Background: There has been a widespread call to adopt evidence-based practices and policies in va... more Background: There has been a widespread call to adopt evidence-based practices and policies in various fields, including healthcare, education, social work, criminal justice, business management, and environmental management.
Key points: This article discusses when it is justified for an individual or organisation to claim that a specific practice or policy is evidence-based. My argument is that this is the case if, and only if, three conditions are met. First, the individual or organisation possesses comparative evidence about the effects of the specific practice or policy in comparison to the effects of at least one alternative practice or policy. Second, the specific practice or policy is supported by this evidence according to at least one of the individual's or organisation's preferences in the given practice or policy area. Third, the individual or organisation can provide a sound account for this support by explaining the evidence and preferences that lay the foundation for the claim.
Conclusions and implications: My argument has at least three noteworthy implications. First, it is possible that some, but not others, are justified in claiming a given practice or policy is evidence-based. Second, being justified in claiming that a practice or policy is evidence-based does not imply that this practice or policy ought to be implemented, not even according to the claimant. Third, the individual's or organisation's preferences ought to guide the collection of evidence to help them identify what the best practices and policies are based on their normative stance.
Abstract: Objectives: When offenders or victims are randomly assigned to receive experimental vs.... more Abstract: Objectives: When offenders or victims are randomly assigned to receive experimental vs. current treatments, the external validity of results may depend on whether different treatments are delivered by similar kinds of treatment providers. When treatment providers volunteer to deliver innovative practices in an experiment, it is unclear whether outcomes depend on the content of the treatment, enthusiasm of the providers for the new practice, or both. In such situations, the potential for what we describe as differential predisposition of volunteers for a new treatment raises a question of external validity. Methods: We describe the process by which 14 out of 29 mediators across seven Danish police districts came to deliver a new, restorative conferencing method of conducting face-to-face meetings between offenders and their victims, in comparison to longstanding mediation methods. Results: We negotiated with all seven District mediation leaders and all 29 of their mediators...
Objectives When offenders or victims are randomly assigned to receive experimental vs. current tr... more Objectives When offenders or victims are randomly assigned to receive experimental vs. current treatments, the external validity of results may depend on whether different treatments are delivered by similar kinds of treatment providers. When treatment providers volunteer to deliver innovative practices in an experiment, it is unclear whether outcomes depend on the content of the treatment, enthusiasm of the providers for the new practice, or both. In such situations, the potential for what we describe as differential predisposition of volunteers for a new treatment raises a question of external validity. Methods We describe the process by which 14 out of 29 mediators across seven Danish police districts came to deliver a new, restorative conferencing method of conducting face-to-face meetings between offenders and their victims, in comparison to longstanding mediation methods. Results We negotiated with all seven District mediation leaders and all 29 of their mediators to use parti...
This article has two objectives, both of which are new. First, it presents a new framework of pun... more This article has two objectives, both of which are new. First, it presents a new framework of punishment in nine dimensions, which makes it possible to distinguish systematically between different conceptualizations of the nature of punishment. Second, using the framework, it discusses the relationship between restorative justice and punishment, showing that some cases of restorative justice constitute punishment from the perspectives of some of the punishment positions in the framework but not for others. Thus, according to some positions, restorative justice (mediation, conferences, circles, etc.) is punishment.
It has frequently been argued that the post-apartheid Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) w... more It has frequently been argued that the post-apartheid Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) was committed to restorative justice (RJ), and that RJ has deep historical roots in African indigenous cultures by virtue of its congruence both with ubuntu and with African indigenous justice systems (AIJS). In this article, I look into the question of what RJ is. I also present the finding that the term ‘restorative justice’ appears only in transcripts of three public TRC hearings, and the hypothesis that the TRC first really began to take notice of the term ‘restorative justice’ after April 1997, when the South African Law Commission published an Issue Paper dealing with RJ. Furthermore, I show that neither the connection between RJ and ubuntu nor the connection between RJ and AIJS is as straightforward and unproblematic as often assumed.
In this article, I describe and systematize the different answers to the question 'What is Ubuntu... more In this article, I describe and systematize the different answers to the question 'What is Ubuntu?' that I have been able to identify among South Africans of African descent (SAADs). I show that it is possible to distinguish between two clusters of answers. The answers of the first cluster all define ubuntu as a moral quality of a person, while the answers of the second cluster all define ubuntu as a phenomenon (for instance a philosophy, an ethic, African humanism, or, a wordview) according to which persons are interconnected. The concept of a person is of central importance to all the answers of both clusters, which means that to understand these answers, it is decisive to raise the question of who counts as a person according to SAADs. I show that some SAADs define all Homo sapiens as persons, whereas others hold the view that only some Homo sapiens count as persons: only those who are black, only those who have been incorporated into personhood, or only those who behave in a morally acceptable manner.
In this article, I demonstrate that the term ‘ubuntu’ has frequently appeared in writing since at... more In this article, I demonstrate that the term ‘ubuntu’ has frequently appeared in writing since at least 1846. I also analyse changes in how ubuntu has been defined in written sources in the period 1846 to 2011. The analysis shows that in written sources published prior to 1950, it appears that ubuntu is always defined as a human quality. At different stages during the second half of the 1900s, some authors began to define ubuntu more broadly: definitions included ubuntu as African humanism, a philosophy, an ethic, and as a worldview. Furthermore, my findings indicate that it was during the period from 1993 to 1995 that the Nguni proverb ‘umuntu ngumuntu ngabantu’ (often translated as ‘a person is a person through other persons’) was used for the first time to describe what ubuntu is. Most authors today refer to the proverb when describing ubuntu, irrespective of whether they consider ubuntu to be a human quality, African humanism, a philosophy, an ethic, or a worldview.
African Philosophy • Conflict Studies
African Philosophy: Critical Perspectives and Global Dialog... more African Philosophy • Conflict Studies African Philosophy: Critical Perspectives and Global Dialogue Series Editors: Uchenna B. Okeja, Rhodes University, and Bruce B. Janz, University of Central Florida
"In this book, Christian B. N. Gade refreshingly approaches the African philosophy of ubuntu neither as an ethnophilosophy, describing a single worldview purportedly held by all sub-Saharan peoples, nor as a moral philosophy, prescribing a single ethic they all should hold. Instead, he approaches it as an intellectual historian who is true to particularities. Resourcefully drawing on novel sources such as interviews and neglected documents, Gade reveals a variety of competing interpretations of ubuntu and plausibly argues for ways they have influenced South African politics in the post-apartheid era.” —Thaddeus Metz, University of Johannesburg
Many have argued that ubuntu was a formative influence on the post-apartheid Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC), South Africa’s famous transitional justice mechanism. A Discourse on African Philosophy: A New Perspective on Ubuntu and Transitional Justice in South Africa challenges and contextualizes this view in a way that not only provides new findings and reflections on ubuntu and the TRC, but also contributes to the field of African philosophy. One of Gade’s key findings, founded on qualitative interviews in South Africa, is that some former TRC commissioners and committee members question the importance of ubuntu in the TRC process. Another is that there are several differing and historically developing interpretations of ubuntu, some of which have evident political implications and reflect non-factual and creative uses of history. Thus, ubuntu is not a shared cultural heritage in the ethnophilosophical sense of a static property characterizing a group. In fact, throughout this book Gade argues that the ethnophilosophical approach to African philosophy as a static group property is highly problematic. Gade’s research presents an alternative collective discourse on African philosophy (“collective” in the sense that it does not focus on any single individual in particular) that takes differences, historical developments, and social contexts seriously.
This book will be of interest to scholars of African philosophy, transitional justice, politics and cultural heritage, and law in South Africa.
Christian B. N. Gade is assistant professor of human security at Aarhus University.
Background: There has been a widespread call to adopt evidence-based practices and policies in va... more Background: There has been a widespread call to adopt evidence-based practices and policies in various fields, including healthcare, education, social work, criminal justice, business management, and environmental management.
Key points: This article discusses when it is justified for an individual or organisation to claim that a specific practice or policy is evidence-based. My argument is that this is the case if, and only if, three conditions are met. First, the individual or organisation possesses comparative evidence about the effects of the specific practice or policy in comparison to the effects of at least one alternative practice or policy. Second, the specific practice or policy is supported by this evidence according to at least one of the individual's or organisation's preferences in the given practice or policy area. Third, the individual or organisation can provide a sound account for this support by explaining the evidence and preferences that lay the foundation for the claim.
Conclusions and implications: My argument has at least three noteworthy implications. First, it is possible that some, but not others, are justified in claiming a given practice or policy is evidence-based. Second, being justified in claiming that a practice or policy is evidence-based does not imply that this practice or policy ought to be implemented, not even according to the claimant. Third, the individual's or organisation's preferences ought to guide the collection of evidence to help them identify what the best practices and policies are based on their normative stance.
Abstract: Objectives: When offenders or victims are randomly assigned to receive experimental vs.... more Abstract: Objectives: When offenders or victims are randomly assigned to receive experimental vs. current treatments, the external validity of results may depend on whether different treatments are delivered by similar kinds of treatment providers. When treatment providers volunteer to deliver innovative practices in an experiment, it is unclear whether outcomes depend on the content of the treatment, enthusiasm of the providers for the new practice, or both. In such situations, the potential for what we describe as differential predisposition of volunteers for a new treatment raises a question of external validity. Methods: We describe the process by which 14 out of 29 mediators across seven Danish police districts came to deliver a new, restorative conferencing method of conducting face-to-face meetings between offenders and their victims, in comparison to longstanding mediation methods. Results: We negotiated with all seven District mediation leaders and all 29 of their mediators...
Objectives When offenders or victims are randomly assigned to receive experimental vs. current tr... more Objectives When offenders or victims are randomly assigned to receive experimental vs. current treatments, the external validity of results may depend on whether different treatments are delivered by similar kinds of treatment providers. When treatment providers volunteer to deliver innovative practices in an experiment, it is unclear whether outcomes depend on the content of the treatment, enthusiasm of the providers for the new practice, or both. In such situations, the potential for what we describe as differential predisposition of volunteers for a new treatment raises a question of external validity. Methods We describe the process by which 14 out of 29 mediators across seven Danish police districts came to deliver a new, restorative conferencing method of conducting face-to-face meetings between offenders and their victims, in comparison to longstanding mediation methods. Results We negotiated with all seven District mediation leaders and all 29 of their mediators to use parti...
This article has two objectives, both of which are new. First, it presents a new framework of pun... more This article has two objectives, both of which are new. First, it presents a new framework of punishment in nine dimensions, which makes it possible to distinguish systematically between different conceptualizations of the nature of punishment. Second, using the framework, it discusses the relationship between restorative justice and punishment, showing that some cases of restorative justice constitute punishment from the perspectives of some of the punishment positions in the framework but not for others. Thus, according to some positions, restorative justice (mediation, conferences, circles, etc.) is punishment.
It has frequently been argued that the post-apartheid Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) w... more It has frequently been argued that the post-apartheid Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) was committed to restorative justice (RJ), and that RJ has deep historical roots in African indigenous cultures by virtue of its congruence both with ubuntu and with African indigenous justice systems (AIJS). In this article, I look into the question of what RJ is. I also present the finding that the term ‘restorative justice’ appears only in transcripts of three public TRC hearings, and the hypothesis that the TRC first really began to take notice of the term ‘restorative justice’ after April 1997, when the South African Law Commission published an Issue Paper dealing with RJ. Furthermore, I show that neither the connection between RJ and ubuntu nor the connection between RJ and AIJS is as straightforward and unproblematic as often assumed.
In this article, I describe and systematize the different answers to the question 'What is Ubuntu... more In this article, I describe and systematize the different answers to the question 'What is Ubuntu?' that I have been able to identify among South Africans of African descent (SAADs). I show that it is possible to distinguish between two clusters of answers. The answers of the first cluster all define ubuntu as a moral quality of a person, while the answers of the second cluster all define ubuntu as a phenomenon (for instance a philosophy, an ethic, African humanism, or, a wordview) according to which persons are interconnected. The concept of a person is of central importance to all the answers of both clusters, which means that to understand these answers, it is decisive to raise the question of who counts as a person according to SAADs. I show that some SAADs define all Homo sapiens as persons, whereas others hold the view that only some Homo sapiens count as persons: only those who are black, only those who have been incorporated into personhood, or only those who behave in a morally acceptable manner.
In this article, I demonstrate that the term ‘ubuntu’ has frequently appeared in writing since at... more In this article, I demonstrate that the term ‘ubuntu’ has frequently appeared in writing since at least 1846. I also analyse changes in how ubuntu has been defined in written sources in the period 1846 to 2011. The analysis shows that in written sources published prior to 1950, it appears that ubuntu is always defined as a human quality. At different stages during the second half of the 1900s, some authors began to define ubuntu more broadly: definitions included ubuntu as African humanism, a philosophy, an ethic, and as a worldview. Furthermore, my findings indicate that it was during the period from 1993 to 1995 that the Nguni proverb ‘umuntu ngumuntu ngabantu’ (often translated as ‘a person is a person through other persons’) was used for the first time to describe what ubuntu is. Most authors today refer to the proverb when describing ubuntu, irrespective of whether they consider ubuntu to be a human quality, African humanism, a philosophy, an ethic, or a worldview.
African Philosophy • Conflict Studies
African Philosophy: Critical Perspectives and Global Dialog... more African Philosophy • Conflict Studies African Philosophy: Critical Perspectives and Global Dialogue Series Editors: Uchenna B. Okeja, Rhodes University, and Bruce B. Janz, University of Central Florida
"In this book, Christian B. N. Gade refreshingly approaches the African philosophy of ubuntu neither as an ethnophilosophy, describing a single worldview purportedly held by all sub-Saharan peoples, nor as a moral philosophy, prescribing a single ethic they all should hold. Instead, he approaches it as an intellectual historian who is true to particularities. Resourcefully drawing on novel sources such as interviews and neglected documents, Gade reveals a variety of competing interpretations of ubuntu and plausibly argues for ways they have influenced South African politics in the post-apartheid era.” —Thaddeus Metz, University of Johannesburg
Many have argued that ubuntu was a formative influence on the post-apartheid Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC), South Africa’s famous transitional justice mechanism. A Discourse on African Philosophy: A New Perspective on Ubuntu and Transitional Justice in South Africa challenges and contextualizes this view in a way that not only provides new findings and reflections on ubuntu and the TRC, but also contributes to the field of African philosophy. One of Gade’s key findings, founded on qualitative interviews in South Africa, is that some former TRC commissioners and committee members question the importance of ubuntu in the TRC process. Another is that there are several differing and historically developing interpretations of ubuntu, some of which have evident political implications and reflect non-factual and creative uses of history. Thus, ubuntu is not a shared cultural heritage in the ethnophilosophical sense of a static property characterizing a group. In fact, throughout this book Gade argues that the ethnophilosophical approach to African philosophy as a static group property is highly problematic. Gade’s research presents an alternative collective discourse on African philosophy (“collective” in the sense that it does not focus on any single individual in particular) that takes differences, historical developments, and social contexts seriously.
This book will be of interest to scholars of African philosophy, transitional justice, politics and cultural heritage, and law in South Africa.
Christian B. N. Gade is assistant professor of human security at Aarhus University.
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Key points: This article discusses when it is justified for an individual or organisation to claim that a specific practice or policy is evidence-based. My argument is that this is the case if, and only if, three conditions are met. First, the individual or organisation possesses comparative evidence about the effects of the specific practice or policy in comparison to the effects of at least one alternative practice or policy. Second, the specific practice or policy is supported by this evidence according to at least one of the individual's or organisation's preferences in the given practice or policy area. Third, the individual or organisation can provide a sound account for this support by explaining the evidence and preferences that lay the foundation for the claim.
Conclusions and implications: My argument has at least three noteworthy implications. First, it is possible that some, but not others, are justified in claiming a given practice or policy is evidence-based. Second, being justified in claiming that a practice or policy is evidence-based does not imply that this practice or policy ought to be implemented, not even according to the claimant. Third, the individual's or organisation's preferences ought to guide the collection of evidence to help them identify what the best practices and policies are based on their normative stance.
African Philosophy: Critical Perspectives and Global Dialogue
Series Editors: Uchenna B. Okeja, Rhodes University, and Bruce B. Janz, University of Central Florida
"In this book, Christian B. N. Gade refreshingly approaches the African philosophy of ubuntu neither as an ethnophilosophy, describing a single worldview purportedly held by all sub-Saharan peoples, nor as a moral philosophy, prescribing a single ethic they all should hold. Instead, he approaches it as an intellectual historian who is true to particularities. Resourcefully drawing on novel sources such as interviews and neglected documents, Gade reveals a variety of competing interpretations of ubuntu and plausibly argues for ways they have influenced South African politics in the post-apartheid era.” —Thaddeus Metz, University of Johannesburg
Many have argued that ubuntu was a formative influence on the post-apartheid Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC), South Africa’s famous transitional justice mechanism. A Discourse on African Philosophy: A New Perspective on Ubuntu and Transitional Justice in South Africa challenges and contextualizes this view in a way that not only provides new findings and reflections on ubuntu and the TRC, but also contributes to the field of African philosophy. One of Gade’s key findings, founded on qualitative interviews in South Africa, is that some former TRC commissioners and committee members question the importance of ubuntu in the TRC process. Another is that there are several differing and historically developing interpretations of ubuntu, some of which have evident political implications and reflect non-factual and creative uses of history. Thus, ubuntu is not a shared cultural heritage in the ethnophilosophical sense of a static property characterizing a group. In fact, throughout this book Gade argues that the ethnophilosophical approach to African philosophy as a static group property is highly problematic. Gade’s research presents an alternative collective discourse on African philosophy (“collective” in the sense that it does not focus on any single individual in particular) that takes differences, historical developments, and social contexts seriously.
This book will be of interest to scholars of African philosophy, transitional justice, politics and cultural heritage, and law in South Africa.
Christian B. N. Gade is assistant professor of human security at Aarhus University.
Key points: This article discusses when it is justified for an individual or organisation to claim that a specific practice or policy is evidence-based. My argument is that this is the case if, and only if, three conditions are met. First, the individual or organisation possesses comparative evidence about the effects of the specific practice or policy in comparison to the effects of at least one alternative practice or policy. Second, the specific practice or policy is supported by this evidence according to at least one of the individual's or organisation's preferences in the given practice or policy area. Third, the individual or organisation can provide a sound account for this support by explaining the evidence and preferences that lay the foundation for the claim.
Conclusions and implications: My argument has at least three noteworthy implications. First, it is possible that some, but not others, are justified in claiming a given practice or policy is evidence-based. Second, being justified in claiming that a practice or policy is evidence-based does not imply that this practice or policy ought to be implemented, not even according to the claimant. Third, the individual's or organisation's preferences ought to guide the collection of evidence to help them identify what the best practices and policies are based on their normative stance.
African Philosophy: Critical Perspectives and Global Dialogue
Series Editors: Uchenna B. Okeja, Rhodes University, and Bruce B. Janz, University of Central Florida
"In this book, Christian B. N. Gade refreshingly approaches the African philosophy of ubuntu neither as an ethnophilosophy, describing a single worldview purportedly held by all sub-Saharan peoples, nor as a moral philosophy, prescribing a single ethic they all should hold. Instead, he approaches it as an intellectual historian who is true to particularities. Resourcefully drawing on novel sources such as interviews and neglected documents, Gade reveals a variety of competing interpretations of ubuntu and plausibly argues for ways they have influenced South African politics in the post-apartheid era.” —Thaddeus Metz, University of Johannesburg
Many have argued that ubuntu was a formative influence on the post-apartheid Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC), South Africa’s famous transitional justice mechanism. A Discourse on African Philosophy: A New Perspective on Ubuntu and Transitional Justice in South Africa challenges and contextualizes this view in a way that not only provides new findings and reflections on ubuntu and the TRC, but also contributes to the field of African philosophy. One of Gade’s key findings, founded on qualitative interviews in South Africa, is that some former TRC commissioners and committee members question the importance of ubuntu in the TRC process. Another is that there are several differing and historically developing interpretations of ubuntu, some of which have evident political implications and reflect non-factual and creative uses of history. Thus, ubuntu is not a shared cultural heritage in the ethnophilosophical sense of a static property characterizing a group. In fact, throughout this book Gade argues that the ethnophilosophical approach to African philosophy as a static group property is highly problematic. Gade’s research presents an alternative collective discourse on African philosophy (“collective” in the sense that it does not focus on any single individual in particular) that takes differences, historical developments, and social contexts seriously.
This book will be of interest to scholars of African philosophy, transitional justice, politics and cultural heritage, and law in South Africa.
Christian B. N. Gade is assistant professor of human security at Aarhus University.