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1. Corporate leniency programs for antitrust: Past, present, and future. (2023). Soetevent, Adriaan ; Onderstal, Sander ; Hinloopen, Jeroen.
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2. Strategic environment effect and communication. (2023). Ozkes, Ali I ; Hanaki, Nobuyuki.
   In: Experimental Economics.
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3. Cartel formation and detection: the role of information costs and disclosure. (2023). Samuel, Andrew ; Korsten, Ruben.
   In: European Journal of Law and Economics.
   RePEc:kap:ejlwec:v:56:y:2023:i:1:d:10.1007_s10657-023-09770-z.

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4. How communication makes the difference between a cartel and tacit collusion: A machine learning approach. (2023). Bruttel, Lisa ; Friedrichsen, Jana ; Andres, Maximilian.
   In: European Economic Review.
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5. Multiproduct firm’s reputation and leniency program in multimarket collusion. (2023). Shen, Chaohai ; Isogai, Shigeki.
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6. Gender and collusion. (2022). Haucap, Justus ; Rau, Holger A ; Heldman, Christina.
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7. How communication makes the difference between a cartel and tacit collusion: a machine learning approach. (2022). Friedrichsen, Jana ; Bruttel, Lisa ; Andres, Maximilian.
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8. How do antitrust regimes impact on cartel formation and managers’ labor market? An experiment. (2022). Gonçalves, Ricardo ; Tabacco, Giovanni A ; Pinho, Joana ; Gonalves, Ricardo ; Fonseca, Miguel A.
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9. How Communication Makes the Difference between a Cartel and Tacit Collusion: A Machine Learning Approach. (2022). Friedrichsen, Jana ; Bruttel, Lisa ; Andres, Maximilian.
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10. Gender and Collusion. (2022). Haucap, Justus ; Rau, Holger A ; Heldman, Christina.
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11. How Communication Makes the Difference between a Cartel and Tacit Collusion: A Machine Learning Approach. (2022). Friedrichsen, Jana ; Bruttel, Lisa ; Andres, Maximilian.
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12. Whistleblowing determinants and the effectiveness of reporting channels in the international sports sector. (2020). Verschuuren, Pim.
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13. Effects of institutional history and leniency on collusive corruption and tax evasion. (2020). Mittone, Luigi ; Dimant, Eugen ; Buckenmaier, Johannes.
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14. Does trust in the government matter for whistleblowing on tax evaders? Survey and experimental evidence. (2020). pavesi, filippo ; Corazzini, Luca ; Antinyan, Armenak.
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15. The effect of collusion on efficiency in experimental auctions. (2020). Seres, Gyula ; Noussair, Charles.
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16. Can whistleblower programs reduce tax evasion? Experimental evidence. (2019). Montmarquette, Claude ; Viennot-Briot, Nathalie ; Masclet, David.
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17. Whistleblowing and diffusion of responsibility: An experiment. (2019). Horvath, Gergely ; Nitta, Kohei ; Grimm, Veronika ; Choo, Lawrence.
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18. Once bitten, twice shy? Market size affects the effectiveness of a leniency program by (de-)activating hysteresis effects. (2018). von Blanckenburg, Korbinian ; Tebbe, Eva.
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19. Partial Cartels and Mergers with Heterogenous Firms: Experimental Evidence. (2017). Gomez-Martinez, Francisco.
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20. Voting For a Cartel as a Sign of Cooperativeness. (2017). Gillet, Joris.
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21. Partial Cartels and Mergers with Heterogeneous Firms: Experimental Evidence. (2017). Gomez-Martinez, Francisco.
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22. Partial Cartels and Mergers with Heterogenous Firms: Experimental Evidence. (2017). Gomez-Martinez, Francisco.
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23. Leniency, Asymmetric Punishment and Corruption: Evidence from China. (2017). Spagnolo, Giancarlo ; Berlin, Maria.
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24. Reward self-reporting to deter corruption: An experiment on mitigating collusive bribery. (2017). Abbink, Klaus ; Wu, Kevin .
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25. Partial Cartels and Mergers with Heterogeneous Firms : Experimental Evidence. (2017). Gomez-Martinez, Francisco.
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26. The effects of endogenous enforcement on strategic uncertainty and cartel deterrence. (2016). Crede, Carsten ; Lu, Liang.
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27. Business Ethics in Organizations: An Experimental Examination of Whistleblowing and Personality. (2016). Fahr, René ; Bartuli, Jenny ; Djawadi, Behnud Mir .
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28. The effects of group composition in a strategic environment: Evidence from a field experiment. (2016). Price, Michael ; Neilson, William ; List, John.
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29. The effects of group composition in a strategic environment: Evidence from a field experiment. (2016). Price, Michael ; Neilson, William ; list, john.
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30. Firm-specific information and explicit collusion in experimental oligopolies. (2016). Sonnemans, Joep ; Onderstal, Sander ; Gomez-Martinez, Francisco.
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31. Do buyer groups facilitate collusion?. (2015). Normann, Hans-Theo ; Schultz, Luis Manuel ; Rosch, Jurgen .
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32. Do Leniency Policies facilitate Collusion? Experimental Evidence. (2014). Clemens, Georg ; Rau, Holger.
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33. Do leniency policies facilitate collusion? Experimental evidence. (2014). Rau, Holger ; Clemens, Georg .
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34. The Effects of Leniency on Cartel Pricing. (2014). Wen, Quan ; Motchenkova, Evgenia ; Houba, Harold.
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35. Letting the briber go free: An experiment on mitigating harassment bribes. (2014). Jain, Tarun ; Gangadharan, Lata ; Dasgupta, Utteeyo ; Abbink, Klaus.
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36. Going once, going twice, reported! Cartel activity and the effectiveness of antitrust policies in experimental auctions. (2014). Onderstal, Sander ; Hinloopen, Jeroen.
    In: European Economic Review.
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37. Endogenous cartel formation: Experimental evidence. (2014). Fonseca, Miguel ; Normann, Hans-Theo.
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38. Are leniency programs too generous?. (2014). sauvagnat, julien.
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39. Symmetric vs. Asymmetric Punishment Regimes for Bribery. (2013). Goerg, Sebastian ; Engel, Christoph ; Yu, Gaoneng.
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40. The Relative Efficacy of Price Announcements and Express Communication for Collusion: Experimental Findings. (2013). Kujal, Praveen ; Hernan Gonzalez, Roberto ; Joseph E. Harrington, Jr, ; Hernan-Gonzalez, Roberto.
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41. Letting the briber go free: an experiment on mitigating harassment bribes. (2012). Jain, Tarun ; Gangadharan, Lata ; Dasgupta, Utteeyo ; Abbink, Klaus.
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42. Reducing deception through subsequent transparency - An experimental investigation. (2012). García-Gallego, Aurora ; Barreda-Tarrazona, Iván ; Garcia-Gallego, Aurora ; Behnk, Sascha.
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43. Leniency programs for multimarket firms: The effect of Amnesty Plus on cartel formation. (2012). Roux, Catherine ; Lefouili, Yassine.
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44. Global cartels, leniency programs and international antitrust cooperation. (2012). Gerlach, Heiko ; Choi, Jay.
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45. Explicit vs. tacit collusion—The impact of communication in oligopoly experiments. (2012). Normann, Hans-Theo ; Fonseca, Miguel.
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46. Evaluating Leniency with Missing Information on Undetected Cartels: Exploring Time-Varying Policy Impacts on Cartel Duration. (2011). Zhou, Jun .
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47. Strictness of leniency programs and asymmetric punishment effect. (2011). Motchenkova, Evgenia ; Laan, Rob .
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48. A comment on School choice: An experimental study [J. Econ. Theory 127 (1) (2006) 202-231]. (2011). Klijn, Flip ; Haeringer, Guillaume ; Calsamiglia, Caterina.
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49. Cartel formation and pricing: The effect of managerial decision-making rules. (2011). Sonnemans, Joep ; Schram, Arthur ; Gillet, Joris.
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50. Pre-play communication in Cournot competition: An experiment with students and managers. (2010). Waichman, Israel ; Requate, Till ; Siang, Ch'ng Kean, .
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51. Prosecution and Leniency Programs: a Fools Game. (2010). sauvagnat, julien.
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52. Behavioral economics as applied to firms: a primer. (2010). Huck, Steffen ; Armstrong, Mark.
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53. Evidence Dependence of Fine Reductions in Corporate Leniency Programs. (2010). Walzl, Markus ; Feess, Eberhard.
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54. Demand Shocks, Capacity Coordination and Industry Performance: Lessons from Economic Laboratory. (2010). Sherstyuk, Katerina ; Hampton, Kyle.
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55. Behavioral Economics as Applied to Firms: A Primer. (2010). Huck, Steffen ; Armstrong, Mark.
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56. Demand Shocks, Capacity Coordination and Industry Performance: Lessons from Economic Laboratory. (2010). Sherstyuk, Katerina ; Hampton, Kyle.
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57. An empirical study of the European corporate leniency program. (2009). Brenner, Steffen .
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58. Group size effects on cartel formation and the enforcement power of leniency programs. (2009). Hamaguchi, Yasuyo ; Shibata, Aiko ; Kawagoe, Toshiji.
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59. Fines, Leniency and Rewards in Antitrust: an Experiment. (2009). Spagnolo, Giancarlo ; Fridolfsson, Sven-Olof ; Bigoni, Maria ; le Coq, Chloe.
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60. On cheating, doping and whistleblowing. (2008). Loertscher, Simon ; Berentsen, Aleksander ; Bruegger, Esther .
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61. An Experimental Study of Leniency Programs. (2005). Hamaguchi, Yasuyo ; Kawagoe, Toshiji.
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