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Endogenous shifts in OPEC market power - A Stackelberg oligopoly with fringe. (2013). Huppmann, Daniel.
In: Annual Conference 2013 (Duesseldorf): Competition Policy and Regulation in a Global Economic Order.
RePEc:zbw:vfsc13:79758.

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  1. Strategic investment decisions in an oligopoly with a competitive fringe: An equilibrium problem with equilibrium constraints approach. (2023). Siddiqui, Sauleh ; Devine, Mel T.
    In: European Journal of Operational Research.
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  2. Modeling world oil market questions: An economic perspective. (2021). Pierru, Axel ; Durand-Lasserve, Olivier.
    In: Energy Policy.
    RePEc:eee:enepol:v:159:y:2021:i:c:s0301421521004729.

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  3. OPECs crude game: Strategic Competition and Regime-switching in Global Oil Markets. (2021). Gundersen, Thomas ; Hvinden, Even Soltvedt.
    In: Working Papers.
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  4. The Shale Revolution and the Dynamics of the Oil Market. (2020). Yucel, Mine ; Balke, Nathan ; Jin, Xin.
    In: Working Papers.
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  5. OPECs crude game. (2019). Hvinden, Even Comfort.
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  6. OPEC, Saudi Arabia, and the shale revolution: Insights from equilibrium modelling and oil politics. (2017). Ansari, Dawud.
    In: EconStor Open Access Articles.
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  7. OPEC, Saudi Arabia, and the Shale Revolution: Insights from Equilibrium Modelling and Oil Politics. (2017). Ansari, Dawud.
    In: MPRA Paper.
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  8. OPEC, Saudi Arabia, and the shale revolution: Insights from equilibrium modelling and oil politics. (2017). Ansari, Dawud.
    In: Energy Policy.
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  9. OPEC vs US shale: Analyzing the shift to a market-share strategy. (2017). Ritz, Robert ; Behar, Alberto.
    In: Energy Economics.
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  10. An Analysis of OPEC’s Strategic Actions, US Shale Growth and the 2014 Oil Price Crash. (2016). Ritz, Robert ; Behar, Alberto.
    In: IMF Working Papers.
    RePEc:imf:imfwpa:2016/131.

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  11. North American natural gas model: Impact of cross-border trade with Mexico. (2016). Siddiqui, Sauleh ; Huppmann, Daniel ; Feijoo, Felipe ; Sakiyama, Larissa .
    In: Energy.
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  12. Lifting the US crude oil export ban: A numerical partial equilibrium analysis. (2016). Huppmann, Daniel ; Holz, Franziska ; Langer, Lissy .
    In: Energy Policy.
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  13. North American Natural Gas Model Impact of Cross-Border Trade with Mexico. (2016). Siddiqui, Sauleh ; Huppmann, Daniel ; Feijoo, Felipe ; Sakiyama, Larissa .
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  14. Lifting the US Crude Oil Export Ban: A Numerical Partial-Equilibrium Analysis. (2016). Huppmann, Daniel ; Holz, Franziska ; Langer, Lissy .
    In: Discussion Papers of DIW Berlin.
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  15. The prisoner’s dilemma in Cournot models: when endogenizing the level of competition leads to competitive behaviors.. (2016). ABADA, Ibrahim ; Ehrenmann, Andreas.
    In: Cambridge Working Papers in Economics.
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  16. OPEC vs US shale oil: Analyzing the shift to a market-share strategy. (2016). Ritz, Robert ; Behar, Alberto.
    In: Cambridge Working Papers in Economics.
    RePEc:cam:camdae:1623.

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  17. What about the OPEC Cartel?. (2015). Huppmann, Daniel ; Holz, Franziska.
    In: DIW Roundup: Politik im Fokus.
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  18. Market power, fuel substitution and infrastructure – A large-scale equilibrium model of global energy markets. (2014). Huppmann, Daniel ; Egging, Rudolf.
    In: Energy.
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    RePEc:aea:jecper:v:24:y:2010:i:2:p:145-62.

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  39. Increasing Market Interconnection: An analysis of the Italian Electricity Spot Market. (2009). Boffa, Federico ; Pingali, Viswanath .
    In: Working papers.
    RePEc:tur:wpaper:4.

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  40. Goal! Profit Maximization Versus Win Maximization in Soccer. (2009). Szymanski, Stefan ; Garcia-del-Barrio, Pedro ; Pedro Garcia-del-Barrio, .
    In: Review of Industrial Organization.
    RePEc:kap:revind:v:34:y:2009:i:1:p:45-68.

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  41. Supply function equilibria of pay-as-bid auctions. (2009). Holmberg, Pär.
    In: Journal of Regulatory Economics.
    RePEc:kap:regeco:v:36:y:2009:i:2:p:154-177.

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  42. Characterization of bidding behavior in multi-unit auctions. (2009). Riascos, Alvaro ; de Castro, Luciano I..
    In: Journal of Mathematical Economics.
    RePEc:eee:mateco:v:45:y:2009:i:9-10:p:559-575.

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  43. Strategic Supply Function Competition with Private Information. (2009). Vives, Xavier.
    In: Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers.
    RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:1736.

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  44. Strategic Supply Function Competition with Private Information. (2009). Vives, Xavier.
    In: CESifo Working Paper Series.
    RePEc:ces:ceswps:_2856.

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  45. Partial identification and testable restrictions in multi-unit auctions. (2008). McAdams, David.
    In: Journal of Econometrics.
    RePEc:eee:econom:v:146:y:2008:i:1:p:74-85.

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  46. Strategic supply function competition with private information. (2008). Vives, Xavier.
    In: IESE Research Papers.
    RePEc:ebg:iesewp:d-0774.

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  47. Strategic Supply Function Competition with Private Information. (2008). Vives, Xavier.
    In: CEPR Discussion Papers.
    RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:6960.

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  48. On the Impact of Forward Contract Obligations in Multi-Unit Auctions. (2008). Fabra, Natalia ; de Frutos, Maria-Angeles.
    In: CEPR Discussion Papers.
    RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:6756.

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  49. Strategic Supply Function Competition with Private Information. (2008). Vives, Xavier.
    In: CESifo Working Paper Series.
    RePEc:ces:ceswps:_2410.

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  50. Supply Function Equilibria: Step Functions and Continuous Representations. (2008). Ralph, Daniel ; Newbery, David M ; Holmberg, Pär.
    In: Cambridge Working Papers in Economics.
    RePEc:cam:camdae:0863.

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