Cited By
View all- Benabbou NChakraborty MIgarashi AZick Y(2021)Finding Fair and Efficient Allocations for Matroid Rank ValuationsACM Transactions on Economics and Computation10.1145/34850069:4(1-41)Online publication date: 16-Oct-2021
Fair Division of Indivisible Goods Among Strategic Agents
Authors: 
Siddharth Barman, Ganesh Ghalme, Shweta Jain, Pooja Kulkarni, Shivika NarangAuthors Info & Claims
Siddharth Barman, Ganesh Ghalme, Shweta Jain, Pooja Kulkarni, Shivika NarangAuthors Info & ClaimsPages 1811 - 1813
Abstract
We study fair division of indivisible goods among strategic agents in a single-parameter environment. This work specifically considers fairness in terms of envy freeness up to one good (EF1) and maximin share guarantee (MMS). We show that (in a single-parameter environment) the problem of maximizing welfare, subject to the constraint that the allocation of the indivisible goods is EF1, admits a polynomial-time, 1/2-approximate, truthful auction. Under MMS setup, we develop a truthful auction which efficiently finds an allocation wherein each agent gets a bundle of value at least (1/2 - ε) times her maximin share and the welfare of the computed allocation is at least the optimal, here ε >0 is a fixed constant. Our results for EF1 and MMS are based on establishing interesting majorization inequalities.
References
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Siddharth Barman, Ganesh Ghalme, Shweta Jain, Pooja Kulkarni, and Shivika Narang. 2019. Fair Division of Indivisible Goods Among Strategic Agents. arXiv preprint arXiv:1901.09427 (2019).
[2]
Siddharth Barman, Sanath Kumar Krishnamurthy, and Rohit Vaish. 2018. Greedy Algorithms for Maximizing Nash Social Welfare. In Proceedings of the 17th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and MultiAgent Systems (AAMAS'18). ACM, 7--13.
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Eric Budish. 2011. The Combinatorial Assignment Problem: Approximate Competitive Equilibrium from Equal Incomes. Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 119, 6 (2011), 1061--1103.
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Ioannis Caragiannis, David Kurokawa, Hervé Moulin, Ariel D. Procaccia, Nisarg Shah, and Junxing Wang. 2016. The Unreasonable Fairness of Maximum Nash Welfare. Proceedings of the 2016 ACM Conference on Economics and Computation (EC '16). ACM, 305--322.
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Richard Cole and Vasilis Gkatzelis. 2015. Approximating the Nash Social Welfare with Indivisible Items. In Proceedings of the Forty-seventh Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing (STOC '15). ACM, 371--380.
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Mohammad Ghodsi, MohammadTaghi Hajiaghayi, Masoud Seddighin, Saeed Seddighin, and Hadi Yami. 2018. Fair Allocation of Indivisible Goods: Improvement and Generalization. In Proceedings of the 2018 ACM Conference on Economics and Computation (EC'18). ACM, 539--556.
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Jonathan Goldman and Ariel D Procaccia. 2015. Spliddit: Unleashing Fair Division Algorithms. ACM SIGecom Exchanges, Vol. 13, 2 (2015), 41--46.
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Richard J Lipton, Evangelos Markakis, Elchanan Mossel, and Amin Saberi. 2004. On Approximately Fair Allocations of Indivisible Goods. In Proceedings of the 5th ACM conference on Electronic Commerce (EC'04). 125--131.
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Roger B. Myerson. 1981. Optimal Auction Design. Math. Oper. Res., Vol. 6, 1 (Feb. 1981), 58--73.
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Abraham Othman, Tuomas Sandholm, and Eric Budish. 2010. Finding Approximate Competitive Equilibria: Efficient and Fair Course Allocation. In Proceedings of the 9th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS'10). 873--880.
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Index Terms
- Fair Division of Indivisible Goods Among Strategic Agents
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Information
Published In
May 2019
2518 pages
ISBN:9781450363099
- General Chairs:
- Edith Elkind,
- Manuela Veloso,
- Program Chairs:
- Noa Agmon,
- Matthew E. Taylor
Sponsors
Publisher
International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems
Richland, SC
Publication History
Published: 08 May 2019
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- Research-article
Funding Sources
- Ramanujan Fellowship
- Pratiksha Trust
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AAMAS '19
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AAMAS '19: International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems
May 13 - 17, 2019
Montreal QC, Canada
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AAMAS '19 Paper Acceptance Rate 193 of 793 submissions, 24%;
Overall Acceptance Rate 1,155 of 5,036 submissions, 23%
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Cited By
View all- Benabbou NChakraborty MIgarashi AZick Y(2021)Finding Fair and Efficient Allocations for Matroid Rank ValuationsACM Transactions on Economics and Computation10.1145/34850069:4(1-41)Online publication date: 16-Oct-2021
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