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24. Matching markets with price bargaining. (2011). Bolle, Friedel ; Otto, Philipp.
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25. Implementation of the Core in College Admissions Problems When Colleagues Matter. (2011). Küçükşenel, Serkan.
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26. The singleton core in the college admissions problem and its application to the National Resident Matching Program (NRMP). (2010). Ma, Jinpeng.
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29. Beauty vs. earnings: Gender differences in earnings and priorities over spousal characteristics in a matching model. (2009). Bjerk, David.
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30. DIVORCE AND THE OPTION VALUE OF MARITAL SEARCH. (2009). Filoso, Valerio.
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32. Incentives and Stability in Large Two-Sided Matching Markets. (2009). Pathak, Parag ; Kojima, Fuhito.
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33. Incentives in decentralized random matching markets. (2008). Pais, Joana.
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34. Matching Markets under (In)complete Information. (2007). Masso, Jordi ; Ehlers, Lars.
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35. Games of school choice under the Boston mechanism. (2006). Sönmez, Tayfun ; Ergin, Haluk.
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39. In search of advice for participants in matching markets which use the deferred-acceptance algorithm. (2004). Ehlers, Lars.
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40. Implementation in the many-to-many matching market. (2004). Sotomayor, Marilda.
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41. Incomplete Information and Small Cores in Matching Markets. (2004). Masso, Jordi ; Ehlers, Lars.
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42. A Selling Mechanism. (2003). Sotomayor, Marilda ; Perez-Castrillo, David.
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46. Protective behavior in matching models. (1995). Dutta, Bhaskar ; Barberà, Salvador.
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47. Common and conflicting interests in two-sided matching markets. (1985). Roth, Alvin.
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