1. The interaction between private sector and public sector labor markets: Evidence from Romania. (2021). Nalban, Valeriu ; Smdu, Andra.
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2. The behavioural foundations of urban and regional development: culture, psychology and agency. (2019). Thompson, Piers ; Huggins, Robert.
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