Article

Truthful fair division

Authors:

Elchanan Mossel,

Omer TamuzAuthors Info & Claims

SAGT'10: Proceedings of the Third international conference on Algorithmic game theory

Pages 288 - 299

Published: 18 October 2010 Publication History

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Abstract

We address the problem of fair division, or cake cutting, with the goal of finding truthful mechanisms. In the case of a general measure space ("cake") and non-atomic, additive individual preference measures - or utilities - we show that there exists a truthful "mechanism" which ensures that each of the k players gets at least 1/k of the cake. This mechanism also minimizes risk for truthful players. Furthermore, in the case where there exist at least two different measures we present a different truthful mechanism which ensures that each of the players gets more than 1/k of the cake.

We then turn our attention to partitions of indivisible goods with bounded utilities and a large number of goods. Here we provide similar mechanisms, but with slightly weaker guarantees. These guarantees converge to those obtained in the non-atomic case as the number of goods goes to infinity.

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Cited By

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Li ZLiu SLu XTao BElkind E(2023)Truthful fair mechanisms for allocating mixed divisible and indivisible goodsProceedings of the Thirty-Second International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence10.24963/ijcai.2023/313(2808-2816)Online publication date: 19-Aug-2023
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.24963/ijcai.2023/313
Bei XHuzhang GSuksompong W(2018)Truthful fair division without free disposalProceedings of the 27th International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence10.5555/3304415.3304426(63-69)Online publication date: 13-Jul-2018
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.5555/3304415.3304426
Bei XChen NHuzhang GTao BWu J(2017)Cake cuttingProceedings of the 26th International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence10.5555/3172077.3172396(3625-3631)Online publication date: 19-Aug-2017
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.5555/3172077.3172396
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Published In

SAGT'10: Proceedings of the Third international conference on Algorithmic game theory

October 2010

359 pages

ISBN:3642161693

Editors:
Spyros Kontogiannis
University of Ioannina, Department of Computer Science, Ioannina, Greece
,
Elias Koutsoupias
National and Kapodistrian University of Athens, Department of Informatics and Telecommunications, Athens, Greece
,
Paul G. Spirakis
Patras University, Research Academic Computer Technology Institute, Rion-Patra, Greece

In-Cooperation

ARNA: Academic Research Network Algogames
SIGecom: Special Interest Group on Economics and Computation
EATCS: European Association for Theoretical Computer Science

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Springer-Verlag

Berlin, Heidelberg

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Published: 18 October 2010

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Li ZLiu SLu XTao BElkind E(2023)Truthful fair mechanisms for allocating mixed divisible and indivisible goodsProceedings of the Thirty-Second International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence10.24963/ijcai.2023/313(2808-2816)Online publication date: 19-Aug-2023
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.24963/ijcai.2023/313
Bei XHuzhang GSuksompong W(2018)Truthful fair division without free disposalProceedings of the 27th International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence10.5555/3304415.3304426(63-69)Online publication date: 13-Jul-2018
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.5555/3304415.3304426
Bei XChen NHuzhang GTao BWu J(2017)Cake cuttingProceedings of the 26th International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence10.5555/3172077.3172396(3625-3631)Online publication date: 19-Aug-2017
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.5555/3172077.3172396
Menon VLarson K(2017)Deterministic, strategyproof, and fair cake cuttingProceedings of the 26th International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence10.5555/3171642.3171693(352-358)Online publication date: 19-Aug-2017
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.5555/3171642.3171693
Branzei SGkatzelis VMehta RDaskalakis CBabaioff MMoulin H(2017)Nash Social Welfare Approximation for Strategic AgentsProceedings of the 2017 ACM Conference on Economics and Computation10.1145/3033274.3085143(611-628)Online publication date: 20-Jun-2017
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Aumann YDombb YHassidim A(2016)Auctioning TimeACM Transactions on Economics and Computation10.1145/28330864:1(1-16)Online publication date: 5-Jan-2016
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/2833086
Hoang LSoumis FZaccour G(2016)A heuristic optimization of Bayesian incentive-compatible cake-cuttingComputers and Operations Research10.1016/j.cor.2016.05.00975:C(76-82)Online publication date: 1-Nov-2016
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Brânzei SMiltersen P(2015)A dictatorship theorem for cake cuttingProceedings of the 24th International Conference on Artificial Intelligence10.5555/2832249.2832316(482-488)Online publication date: 25-Jul-2015
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Tsuruta SOka MTodo TSakurai YYokoo MWeiss GYolum PBordini RElkind E(2015)Fairness and False-Name Manipulations in Randomized Cake CuttingProceedings of the 2015 International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems10.5555/2772879.2773269(909-917)Online publication date: 4-May-2015
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Aumann YDombb YHassidim ABazzan AHuhns MLomuscio AScerri P(2014)Auctioning a cakeProceedings of the 2014 international conference on Autonomous agents and multi-agent systems10.5555/2615731.2617412(1045-1052)Online publication date: 5-May-2014
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On Existence of Truthful Fair Cake Cutting Mechanisms

On existence of truthful fair cake cutting mechanisms

Mechanism design for fair division: allocating divisible items without payments

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