa (2004). Electoral Engineering: Voting Rules and Political Behavior, Cambridge University Press.
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  23. Persson, Torsten, and Guido Tabellini (1999). “The size and scope of government: Comparative politics with rational politicians,” European Economic Review 43, 699–735.

  24. Persson, Torsten, and Guido Tabellini (2003). The Economic Effects of Constitutions, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
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  25. Persson, Torsten, Gerard Roland, and Guido Tabellini (2007). “Electoral rules and government spending in parliamentary democracies,” Quarterly Journal of Political Science, Vol. 2(2), pp. 155–188.

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  28. Voigt, Stefan (2011). “Positive Constitutional Economics II—A Survey of Recent Developments, ” Public Choice 146, 205–256.

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