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Time consistent monetary policy reconsidered: may we have a deflationary bias too?. (2000). Rotondi, Zeno.
In: Discussion Paper Series In Economics And Econometrics.
RePEc:stn:sotoec:4.

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  15. Goodhart, C.A.E.and H. Huang (1998). Time Inconsistency in a Model with Lags, Persistence, and Overlapping Wage Contracts, Oxford Economic Papers, 50:378-396.

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  28. Schellekens, P. (1998). Caution and Conservatism in Monetary Policymaking, Discussion Paper No. 284, Financial Market Group, LSE, London.
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  31. Taylor, J.B. (1982). Establishing Credibility: A Rational Expectations Viewpoint, American Economic Review, 72: 81-85.

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  33. Walsh, C.E. (1998). ”Monetary Theory and Policy”, the MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, USA.
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Cocites

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  1. How Important is Money in the Conduct of Monetary Policy?. (2007). Woodford, Michael.
    In: Levine's Working Paper Archive.
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  2. Fiscal-Monetary Policy Interactions in the Presence of Unionized Labour Markets. (2005). Cukierman, Alex ; Dalmazzo, Alberto.
    In: CEPR Discussion Papers.
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  3. Monetary Discretion, Pricing Complementarity and Dynamic Multiple Equilibria. (2003). Wolman, Alexander ; King, Robert.
    In: NBER Working Papers.
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  4. Public demand for low inflation. (2003). Scheve, Kenneth .
    In: Bank of England working papers.
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  5. Openness, Inflation, and the Phillips Curve: A Puzzle.. (2002). Temple, Jonathan.
    In: Journal of Money, Credit and Banking.
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  6. Do Central Banks have Precautionary Demands for Expansions and for Price Stability?. (2002). Muscatelli, Vito ; Cukierman, Alex.
    In: Working Papers.
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  7. Are contemporary central banks transparent about economic models and objectives and what difference does it make?. (2002). Cukierman, Alex.
    In: Review.
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  8. International money and common currencies in historical perspective. (2002). Lothian, James ; Dwyer, Gerald.
    In: FRB Atlanta Working Paper.
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  9. Public Announcements, Adjustment Delays, and the Business Cycle (November 2002). (2002). Hellwig, Christian.
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  10. The role of short-run inflation targets and forecasts in disinflation. (2002). Sterne, Gabriel ; Mahadeva, Lavan.
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  11. Inflation Expectations and Learning about Monetary Policy. (2002). Moran, Kevin ; Hendry, Scott ; Andolfatto, David.
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  12. Reflections on the Current Fashion For Central Bank Independence. (2001). Bibow, Joerg.
    In: Macroeconomics.
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  13. The Interaction of Wage Bargaining Institutions and an Independent Central Bank – A Methodological Reflection on Current Theories. (2001). .
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  14. Wages and Wage-Bargaining Institutions in the EMU – A Survey of the Issues. (2001). .
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  15. Will EMU increase eurosclerosis?. (2000). Saint-Paul, Gilles ; Bentolila, Samuel.
    In: Economics Working Papers.
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  16. Monetary Policy Delegation, Contract Costs, and Contract Targets. (2000). Miller, Stephen ; Chortareas, Georgios.
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  17. Optimal Monetary Policy Inertia. (2000). Woodford, Michael.
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  18. Optimal Contracts for Central Bankers and Inflation and Exchange Rate Targeting Regimes. (1999). Ratti, Ronald.
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  19. Optimal Monetary Policy Inertia. (1999). Woodford, Michael.
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  20. Political Contagion in Currency Crises. (1999). Drazen, Allan.
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  21. Central Bank Credibility: Why Do We Care? How Do We Build It?. (1999). Blinder, Alan.
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  22. The Equilibrium Degree of Transparency and Control in Monetary Policy. (1999). Svensson, Lars ; Faust, Jon.
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  23. Taylor Rules in a Limited Participation Model. (1999). Gust, Christopher ; Christiano, Lawrence.
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  24. Central Bank Conservatism and Labor Market Reform. (1999). Laséen, Stefan ; Jordahl, Henrik ; Laseen, Stefan .
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