How do states decide to extend or withhold international recognition in cases of contested sovere... more How do states decide to extend or withhold international recognition in cases of contested sovereignty? We focus on how religion shapes the incentives of states in making this decision, both at the domestic level through religious institutions and at the international level through religious affinities. States with transnational religious ties to the contested territory are more likely to extend recognition. At the domestic level, states that heavily regulate religion are less likely to extend international recognition. We test these conjectures, and examine others in the literature, with two new data sets on the international recognition of both Palestine and Israel and voting on the United Nations resolution to admit Palestine as a non-member state observer, combined with global data on religious regulation and religious affinities. In cases of contested sovereignty, the results provide support for these two mechanisms through which religion shapes foreign policy decisions about i...
Recognition of aspiring states from established countries is central to becoming a member state o... more Recognition of aspiring states from established countries is central to becoming a member state of the international system. Previous research suggests that great power recognition decisions regarding aspiring states rapidly converge toward either recognition or non-recognition, yet great power convergence has still not occurred in the case of Kosovo after more than ten years. Unilateral secessions typically remain wholly unrecognized, since they violate the norm of home state consent, yet Kosovo has now been recognized by more than 100 countries. Why do some countries extend recognition to unilateral secessions, and do so early, whereas others delay recognition or withhold it altogether? In the case of Kosovo, great power influence and contestation, rather than convergence, have played a key role in shaping recognition decisions. We argue that countries in the US sphere of influence, with strong economic and military ties, are more likely to recognize Kosovo and to do so relatively fast, whereas countries influenced by Russia are less likely to recognize Kosovo at all, or to do so only after an extended delay. However, great powers are not equal in influencing other states to adopt their preferred position, since the USA is more powerful than Russia and can benefit from working alongside allies within the Western-oriented world order. We estimate a non-proportional Cox model with new time-varying data on Kosovo recognition and provide evidence that US military ties influenced other countries in extending recognition to unilateral secession.
Most studies of technocratic populism have focused on democracies under stress (e.g., Italy, Czec... more Most studies of technocratic populism have focused on democracies under stress (e.g., Italy, Czech Republic). This article builds on and extends these studies by analyzing a hybrid regime-post-Soviet Georgia-and argues that technocratic pop-ulism in this context is utilized as a façade to cover authoritarian and oligarchic tendencies, while suspending (or reversing) democratization efforts. The state apparatus is weaponized against current and potential political opponents. Ideology is irrelevant, loyalty is key, and passivity is encouraged. The government aims to chip away at institutional checks and balances , and to demobilize the public by undermining confidence in the country's representative institutions while increasing dependence on experienced personalities, the 'can do experts.' The result is most often a stable partial-reform equilibrium. We illustrate this argument with evidence from Georgia, where Bidzina Ivanishvili, the richest man in the country, came to power in 2012 and, despite not holding any official position in the government since 2013, has run the state as a firm.
Central governments in multinational states frequently deploy indirect rule to contain peripheral... more Central governments in multinational states frequently deploy indirect rule to contain peripheral nationalism. Through the exchange of economic resources for political control, local notables are co-opted into cementing loyalty to the central state. Although nationalism often has cultural roots, these can fail to bear fruit because indirect rulers prevent them from developing. When the incentives sustaining support for indirect rulers change, this can open a window of opportunity for nationalism. This article examines how culture, institutions and economics influence center-periphery relations, specifically the demand for autonomy and nationalist parties. Utilizing new, disaggregated data and an original survey from the French island of Corsica, we show that indirect rulers have managed to contain nationalist parties in culturally distinct communes, specifically those that are more dependent on public funds. Only where a thriving private sector offers alternatives to state dependence, lessening the force of indirect rule, is cultural distinctiveness associated with nationalist voting.
How do countries decide whether or not to recognize an aspiring state? We examine such decisions ... more How do countries decide whether or not to recognize an aspiring state? We examine such decisions in the context of contested recognition, which we define as a claim to statehood that is recognized by a large number of countries, but remains unrecognized by many others. We suggest that religion-both at the domestic level via religious regulation and discrimination against minority religions and at the international level via transnational religious ties-shapes recognition decisions. In cases where the two parties to a recognition dispute share the same dominant religious tradition (as in Western Sahara), transnational religious ties are expected to lead to external support for the side that emphasizes its religious identity and that has access to more resources. Moreover, we show that countries with higher levels of religious regulation are less likely to extend recognition. We assess these two conjectures for why some countries-but not others-have recognized the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic as an independent state using data on the recognition decisions of all 192 United Nations member states.
When do parties respond to their political rivals and when do they ignore them? This article pres... more When do parties respond to their political rivals and when do they ignore them? This article presents a new computational framework to detect, analyze and predict partisan responsiveness by showing when parties on opposite poles of the political spectrum react to each other's agendas and thereby contribute to polarization. Once spikes in responsiveness are detected and categorized using latent Dirichlet allocation, we utilize the terms that comprise the topics, together with a gradient descent solver, to assess the classifier's predictive accuracy. Using ,, documents from the ooicial websites of radical right and ethnic political parties in Slovakia ((-), the analysis predicts which political issues will elicit partisan reactions, and which will be ignored, with an accuracy of % (F-measure) and outperforms both Random Forest and Naive Bayes classifiers. Subject matter experts validate the approach and interpret the results. One of the most fundamental questions in party politics is whether, and if so when, parties react to other parties. Advances in machine learning and the availability of highly granular textual data make progress on this question possible in a manner than was not previously feasible on a large scale. This paper develops a computational system, building upon recent advances in natural language processing, to analyze partisan debate and responsiveness with a broad potential utility for studying the dynamics of political competition across diierent scales and contexts. Hotly debated issues span all spheres of human activity, but politics is perhaps the sphere most defined by contentious debates, and much of it is now fully documented online and available for textual analysis. Text mining tools enable researchers to engage in the systematic analysis of text as data in an unprecedented manner, and political scientists have ooen been at the forefront of developing
Unlike structural realism, neoclassical realism focuses on how the
interaction between systemic a... more Unlike structural realism, neoclassical realism focuses on how the interaction between systemic and unit-level variables influences foreign policy. This article assesses neoclassical realism against two alternative accounts – balance of threat and economic dependence – to explain change in Georgia’s foreign policy. While structural realism highlights how the external security environment shapes general tendencies in foreign policy, specific strategies depend largely on unit-level factors, specifically elite cohesion and state capacity. The analysis of primary sources and exclusive interviews with high-level policy-makers suggests that neoclassical realism affords a more nuanced and precise account of foreign policy change over time than structural realism.
Many scholars have suggested that organized violence in Chechnya has ended, and that Russia's Che... more Many scholars have suggested that organized violence in Chechnya has ended, and that Russia's Chechenization policy and Ramzan Kadyrov's presidency deserve the credit. We suggest that Putin has created a Frankenstein-like ruler over whom he risks losing control. As a result, the conflict only appears resolved, and we draw attention to both vertical and horizontal cracks in the foundation of Kadyrov's rule that could lead to renewed violence. Vertically, the Chechen strongman and his growing clout in regional and federal politics have antagonized Russian siloviki. Horizontally, thousands of Chechens appear to be in a state of postponed blood feud toward Kadyrov, his clan, and the kadyrovtsy, his personal army. Backed by President Putin's personal support, Kadyrov has put in motion a brutal machine of persecution over which some signs indicate he has lost control. Fear of extermination at the hands of the Kadyrov and his personal army has kept most prospective avengers at a bay.
Foreign policy alliance formation among small states in the
aggregate has been extensively examin... more Foreign policy alliance formation among small states in the aggregate has been extensively examined in the literature, but mass opinion and preferences on alliance formation in these states remains understudied. To address this gap, this article examines individual alliance preferences in two small states in the South Caucasus region: Georgia and Armenia. While most Armenians seem to support Armenian membership in CSTO and most Georgians appear to believe that Georgia should pursue NATO membership, some Armenians and Georgians prefer equal relations with both security alliances. The paper suggests that threat perception influences alliance formation preferences at the individual level and advances three testable pre-registered propositions. First, individuals who perceive Azerbaijan or Turkey as the primary threat to their state tend to support alignment with the Russian-led CSTO. Second, individuals who view the main threat to their state coming from Russia are predisposed to support NATO membership. Finally, individuals who believe that tensions between Russia and the West are detrimental to their country are more inclined to support equal relations with both NATO and CSTO. In general, the evidence is consistent with these conjectures. We conclude with important qualifications and key implications for the study of mass opinion on alliance formation.
While the efforts of great powers to export their regimes to small states is well studied in the ... more While the efforts of great powers to export their regimes to small states is well studied in the literature, the role of mass opinion in small states where great powers compete for influence remains under-theorized as a factor that can shape small state preferences over foreign alliances and policies. This paper investigates the causes of individual-level variation in foreign policy preferences toward major powers in small states with big neighbors. Using recent public opinion data from Georgia, we propose a conceptual framework based on three factors-political paternalism, economic status, and religiosity-to explain why some individuals in small states prefer closer ties with different major powers. We find support for all three factors influencing foreign policy attitudes toward Russia, but not America. As great powers continue to pursue policies that encourage their preferred political orders in small states, the analysis of foreign policy preferences in such states will become increasingly vital to our understanding of world politics. Russia's resurgence, including its ongoing intervention in Ukraine and its previous actions in Georgia and Moldova, sent a clear signal to all former Soviet Union member states that there will be deadly consequences, in addition to energy and economic sanctions, for turning away from Russia and pursuing closer ties with the West. The tepid US response to these crises has also made it obvious that the United States is unwilling to use military force against Russia to defend its interests in non-NATO countries, particularly those on Russia's periphery. Some have even called into question NATO's resolve to respond militarily in the event of a Russian invasion into NATO countries, chiefly the Baltics, which has recently engaged in a series of war games in anticipation of a potential Russian invasion.
The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) is widely regarded as the most important
human rights ... more The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) is widely regarded as the most important human rights court worldwide. This article investigates the extent to which the court addresses cases from countries with the worst human rights performance. Using a new data set on all ECtHR judgments from 1995–2012, the analysis suggests that the ECtHR does not deliver its judgments against members of the Council of Europe with the worst human rights records, but instead against more democratic and affluent states. The reason is that litigating in front of a supranational court requires capacities that vulnerable people are unlikely to possess, except when aided by transnational advocacy groups. However, more judgements are issued against countries that lack independent judiciaries, where cases are less likely to be resolved at the domestic level. While the ECtHR might not address the worst human rights crimes, it plays a subsidiary role in the European human rights protection system by compensating for weak domestic judiciaries. However, the court’s inability to independently pursue litigation, together with the lack of capacity in some countries to bring cases forward, have hampered more effective protection of human rights for the most vulnerable in Europe.
Recognition from other recognized states is the key to becoming
a fully fledged member state of t... more Recognition from other recognized states is the key to becoming a fully fledged member state of the international system. Although many new states are quickly and universally recognized, the recognition of other aspiring states remains highly contested. In these cases of contested sovereignty, some countries but not others extend recognition. However, research on what shapes a country’s decision to recognize a claim to sovereign statehood remains relatively sparse. This article focuses on how religion shapes the incentives of states to extend or withhold recognition to aspiring states in cases of contested sovereignty. It posits two mechanisms, one at the domestic level through religious institutions and one at the international level through transnational religious affinities. The article uses new data on all state decisions regarding the international recognition of Kosovo to test these propositions. The results provide strong support for these two pathways through which religion shapes state decisions regarding international recognition.
This paper introduces the key concepts used in this special issue-center, periphery, and vertical... more This paper introduces the key concepts used in this special issue-center, periphery, and vertical bargaining-and inquires why some national groups within democratic states demand outright independence, while others mobilize for regional autonomy and still others settle for even less. It then specifies a theoretical framework that tries to explain cross-sectional differences and temporal changes in both peripheral demands and central responses. The building blocks of that framework include cultural distinctiveness, credibility of the exit threat and central dependence on the periphery. As an empirical illustration, the paper discusses the case of the Bernese Jura in Switzerland, and then briefly introduces the contributions to this special issue.
Nationalism is one of the most powerful forces in the modern world –
but why some ethno-national ... more Nationalism is one of the most powerful forces in the modern world – but why some ethno-national groups mobilize for conflict, while others remain quiescent, remains subject to significant disagreement. This paper argues that domestic politics create the incentives for secession, and international forces make conflict feasible against a sometimes stronger military adversary – the state. The proposed theory unpacks this interaction of domestic and international factors, and posits that when regional elites possess local control in an area that is contiguous with a potential sponsor, external support is more feasible and more apt to lead to mobilization and conflict. When regional elites lack local control, external sponsors will be wary of supporting a potentially lost cause and regional elites will exhibit more restraint, reducing the chances of conflict – external support therefore often flows from strong states to strong regions in weaker states. It is instrumental and variable, rather than affective and constant, and thus kin states will not always support their secessionist brethren in neighbouring states. Using a sub-national research design from post-Soviet Georgia, the results lend support to these conjectures.
Why are some countries prone to ethno-nationalist conflict, whereas others are
plagued by class c... more Why are some countries prone to ethno-nationalist conflict, whereas others are plagued by class conflict? This is a question that has seldom been raised and rarely been examined empirically. This paper presents a social-structural theory to account for the variable incidence of these two forms of political instability. These two types of conflict result from distinct principles of group solidarity – ethnicity and class – and since each individual is simultaneously a member of an ethnic group (or many such groups) and a particular class, these two principles vary in the degree to which they are mutually exclusive or cross-cutting. The degree of economic stratification between groups and economic segmentation within them shapes the relative salience of each principle of group solidarity in any society and is associated with a characteristic form of political mobilization. In places where between-group inequalities are high, and within-group inequalities low, ethnicity should be the dominant principle of group solidarity and serve as the primary basis of group conflict. By contrast, in countries where between-group inequalities are low, and within-group inequalities high, class is more likely to serve as the dominant principle of group solidarity, and conflicts along class lines are more likely. We test these conjectures with data in over 100 countries on cross-cutting cleavages, ethnic war, and class conflict. The results are supportive of the theory, and provide evidence that how groups are stratified and segmented in societies shapes the type of civil war.
Many scholars have argued that orthodox Muslims harbor attitudes that are more economically commu... more Many scholars have argued that orthodox Muslims harbor attitudes that are more economically communitarian and politically illiberal, since individuals are seen as embedded within a larger community that places a premium on social order. Yet most studies have ignored the potential of Islam as an ideological platform for political reformers. Religion in general and Islam in particular has mostly been treated as a predictor rather than a derivative of political-economic preferences. This article suggests that, in the absence of credible secular political ideologies and representative political mechanisms, reformist-minded individuals are likely to use religion as a political platform for change. When Muslims are a minority in a repressive non-Muslim society, Islamic orthodoxy can serve as a political platform for politically and economically liberal forces. We test these conjectures with original micro-level data from the Russian North Caucasus and find strong support for them.
The study of secession generally stresses the causal influence of cultural identities, political ... more The study of secession generally stresses the causal influence of cultural identities, political preferences, or ecological factors. Whereas these different views are often considered to be mutually exclusive, this paper proposes a two-stage model in which they are complementary. We posit that cultural identities matter for explaining secessionism, but not because of primordial attachments. Rather, religious and linguistic groups matter because their members are imbued with cultural legacies that lead to distinct political preferences-in this case preferences over welfare statism. Further, ecological constraints such as geography and topography affect social interaction with like-minded individuals. On the basis of both these political preferences and ecological constraints, individuals then make rational choices about the desirability of secession. Instrumental considerations are therefore crucial in explaining the decision to secede, but not in a conventional pocketbook manner. To examine this theory, we analyze the 2013 referendum on the secession of the Jura Bernois region from the Canton of Berne in Switzerland, using municipal level census and referendum data. The results lend support to the theory and suggest one way in which the politics of identity, based on factors like language and religion, can be fused with the politics of interest (preferences for more or less state intervention into the polity and economy) to better understand group behavior.
Although many countries have ethnic kin on the “wrong side” of their borders, few seek to annex f... more Although many countries have ethnic kin on the “wrong side” of their borders, few seek to annex foreign territories on the basis of ethnicity. This article examines why some states pursue irredentism, whereas others exhibit restraint. It focuses on the triadic structure of the kin group in the irredentist state, its co-ethnic enclave, and the host state, and provides new data on all actual and potential irredentist cases from 1946 to 2014. The results indicate that irredentism is more likely when the kin group is near economic parity with other groups in its own state, which results in status inconsistency and engenders grievances. It is also more likely in more ethnically homogeneous countries with winner‐take‐all majoritarian systems where the kin group does not need to moderate its policy to win elections by attracting other groups. These conditions generate both the grievance and opportunity for kin groups to pursue irredentism.
Does a state's use of indiscriminate violence incite insurgent attacks? The conventional wisdom s... more Does a state's use of indiscriminate violence incite insurgent attacks? The conventional wisdom suggests that it does—Stathis Kalyvas cites dozens of studies and historical cases where collective targeting of the noncombatant population provoked greater insurgent violence. But others have pushed back against this claim. These scholars have made significant advances that allow us to understand and explain when, why, and how the world's militaries have used indiscriminate violence against noncombatants with shocking regularity.
This study builds on these contributions. We use interviews we conducted with ex-combatants and eyewitnesses of the Chechen wars to provide a critical reexamination of the current theoretical debate concerning indiscriminate violence. In doing so, we argue that treating the concept of indiscriminate violence as an essentially random counter-insurgency tactic obscures the important distinction between random and retributive indiscriminate violence deployed against civilians. The distinction raises crucial questions of location and timing that have hindered efforts to evaluate the efficacy of indiscriminate violence in irregular war. Even if indiscriminate violence does lead to a short-term decrease in insurgent activity in the targeted locations as prior research has shown, it does not follow that indiscriminate violence is necessarily effective, for two reasons. After a period of recovery, many local insurgents and prospective avengers from the targeted villages in Chechnya retaliated. But it took prospective Chechen avengers at least six to nine months to recover and to coordinate their attacks, which explains why indiscriminate violence might appear effective in the short term. Moreover, and more important, indiscriminate violence deployed retributively against village communities in Chechnya led to retaliation in different areas to ensure that covillagers were not targeted in retribution. This explains why rebel violence deployed in response to retributive indiscriminate violence might not be observed in the same location. By contrast, because rebels are less fearful of retribution when indiscriminate violence is deployed randomly against village communities, would-be avengers from the targeted villages and local insurgents tended to strike back in the same area and to target randomly picked personnel from the counterinsurgent forces, but again with delays of at least six months for recovery and operational planning.
The reaction of the rebels was therefore not observed immediately (in the case of both random and retributive violence), and was not observed in the same location (in the case of retributive indiscriminate violence). Any analysis of the effectiveness of indiscriminate violence, however sophisticated, that fails to account for this delayed timing (and in the case of retributive violence, the alternative location) is bound to mistakenly attribute the lull in activity to the efficacy of the counterinsurgency’s use of indiscriminate violence. Using interviews with ex-combatants and eyewitnesses of the Chechen wars from targeted Chechen villages, we show that this interpretation of the data is flawed. Our findings suggest that we need to better understand the social and political context that shapes how populations react to different forms of violence. Although the counterinsurgency contributed to a shortterm decline in insurgent activity within the targeted localities, rebel violence often resurfaced in the longer term. And when violence was deployed retributively against village communities, it created a whacka- mole dynamic that merely moved rebel violence elsewhere. As a result, both forms of indiscriminate violence reduced rebel activity in the short term, but rebels often sought vengeance in the longer term and, in response to retributive indiscriminate violence, retaliated in other areas.
The most commonly used statistical models of civil war onset fail to correctly predict most occur... more The most commonly used statistical models of civil war onset fail to correctly predict most occurrences of this rare event in out of sample data. Statistical methods for the analysis of bi- nary data, such as logistic regression, even in their rare event and regularized forms, perform poorly at prediction. We compare the performance of Random Forests with three versions of logistic regression (classic logistic regression, Firth rare events logistic regression and L1- regularized logistic regression), and find that the algorithmic approach provides significantly more accurate predictions of civil war onset in out of sample data than any of the logistic regression models. The paper discusses these results and the ways in which algorithmic statistical methods like Random Forests can be useful to more accurately predict rare events in conflict data.
How do states decide to extend or withhold international recognition in cases of contested sovere... more How do states decide to extend or withhold international recognition in cases of contested sovereignty? We focus on how religion shapes the incentives of states in making this decision, both at the domestic level through religious institutions and at the international level through religious affinities. States with transnational religious ties to the contested territory are more likely to extend recognition. At the domestic level, states that heavily regulate religion are less likely to extend international recognition. We test these conjectures, and examine others in the literature, with two new data sets on the international recognition of both Palestine and Israel and voting on the United Nations resolution to admit Palestine as a non-member state observer, combined with global data on religious regulation and religious affinities. In cases of contested sovereignty, the results provide support for these two mechanisms through which religion shapes foreign policy decisions about i...
Recognition of aspiring states from established countries is central to becoming a member state o... more Recognition of aspiring states from established countries is central to becoming a member state of the international system. Previous research suggests that great power recognition decisions regarding aspiring states rapidly converge toward either recognition or non-recognition, yet great power convergence has still not occurred in the case of Kosovo after more than ten years. Unilateral secessions typically remain wholly unrecognized, since they violate the norm of home state consent, yet Kosovo has now been recognized by more than 100 countries. Why do some countries extend recognition to unilateral secessions, and do so early, whereas others delay recognition or withhold it altogether? In the case of Kosovo, great power influence and contestation, rather than convergence, have played a key role in shaping recognition decisions. We argue that countries in the US sphere of influence, with strong economic and military ties, are more likely to recognize Kosovo and to do so relatively fast, whereas countries influenced by Russia are less likely to recognize Kosovo at all, or to do so only after an extended delay. However, great powers are not equal in influencing other states to adopt their preferred position, since the USA is more powerful than Russia and can benefit from working alongside allies within the Western-oriented world order. We estimate a non-proportional Cox model with new time-varying data on Kosovo recognition and provide evidence that US military ties influenced other countries in extending recognition to unilateral secession.
Most studies of technocratic populism have focused on democracies under stress (e.g., Italy, Czec... more Most studies of technocratic populism have focused on democracies under stress (e.g., Italy, Czech Republic). This article builds on and extends these studies by analyzing a hybrid regime-post-Soviet Georgia-and argues that technocratic pop-ulism in this context is utilized as a façade to cover authoritarian and oligarchic tendencies, while suspending (or reversing) democratization efforts. The state apparatus is weaponized against current and potential political opponents. Ideology is irrelevant, loyalty is key, and passivity is encouraged. The government aims to chip away at institutional checks and balances , and to demobilize the public by undermining confidence in the country's representative institutions while increasing dependence on experienced personalities, the 'can do experts.' The result is most often a stable partial-reform equilibrium. We illustrate this argument with evidence from Georgia, where Bidzina Ivanishvili, the richest man in the country, came to power in 2012 and, despite not holding any official position in the government since 2013, has run the state as a firm.
Central governments in multinational states frequently deploy indirect rule to contain peripheral... more Central governments in multinational states frequently deploy indirect rule to contain peripheral nationalism. Through the exchange of economic resources for political control, local notables are co-opted into cementing loyalty to the central state. Although nationalism often has cultural roots, these can fail to bear fruit because indirect rulers prevent them from developing. When the incentives sustaining support for indirect rulers change, this can open a window of opportunity for nationalism. This article examines how culture, institutions and economics influence center-periphery relations, specifically the demand for autonomy and nationalist parties. Utilizing new, disaggregated data and an original survey from the French island of Corsica, we show that indirect rulers have managed to contain nationalist parties in culturally distinct communes, specifically those that are more dependent on public funds. Only where a thriving private sector offers alternatives to state dependence, lessening the force of indirect rule, is cultural distinctiveness associated with nationalist voting.
How do countries decide whether or not to recognize an aspiring state? We examine such decisions ... more How do countries decide whether or not to recognize an aspiring state? We examine such decisions in the context of contested recognition, which we define as a claim to statehood that is recognized by a large number of countries, but remains unrecognized by many others. We suggest that religion-both at the domestic level via religious regulation and discrimination against minority religions and at the international level via transnational religious ties-shapes recognition decisions. In cases where the two parties to a recognition dispute share the same dominant religious tradition (as in Western Sahara), transnational religious ties are expected to lead to external support for the side that emphasizes its religious identity and that has access to more resources. Moreover, we show that countries with higher levels of religious regulation are less likely to extend recognition. We assess these two conjectures for why some countries-but not others-have recognized the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic as an independent state using data on the recognition decisions of all 192 United Nations member states.
When do parties respond to their political rivals and when do they ignore them? This article pres... more When do parties respond to their political rivals and when do they ignore them? This article presents a new computational framework to detect, analyze and predict partisan responsiveness by showing when parties on opposite poles of the political spectrum react to each other's agendas and thereby contribute to polarization. Once spikes in responsiveness are detected and categorized using latent Dirichlet allocation, we utilize the terms that comprise the topics, together with a gradient descent solver, to assess the classifier's predictive accuracy. Using ,, documents from the ooicial websites of radical right and ethnic political parties in Slovakia ((-), the analysis predicts which political issues will elicit partisan reactions, and which will be ignored, with an accuracy of % (F-measure) and outperforms both Random Forest and Naive Bayes classifiers. Subject matter experts validate the approach and interpret the results. One of the most fundamental questions in party politics is whether, and if so when, parties react to other parties. Advances in machine learning and the availability of highly granular textual data make progress on this question possible in a manner than was not previously feasible on a large scale. This paper develops a computational system, building upon recent advances in natural language processing, to analyze partisan debate and responsiveness with a broad potential utility for studying the dynamics of political competition across diierent scales and contexts. Hotly debated issues span all spheres of human activity, but politics is perhaps the sphere most defined by contentious debates, and much of it is now fully documented online and available for textual analysis. Text mining tools enable researchers to engage in the systematic analysis of text as data in an unprecedented manner, and political scientists have ooen been at the forefront of developing
Unlike structural realism, neoclassical realism focuses on how the
interaction between systemic a... more Unlike structural realism, neoclassical realism focuses on how the interaction between systemic and unit-level variables influences foreign policy. This article assesses neoclassical realism against two alternative accounts – balance of threat and economic dependence – to explain change in Georgia’s foreign policy. While structural realism highlights how the external security environment shapes general tendencies in foreign policy, specific strategies depend largely on unit-level factors, specifically elite cohesion and state capacity. The analysis of primary sources and exclusive interviews with high-level policy-makers suggests that neoclassical realism affords a more nuanced and precise account of foreign policy change over time than structural realism.
Many scholars have suggested that organized violence in Chechnya has ended, and that Russia's Che... more Many scholars have suggested that organized violence in Chechnya has ended, and that Russia's Chechenization policy and Ramzan Kadyrov's presidency deserve the credit. We suggest that Putin has created a Frankenstein-like ruler over whom he risks losing control. As a result, the conflict only appears resolved, and we draw attention to both vertical and horizontal cracks in the foundation of Kadyrov's rule that could lead to renewed violence. Vertically, the Chechen strongman and his growing clout in regional and federal politics have antagonized Russian siloviki. Horizontally, thousands of Chechens appear to be in a state of postponed blood feud toward Kadyrov, his clan, and the kadyrovtsy, his personal army. Backed by President Putin's personal support, Kadyrov has put in motion a brutal machine of persecution over which some signs indicate he has lost control. Fear of extermination at the hands of the Kadyrov and his personal army has kept most prospective avengers at a bay.
Foreign policy alliance formation among small states in the
aggregate has been extensively examin... more Foreign policy alliance formation among small states in the aggregate has been extensively examined in the literature, but mass opinion and preferences on alliance formation in these states remains understudied. To address this gap, this article examines individual alliance preferences in two small states in the South Caucasus region: Georgia and Armenia. While most Armenians seem to support Armenian membership in CSTO and most Georgians appear to believe that Georgia should pursue NATO membership, some Armenians and Georgians prefer equal relations with both security alliances. The paper suggests that threat perception influences alliance formation preferences at the individual level and advances three testable pre-registered propositions. First, individuals who perceive Azerbaijan or Turkey as the primary threat to their state tend to support alignment with the Russian-led CSTO. Second, individuals who view the main threat to their state coming from Russia are predisposed to support NATO membership. Finally, individuals who believe that tensions between Russia and the West are detrimental to their country are more inclined to support equal relations with both NATO and CSTO. In general, the evidence is consistent with these conjectures. We conclude with important qualifications and key implications for the study of mass opinion on alliance formation.
While the efforts of great powers to export their regimes to small states is well studied in the ... more While the efforts of great powers to export their regimes to small states is well studied in the literature, the role of mass opinion in small states where great powers compete for influence remains under-theorized as a factor that can shape small state preferences over foreign alliances and policies. This paper investigates the causes of individual-level variation in foreign policy preferences toward major powers in small states with big neighbors. Using recent public opinion data from Georgia, we propose a conceptual framework based on three factors-political paternalism, economic status, and religiosity-to explain why some individuals in small states prefer closer ties with different major powers. We find support for all three factors influencing foreign policy attitudes toward Russia, but not America. As great powers continue to pursue policies that encourage their preferred political orders in small states, the analysis of foreign policy preferences in such states will become increasingly vital to our understanding of world politics. Russia's resurgence, including its ongoing intervention in Ukraine and its previous actions in Georgia and Moldova, sent a clear signal to all former Soviet Union member states that there will be deadly consequences, in addition to energy and economic sanctions, for turning away from Russia and pursuing closer ties with the West. The tepid US response to these crises has also made it obvious that the United States is unwilling to use military force against Russia to defend its interests in non-NATO countries, particularly those on Russia's periphery. Some have even called into question NATO's resolve to respond militarily in the event of a Russian invasion into NATO countries, chiefly the Baltics, which has recently engaged in a series of war games in anticipation of a potential Russian invasion.
The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) is widely regarded as the most important
human rights ... more The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) is widely regarded as the most important human rights court worldwide. This article investigates the extent to which the court addresses cases from countries with the worst human rights performance. Using a new data set on all ECtHR judgments from 1995–2012, the analysis suggests that the ECtHR does not deliver its judgments against members of the Council of Europe with the worst human rights records, but instead against more democratic and affluent states. The reason is that litigating in front of a supranational court requires capacities that vulnerable people are unlikely to possess, except when aided by transnational advocacy groups. However, more judgements are issued against countries that lack independent judiciaries, where cases are less likely to be resolved at the domestic level. While the ECtHR might not address the worst human rights crimes, it plays a subsidiary role in the European human rights protection system by compensating for weak domestic judiciaries. However, the court’s inability to independently pursue litigation, together with the lack of capacity in some countries to bring cases forward, have hampered more effective protection of human rights for the most vulnerable in Europe.
Recognition from other recognized states is the key to becoming
a fully fledged member state of t... more Recognition from other recognized states is the key to becoming a fully fledged member state of the international system. Although many new states are quickly and universally recognized, the recognition of other aspiring states remains highly contested. In these cases of contested sovereignty, some countries but not others extend recognition. However, research on what shapes a country’s decision to recognize a claim to sovereign statehood remains relatively sparse. This article focuses on how religion shapes the incentives of states to extend or withhold recognition to aspiring states in cases of contested sovereignty. It posits two mechanisms, one at the domestic level through religious institutions and one at the international level through transnational religious affinities. The article uses new data on all state decisions regarding the international recognition of Kosovo to test these propositions. The results provide strong support for these two pathways through which religion shapes state decisions regarding international recognition.
This paper introduces the key concepts used in this special issue-center, periphery, and vertical... more This paper introduces the key concepts used in this special issue-center, periphery, and vertical bargaining-and inquires why some national groups within democratic states demand outright independence, while others mobilize for regional autonomy and still others settle for even less. It then specifies a theoretical framework that tries to explain cross-sectional differences and temporal changes in both peripheral demands and central responses. The building blocks of that framework include cultural distinctiveness, credibility of the exit threat and central dependence on the periphery. As an empirical illustration, the paper discusses the case of the Bernese Jura in Switzerland, and then briefly introduces the contributions to this special issue.
Nationalism is one of the most powerful forces in the modern world –
but why some ethno-national ... more Nationalism is one of the most powerful forces in the modern world – but why some ethno-national groups mobilize for conflict, while others remain quiescent, remains subject to significant disagreement. This paper argues that domestic politics create the incentives for secession, and international forces make conflict feasible against a sometimes stronger military adversary – the state. The proposed theory unpacks this interaction of domestic and international factors, and posits that when regional elites possess local control in an area that is contiguous with a potential sponsor, external support is more feasible and more apt to lead to mobilization and conflict. When regional elites lack local control, external sponsors will be wary of supporting a potentially lost cause and regional elites will exhibit more restraint, reducing the chances of conflict – external support therefore often flows from strong states to strong regions in weaker states. It is instrumental and variable, rather than affective and constant, and thus kin states will not always support their secessionist brethren in neighbouring states. Using a sub-national research design from post-Soviet Georgia, the results lend support to these conjectures.
Why are some countries prone to ethno-nationalist conflict, whereas others are
plagued by class c... more Why are some countries prone to ethno-nationalist conflict, whereas others are plagued by class conflict? This is a question that has seldom been raised and rarely been examined empirically. This paper presents a social-structural theory to account for the variable incidence of these two forms of political instability. These two types of conflict result from distinct principles of group solidarity – ethnicity and class – and since each individual is simultaneously a member of an ethnic group (or many such groups) and a particular class, these two principles vary in the degree to which they are mutually exclusive or cross-cutting. The degree of economic stratification between groups and economic segmentation within them shapes the relative salience of each principle of group solidarity in any society and is associated with a characteristic form of political mobilization. In places where between-group inequalities are high, and within-group inequalities low, ethnicity should be the dominant principle of group solidarity and serve as the primary basis of group conflict. By contrast, in countries where between-group inequalities are low, and within-group inequalities high, class is more likely to serve as the dominant principle of group solidarity, and conflicts along class lines are more likely. We test these conjectures with data in over 100 countries on cross-cutting cleavages, ethnic war, and class conflict. The results are supportive of the theory, and provide evidence that how groups are stratified and segmented in societies shapes the type of civil war.
Many scholars have argued that orthodox Muslims harbor attitudes that are more economically commu... more Many scholars have argued that orthodox Muslims harbor attitudes that are more economically communitarian and politically illiberal, since individuals are seen as embedded within a larger community that places a premium on social order. Yet most studies have ignored the potential of Islam as an ideological platform for political reformers. Religion in general and Islam in particular has mostly been treated as a predictor rather than a derivative of political-economic preferences. This article suggests that, in the absence of credible secular political ideologies and representative political mechanisms, reformist-minded individuals are likely to use religion as a political platform for change. When Muslims are a minority in a repressive non-Muslim society, Islamic orthodoxy can serve as a political platform for politically and economically liberal forces. We test these conjectures with original micro-level data from the Russian North Caucasus and find strong support for them.
The study of secession generally stresses the causal influence of cultural identities, political ... more The study of secession generally stresses the causal influence of cultural identities, political preferences, or ecological factors. Whereas these different views are often considered to be mutually exclusive, this paper proposes a two-stage model in which they are complementary. We posit that cultural identities matter for explaining secessionism, but not because of primordial attachments. Rather, religious and linguistic groups matter because their members are imbued with cultural legacies that lead to distinct political preferences-in this case preferences over welfare statism. Further, ecological constraints such as geography and topography affect social interaction with like-minded individuals. On the basis of both these political preferences and ecological constraints, individuals then make rational choices about the desirability of secession. Instrumental considerations are therefore crucial in explaining the decision to secede, but not in a conventional pocketbook manner. To examine this theory, we analyze the 2013 referendum on the secession of the Jura Bernois region from the Canton of Berne in Switzerland, using municipal level census and referendum data. The results lend support to the theory and suggest one way in which the politics of identity, based on factors like language and religion, can be fused with the politics of interest (preferences for more or less state intervention into the polity and economy) to better understand group behavior.
Although many countries have ethnic kin on the “wrong side” of their borders, few seek to annex f... more Although many countries have ethnic kin on the “wrong side” of their borders, few seek to annex foreign territories on the basis of ethnicity. This article examines why some states pursue irredentism, whereas others exhibit restraint. It focuses on the triadic structure of the kin group in the irredentist state, its co-ethnic enclave, and the host state, and provides new data on all actual and potential irredentist cases from 1946 to 2014. The results indicate that irredentism is more likely when the kin group is near economic parity with other groups in its own state, which results in status inconsistency and engenders grievances. It is also more likely in more ethnically homogeneous countries with winner‐take‐all majoritarian systems where the kin group does not need to moderate its policy to win elections by attracting other groups. These conditions generate both the grievance and opportunity for kin groups to pursue irredentism.
Does a state's use of indiscriminate violence incite insurgent attacks? The conventional wisdom s... more Does a state's use of indiscriminate violence incite insurgent attacks? The conventional wisdom suggests that it does—Stathis Kalyvas cites dozens of studies and historical cases where collective targeting of the noncombatant population provoked greater insurgent violence. But others have pushed back against this claim. These scholars have made significant advances that allow us to understand and explain when, why, and how the world's militaries have used indiscriminate violence against noncombatants with shocking regularity.
This study builds on these contributions. We use interviews we conducted with ex-combatants and eyewitnesses of the Chechen wars to provide a critical reexamination of the current theoretical debate concerning indiscriminate violence. In doing so, we argue that treating the concept of indiscriminate violence as an essentially random counter-insurgency tactic obscures the important distinction between random and retributive indiscriminate violence deployed against civilians. The distinction raises crucial questions of location and timing that have hindered efforts to evaluate the efficacy of indiscriminate violence in irregular war. Even if indiscriminate violence does lead to a short-term decrease in insurgent activity in the targeted locations as prior research has shown, it does not follow that indiscriminate violence is necessarily effective, for two reasons. After a period of recovery, many local insurgents and prospective avengers from the targeted villages in Chechnya retaliated. But it took prospective Chechen avengers at least six to nine months to recover and to coordinate their attacks, which explains why indiscriminate violence might appear effective in the short term. Moreover, and more important, indiscriminate violence deployed retributively against village communities in Chechnya led to retaliation in different areas to ensure that covillagers were not targeted in retribution. This explains why rebel violence deployed in response to retributive indiscriminate violence might not be observed in the same location. By contrast, because rebels are less fearful of retribution when indiscriminate violence is deployed randomly against village communities, would-be avengers from the targeted villages and local insurgents tended to strike back in the same area and to target randomly picked personnel from the counterinsurgent forces, but again with delays of at least six months for recovery and operational planning.
The reaction of the rebels was therefore not observed immediately (in the case of both random and retributive violence), and was not observed in the same location (in the case of retributive indiscriminate violence). Any analysis of the effectiveness of indiscriminate violence, however sophisticated, that fails to account for this delayed timing (and in the case of retributive violence, the alternative location) is bound to mistakenly attribute the lull in activity to the efficacy of the counterinsurgency’s use of indiscriminate violence. Using interviews with ex-combatants and eyewitnesses of the Chechen wars from targeted Chechen villages, we show that this interpretation of the data is flawed. Our findings suggest that we need to better understand the social and political context that shapes how populations react to different forms of violence. Although the counterinsurgency contributed to a shortterm decline in insurgent activity within the targeted localities, rebel violence often resurfaced in the longer term. And when violence was deployed retributively against village communities, it created a whacka- mole dynamic that merely moved rebel violence elsewhere. As a result, both forms of indiscriminate violence reduced rebel activity in the short term, but rebels often sought vengeance in the longer term and, in response to retributive indiscriminate violence, retaliated in other areas.
The most commonly used statistical models of civil war onset fail to correctly predict most occur... more The most commonly used statistical models of civil war onset fail to correctly predict most occurrences of this rare event in out of sample data. Statistical methods for the analysis of bi- nary data, such as logistic regression, even in their rare event and regularized forms, perform poorly at prediction. We compare the performance of Random Forests with three versions of logistic regression (classic logistic regression, Firth rare events logistic regression and L1- regularized logistic regression), and find that the algorithmic approach provides significantly more accurate predictions of civil war onset in out of sample data than any of the logistic regression models. The paper discusses these results and the ways in which algorithmic statistical methods like Random Forests can be useful to more accurately predict rare events in conflict data.
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interaction between systemic and unit-level variables influences
foreign policy. This article assesses neoclassical realism against
two alternative accounts – balance of threat and economic
dependence – to explain change in Georgia’s foreign policy. While
structural realism highlights how the external security
environment shapes general tendencies in foreign policy, specific
strategies depend largely on unit-level factors, specifically elite
cohesion and state capacity. The analysis of primary sources and
exclusive interviews with high-level policy-makers suggests that
neoclassical realism affords a more nuanced and precise account
of foreign policy change over time than structural realism.
aggregate has been extensively examined in the literature, but
mass opinion and preferences on alliance formation in these
states remains understudied. To address this gap, this article
examines individual alliance preferences in two small states in the
South Caucasus region: Georgia and Armenia. While most
Armenians seem to support Armenian membership in CSTO and
most Georgians appear to believe that Georgia should pursue
NATO membership, some Armenians and Georgians prefer equal
relations with both security alliances. The paper suggests that
threat perception influences alliance formation preferences at the
individual level and advances three testable pre-registered
propositions. First, individuals who perceive Azerbaijan or Turkey
as the primary threat to their state tend to support alignment
with the Russian-led CSTO. Second, individuals who view the main
threat to their state coming from Russia are predisposed to
support NATO membership. Finally, individuals who believe that
tensions between Russia and the West are detrimental to their
country are more inclined to support equal relations with both
NATO and CSTO. In general, the evidence is consistent with these
conjectures. We conclude with important qualifications and key
implications for the study of mass opinion on alliance formation.
human rights court worldwide. This article investigates the extent to which the court
addresses cases from countries with the worst human rights performance. Using a new
data set on all ECtHR judgments from 1995–2012, the analysis suggests that the ECtHR
does not deliver its judgments against members of the Council of Europe with the
worst human rights records, but instead against more democratic and affluent
states. The reason is that litigating in front of a supranational court requires
capacities that vulnerable people are unlikely to possess, except when aided by
transnational advocacy groups. However, more judgements are issued against
countries that lack independent judiciaries, where cases are less likely to be resolved
at the domestic level. While the ECtHR might not address the worst human rights
crimes, it plays a subsidiary role in the European human rights protection system by
compensating for weak domestic judiciaries. However, the court’s inability to
independently pursue litigation, together with the lack of capacity in some countries
to bring cases forward, have hampered more effective protection of human rights
for the most vulnerable in Europe.
a fully fledged member state of the international system.
Although many new states are quickly and universally recognized,
the recognition of other aspiring states remains highly
contested. In these cases of contested sovereignty, some countries
but not others extend recognition. However, research on
what shapes a country’s decision to recognize a claim to sovereign
statehood remains relatively sparse. This article focuses on
how religion shapes the incentives of states to extend or withhold
recognition to aspiring states in cases of contested sovereignty.
It posits two mechanisms, one at the domestic level
through religious institutions and one at the international level
through transnational religious affinities. The article uses new
data on all state decisions regarding the international recognition
of Kosovo to test these propositions. The results provide
strong support for these two pathways through which religion
shapes state decisions regarding international recognition.
but why some ethno-national groups mobilize for conflict, while
others remain quiescent, remains subject to significant
disagreement. This paper argues that domestic politics create the
incentives for secession, and international forces make conflict
feasible against a sometimes stronger military adversary – the
state. The proposed theory unpacks this interaction of domestic
and international factors, and posits that when regional elites
possess local control in an area that is contiguous with a potential
sponsor, external support is more feasible and more apt to lead to
mobilization and conflict. When regional elites lack local control,
external sponsors will be wary of supporting a potentially lost
cause and regional elites will exhibit more restraint, reducing the
chances of conflict – external support therefore often flows from
strong states to strong regions in weaker states. It is instrumental
and variable, rather than affective and constant, and thus kin
states will not always support their secessionist brethren in
neighbouring states. Using a sub-national research design from
post-Soviet Georgia, the results lend support to these conjectures.
plagued by class conflict? This is a question that has seldom been raised and
rarely been examined empirically. This paper presents a social-structural theory to
account for the variable incidence of these two forms of political instability. These
two types of conflict result from distinct principles of group solidarity – ethnicity
and class – and since each individual is simultaneously a member of an ethnic
group (or many such groups) and a particular class, these two principles vary in
the degree to which they are mutually exclusive or cross-cutting. The degree of
economic stratification between groups and economic segmentation within them
shapes the relative salience of each principle of group solidarity in any society and
is associated with a characteristic form of political mobilization. In places where
between-group inequalities are high, and within-group inequalities low, ethnicity
should be the dominant principle of group solidarity and serve as the primary
basis of group conflict. By contrast, in countries where between-group inequalities
are low, and within-group inequalities high, class is more likely to serve as the
dominant principle of group solidarity, and conflicts along class lines are more
likely. We test these conjectures with data in over 100 countries on cross-cutting
cleavages, ethnic war, and class conflict. The results are supportive of the theory,
and provide evidence that how groups are stratified and segmented in societies
shapes the type of civil war.
This study builds on these contributions. We use interviews we conducted with ex-combatants and eyewitnesses of the Chechen wars to provide a critical reexamination of the current theoretical debate concerning indiscriminate violence. In doing so, we argue that treating the concept of indiscriminate violence as an essentially random counter-insurgency tactic obscures the important distinction between random and retributive indiscriminate violence deployed against civilians. The distinction raises crucial questions of location and timing that have hindered efforts to evaluate the efficacy of indiscriminate violence in irregular war. Even if indiscriminate violence does lead to a short-term decrease in insurgent activity in the targeted locations as prior research has shown, it does not follow that indiscriminate violence is necessarily effective, for two reasons. After a period of recovery, many local insurgents and prospective avengers from the targeted villages in Chechnya retaliated. But it took prospective Chechen avengers at least six to nine months to recover and to coordinate their attacks, which explains why indiscriminate violence might appear effective in the short term. Moreover, and
more important, indiscriminate violence deployed retributively against
village communities in Chechnya led to retaliation in different areas to
ensure that covillagers were not targeted in retribution. This explains
why rebel violence deployed in response to retributive indiscriminate
violence might not be observed in the same location. By contrast, because
rebels are less fearful of retribution when indiscriminate violence
is deployed randomly against village communities, would-be avengers
from the targeted villages and local insurgents tended to strike back in
the same area and to target randomly picked personnel from the counterinsurgent
forces, but again with delays of at least six months for
recovery and operational planning.
The reaction of the rebels was therefore not observed immediately
(in the case of both random and retributive violence), and was not observed
in the same location (in the case of retributive indiscriminate
violence). Any analysis of the effectiveness of indiscriminate violence,
however sophisticated, that fails to account for this delayed timing (and
in the case of retributive violence, the alternative location) is bound
to mistakenly attribute the lull in activity to the efficacy of the counterinsurgency’s
use of indiscriminate violence. Using interviews with
ex-combatants and eyewitnesses of the Chechen wars from targeted
Chechen villages, we show that this interpretation of the data is flawed.
Our findings suggest that we need to better understand the social and
political context that shapes how populations react to different forms
of violence. Although the counterinsurgency contributed to a shortterm
decline in insurgent activity within the targeted localities, rebel
violence often resurfaced in the longer term. And when violence was
deployed retributively against village communities, it created a whacka-
mole dynamic that merely moved rebel violence elsewhere. As a result,
both forms of indiscriminate violence reduced rebel activity in the
short term, but rebels often sought vengeance in the longer term and,
in response to retributive indiscriminate violence, retaliated in other
areas.
interaction between systemic and unit-level variables influences
foreign policy. This article assesses neoclassical realism against
two alternative accounts – balance of threat and economic
dependence – to explain change in Georgia’s foreign policy. While
structural realism highlights how the external security
environment shapes general tendencies in foreign policy, specific
strategies depend largely on unit-level factors, specifically elite
cohesion and state capacity. The analysis of primary sources and
exclusive interviews with high-level policy-makers suggests that
neoclassical realism affords a more nuanced and precise account
of foreign policy change over time than structural realism.
aggregate has been extensively examined in the literature, but
mass opinion and preferences on alliance formation in these
states remains understudied. To address this gap, this article
examines individual alliance preferences in two small states in the
South Caucasus region: Georgia and Armenia. While most
Armenians seem to support Armenian membership in CSTO and
most Georgians appear to believe that Georgia should pursue
NATO membership, some Armenians and Georgians prefer equal
relations with both security alliances. The paper suggests that
threat perception influences alliance formation preferences at the
individual level and advances three testable pre-registered
propositions. First, individuals who perceive Azerbaijan or Turkey
as the primary threat to their state tend to support alignment
with the Russian-led CSTO. Second, individuals who view the main
threat to their state coming from Russia are predisposed to
support NATO membership. Finally, individuals who believe that
tensions between Russia and the West are detrimental to their
country are more inclined to support equal relations with both
NATO and CSTO. In general, the evidence is consistent with these
conjectures. We conclude with important qualifications and key
implications for the study of mass opinion on alliance formation.
human rights court worldwide. This article investigates the extent to which the court
addresses cases from countries with the worst human rights performance. Using a new
data set on all ECtHR judgments from 1995–2012, the analysis suggests that the ECtHR
does not deliver its judgments against members of the Council of Europe with the
worst human rights records, but instead against more democratic and affluent
states. The reason is that litigating in front of a supranational court requires
capacities that vulnerable people are unlikely to possess, except when aided by
transnational advocacy groups. However, more judgements are issued against
countries that lack independent judiciaries, where cases are less likely to be resolved
at the domestic level. While the ECtHR might not address the worst human rights
crimes, it plays a subsidiary role in the European human rights protection system by
compensating for weak domestic judiciaries. However, the court’s inability to
independently pursue litigation, together with the lack of capacity in some countries
to bring cases forward, have hampered more effective protection of human rights
for the most vulnerable in Europe.
a fully fledged member state of the international system.
Although many new states are quickly and universally recognized,
the recognition of other aspiring states remains highly
contested. In these cases of contested sovereignty, some countries
but not others extend recognition. However, research on
what shapes a country’s decision to recognize a claim to sovereign
statehood remains relatively sparse. This article focuses on
how religion shapes the incentives of states to extend or withhold
recognition to aspiring states in cases of contested sovereignty.
It posits two mechanisms, one at the domestic level
through religious institutions and one at the international level
through transnational religious affinities. The article uses new
data on all state decisions regarding the international recognition
of Kosovo to test these propositions. The results provide
strong support for these two pathways through which religion
shapes state decisions regarding international recognition.
but why some ethno-national groups mobilize for conflict, while
others remain quiescent, remains subject to significant
disagreement. This paper argues that domestic politics create the
incentives for secession, and international forces make conflict
feasible against a sometimes stronger military adversary – the
state. The proposed theory unpacks this interaction of domestic
and international factors, and posits that when regional elites
possess local control in an area that is contiguous with a potential
sponsor, external support is more feasible and more apt to lead to
mobilization and conflict. When regional elites lack local control,
external sponsors will be wary of supporting a potentially lost
cause and regional elites will exhibit more restraint, reducing the
chances of conflict – external support therefore often flows from
strong states to strong regions in weaker states. It is instrumental
and variable, rather than affective and constant, and thus kin
states will not always support their secessionist brethren in
neighbouring states. Using a sub-national research design from
post-Soviet Georgia, the results lend support to these conjectures.
plagued by class conflict? This is a question that has seldom been raised and
rarely been examined empirically. This paper presents a social-structural theory to
account for the variable incidence of these two forms of political instability. These
two types of conflict result from distinct principles of group solidarity – ethnicity
and class – and since each individual is simultaneously a member of an ethnic
group (or many such groups) and a particular class, these two principles vary in
the degree to which they are mutually exclusive or cross-cutting. The degree of
economic stratification between groups and economic segmentation within them
shapes the relative salience of each principle of group solidarity in any society and
is associated with a characteristic form of political mobilization. In places where
between-group inequalities are high, and within-group inequalities low, ethnicity
should be the dominant principle of group solidarity and serve as the primary
basis of group conflict. By contrast, in countries where between-group inequalities
are low, and within-group inequalities high, class is more likely to serve as the
dominant principle of group solidarity, and conflicts along class lines are more
likely. We test these conjectures with data in over 100 countries on cross-cutting
cleavages, ethnic war, and class conflict. The results are supportive of the theory,
and provide evidence that how groups are stratified and segmented in societies
shapes the type of civil war.
This study builds on these contributions. We use interviews we conducted with ex-combatants and eyewitnesses of the Chechen wars to provide a critical reexamination of the current theoretical debate concerning indiscriminate violence. In doing so, we argue that treating the concept of indiscriminate violence as an essentially random counter-insurgency tactic obscures the important distinction between random and retributive indiscriminate violence deployed against civilians. The distinction raises crucial questions of location and timing that have hindered efforts to evaluate the efficacy of indiscriminate violence in irregular war. Even if indiscriminate violence does lead to a short-term decrease in insurgent activity in the targeted locations as prior research has shown, it does not follow that indiscriminate violence is necessarily effective, for two reasons. After a period of recovery, many local insurgents and prospective avengers from the targeted villages in Chechnya retaliated. But it took prospective Chechen avengers at least six to nine months to recover and to coordinate their attacks, which explains why indiscriminate violence might appear effective in the short term. Moreover, and
more important, indiscriminate violence deployed retributively against
village communities in Chechnya led to retaliation in different areas to
ensure that covillagers were not targeted in retribution. This explains
why rebel violence deployed in response to retributive indiscriminate
violence might not be observed in the same location. By contrast, because
rebels are less fearful of retribution when indiscriminate violence
is deployed randomly against village communities, would-be avengers
from the targeted villages and local insurgents tended to strike back in
the same area and to target randomly picked personnel from the counterinsurgent
forces, but again with delays of at least six months for
recovery and operational planning.
The reaction of the rebels was therefore not observed immediately
(in the case of both random and retributive violence), and was not observed
in the same location (in the case of retributive indiscriminate
violence). Any analysis of the effectiveness of indiscriminate violence,
however sophisticated, that fails to account for this delayed timing (and
in the case of retributive violence, the alternative location) is bound
to mistakenly attribute the lull in activity to the efficacy of the counterinsurgency’s
use of indiscriminate violence. Using interviews with
ex-combatants and eyewitnesses of the Chechen wars from targeted
Chechen villages, we show that this interpretation of the data is flawed.
Our findings suggest that we need to better understand the social and
political context that shapes how populations react to different forms
of violence. Although the counterinsurgency contributed to a shortterm
decline in insurgent activity within the targeted localities, rebel
violence often resurfaced in the longer term. And when violence was
deployed retributively against village communities, it created a whacka-
mole dynamic that merely moved rebel violence elsewhere. As a result,
both forms of indiscriminate violence reduced rebel activity in the
short term, but rebels often sought vengeance in the longer term and,
in response to retributive indiscriminate violence, retaliated in other
areas.