This book explores some of the complexities prompted by the application of the definition of mone... more This book explores some of the complexities prompted by the application of the definition of money laundering to practical situations encountered in Africa. It exposes the inaccuracy of the term ‘money laundering’ as a description of what may be concealed or converted. It is not only money that can be
unlawfully handled in the way envisaged by the definition. Any value-storing commodity can be ‘laundered’, with money being but the commonest example.
In recent years, joint policing operations between countries and the development of regional orga... more In recent years, joint policing operations between countries and the development of regional organisations such as SARPCCO has resulted in increasing regionalisation and trans nationalisation of policing. Just as the increasing privatisation of security has highlighted new challenges for issues of accountability, so too has the regionalisation and trans nationalisation of policing taken the debate on police accountability into different spheres and introduced new questions on who needs to hold whom accountable and by what means.
The seven papers presented in the publication to be launched by APCOF and UCT Criminology is a discussion on this and on cross border policing in general. They fall into three categories. Louise Edwards and Leon Kukkuk present informative, detailed accounts of the institutional framework for cooperation and accountability regarding cross-border policing and peacekeeping both internationally and as regards the evolution of the police component of the African Standby Force. They explicate the myriad of legal and other instruments applicable to both cases, and comment on the challenges faced in the institutionalization of accountability provisions. The latter are many and complex, but some progress has taken place.
Taking the examples of Lesotho-South Africa policing cooperation and the work of Operation Rachel in small-arms destruction, Amanda Lucey and Chelete Monyane investigate how such cooperation has been functioning in recent years under the aegis of SARPCCO. This is valuable information on how the system of cooperative policing has worked in practice in these two cases. While both authors painstakingly document the deficiencies on the ground, they also reveal how extensive cross-border policing activity has been. They too emphasise the issue of accountability, and how the experience of the last fifteen years has brought to the surface both the possibilities and problems of generalising police accountability across borders.
Amanda Dissel writes on the SARPCCO Code of conduct and its relevance in articulating a standard of acceptable policing in Southern Africa. Reflecting on current APCOF work she makes a case for deepening and strengthening the application of the code through the development of appropriate indicators. Sean Tait reflects on the Strategic Indicative Plan of the SADC Organ on Politics Democracy and Security Cooperation and raises issues for consideration regarding policing. Finally Elrena van der Spuy reflects on the impact of the Fifa world cup on policing and police co operation in the region
The utility of a better understanding of the challenges and issues for policing in new regional and transnational settings are similar to those of policing anywhere. It has value in the broader issues of governance and in the more practical issues of police effectiveness. However given the context of cross border operations, this utility is often magnified.
Volume 6 of the highly-regarded series, now with 120 additional pages and loads of award-winning ... more Volume 6 of the highly-regarded series, now with 120 additional pages and loads of award-winning writers from around the globe. The book series that defines a generation, the generation born since 1960, defining its unique place in history through its own voices.
War in Angola lasted intermittently for more than forty years. After a failed attempt at peace fr... more War in Angola lasted intermittently for more than forty years. After a failed attempt at peace from 1994 to 1998 a full scale conventional war broke out again at the end of 1998. This marked the end of a United Nations attempt, lasting more than twelve years, to make peace in this country. It was one of the first big UN missions after the Cold War and turned into a spectacular and expensive failure. Throughout this last "War for Peace" from 1998-2002 the author lived and worked in Huambo, at the epicentre of the war, implementing a United Nations project. This project, poorly planned initially, was restructured locally and achieved considerable successes before finally succumbing to UN incompetence that saw two thirds of its funding disappear and degenerated into a web of lies, excuses and accusations as the UN refused to provide an explanation to donors, the Angolan government and people, project staff and the press of what went wrong and why.
It had become more apparent in 2024 that a new mission should replace the African Union Transitio... more It had become more apparent in 2024 that a new mission should replace the African Union Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS). Towards the end of July 2024, the PSC requested the African Union Commission (AUC) to submit a Concept of Operations (ConOps) for a new mission: the AU Stabilisation and Support Mission in Somalia (AUSSOM). On 01 August 2024, the PSC published a Communique of its 1225th meeting. It recognises the need to assess the impact and implications of the Phase 3 drawdown of ATMIS to avoid any security vacuum during the transition phase. Getting out of Somalia credibly was always going to be a challenging proposition, which would require a sufficient understanding of how to handle several outstanding political and military priorities, followed by clear communication to avoid worsening the situation. In 2022, when AMISOM transitioned to ATMIS, the new mission inherited the same priorities and constraints as AMISOM, almost certainly the same inability to deal with it and the same uncertainty about how it would leave. Learning from the past, therefore, makes the same question a top priority. The strategy for the new mission is premised on supporting the effective implementation of the Somalia Stabilisation and Development Plan (SSDP). It is also “predicated on the achievement by Somalia Security Forces (SSF) of a level of capability for taking over security responsibility from the AU mission, the erosion of Al-Shabaab’s capacity to a point where it no longer poses serious threats, and most notably the consolidation of national political cohesion and settlement and the expansion of state authority through enhanced legitimate local governance structures that deliver public services.” The concerned institutions and stakeholders need to demonstrate a deeper understanding of how to adequately incorporate a sufficiently nuanced understanding of the dynamics of fragility and its variations into policies or practices. This ensures that the mission does not become a captive of problematic communication that will undermine its very essence. Improving the efficiency and effectiveness of the mission will require that Peace Support Operations (PSOs) prioritise human security considerations.
AU missions should strengthen the institutional framework for Human Security threat early warning... more AU missions should strengthen the institutional framework for Human Security threat early warning signals, escalation, response preparedness and capabilities through utilising the full capacities of the UN and international framework.
A specific institutional structure of effective threat intelligence, data gathering, and analysis for robust operational, policy and strategic decision-making is needed.
There is an increasing urgency to highlight the need for full support and long-term commitment from the international community in preventing and combating transnational threats. Improving the efficiency and effectiveness of AU missions may require that human security considerations are adequately prioritised in mandates. Mandates must better specify areas of human security considerations such as access to justice, education, health, physical protection from abuse by state and non-state actors, armed and criminal groups and spoilers.
A scale up of political and technical support to the AU is required in its peacebuilding, reconstruction and development efforts across all relevant activities and engagements. AU missions should strengthen the institutional framework for Human Security threat early warning signals, escalation, response preparedness and capabilities through utilising the full capacities of the UN and international framework.
Protection of civilians mandates have been a key feature of peace support operations for almost t... more Protection of civilians mandates have been a key feature of peace support operations for almost two decades, but policies and guidance for troops on how to achieve this exist mostly in aspirational and normative instruments. The quality of missions are affected by an inability of international support to address the root causes of the conflict. While United Nations peacekeeping operational doctrines are readily understood at the strategic level, their effective implementation at the tactical level poses challenges.
The international response to conflict often takes the form of increasingly complex interventions characterized by institutional proliferation and overlap; various sources of legitimacy and authority; and convoluted hierarchies. Missions increasing operate in an unstable environment where conflict dynamics are highly unpredictable. A closer integration between the AU missions and the UN system of coordination bodies, funds and programmes is widely suggested by stakeholders.
Although protection of civilians mandates have been a key feature of peace support operations for... more Although protection of civilians mandates have been a key feature of peace support operations for almost two decades, policies and guidance for troops on how to achieve this exist mostly in aspirational and normative instruments. AMISOM had a contradictory relationship with the challenge to protect Somali civilians and to comply with its mandate.
This begs the question of whether the foreign troops brought peace or whether their presence rekindled the conflict. The heavy presence of AU troops brought some stability but also reignited hostilities, rivalry and retaliatory attacks by militant groups against potential targets. The need for recognition and understanding of how Troop Contributing Countries (TCCs) operate in hostile environments in the interest of civilians and the ad-hoc initiatives adopted by PSOs indicate a need for systemic change and a resolution of the tension between, mandate; doctrine, practice and reception of missions.
Perpetrators of violence against civilians employ a range of strategies to both target the physical safety and well-being of individuals and groups and to render the environment in which individuals and groups live insecure. While all stakeholders, including the UN, AU, troop contributing countries, and the Somali government, share a common understanding of countering Al-Shabaab’s vision, the political commitment to this fight varies.
The nature of the wars, armed conflicts, violence and civil movements in African countries indica... more The nature of the wars, armed conflicts, violence and civil movements in African countries indicate that there is a need to improve and modernize the traditional military and police peace operations, especially African-led operations. A gap in mandate language, combined with an overall limited understanding of the tangible value of civil society engagement, has historically led to the lack of an institutional incentive within missions to develop a systematic approach for regular mission engagement with civil society actors on issues of peace and security (DPKO, 2016).
Various resolutions passed by the UNSC and AU PSC gradually evolved to specifically emphasising to protect the human rights of vulnerable groups. Emphases came to be placed on the importance of adhering to the Secretary-General’s Human Rights and Due Diligence Policy and the United Nations Zero-Tolerance Policy on Sexual Exploitation and Abuse. Increasing the involvement of local actors supporting justice, police, and civilian management and governance capacities could make peace support more effective.
Successive resolutions stressed concerns on violations of human rights, including extrajudicial killings, violence against women, children and journalists, arbitrary detention and pervasive sexual violence, and underscoring the need to end impunity, uphold human rights and to hold accountable those who commit such crimes. A human security approach could speak better to legitimacy and authority where there is no other source. It could set up a more solid foundation for a state to emerge, not based on violence or for an indifferent and exploitative form of governance to be imposed.
The African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) is an active, regional peacekeeping mission operate... more The African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) is an active, regional peacekeeping mission operated by the African Union (AU) with the approval of the United Nations. It was created by the African Union’s Peace and Security Council on 19th January 2007 with an initial six month mandate. It replaced and subsumed the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) Peace Support Mission to Somalia (IGASOM), which was a proposed protection and training mission approved by the AU in September 2006. It was also approved by the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). Initially the expectation was that when conditions permitted, the UNSC would deploy a UN peacekeeping operation that would subsume or replace the AU effort. That is not yet the case and the SC continues to rely on AMISOM as the main peace operation, even as the UN presence in the country has grown. Two armed, mobile AMISOM Formed Police Units numbering 280 police, backfill and supplement security in areas of Mogadishu vacated by AMISOM soldiers. Training and improving the Somali security forces is becoming a priority for AMISOM. A civilian component supports the provision of effective governance in recovered areas. The EU supports AMISOM, and also runs a security sector support mission that trains Somali government forces, as well as supporting humanitarian, development and state-building initiatives. The strength of AMISOM uniformed personnel is 22,126.
The African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM)was an active, regional peacekeeping mission operate... more The African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM)was an active, regional peacekeeping mission operated by the African Union (AU) with the approval of the United Nations. It was created by the African Union’s Peace and Security Council on 19th January 2007 with an initial six month mandate. It replaced and subsumed the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) Peace Support Mission to Somalia (IGASOM), which was a proposed protection and training mission approved by the AU in September 2006. It was also approved by the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). Initially the expectation was that when conditions permitted, the UNSC would deploy a UN peacekeeping operation that would subsume or replace the AU effort. That is not yet the case and the SC continues to rely on AMISOM as the main peace operation, even as the UN presence in the country has grown. Two armed, mobile AMISOM Formed Police Units numbering 280 police, backfill and supplement security in areas of Mogadishu vacated by AMISOM soldiers. Training and improving the Somali security forces is becoming a priority for AMISOM. A civilian component supports the provision of effective governance in recovered areas. The EU supports AMISOM, and also runs a security sector support mission that trains Somali government forces, as well as supporting humanitarian, development and state-building initiatives. The strength of AMISOM uniformed personnel is 22,126.
The Monitoring and Verification Mechanism (MVM) for South Sudan was established by the IGAD in Ja... more The Monitoring and Verification Mechanism (MVM) for South Sudan was established by the IGAD in January 2014 with the aim of monitoring, investigating and reporting compliance of the two warring parties to the Cessation of Hostilities (CoH) agreement. The parties agreed to the establishment of a Joint Technical Committee (JTC) and Monitoring and Verification Teams (MVTs). The overall objective of the MVM is to have the peace agreements effectively implemented and the return of South Sudan to socio-political normalcy secured by July 2015. Due to delays in the negotiations this is now 31 December 2015. Progress towards the overall goal can be broadly summarized in the areas of the political commitment of the parties to the conflict to engage in negotiations, in the signing of the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement and the Status of Detainees signed on 03 January 2014 and in the subsequent summit decisions that paved way for further dialogue, broadening the basis for other stakeholders.
The successful establishment and deployment of the monitoring and Verification mechanism (MVM) and the succeeding efforts by Envoys to assist parties have clear agenda items with proper modalities and rules of procedure were also very critical in shaping the negotiations.
The Monitoring and Verification Mechanism (MVM) for South Sudan was established by the IGAD in Ja... more The Monitoring and Verification Mechanism (MVM) for South Sudan was established by the IGAD in January 2014 with the aim of monitoring, investigating and reporting compliance of the two warring parties to the Cessation of Hostilities (CoH) agreement. The parties agreed to the establishment of a Joint Technical Committee (JTC) and Monitoring and Verification Teams (MVTs). The overall objective of the MVM is to have the peace agreements effectively implemented and the return of South Sudan to socio-political normalcy secured by July 2015. Due to delays in the negotiations this is now 31 December 2015. Progress towards the overall goal can be broadly summarized in the areas of the political commitment of the parties to the conflict to engage in negotiations, in the signing of the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement and the Status of Detainees signed on 03 January 2014 and in the subsequent summit decisions that paved way for further dialogue, broadening the basis for other stakeholders.
The successful establishment and deployment of the monitoring and Verification mechanism (MVM) and the succeeding efforts by Envoys to assist parties have clear agenda items with proper modalities and rules of procedure were also very critical in shaping the negotiations.
For 20 years Somalia was governed by a variety of political, security and administrative entities... more For 20 years Somalia was governed by a variety of political, security and administrative entities. The internationally recognised Transitional Federal Government (TFG) (2006-2012) and the Federal Government of Somalia (2012-present), fought various Islamic militia groups, most recently Al Shabaab. Government troops, supported by the African Union peace support mission AMISOM, have gained ground in Mogadishu. Al Shabaab have been withdrawing their forces from the capital, allowing the Federal Government to expand control across Mogadishu. The President in 2012 committed to implementing the New Deal (2014-2016) process and principles towards establishing a single overarching framework for all international donor and partner engagement. A critical element of consolidating control is to immediately deploy police across the city and to ensure that they are appropriately trained, equipped and are being paid regularly. The Somalis and the international community agree on the most important priorities in five areas - the Peacebuilding and State building Goals (PSGs): Inclusive Politics; Security; Justice; Economic Foundations; Services and revenue. PSG2 set the strategic objective to establish unified, capable, accountable, and rights based federal security institutions able to provide safety and security for its citizens. Regular stipend payments are critical to ensure the loyalty, commitment, morale, performance and retention of skilled police officers at this critical time.
The Monitoring and Verification Mechanism (MVM) for South Sudan was established by the IGAD in Ja... more The Monitoring and Verification Mechanism (MVM) for South Sudan was established by the IGAD in January 2014 with the aim of monitoring, investigating and reporting compliance of the two warring parties to the Cessation of Hostilities (CoH) agreement. The parties agreed to the establishment of a Joint Technical Committee (JTC) and Monitoring and Verification Teams (MVTs). The overall objective of the MVM is to have the peace agreements effectively implemented and the return of South Sudan to socio-political normalcy secured by July 2015. Due to delays in the negotiations this is now 31 December 2015. Progress towards the overall goal can be broadly summarized in the areas of the political commitment of the parties to the conflict to engage in negotiations, in the signing of the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement and the Status of Detainees signed on 03 January 2014 and in the subsequent summit decisions that paved way for further dialogue, broadening the basis for other stakeholders.
The successful establishment and deployment of the monitoring and Verification mechanism (MVM) and the succeeding efforts by Envoys to assist parties have clear agenda items with proper modalities and rules of procedure were also very critical in shaping the negotiations.
For 20 years Somalia was governed by a variety of political, security and administrative entities... more For 20 years Somalia was governed by a variety of political, security and administrative entities. The internationally recognised Transitional Federal Government (TFG) (2006-2012) and the Federal Government of Somalia (2012-present), fought various Islamic militia groups, most recently Al Shabaab. Government troops, supported by the African Union peace support mission AMISOM, have gained ground in Mogadishu. Al Shabaab have been withdrawing their forces from the capital, allowing the Federal Government to expand control across Mogadishu. The President in 2012 committed to implementing the New Deal (2014-2016) process and principles towards establishing a single overarching framework for all international donor and partner engagement. A critical element of consolidating control is to immediately deploy police across the city and to ensure that they are appropriately trained, equipped and are being paid regularly. The Somalis and the international community agree on the most important priorities in five areas - the Peacebuilding and State building Goals (PSGs): Inclusive Politics; Security; Justice; Economic Foundations; Services and revenue. PSG2 set the strategic objective to establish unified, capable, accountable, and rights based federal security institutions able to provide safety and security for its citizens. Regular stipend payments are critical to ensure the loyalty, commitment, morale, performance and retention of skilled police officers at this critical time.
For 20 years Somalia was governed by a variety of political, security and administrative entities... more For 20 years Somalia was governed by a variety of political, security and administrative entities. The internationally recognised Transitional Federal Government (TFG) (2006-2012) and the Federal Government of Somalia (2012-present), fought various Islamic militia groups, most recently Al Shabaab. Government troops, supported by the African Union peace support mission AMISOM, have gained ground in Mogadishu. Al Shabaab have been withdrawing their forces from the capital, allowing the Federal Government to expand control across Mogadishu. The President in 2012 committed to implementing the New Deal (2014-2016) process and principles towards establishing a single overarching framework for all international donor and partner engagement. A critical element of consolidating control is to immediately deploy police across the city and to ensure that they are appropriately trained, equipped and are being paid regularly. The Somalis and the international community agree on the most important priorities in five areas - the Peacebuilding and State building Goals (PSGs): Inclusive Politics; Security; Justice; Economic Foundations; Services and revenue. PSG2 set the strategic objective to establish unified, capable, accountable, and rights based federal security institutions able to provide safety and security for its citizens. Regular stipend payments are critical to ensure the loyalty, commitment, morale, performance and retention of skilled police officers at this critical time.
Both the AU and EU identified that one of the major challenges for AU Peace Support Operations Di... more Both the AU and EU identified that one of the major challenges for AU Peace Support Operations Division (PSOD) is at the strategic level, where there is little capacity to manage complex peacekeeping operations, undermining the integrity of the ASF concept. The relationship between the AU PSC and the ASF also needed to be further clarified and understood by all stakeholders. The ASF policy documents (Doctrine, Logistics, Training and SoPs etc.) needed to be updated in the light of the lessons learnt. The procedure for establishing mission headquarters also had to be developed and tested. AMANI Africa II was a comprehensive AU/REC exercise that aimed to test political, strategic, operational, tactical components of deploying a PSO. Additionally a live fire exercise was conducted. This was perhaps an over-ambitious and methodologically unsound approach, diluting the results, the applicability of the results to real world scenarios and the ability to objectively evaluate the different components of the exercise. None of the objectives above were fully satisfactory. The Command Post Exercise (CPX), that was financed by the EU, was not tested at all, as this component was not established during the exercise. This is exactly where capacity building is most needed as political leadership and HQ capacity is weak in current PSOs (AMISOM (Somalia) and UNMIS (Darfur region of Sudan; jointly administered with UN).
Both the AU and EU identified that one of the major challenges for AU Peace Support Operations Di... more Both the AU and EU identified that one of the major challenges for AU Peace Support Operations Division (PSOD) is at the strategic level, where there is little capacity to manage complex peacekeeping operations, undermining the integrity of the ASF concept. The relationship between the AU PSC and the ASF also needed to be further clarified and understood by all stakeholders. The ASF policy documents (Doctrine, Logistics, Training and SoPs etc.) needed to be updated in the light of the lessons learnt. The procedure for establishing mission headquarters also had to be developed and tested. AMANI Africa II was a comprehensive AU/REC exercise that aimed to test political, strategic, operational, tactical components of deploying a PSO. Additionally a live fire exercise was conducted. This was perhaps an over-ambitious and methodologically unsound approach, diluting the results, the applicability of the results to real world scenarios and the ability to objectively evaluate the different components of the exercise. None of the objectives above were fully satisfactory. The Command Post Exercise (CPX), that was financed by the EU, was not tested at all, as this component was not established during the exercise. This is exactly where capacity building is most needed as political leadership and HQ capacity is weak in current PSOs (AMISOM (Somalia) and UNMIS (Darfur region of Sudan; jointly administered with UN).
This book explores some of the complexities prompted by the application of the definition of mone... more This book explores some of the complexities prompted by the application of the definition of money laundering to practical situations encountered in Africa. It exposes the inaccuracy of the term ‘money laundering’ as a description of what may be concealed or converted. It is not only money that can be
unlawfully handled in the way envisaged by the definition. Any value-storing commodity can be ‘laundered’, with money being but the commonest example.
In recent years, joint policing operations between countries and the development of regional orga... more In recent years, joint policing operations between countries and the development of regional organisations such as SARPCCO has resulted in increasing regionalisation and trans nationalisation of policing. Just as the increasing privatisation of security has highlighted new challenges for issues of accountability, so too has the regionalisation and trans nationalisation of policing taken the debate on police accountability into different spheres and introduced new questions on who needs to hold whom accountable and by what means.
The seven papers presented in the publication to be launched by APCOF and UCT Criminology is a discussion on this and on cross border policing in general. They fall into three categories. Louise Edwards and Leon Kukkuk present informative, detailed accounts of the institutional framework for cooperation and accountability regarding cross-border policing and peacekeeping both internationally and as regards the evolution of the police component of the African Standby Force. They explicate the myriad of legal and other instruments applicable to both cases, and comment on the challenges faced in the institutionalization of accountability provisions. The latter are many and complex, but some progress has taken place.
Taking the examples of Lesotho-South Africa policing cooperation and the work of Operation Rachel in small-arms destruction, Amanda Lucey and Chelete Monyane investigate how such cooperation has been functioning in recent years under the aegis of SARPCCO. This is valuable information on how the system of cooperative policing has worked in practice in these two cases. While both authors painstakingly document the deficiencies on the ground, they also reveal how extensive cross-border policing activity has been. They too emphasise the issue of accountability, and how the experience of the last fifteen years has brought to the surface both the possibilities and problems of generalising police accountability across borders.
Amanda Dissel writes on the SARPCCO Code of conduct and its relevance in articulating a standard of acceptable policing in Southern Africa. Reflecting on current APCOF work she makes a case for deepening and strengthening the application of the code through the development of appropriate indicators. Sean Tait reflects on the Strategic Indicative Plan of the SADC Organ on Politics Democracy and Security Cooperation and raises issues for consideration regarding policing. Finally Elrena van der Spuy reflects on the impact of the Fifa world cup on policing and police co operation in the region
The utility of a better understanding of the challenges and issues for policing in new regional and transnational settings are similar to those of policing anywhere. It has value in the broader issues of governance and in the more practical issues of police effectiveness. However given the context of cross border operations, this utility is often magnified.
Volume 6 of the highly-regarded series, now with 120 additional pages and loads of award-winning ... more Volume 6 of the highly-regarded series, now with 120 additional pages and loads of award-winning writers from around the globe. The book series that defines a generation, the generation born since 1960, defining its unique place in history through its own voices.
War in Angola lasted intermittently for more than forty years. After a failed attempt at peace fr... more War in Angola lasted intermittently for more than forty years. After a failed attempt at peace from 1994 to 1998 a full scale conventional war broke out again at the end of 1998. This marked the end of a United Nations attempt, lasting more than twelve years, to make peace in this country. It was one of the first big UN missions after the Cold War and turned into a spectacular and expensive failure. Throughout this last "War for Peace" from 1998-2002 the author lived and worked in Huambo, at the epicentre of the war, implementing a United Nations project. This project, poorly planned initially, was restructured locally and achieved considerable successes before finally succumbing to UN incompetence that saw two thirds of its funding disappear and degenerated into a web of lies, excuses and accusations as the UN refused to provide an explanation to donors, the Angolan government and people, project staff and the press of what went wrong and why.
It had become more apparent in 2024 that a new mission should replace the African Union Transitio... more It had become more apparent in 2024 that a new mission should replace the African Union Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS). Towards the end of July 2024, the PSC requested the African Union Commission (AUC) to submit a Concept of Operations (ConOps) for a new mission: the AU Stabilisation and Support Mission in Somalia (AUSSOM). On 01 August 2024, the PSC published a Communique of its 1225th meeting. It recognises the need to assess the impact and implications of the Phase 3 drawdown of ATMIS to avoid any security vacuum during the transition phase. Getting out of Somalia credibly was always going to be a challenging proposition, which would require a sufficient understanding of how to handle several outstanding political and military priorities, followed by clear communication to avoid worsening the situation. In 2022, when AMISOM transitioned to ATMIS, the new mission inherited the same priorities and constraints as AMISOM, almost certainly the same inability to deal with it and the same uncertainty about how it would leave. Learning from the past, therefore, makes the same question a top priority. The strategy for the new mission is premised on supporting the effective implementation of the Somalia Stabilisation and Development Plan (SSDP). It is also “predicated on the achievement by Somalia Security Forces (SSF) of a level of capability for taking over security responsibility from the AU mission, the erosion of Al-Shabaab’s capacity to a point where it no longer poses serious threats, and most notably the consolidation of national political cohesion and settlement and the expansion of state authority through enhanced legitimate local governance structures that deliver public services.” The concerned institutions and stakeholders need to demonstrate a deeper understanding of how to adequately incorporate a sufficiently nuanced understanding of the dynamics of fragility and its variations into policies or practices. This ensures that the mission does not become a captive of problematic communication that will undermine its very essence. Improving the efficiency and effectiveness of the mission will require that Peace Support Operations (PSOs) prioritise human security considerations.
AU missions should strengthen the institutional framework for Human Security threat early warning... more AU missions should strengthen the institutional framework for Human Security threat early warning signals, escalation, response preparedness and capabilities through utilising the full capacities of the UN and international framework.
A specific institutional structure of effective threat intelligence, data gathering, and analysis for robust operational, policy and strategic decision-making is needed.
There is an increasing urgency to highlight the need for full support and long-term commitment from the international community in preventing and combating transnational threats. Improving the efficiency and effectiveness of AU missions may require that human security considerations are adequately prioritised in mandates. Mandates must better specify areas of human security considerations such as access to justice, education, health, physical protection from abuse by state and non-state actors, armed and criminal groups and spoilers.
A scale up of political and technical support to the AU is required in its peacebuilding, reconstruction and development efforts across all relevant activities and engagements. AU missions should strengthen the institutional framework for Human Security threat early warning signals, escalation, response preparedness and capabilities through utilising the full capacities of the UN and international framework.
Protection of civilians mandates have been a key feature of peace support operations for almost t... more Protection of civilians mandates have been a key feature of peace support operations for almost two decades, but policies and guidance for troops on how to achieve this exist mostly in aspirational and normative instruments. The quality of missions are affected by an inability of international support to address the root causes of the conflict. While United Nations peacekeeping operational doctrines are readily understood at the strategic level, their effective implementation at the tactical level poses challenges.
The international response to conflict often takes the form of increasingly complex interventions characterized by institutional proliferation and overlap; various sources of legitimacy and authority; and convoluted hierarchies. Missions increasing operate in an unstable environment where conflict dynamics are highly unpredictable. A closer integration between the AU missions and the UN system of coordination bodies, funds and programmes is widely suggested by stakeholders.
Although protection of civilians mandates have been a key feature of peace support operations for... more Although protection of civilians mandates have been a key feature of peace support operations for almost two decades, policies and guidance for troops on how to achieve this exist mostly in aspirational and normative instruments. AMISOM had a contradictory relationship with the challenge to protect Somali civilians and to comply with its mandate.
This begs the question of whether the foreign troops brought peace or whether their presence rekindled the conflict. The heavy presence of AU troops brought some stability but also reignited hostilities, rivalry and retaliatory attacks by militant groups against potential targets. The need for recognition and understanding of how Troop Contributing Countries (TCCs) operate in hostile environments in the interest of civilians and the ad-hoc initiatives adopted by PSOs indicate a need for systemic change and a resolution of the tension between, mandate; doctrine, practice and reception of missions.
Perpetrators of violence against civilians employ a range of strategies to both target the physical safety and well-being of individuals and groups and to render the environment in which individuals and groups live insecure. While all stakeholders, including the UN, AU, troop contributing countries, and the Somali government, share a common understanding of countering Al-Shabaab’s vision, the political commitment to this fight varies.
The nature of the wars, armed conflicts, violence and civil movements in African countries indica... more The nature of the wars, armed conflicts, violence and civil movements in African countries indicate that there is a need to improve and modernize the traditional military and police peace operations, especially African-led operations. A gap in mandate language, combined with an overall limited understanding of the tangible value of civil society engagement, has historically led to the lack of an institutional incentive within missions to develop a systematic approach for regular mission engagement with civil society actors on issues of peace and security (DPKO, 2016).
Various resolutions passed by the UNSC and AU PSC gradually evolved to specifically emphasising to protect the human rights of vulnerable groups. Emphases came to be placed on the importance of adhering to the Secretary-General’s Human Rights and Due Diligence Policy and the United Nations Zero-Tolerance Policy on Sexual Exploitation and Abuse. Increasing the involvement of local actors supporting justice, police, and civilian management and governance capacities could make peace support more effective.
Successive resolutions stressed concerns on violations of human rights, including extrajudicial killings, violence against women, children and journalists, arbitrary detention and pervasive sexual violence, and underscoring the need to end impunity, uphold human rights and to hold accountable those who commit such crimes. A human security approach could speak better to legitimacy and authority where there is no other source. It could set up a more solid foundation for a state to emerge, not based on violence or for an indifferent and exploitative form of governance to be imposed.
The African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) is an active, regional peacekeeping mission operate... more The African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) is an active, regional peacekeeping mission operated by the African Union (AU) with the approval of the United Nations. It was created by the African Union’s Peace and Security Council on 19th January 2007 with an initial six month mandate. It replaced and subsumed the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) Peace Support Mission to Somalia (IGASOM), which was a proposed protection and training mission approved by the AU in September 2006. It was also approved by the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). Initially the expectation was that when conditions permitted, the UNSC would deploy a UN peacekeeping operation that would subsume or replace the AU effort. That is not yet the case and the SC continues to rely on AMISOM as the main peace operation, even as the UN presence in the country has grown. Two armed, mobile AMISOM Formed Police Units numbering 280 police, backfill and supplement security in areas of Mogadishu vacated by AMISOM soldiers. Training and improving the Somali security forces is becoming a priority for AMISOM. A civilian component supports the provision of effective governance in recovered areas. The EU supports AMISOM, and also runs a security sector support mission that trains Somali government forces, as well as supporting humanitarian, development and state-building initiatives. The strength of AMISOM uniformed personnel is 22,126.
The African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM)was an active, regional peacekeeping mission operate... more The African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM)was an active, regional peacekeeping mission operated by the African Union (AU) with the approval of the United Nations. It was created by the African Union’s Peace and Security Council on 19th January 2007 with an initial six month mandate. It replaced and subsumed the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) Peace Support Mission to Somalia (IGASOM), which was a proposed protection and training mission approved by the AU in September 2006. It was also approved by the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). Initially the expectation was that when conditions permitted, the UNSC would deploy a UN peacekeeping operation that would subsume or replace the AU effort. That is not yet the case and the SC continues to rely on AMISOM as the main peace operation, even as the UN presence in the country has grown. Two armed, mobile AMISOM Formed Police Units numbering 280 police, backfill and supplement security in areas of Mogadishu vacated by AMISOM soldiers. Training and improving the Somali security forces is becoming a priority for AMISOM. A civilian component supports the provision of effective governance in recovered areas. The EU supports AMISOM, and also runs a security sector support mission that trains Somali government forces, as well as supporting humanitarian, development and state-building initiatives. The strength of AMISOM uniformed personnel is 22,126.
The Monitoring and Verification Mechanism (MVM) for South Sudan was established by the IGAD in Ja... more The Monitoring and Verification Mechanism (MVM) for South Sudan was established by the IGAD in January 2014 with the aim of monitoring, investigating and reporting compliance of the two warring parties to the Cessation of Hostilities (CoH) agreement. The parties agreed to the establishment of a Joint Technical Committee (JTC) and Monitoring and Verification Teams (MVTs). The overall objective of the MVM is to have the peace agreements effectively implemented and the return of South Sudan to socio-political normalcy secured by July 2015. Due to delays in the negotiations this is now 31 December 2015. Progress towards the overall goal can be broadly summarized in the areas of the political commitment of the parties to the conflict to engage in negotiations, in the signing of the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement and the Status of Detainees signed on 03 January 2014 and in the subsequent summit decisions that paved way for further dialogue, broadening the basis for other stakeholders.
The successful establishment and deployment of the monitoring and Verification mechanism (MVM) and the succeeding efforts by Envoys to assist parties have clear agenda items with proper modalities and rules of procedure were also very critical in shaping the negotiations.
The Monitoring and Verification Mechanism (MVM) for South Sudan was established by the IGAD in Ja... more The Monitoring and Verification Mechanism (MVM) for South Sudan was established by the IGAD in January 2014 with the aim of monitoring, investigating and reporting compliance of the two warring parties to the Cessation of Hostilities (CoH) agreement. The parties agreed to the establishment of a Joint Technical Committee (JTC) and Monitoring and Verification Teams (MVTs). The overall objective of the MVM is to have the peace agreements effectively implemented and the return of South Sudan to socio-political normalcy secured by July 2015. Due to delays in the negotiations this is now 31 December 2015. Progress towards the overall goal can be broadly summarized in the areas of the political commitment of the parties to the conflict to engage in negotiations, in the signing of the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement and the Status of Detainees signed on 03 January 2014 and in the subsequent summit decisions that paved way for further dialogue, broadening the basis for other stakeholders.
The successful establishment and deployment of the monitoring and Verification mechanism (MVM) and the succeeding efforts by Envoys to assist parties have clear agenda items with proper modalities and rules of procedure were also very critical in shaping the negotiations.
For 20 years Somalia was governed by a variety of political, security and administrative entities... more For 20 years Somalia was governed by a variety of political, security and administrative entities. The internationally recognised Transitional Federal Government (TFG) (2006-2012) and the Federal Government of Somalia (2012-present), fought various Islamic militia groups, most recently Al Shabaab. Government troops, supported by the African Union peace support mission AMISOM, have gained ground in Mogadishu. Al Shabaab have been withdrawing their forces from the capital, allowing the Federal Government to expand control across Mogadishu. The President in 2012 committed to implementing the New Deal (2014-2016) process and principles towards establishing a single overarching framework for all international donor and partner engagement. A critical element of consolidating control is to immediately deploy police across the city and to ensure that they are appropriately trained, equipped and are being paid regularly. The Somalis and the international community agree on the most important priorities in five areas - the Peacebuilding and State building Goals (PSGs): Inclusive Politics; Security; Justice; Economic Foundations; Services and revenue. PSG2 set the strategic objective to establish unified, capable, accountable, and rights based federal security institutions able to provide safety and security for its citizens. Regular stipend payments are critical to ensure the loyalty, commitment, morale, performance and retention of skilled police officers at this critical time.
The Monitoring and Verification Mechanism (MVM) for South Sudan was established by the IGAD in Ja... more The Monitoring and Verification Mechanism (MVM) for South Sudan was established by the IGAD in January 2014 with the aim of monitoring, investigating and reporting compliance of the two warring parties to the Cessation of Hostilities (CoH) agreement. The parties agreed to the establishment of a Joint Technical Committee (JTC) and Monitoring and Verification Teams (MVTs). The overall objective of the MVM is to have the peace agreements effectively implemented and the return of South Sudan to socio-political normalcy secured by July 2015. Due to delays in the negotiations this is now 31 December 2015. Progress towards the overall goal can be broadly summarized in the areas of the political commitment of the parties to the conflict to engage in negotiations, in the signing of the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement and the Status of Detainees signed on 03 January 2014 and in the subsequent summit decisions that paved way for further dialogue, broadening the basis for other stakeholders.
The successful establishment and deployment of the monitoring and Verification mechanism (MVM) and the succeeding efforts by Envoys to assist parties have clear agenda items with proper modalities and rules of procedure were also very critical in shaping the negotiations.
For 20 years Somalia was governed by a variety of political, security and administrative entities... more For 20 years Somalia was governed by a variety of political, security and administrative entities. The internationally recognised Transitional Federal Government (TFG) (2006-2012) and the Federal Government of Somalia (2012-present), fought various Islamic militia groups, most recently Al Shabaab. Government troops, supported by the African Union peace support mission AMISOM, have gained ground in Mogadishu. Al Shabaab have been withdrawing their forces from the capital, allowing the Federal Government to expand control across Mogadishu. The President in 2012 committed to implementing the New Deal (2014-2016) process and principles towards establishing a single overarching framework for all international donor and partner engagement. A critical element of consolidating control is to immediately deploy police across the city and to ensure that they are appropriately trained, equipped and are being paid regularly. The Somalis and the international community agree on the most important priorities in five areas - the Peacebuilding and State building Goals (PSGs): Inclusive Politics; Security; Justice; Economic Foundations; Services and revenue. PSG2 set the strategic objective to establish unified, capable, accountable, and rights based federal security institutions able to provide safety and security for its citizens. Regular stipend payments are critical to ensure the loyalty, commitment, morale, performance and retention of skilled police officers at this critical time.
For 20 years Somalia was governed by a variety of political, security and administrative entities... more For 20 years Somalia was governed by a variety of political, security and administrative entities. The internationally recognised Transitional Federal Government (TFG) (2006-2012) and the Federal Government of Somalia (2012-present), fought various Islamic militia groups, most recently Al Shabaab. Government troops, supported by the African Union peace support mission AMISOM, have gained ground in Mogadishu. Al Shabaab have been withdrawing their forces from the capital, allowing the Federal Government to expand control across Mogadishu. The President in 2012 committed to implementing the New Deal (2014-2016) process and principles towards establishing a single overarching framework for all international donor and partner engagement. A critical element of consolidating control is to immediately deploy police across the city and to ensure that they are appropriately trained, equipped and are being paid regularly. The Somalis and the international community agree on the most important priorities in five areas - the Peacebuilding and State building Goals (PSGs): Inclusive Politics; Security; Justice; Economic Foundations; Services and revenue. PSG2 set the strategic objective to establish unified, capable, accountable, and rights based federal security institutions able to provide safety and security for its citizens. Regular stipend payments are critical to ensure the loyalty, commitment, morale, performance and retention of skilled police officers at this critical time.
Both the AU and EU identified that one of the major challenges for AU Peace Support Operations Di... more Both the AU and EU identified that one of the major challenges for AU Peace Support Operations Division (PSOD) is at the strategic level, where there is little capacity to manage complex peacekeeping operations, undermining the integrity of the ASF concept. The relationship between the AU PSC and the ASF also needed to be further clarified and understood by all stakeholders. The ASF policy documents (Doctrine, Logistics, Training and SoPs etc.) needed to be updated in the light of the lessons learnt. The procedure for establishing mission headquarters also had to be developed and tested. AMANI Africa II was a comprehensive AU/REC exercise that aimed to test political, strategic, operational, tactical components of deploying a PSO. Additionally a live fire exercise was conducted. This was perhaps an over-ambitious and methodologically unsound approach, diluting the results, the applicability of the results to real world scenarios and the ability to objectively evaluate the different components of the exercise. None of the objectives above were fully satisfactory. The Command Post Exercise (CPX), that was financed by the EU, was not tested at all, as this component was not established during the exercise. This is exactly where capacity building is most needed as political leadership and HQ capacity is weak in current PSOs (AMISOM (Somalia) and UNMIS (Darfur region of Sudan; jointly administered with UN).
Both the AU and EU identified that one of the major challenges for AU Peace Support Operations Di... more Both the AU and EU identified that one of the major challenges for AU Peace Support Operations Division (PSOD) is at the strategic level, where there is little capacity to manage complex peacekeeping operations, undermining the integrity of the ASF concept. The relationship between the AU PSC and the ASF also needed to be further clarified and understood by all stakeholders. The ASF policy documents (Doctrine, Logistics, Training and SoPs etc.) needed to be updated in the light of the lessons learnt. The procedure for establishing mission headquarters also had to be developed and tested. AMANI Africa II was a comprehensive AU/REC exercise that aimed to test political, strategic, operational, tactical components of deploying a PSO. Additionally a live fire exercise was conducted. This was perhaps an over-ambitious and methodologically unsound approach, diluting the results, the applicability of the results to real world scenarios and the ability to objectively evaluate the different components of the exercise. None of the objectives above were fully satisfactory. The Command Post Exercise (CPX), that was financed by the EU, was not tested at all, as this component was not established during the exercise. This is exactly where capacity building is most needed as political leadership and HQ capacity is weak in current PSOs (AMISOM (Somalia) and UNMIS (Darfur region of Sudan; jointly administered with UN).
Both the AU and EU identified that one of the major challenges for AU Peace Support Operations Di... more Both the AU and EU identified that one of the major challenges for AU Peace Support Operations Division (PSOD) is at the strategic level, where there is little capacity to manage complex peacekeeping operations, undermining the integrity of the ASF concept. The relationship between the AU PSC and the ASF also needed to be further clarified and understood by all stakeholders. The ASF policy documents (Doctrine, Logistics, Training and SoPs etc.) needed to be updated in the light of the lessons learnt. The procedure for establishing mission headquarters also had to be developed and tested.
AMANI Africa II was a comprehensive AU/REC exercise that aimed to test political, strategic, operational, tactical components of deploying a PSO. Additionally a live fire exercise was conducted. This was perhaps an over-ambitious and methodologically unsound approach, diluting the results, the applicability of the results to real world scenarios and the ability to objectively evaluate the different components of the exercise. None of the objectives above were fully satisfactory. The Command Post Exercise (CPX), that was financed by the EU, was not tested at all, as this component was not established during the exercise. This is exactly where capacity building is most needed as political leadership and HQ capacity is weak in current PSOs (AMISOM (Somalia) and UNMIS (Darfur region of Sudan; jointly administered with UN).
Angola - Final Evaluation of the DEMINING ACTION VOL III - Annex FINAL, 2019
Final Evaluation of the DEMINING ACTION in Angola (2008-2018) to “Support the re-establishment of... more Final Evaluation of the DEMINING ACTION in Angola (2008-2018) to “Support the re-establishment of minimum living condition of the most affected communities by mine and other unexploded devices" and to “Contribute to improve the access to areas affected by mines and other unexploded devices.” The focus of evaluation is on the assessment of achievements, the quality and the results of Actions in the context of an evolving cooperation policy with an increasing emphasis on result-oriented approaches and the contribution towards the implementation of the SDGs. From this perspective, the evaluation looked for evidence of why, whether or how these results are linked to the EU intervention and seek to identify the factors driving or hindering progress.
The Government of Japan has been leading Tokyo International Conference on African Development (T... more The Government of Japan has been leading Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD) conference since as early as 1993. TICAD is a multilateral international conference, in collaboration with the United Nations, United Nations Development Program (UNDP), World Bank and African Union Commission (AUC), that discusses and deal with issues relating to the development of the African continent. TICAD is Japan’s way of amplifying the importance of Africa following countries decreasing interest post-cold war. This forerunner of platforms for development has been able to support African initiatives on social and economic improvement in the continent mainly through grant aids and technical assistance. In doing so, African ownership and international partnership in African development has been the underlying principle in this conference which has been shared globally stirring interest in a number of African countries. It has been able to inspire African countries as well forming the rationale behind the establishment of the first all-inclusive development plan created by Africans themselves- the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD). In July 2020, the Government of Japan announced that TICAD 8 will be held in 2022 and will be hosted by the Republic of Tunisia making it the first TICAD to take place since the COVID-19 pandemic. TICAD is held every three years, and the recent one was TICAD 8, held in Tunis from 27-28 August 2022. TICAD 8 was attended by 48 African countries (20 Heads of State/Government level participants), Representatives of the co-organizers (the United Nations, the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), the World Bank, and the African Union Commission (AUC)) and Japanese private sectors among others. Economy, Society and Peace and Stability were discussed in the TICAD 8.
For the first time in his 31 years in power, Angola’s President, José Eduardo dos Santos, gave a ... more For the first time in his 31 years in power, Angola’s President, José Eduardo dos Santos, gave a State of the Nation address to the National Assembly in Luanda on 15 October. His decision to do so was doubtless informed by the looming elections in 2012. In the speech – a new feature on the political calendar after the revision of Angola’s constitution in February – Dos Santos acknowledged the challenges of ‘hunger and poverty’ and conceded that the economy had hit serious problems when the price of crude oil fell by over US$100 per barrel. Despite the Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola (MPLA) having polled 82% of the votes in the 2008 election, some in Luanda believe that Dos Santos is nervous about the 2012 elections and the possibility that polling fewer votes than before could make him appear weak.
"Cooperation and Accountability in the Cross-border Policing of Southern Africa" edited by Sean T... more "Cooperation and Accountability in the Cross-border Policing of Southern Africa" edited by Sean Tait (APCOF) and Elrena van der Spuy (Centre of Criminology)and funded by the Open Society Foundation of South Africa presents seven articles concerning aspects of cross-border police cooperation in the Southern African region.
The publication includes the following articles:
"The Police Component of the African Standby Force: Challenges for Accountability" by Leon Kukkuk
"Cross-border Policing - Lesotho and South Africa" by Amanda Lucey
"Operation Rachel: A Case Study in Cross-border Police Cooperation" by Chelete Monyane
The SARPCCO Code of Conduct" by Amanda Dissel
"Strategic Indicative Plan 2010-2015 for the Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation: Considerations for Policing in the Region" by Sean Tait
"The World Cup 2010 and Police Cooperation: The South African Case" by Elrena van der Spuy
This session will concentrate on lessons learnt from Angola and Uganda/Ghana in terms of using in... more This session will concentrate on lessons learnt from Angola and Uganda/Ghana in terms of using income from oil for strategic national development. In the case of Angola what benefit has its high GDP growth brought to people at the local level. How has it affected local institutional realities and can income from oil be applied for development at that level? Uganda on the other hand is a ‘new oil producer’. Its challenge is to derive maximum developmental benefit from oil extraction. As a new oil producer Uganda has to develop institutional, policy and other regulatory frameworks to govern the sector. Can we draw any lessons from Uganda’s experience thus far, and what vision does the Ugandan government have for the role of oil income in its national development framework. Lastly, this session will also look at the critical role that multinationals play in oil-producing countries in their mode of engagement in ensuring better governance and better prospects for broad-based, local economic development.
The Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) 1 was re-activated in late 2014 by the Lake Chad Basin... more The Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) 1 was re-activated in late 2014 by the Lake Chad Basin Commission (LCBC), as an ad hoc security arrangement to fight the spreading threat of Boko Haram in the region. 2 The MNJTF is comprised of troops from five Troop Contributing Countries (TCCs), namely Nigeria, Niger, Chad, Cameroon, and a smaller contingent from Benin. It operates under the political leadership and cooperation of the LCBC and its Regional Strategy for theStabilisation, Recovery and Resilience 3 Secretariat. In early 2015, the African Union Peace and Security Council (AU PSC) authorised 4 the operationalisation of the MNJTF mandate. However, the MNJTF is not deployed by AU and is not operating under AU command-and-control.
In times of increased global polarisation, the UN
should consolidate its core values and develop... more In times of increased global polarisation, the UN should consolidate its core values and develop functioning approaches and operational concepts. As highlighted in the UN Secretary-General’s pol- icy brief the New Agenda for Peace (NAP), the world organisation needs to supplement its multilateral toolbox, where regional organizations like the AU and European Union (EU), need to shore up their capacity to prevent and respond to conflicts. This will require mutual respect, common understand- ing and strategic coherence, based on leveraging comparative advantages.
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unlawfully handled in the way envisaged by the definition. Any value-storing commodity can be ‘laundered’, with money being but the commonest example.
The seven papers presented in the publication to be launched by APCOF and UCT Criminology is a discussion on this and on cross border policing in general. They fall into three categories. Louise Edwards and Leon Kukkuk present informative, detailed accounts of the institutional framework for cooperation and accountability regarding cross-border policing and peacekeeping both internationally and as regards the evolution of the police component of the African Standby Force. They explicate the myriad of legal and other instruments applicable to both cases, and comment on the challenges faced in the institutionalization of accountability provisions. The latter are many and complex, but some progress has taken place.
Taking the examples of Lesotho-South Africa policing cooperation and the work of Operation Rachel in small-arms destruction, Amanda Lucey and Chelete Monyane investigate how such cooperation has been functioning in recent years under the aegis of SARPCCO. This is valuable information on how the system of cooperative policing has worked in practice in these two cases. While both authors painstakingly document the deficiencies on the ground, they also reveal how extensive cross-border policing activity has been. They too emphasise the issue of accountability, and how the experience of the last fifteen years has brought to the surface both the possibilities and problems of generalising police accountability across borders.
Amanda Dissel writes on the SARPCCO Code of conduct and its relevance in articulating a standard of acceptable policing in Southern Africa. Reflecting on current APCOF work she makes a case for deepening and strengthening the application of the code through the development of appropriate indicators. Sean Tait reflects on the Strategic Indicative Plan of the SADC Organ on Politics Democracy and Security Cooperation and raises issues for consideration regarding policing. Finally Elrena van der Spuy reflects on the impact of the Fifa world cup on policing and police co operation in the region
The utility of a better understanding of the challenges and issues for policing in new regional and transnational settings are similar to those of policing anywhere. It has value in the broader issues of governance and in the more practical issues of police effectiveness. However given the context of cross border operations, this utility is often magnified.
Papers by Leon Kukkuk
Mission in Somalia (ATMIS). Towards the end of July 2024, the PSC requested the African Union
Commission (AUC) to submit a Concept of Operations (ConOps) for a new mission: the AU Stabilisation
and Support Mission in Somalia (AUSSOM). On 01 August 2024, the PSC published a Communique
of its 1225th meeting. It recognises the need to assess the impact and implications of the Phase
3 drawdown of ATMIS to avoid any security vacuum during the transition phase. Getting out of
Somalia credibly was always going to be a challenging proposition, which would require a sufficient
understanding of how to handle several outstanding political and military priorities, followed by clear
communication to avoid worsening the situation. In 2022, when AMISOM transitioned to ATMIS, the
new mission inherited the same priorities and constraints as AMISOM, almost certainly the same
inability to deal with it and the same uncertainty about how it would leave. Learning from the past,
therefore, makes the same question a top priority.
The strategy for the new mission is premised on supporting the effective implementation of the
Somalia Stabilisation and Development Plan (SSDP). It is also “predicated on the achievement by
Somalia Security Forces (SSF) of a level of capability for taking over security responsibility from the AU
mission, the erosion of Al-Shabaab’s capacity to a point where it no longer poses serious threats, and
most notably the consolidation of national political cohesion and settlement and the expansion of
state authority through enhanced legitimate local governance structures that deliver public services.”
The concerned institutions and stakeholders need to demonstrate a deeper understanding of how
to adequately incorporate a sufficiently nuanced understanding of the dynamics of fragility and
its variations into policies or practices. This ensures that the mission does not become a captive of
problematic communication that will undermine its very essence.
Improving the efficiency and effectiveness of the mission will require that Peace Support Operations
(PSOs) prioritise human security considerations.
A specific institutional structure of effective threat intelligence, data gathering, and analysis for robust operational, policy and strategic decision-making is needed.
There is an increasing urgency to highlight the need for full support and long-term commitment from the international community in preventing and combating transnational threats. Improving the efficiency and effectiveness of AU missions may require that human security considerations are adequately prioritised in mandates. Mandates must better specify areas of human security considerations such as access to justice, education, health, physical protection from abuse by state and non-state actors, armed and criminal groups and spoilers.
A scale up of political and technical support to the AU is required in its peacebuilding, reconstruction and development efforts across all relevant activities and engagements.
AU missions should strengthen the institutional framework for Human Security threat early warning signals, escalation, response preparedness and capabilities through utilising the full capacities of the UN and international framework.
The international response to conflict often takes the form of increasingly complex interventions characterized by institutional proliferation and overlap; various sources of legitimacy and authority; and convoluted hierarchies.
Missions increasing operate in an unstable environment where conflict dynamics are highly unpredictable.
A closer integration between the AU missions and the UN system of coordination bodies, funds and programmes is widely suggested by stakeholders.
This begs the question of whether the foreign troops brought peace or whether their presence rekindled the conflict. The heavy presence of AU troops brought some stability but also reignited hostilities, rivalry and retaliatory attacks by militant groups against potential targets. The need for recognition and understanding of how Troop Contributing Countries (TCCs) operate in hostile environments in the interest of civilians and the ad-hoc initiatives adopted by PSOs indicate a need for systemic change and a resolution of the tension between, mandate; doctrine, practice and reception of missions.
Perpetrators of violence against civilians employ a range of strategies to both target the physical safety and well-being of individuals and groups and to render the environment in which individuals and groups live insecure.
While all stakeholders, including the UN, AU, troop contributing countries, and the Somali government, share a common understanding of countering Al-Shabaab’s vision, the political commitment to this fight varies.
Various resolutions passed by the UNSC and AU PSC gradually evolved to specifically emphasising to protect the human rights of vulnerable groups. Emphases came to be placed on the importance of adhering to the Secretary-General’s Human Rights and Due Diligence Policy and the United Nations Zero-Tolerance Policy on Sexual Exploitation and Abuse.
Increasing the involvement of local actors supporting justice, police, and civilian management and governance capacities could make peace support more effective.
Successive resolutions stressed concerns on violations of human rights, including extrajudicial killings, violence against women, children and journalists, arbitrary detention and pervasive sexual violence, and underscoring the need to end impunity, uphold human rights and to hold accountable those who commit such crimes. A human security approach could speak better to legitimacy and authority where there is no other source. It could set up a more solid foundation for a state to emerge, not based on violence or for an indifferent and exploitative form of governance to be imposed.
It replaced and subsumed the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) Peace Support Mission to Somalia (IGASOM), which was a proposed protection and training mission approved by the AU in September 2006. It was also approved by the United Nations Security Council (UNSC).
Initially the expectation was that when conditions permitted, the UNSC would deploy a UN peacekeeping operation that would subsume or replace the AU effort. That is not yet the case and the SC continues to rely on AMISOM as the main peace operation, even as the UN presence in the country has grown. Two armed, mobile AMISOM Formed Police Units numbering 280 police, backfill and supplement security in areas of Mogadishu vacated by AMISOM soldiers. Training and improving the Somali security forces is becoming a priority for AMISOM. A civilian component supports the provision of effective governance in recovered areas.
The EU supports AMISOM, and also runs a security sector support mission that trains Somali government forces, as well as supporting humanitarian, development and state-building initiatives. The strength of AMISOM uniformed personnel is 22,126.
It replaced and subsumed the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) Peace Support Mission to Somalia (IGASOM), which was a proposed protection and training mission approved by the AU in September 2006. It was also approved by the United Nations Security Council (UNSC).
Initially the expectation was that when conditions permitted, the UNSC would deploy a UN peacekeeping operation that would subsume or replace the AU effort. That is not yet the case and the SC continues to rely on AMISOM as the main peace operation, even as the UN presence in the country has grown. Two armed, mobile AMISOM Formed Police Units numbering 280 police, backfill and supplement security in areas of Mogadishu vacated by AMISOM soldiers. Training and improving the Somali security forces is becoming a priority for AMISOM. A civilian component supports the provision of effective governance in recovered areas.
The EU supports AMISOM, and also runs a security sector support mission that trains Somali government forces, as well as supporting humanitarian, development and state-building initiatives. The strength of AMISOM uniformed personnel is 22,126.
The overall objective of the MVM is to have the peace agreements effectively implemented and the return of South Sudan to socio-political normalcy secured by July 2015. Due to delays in the negotiations this is now 31 December 2015.
Progress towards the overall goal can be broadly summarized in the areas of the political commitment of the parties to the conflict to engage in negotiations, in the signing of the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement and the Status of Detainees signed on 03 January 2014 and in the subsequent summit decisions that paved way for further dialogue, broadening the basis for other stakeholders.
The successful establishment and deployment of the monitoring and Verification mechanism (MVM) and the succeeding efforts by Envoys to assist parties have clear agenda items with proper modalities and rules of procedure were also very critical in shaping the negotiations.
The overall objective of the MVM is to have the peace agreements effectively implemented and the return of South Sudan to socio-political normalcy secured by July 2015. Due to delays in the negotiations this is now 31 December 2015.
Progress towards the overall goal can be broadly summarized in the areas of the political commitment of the parties to the conflict to engage in negotiations, in the signing of the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement and the Status of Detainees signed on 03 January 2014 and in the subsequent summit decisions that paved way for further dialogue, broadening the basis for other stakeholders.
The successful establishment and deployment of the monitoring and Verification mechanism (MVM) and the succeeding efforts by Envoys to assist parties have clear agenda items with proper modalities and rules of procedure were also very critical in shaping the negotiations.
Federal Government (TFG) (2006-2012) and the Federal Government of Somalia (2012-present), fought various Islamic militia groups,
most recently Al Shabaab. Government troops, supported by the African Union peace support mission AMISOM, have gained ground in
Mogadishu. Al Shabaab have been withdrawing their forces from the capital, allowing the Federal Government to expand control across
Mogadishu. The President in 2012 committed to implementing the New Deal (2014-2016) process and principles towards establishing a
single overarching framework for all international donor and partner engagement. A critical element of consolidating control is to
immediately deploy police across the city and to ensure that they are appropriately trained, equipped and are being paid regularly.
The Somalis and the international community agree on the most important priorities in five areas - the Peacebuilding and State building
Goals (PSGs): Inclusive Politics; Security; Justice; Economic Foundations; Services and revenue.
PSG2 set the strategic objective to establish unified, capable, accountable, and rights based federal security institutions able to provide
safety and security for its citizens. Regular stipend payments are critical to ensure the loyalty, commitment, morale, performance and
retention of skilled police officers at this critical time.
The overall objective of the MVM is to have the peace agreements effectively implemented and the return of South Sudan to socio-political normalcy secured by July 2015. Due to delays in the negotiations this is now 31 December 2015.
Progress towards the overall goal can be broadly summarized in the areas of the political commitment of the parties to the conflict to engage in negotiations, in the signing of the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement and the Status of Detainees signed on 03 January 2014 and in the subsequent summit decisions that paved way for further dialogue, broadening the basis for other stakeholders.
The successful establishment and deployment of the monitoring and Verification mechanism (MVM) and the succeeding efforts by Envoys to assist parties have clear agenda items with proper modalities and rules of procedure were also very critical in shaping the negotiations.
Federal Government (TFG) (2006-2012) and the Federal Government of Somalia (2012-present), fought various Islamic militia groups,
most recently Al Shabaab. Government troops, supported by the African Union peace support mission AMISOM, have gained ground in
Mogadishu. Al Shabaab have been withdrawing their forces from the capital, allowing the Federal Government to expand control across
Mogadishu. The President in 2012 committed to implementing the New Deal (2014-2016) process and principles towards establishing a
single overarching framework for all international donor and partner engagement. A critical element of consolidating control is to
immediately deploy police across the city and to ensure that they are appropriately trained, equipped and are being paid regularly.
The Somalis and the international community agree on the most important priorities in five areas - the Peacebuilding and State building
Goals (PSGs): Inclusive Politics; Security; Justice; Economic Foundations; Services and revenue.
PSG2 set the strategic objective to establish unified, capable, accountable, and rights based federal security institutions able to provide
safety and security for its citizens. Regular stipend payments are critical to ensure the loyalty, commitment, morale, performance and
retention of skilled police officers at this critical time.
Federal Government (TFG) (2006-2012) and the Federal Government of Somalia (2012-present), fought various Islamic militia groups,
most recently Al Shabaab. Government troops, supported by the African Union peace support mission AMISOM, have gained ground in
Mogadishu. Al Shabaab have been withdrawing their forces from the capital, allowing the Federal Government to expand control across
Mogadishu. The President in 2012 committed to implementing the New Deal (2014-2016) process and principles towards establishing a
single overarching framework for all international donor and partner engagement. A critical element of consolidating control is to
immediately deploy police across the city and to ensure that they are appropriately trained, equipped and are being paid regularly.
The Somalis and the international community agree on the most important priorities in five areas - the Peacebuilding and State building
Goals (PSGs): Inclusive Politics; Security; Justice; Economic Foundations; Services and revenue.
PSG2 set the strategic objective to establish unified, capable, accountable, and rights based federal security institutions able to provide
safety and security for its citizens. Regular stipend payments are critical to ensure the loyalty, commitment, morale, performance and
retention of skilled police officers at this critical time.
AMANI Africa II was a comprehensive AU/REC exercise that aimed to test political, strategic, operational, tactical components of deploying a PSO. Additionally a live fire exercise was conducted. This was perhaps an over-ambitious and methodologically unsound approach, diluting the results, the applicability of the results to real world scenarios and the ability to objectively evaluate the different components of the exercise. None of the objectives above were fully satisfactory. The Command Post Exercise (CPX), that was financed by the EU, was not tested at all, as this component was not established during the exercise. This is exactly where capacity building is most needed as political leadership and HQ capacity is weak in current PSOs (AMISOM (Somalia) and UNMIS (Darfur region of Sudan; jointly administered with UN).
AMANI Africa II was a comprehensive AU/REC exercise that aimed to test political, strategic, operational, tactical components of deploying a PSO. Additionally a live fire exercise was conducted. This was perhaps an over-ambitious and methodologically unsound approach, diluting the results, the applicability of the results to real world scenarios and the ability to objectively evaluate the different components of the exercise. None of the objectives above were fully satisfactory. The Command Post Exercise (CPX), that was financed by the EU, was not tested at all, as this component was not established during the exercise. This is exactly where capacity building is most needed as political leadership and HQ capacity is weak in current PSOs (AMISOM (Somalia) and UNMIS (Darfur region of Sudan; jointly administered with UN).
unlawfully handled in the way envisaged by the definition. Any value-storing commodity can be ‘laundered’, with money being but the commonest example.
The seven papers presented in the publication to be launched by APCOF and UCT Criminology is a discussion on this and on cross border policing in general. They fall into three categories. Louise Edwards and Leon Kukkuk present informative, detailed accounts of the institutional framework for cooperation and accountability regarding cross-border policing and peacekeeping both internationally and as regards the evolution of the police component of the African Standby Force. They explicate the myriad of legal and other instruments applicable to both cases, and comment on the challenges faced in the institutionalization of accountability provisions. The latter are many and complex, but some progress has taken place.
Taking the examples of Lesotho-South Africa policing cooperation and the work of Operation Rachel in small-arms destruction, Amanda Lucey and Chelete Monyane investigate how such cooperation has been functioning in recent years under the aegis of SARPCCO. This is valuable information on how the system of cooperative policing has worked in practice in these two cases. While both authors painstakingly document the deficiencies on the ground, they also reveal how extensive cross-border policing activity has been. They too emphasise the issue of accountability, and how the experience of the last fifteen years has brought to the surface both the possibilities and problems of generalising police accountability across borders.
Amanda Dissel writes on the SARPCCO Code of conduct and its relevance in articulating a standard of acceptable policing in Southern Africa. Reflecting on current APCOF work she makes a case for deepening and strengthening the application of the code through the development of appropriate indicators. Sean Tait reflects on the Strategic Indicative Plan of the SADC Organ on Politics Democracy and Security Cooperation and raises issues for consideration regarding policing. Finally Elrena van der Spuy reflects on the impact of the Fifa world cup on policing and police co operation in the region
The utility of a better understanding of the challenges and issues for policing in new regional and transnational settings are similar to those of policing anywhere. It has value in the broader issues of governance and in the more practical issues of police effectiveness. However given the context of cross border operations, this utility is often magnified.
Mission in Somalia (ATMIS). Towards the end of July 2024, the PSC requested the African Union
Commission (AUC) to submit a Concept of Operations (ConOps) for a new mission: the AU Stabilisation
and Support Mission in Somalia (AUSSOM). On 01 August 2024, the PSC published a Communique
of its 1225th meeting. It recognises the need to assess the impact and implications of the Phase
3 drawdown of ATMIS to avoid any security vacuum during the transition phase. Getting out of
Somalia credibly was always going to be a challenging proposition, which would require a sufficient
understanding of how to handle several outstanding political and military priorities, followed by clear
communication to avoid worsening the situation. In 2022, when AMISOM transitioned to ATMIS, the
new mission inherited the same priorities and constraints as AMISOM, almost certainly the same
inability to deal with it and the same uncertainty about how it would leave. Learning from the past,
therefore, makes the same question a top priority.
The strategy for the new mission is premised on supporting the effective implementation of the
Somalia Stabilisation and Development Plan (SSDP). It is also “predicated on the achievement by
Somalia Security Forces (SSF) of a level of capability for taking over security responsibility from the AU
mission, the erosion of Al-Shabaab’s capacity to a point where it no longer poses serious threats, and
most notably the consolidation of national political cohesion and settlement and the expansion of
state authority through enhanced legitimate local governance structures that deliver public services.”
The concerned institutions and stakeholders need to demonstrate a deeper understanding of how
to adequately incorporate a sufficiently nuanced understanding of the dynamics of fragility and
its variations into policies or practices. This ensures that the mission does not become a captive of
problematic communication that will undermine its very essence.
Improving the efficiency and effectiveness of the mission will require that Peace Support Operations
(PSOs) prioritise human security considerations.
A specific institutional structure of effective threat intelligence, data gathering, and analysis for robust operational, policy and strategic decision-making is needed.
There is an increasing urgency to highlight the need for full support and long-term commitment from the international community in preventing and combating transnational threats. Improving the efficiency and effectiveness of AU missions may require that human security considerations are adequately prioritised in mandates. Mandates must better specify areas of human security considerations such as access to justice, education, health, physical protection from abuse by state and non-state actors, armed and criminal groups and spoilers.
A scale up of political and technical support to the AU is required in its peacebuilding, reconstruction and development efforts across all relevant activities and engagements.
AU missions should strengthen the institutional framework for Human Security threat early warning signals, escalation, response preparedness and capabilities through utilising the full capacities of the UN and international framework.
The international response to conflict often takes the form of increasingly complex interventions characterized by institutional proliferation and overlap; various sources of legitimacy and authority; and convoluted hierarchies.
Missions increasing operate in an unstable environment where conflict dynamics are highly unpredictable.
A closer integration between the AU missions and the UN system of coordination bodies, funds and programmes is widely suggested by stakeholders.
This begs the question of whether the foreign troops brought peace or whether their presence rekindled the conflict. The heavy presence of AU troops brought some stability but also reignited hostilities, rivalry and retaliatory attacks by militant groups against potential targets. The need for recognition and understanding of how Troop Contributing Countries (TCCs) operate in hostile environments in the interest of civilians and the ad-hoc initiatives adopted by PSOs indicate a need for systemic change and a resolution of the tension between, mandate; doctrine, practice and reception of missions.
Perpetrators of violence against civilians employ a range of strategies to both target the physical safety and well-being of individuals and groups and to render the environment in which individuals and groups live insecure.
While all stakeholders, including the UN, AU, troop contributing countries, and the Somali government, share a common understanding of countering Al-Shabaab’s vision, the political commitment to this fight varies.
Various resolutions passed by the UNSC and AU PSC gradually evolved to specifically emphasising to protect the human rights of vulnerable groups. Emphases came to be placed on the importance of adhering to the Secretary-General’s Human Rights and Due Diligence Policy and the United Nations Zero-Tolerance Policy on Sexual Exploitation and Abuse.
Increasing the involvement of local actors supporting justice, police, and civilian management and governance capacities could make peace support more effective.
Successive resolutions stressed concerns on violations of human rights, including extrajudicial killings, violence against women, children and journalists, arbitrary detention and pervasive sexual violence, and underscoring the need to end impunity, uphold human rights and to hold accountable those who commit such crimes. A human security approach could speak better to legitimacy and authority where there is no other source. It could set up a more solid foundation for a state to emerge, not based on violence or for an indifferent and exploitative form of governance to be imposed.
It replaced and subsumed the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) Peace Support Mission to Somalia (IGASOM), which was a proposed protection and training mission approved by the AU in September 2006. It was also approved by the United Nations Security Council (UNSC).
Initially the expectation was that when conditions permitted, the UNSC would deploy a UN peacekeeping operation that would subsume or replace the AU effort. That is not yet the case and the SC continues to rely on AMISOM as the main peace operation, even as the UN presence in the country has grown. Two armed, mobile AMISOM Formed Police Units numbering 280 police, backfill and supplement security in areas of Mogadishu vacated by AMISOM soldiers. Training and improving the Somali security forces is becoming a priority for AMISOM. A civilian component supports the provision of effective governance in recovered areas.
The EU supports AMISOM, and also runs a security sector support mission that trains Somali government forces, as well as supporting humanitarian, development and state-building initiatives. The strength of AMISOM uniformed personnel is 22,126.
It replaced and subsumed the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) Peace Support Mission to Somalia (IGASOM), which was a proposed protection and training mission approved by the AU in September 2006. It was also approved by the United Nations Security Council (UNSC).
Initially the expectation was that when conditions permitted, the UNSC would deploy a UN peacekeeping operation that would subsume or replace the AU effort. That is not yet the case and the SC continues to rely on AMISOM as the main peace operation, even as the UN presence in the country has grown. Two armed, mobile AMISOM Formed Police Units numbering 280 police, backfill and supplement security in areas of Mogadishu vacated by AMISOM soldiers. Training and improving the Somali security forces is becoming a priority for AMISOM. A civilian component supports the provision of effective governance in recovered areas.
The EU supports AMISOM, and also runs a security sector support mission that trains Somali government forces, as well as supporting humanitarian, development and state-building initiatives. The strength of AMISOM uniformed personnel is 22,126.
The overall objective of the MVM is to have the peace agreements effectively implemented and the return of South Sudan to socio-political normalcy secured by July 2015. Due to delays in the negotiations this is now 31 December 2015.
Progress towards the overall goal can be broadly summarized in the areas of the political commitment of the parties to the conflict to engage in negotiations, in the signing of the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement and the Status of Detainees signed on 03 January 2014 and in the subsequent summit decisions that paved way for further dialogue, broadening the basis for other stakeholders.
The successful establishment and deployment of the monitoring and Verification mechanism (MVM) and the succeeding efforts by Envoys to assist parties have clear agenda items with proper modalities and rules of procedure were also very critical in shaping the negotiations.
The overall objective of the MVM is to have the peace agreements effectively implemented and the return of South Sudan to socio-political normalcy secured by July 2015. Due to delays in the negotiations this is now 31 December 2015.
Progress towards the overall goal can be broadly summarized in the areas of the political commitment of the parties to the conflict to engage in negotiations, in the signing of the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement and the Status of Detainees signed on 03 January 2014 and in the subsequent summit decisions that paved way for further dialogue, broadening the basis for other stakeholders.
The successful establishment and deployment of the monitoring and Verification mechanism (MVM) and the succeeding efforts by Envoys to assist parties have clear agenda items with proper modalities and rules of procedure were also very critical in shaping the negotiations.
Federal Government (TFG) (2006-2012) and the Federal Government of Somalia (2012-present), fought various Islamic militia groups,
most recently Al Shabaab. Government troops, supported by the African Union peace support mission AMISOM, have gained ground in
Mogadishu. Al Shabaab have been withdrawing their forces from the capital, allowing the Federal Government to expand control across
Mogadishu. The President in 2012 committed to implementing the New Deal (2014-2016) process and principles towards establishing a
single overarching framework for all international donor and partner engagement. A critical element of consolidating control is to
immediately deploy police across the city and to ensure that they are appropriately trained, equipped and are being paid regularly.
The Somalis and the international community agree on the most important priorities in five areas - the Peacebuilding and State building
Goals (PSGs): Inclusive Politics; Security; Justice; Economic Foundations; Services and revenue.
PSG2 set the strategic objective to establish unified, capable, accountable, and rights based federal security institutions able to provide
safety and security for its citizens. Regular stipend payments are critical to ensure the loyalty, commitment, morale, performance and
retention of skilled police officers at this critical time.
The overall objective of the MVM is to have the peace agreements effectively implemented and the return of South Sudan to socio-political normalcy secured by July 2015. Due to delays in the negotiations this is now 31 December 2015.
Progress towards the overall goal can be broadly summarized in the areas of the political commitment of the parties to the conflict to engage in negotiations, in the signing of the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement and the Status of Detainees signed on 03 January 2014 and in the subsequent summit decisions that paved way for further dialogue, broadening the basis for other stakeholders.
The successful establishment and deployment of the monitoring and Verification mechanism (MVM) and the succeeding efforts by Envoys to assist parties have clear agenda items with proper modalities and rules of procedure were also very critical in shaping the negotiations.
Federal Government (TFG) (2006-2012) and the Federal Government of Somalia (2012-present), fought various Islamic militia groups,
most recently Al Shabaab. Government troops, supported by the African Union peace support mission AMISOM, have gained ground in
Mogadishu. Al Shabaab have been withdrawing their forces from the capital, allowing the Federal Government to expand control across
Mogadishu. The President in 2012 committed to implementing the New Deal (2014-2016) process and principles towards establishing a
single overarching framework for all international donor and partner engagement. A critical element of consolidating control is to
immediately deploy police across the city and to ensure that they are appropriately trained, equipped and are being paid regularly.
The Somalis and the international community agree on the most important priorities in five areas - the Peacebuilding and State building
Goals (PSGs): Inclusive Politics; Security; Justice; Economic Foundations; Services and revenue.
PSG2 set the strategic objective to establish unified, capable, accountable, and rights based federal security institutions able to provide
safety and security for its citizens. Regular stipend payments are critical to ensure the loyalty, commitment, morale, performance and
retention of skilled police officers at this critical time.
Federal Government (TFG) (2006-2012) and the Federal Government of Somalia (2012-present), fought various Islamic militia groups,
most recently Al Shabaab. Government troops, supported by the African Union peace support mission AMISOM, have gained ground in
Mogadishu. Al Shabaab have been withdrawing their forces from the capital, allowing the Federal Government to expand control across
Mogadishu. The President in 2012 committed to implementing the New Deal (2014-2016) process and principles towards establishing a
single overarching framework for all international donor and partner engagement. A critical element of consolidating control is to
immediately deploy police across the city and to ensure that they are appropriately trained, equipped and are being paid regularly.
The Somalis and the international community agree on the most important priorities in five areas - the Peacebuilding and State building
Goals (PSGs): Inclusive Politics; Security; Justice; Economic Foundations; Services and revenue.
PSG2 set the strategic objective to establish unified, capable, accountable, and rights based federal security institutions able to provide
safety and security for its citizens. Regular stipend payments are critical to ensure the loyalty, commitment, morale, performance and
retention of skilled police officers at this critical time.
AMANI Africa II was a comprehensive AU/REC exercise that aimed to test political, strategic, operational, tactical components of deploying a PSO. Additionally a live fire exercise was conducted. This was perhaps an over-ambitious and methodologically unsound approach, diluting the results, the applicability of the results to real world scenarios and the ability to objectively evaluate the different components of the exercise. None of the objectives above were fully satisfactory. The Command Post Exercise (CPX), that was financed by the EU, was not tested at all, as this component was not established during the exercise. This is exactly where capacity building is most needed as political leadership and HQ capacity is weak in current PSOs (AMISOM (Somalia) and UNMIS (Darfur region of Sudan; jointly administered with UN).
AMANI Africa II was a comprehensive AU/REC exercise that aimed to test political, strategic, operational, tactical components of deploying a PSO. Additionally a live fire exercise was conducted. This was perhaps an over-ambitious and methodologically unsound approach, diluting the results, the applicability of the results to real world scenarios and the ability to objectively evaluate the different components of the exercise. None of the objectives above were fully satisfactory. The Command Post Exercise (CPX), that was financed by the EU, was not tested at all, as this component was not established during the exercise. This is exactly where capacity building is most needed as political leadership and HQ capacity is weak in current PSOs (AMISOM (Somalia) and UNMIS (Darfur region of Sudan; jointly administered with UN).
AMANI Africa II was a comprehensive AU/REC exercise that aimed to test political, strategic, operational, tactical components of deploying a PSO. Additionally a live fire exercise was conducted. This was perhaps an over-ambitious and methodologically unsound approach, diluting the results, the applicability of the results to real world scenarios and the ability to objectively evaluate the different components of the exercise. None of the objectives above were fully satisfactory. The Command Post Exercise (CPX), that was financed by the EU, was not tested at all, as this component was not established during the exercise. This is exactly where capacity building is most needed as political leadership and HQ capacity is weak in current PSOs (AMISOM (Somalia) and UNMIS (Darfur region of Sudan; jointly administered with UN).
In July 2020, the Government of Japan announced that TICAD 8 will be held in 2022 and will be hosted by the Republic of Tunisia making it the first TICAD to take place since the COVID-19 pandemic. TICAD is held every three years, and the recent one was TICAD 8, held in Tunis from 27-28 August 2022. TICAD 8 was attended by 48 African countries (20 Heads of State/Government level participants), Representatives of the co-organizers (the United Nations, the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), the World Bank, and the African Union Commission (AUC)) and Japanese private sectors among others. Economy, Society and Peace and Stability were discussed in the TICAD 8.
The publication includes the following articles:
"The Police Component of the African Standby Force: Challenges for Accountability" by Leon Kukkuk
"Cross-border Policing - Lesotho and South Africa" by Amanda Lucey
"Operation Rachel: A Case Study in Cross-border Police Cooperation" by Chelete Monyane
The SARPCCO Code of Conduct" by Amanda Dissel
"Strategic Indicative Plan 2010-2015 for the Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation: Considerations for Policing in the Region" by Sean Tait
"The World Cup 2010 and Police Cooperation: The South African Case" by Elrena van der Spuy
should consolidate its core values and develop
functioning approaches and operational concepts.
As highlighted in the UN Secretary-General’s pol-
icy brief the New Agenda for Peace (NAP), the world
organisation needs to supplement its multilateral
toolbox, where regional organizations like the AU
and European Union (EU), need to shore up their
capacity to prevent and respond to conflicts. This
will require mutual respect, common understand-
ing and strategic coherence, based on leveraging
comparative advantages.