Papers by Gaston G LeNotre
The Thomist, 2025
The science of being as being for Thomas Aquinas acquires distinct modalities based on distinct p... more The science of being as being for Thomas Aquinas acquires distinct modalities based on distinct paths of reasoning, either from principles or towards principles, and based on distinct domains of discourse, either according to extrinsic causes (secundum rem) or according to intrinsic causes (secundum rationem). “Metaphysics” proceeds by resolution secundum rationem towards the universal principle of being, and “first philosophy” proceeds by way of composition secundum rationem from the universal principle of being. In another sense, “first philosophy” proceeds by resolution secundum rem to the universal cause of being as such, and theology, divine science, or “philosophical theology” proceeds by composition secundum rem from the universal cause of being, namely, God. I respond to arguments against the possibility of philosophical theology by showing how some arguments for the real distinction and for the existence of angels proceed by way of composition secundum rem. We can argue from an imperfect notion of God insofar as we assume philosophical insights already gained about God through another mode, namely, through first philosophy, by way of resolution secundum rem. Finally, I have shown how this mode assumes only a suppositional necessity in God’s operation with regard to creatures.
Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association, 2022
Thomas Aquinas's writings on natural law (ST 1-2.94) are well-known. Around the same period of wr... more Thomas Aquinas's writings on natural law (ST 1-2.94) are well-known. Around the same period of writing, Thomas wrote his twelfth Quodlibet (1272), including one famous article about why truth is stronger than wine, women, and kings (QQ 12.13.1). The two texts are parallel in surprising ways. Although the Quodlibet passage is overly brief, similar arguments concerning whether love is stronger than hatred (Summa Theologiae 1-2.29.3) and whether all things tend to the good (De Veritate q. 22, a. 1) complete the Quodlibet's argumentation. Furthermore, Thomas's understanding of natural law in the human heart as a participation in the eternal law, especially in terms of natural inclinations, gives theoretical justification for why truth is strongest.
Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association, 2020
Neoplatonic commentators found in Aristotle's Categories a basis for participation and self-predi... more Neoplatonic commentators found in Aristotle's Categories a basis for participation and self-predication (or reflex predication). Although Simplicius seems to accept a certain type of self-predication (e.g., "quality is qualified"), Pseudo-Dionysius gives arguments against self-predication among caused things, making exception only for the divine nature insofar as the predicates preexist in their Cause (e.g., "God's Beauty is beautiful"). Theologians such as Philip the Chancellor (1165/85-1236) and Thomas Aquinas adapt the Neoplatonic view of divine transcendence while also elaborating a transcendental conception of metaphysics. These theologians in effect made ontological space for created substantial goodness. One sign of this second beginning in metaphysics is the ability to make reflex predications about creatures (e.g., "goodness is good"). Philip the Chancellor argues for this reflex predication in Summa de Bono (q. 9), and Thomas defends it at length in De veritate (q. 21, a. 4 ad 4).
American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly, 2020
The scholarly consensus (e.g., J. Wippel, J. Gracia, L. Dewan, J. Brower, G. Pini, F. Amerini, P.... more The scholarly consensus (e.g., J. Wippel, J. Gracia, L. Dewan, J. Brower, G. Pini, F. Amerini, P. Porro) holds that Thomas Aquinas's views about individuation changed over time. The consensus states that he wavered in his opinion about whether determinate dimensions or indeterminate dimensions serve in the individuation of corporeal substances. I argue that this consensus is mistaken. I focus on early texts of Thomas to argue that he relies on different types of dimensions to answer different problems of individuation. Determinate dimensions resolve a problem in the order of perfection, and indeterminate dimensions resolve a problem in the order of generation. I explain texts that answer the problem of individuation in the order of perfection according to questions about universals, cognition, and science. I then explain texts that answer the problem of individuation in the order of generation. My conclusion argues that, despite abandoning the language, Thomas continues later in his career to rely on indeterminate dimensions to resolve the problem of individuation in the order of generation.
Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association, 2018
A premodern philosophy of race and racism in Thomas Aquinas resolves some seeming oppositions bet... more A premodern philosophy of race and racism in Thomas Aquinas resolves some seeming oppositions between the three most current theories of race. Thomas’s generational account of race is primary. It affirms the racial naturalist view that there are biological differences between people, and some of which stem from a characteristic genotype and geography. Thomas’s individual account of race is secondary but nevertheless a necessary clarification of the generational account. It affirms the racial skeptic view that these racial characteristic properties are individual properties, not essential or specific properties, and as such cannot lead to a definite, essential being that is a ‘race’. Thomas’s intersubjective account of race is tertiary, insofar as it presumes the generational and individual accounts, and yet crucially explains a peculiar social reality. It affirms the racial constructionist view that the intention by which we understand the notion of race is a socially constituted object, a mind-dependent reality informed by experience.
Dissertation by Gaston G LeNotre
Catholic University of America, 2017
St. Thomas Aquinas sometimes uses strictly conceptual and logical insights to draw insi... more St. Thomas Aquinas sometimes uses strictly conceptual and logical insights to draw insights about things in reality. I show that, throughout his career, Aquinas’s metaphysics employs a logical procedure that he calls the “method of predication” (modus praedicandi). This method consists in using what logic teaches about modes of predicating as a tool for deductive reasoning in metaphysics.
The first chapter examines passages in Aquinas’s Commentaries on De Trinitate and on the Metaphysics that describe this method of predication or “logical method” as a “fitting” and “proper” way for metaphysics to proceed. This chapter also provides the context for Aquinas’s method by identifying some important classical and contemporaneous sources (Aristotle, Boethius, Averroes), including a discussion on topical arguments and the distinction between doctrinal and instrumental logic (logica docens, logica utens).
In chapters two and three, I consider the realist framework behind the method of predication. I discuss cognitive realism in chapter two focusing on the origin and role of essence or nature (absolutely considered) in predication. I offer an account of how concepts and predications are ultimately caused by (real) things. I discuss metaphysical realism in chapter three focusing on the relationship between the subject of logic, rationate being (ens rationis), and the subject of metaphysics (ens communis), which is real being (ens naturae). This chapter finishes with an examination of essential being (ens secundum se) and different types of predication (e.g., per se, per participationem, denomative).
In chapter four, after examining Aquinas’s rejection of similar types of arguments from previous authors (Parmenides, Plato, Avicebron), I consider the application of the method of predication to various metaphysical issues. Aquinas uses the method of predication in many different contexts. He uses it in order to derive different properties and categories of being, to distinguish esse from essence, to establish the unicity of the substantial form, and to justify the reality of prime matter in a properly metaphysical fashion. These arguments are analyzed for their soundness, and the interpretation of some authors are taken into consideration.
This doctoral dissertation was defended on November 18th, 2016 before Dr. Gregory T. Doolan, Dr. Timothy B. Noone, and Dr. Michael Gorman alongside two external readers at The School of Philosophy, The Catholic University of America in Washington D.C.
Book Reviews by Gaston G LeNotre
Philosophy in Review, 2019
Philosophy in Review, 2018
American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly, 2018
Drafts by Gaston G LeNotre
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Papers by Gaston G LeNotre
Dissertation by Gaston G LeNotre
The first chapter examines passages in Aquinas’s Commentaries on De Trinitate and on the Metaphysics that describe this method of predication or “logical method” as a “fitting” and “proper” way for metaphysics to proceed. This chapter also provides the context for Aquinas’s method by identifying some important classical and contemporaneous sources (Aristotle, Boethius, Averroes), including a discussion on topical arguments and the distinction between doctrinal and instrumental logic (logica docens, logica utens).
In chapters two and three, I consider the realist framework behind the method of predication. I discuss cognitive realism in chapter two focusing on the origin and role of essence or nature (absolutely considered) in predication. I offer an account of how concepts and predications are ultimately caused by (real) things. I discuss metaphysical realism in chapter three focusing on the relationship between the subject of logic, rationate being (ens rationis), and the subject of metaphysics (ens communis), which is real being (ens naturae). This chapter finishes with an examination of essential being (ens secundum se) and different types of predication (e.g., per se, per participationem, denomative).
In chapter four, after examining Aquinas’s rejection of similar types of arguments from previous authors (Parmenides, Plato, Avicebron), I consider the application of the method of predication to various metaphysical issues. Aquinas uses the method of predication in many different contexts. He uses it in order to derive different properties and categories of being, to distinguish esse from essence, to establish the unicity of the substantial form, and to justify the reality of prime matter in a properly metaphysical fashion. These arguments are analyzed for their soundness, and the interpretation of some authors are taken into consideration.
This doctoral dissertation was defended on November 18th, 2016 before Dr. Gregory T. Doolan, Dr. Timothy B. Noone, and Dr. Michael Gorman alongside two external readers at The School of Philosophy, The Catholic University of America in Washington D.C.
Book Reviews by Gaston G LeNotre
Drafts by Gaston G LeNotre
The first chapter examines passages in Aquinas’s Commentaries on De Trinitate and on the Metaphysics that describe this method of predication or “logical method” as a “fitting” and “proper” way for metaphysics to proceed. This chapter also provides the context for Aquinas’s method by identifying some important classical and contemporaneous sources (Aristotle, Boethius, Averroes), including a discussion on topical arguments and the distinction between doctrinal and instrumental logic (logica docens, logica utens).
In chapters two and three, I consider the realist framework behind the method of predication. I discuss cognitive realism in chapter two focusing on the origin and role of essence or nature (absolutely considered) in predication. I offer an account of how concepts and predications are ultimately caused by (real) things. I discuss metaphysical realism in chapter three focusing on the relationship between the subject of logic, rationate being (ens rationis), and the subject of metaphysics (ens communis), which is real being (ens naturae). This chapter finishes with an examination of essential being (ens secundum se) and different types of predication (e.g., per se, per participationem, denomative).
In chapter four, after examining Aquinas’s rejection of similar types of arguments from previous authors (Parmenides, Plato, Avicebron), I consider the application of the method of predication to various metaphysical issues. Aquinas uses the method of predication in many different contexts. He uses it in order to derive different properties and categories of being, to distinguish esse from essence, to establish the unicity of the substantial form, and to justify the reality of prime matter in a properly metaphysical fashion. These arguments are analyzed for their soundness, and the interpretation of some authors are taken into consideration.
This doctoral dissertation was defended on November 18th, 2016 before Dr. Gregory T. Doolan, Dr. Timothy B. Noone, and Dr. Michael Gorman alongside two external readers at The School of Philosophy, The Catholic University of America in Washington D.C.