Problem of Universals

Platon ve Aristoteles'te Tümeller Problemi

Theory of Universals in Aristotle and Plato

Özet

Tümeller probleminde öne çıkan çözüm önerileri gerçekçilik ve adcılık altında toplanabilir. Platon ve Aristoteles görüşleriyle gerçekçiliğin temsilcileri olarak kabul edilebilirler ve kendilerinden sonra gelen düşünürler için bir dayanak noktası oluştururlar. Platon’un İdealar görüşü ve Aristoteles’in kategoriler teorisi tümeller hakkındaki görüşlerini sınırlandırmamıza yardımcı olur ve aralarındaki ayırım, sonraki düşünürler tarafından da çokça tartışılan bir konu haline gelir. Bu makalede Platon ve Aristoteles’in konuya dair düşünceleri tümeller problemi çerçevesinde ortaya serilmesi ve sonraki dönemde tartışmayı etkileyen düşüncelerinin vurgulanması amaçlanmaktadır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Platon, Aristoteles, tümel, cins, tür, gerçekçilik

Abstract

The solutions for the theory of universals may be grouped as realism and nominalism. Plato and Aristotle are considered as the founders of realism for their opinions and they are a certain reference for the philosophers after them. Plato’s theory of ideals and Aristotle’s theory of categories help us to compose their opinions on universals. The difference between these opinions becomes a vastly discussed subject. The aim of this article is to present Plato and Aristotle’s thoughts within the frame of the problem of universals and emphasize their influencing thoughts on the subject.

Keywords: Plato, Aristotle, universal, genus, species, realism

Gardeners, poets, lovers, and philosophers are all interested in the redness of roses; but only philosophers wonder how it is that two different roses can share the same property. Are red things red because they resemble each other? Or do they resemble each other because they are red? Since the 1970s philosophers have tended to favour the latter view, and held that a satisfactory account of properties must involve the postulation of either universals or tropes. But Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra revives the dormant alternative theory of resemblance nominalism, showing first that it can withstand the attacks of such eminent opponents as Goodman and Armstrong, and then that there are reasons to prefer it to its rival theories. The clarity and rigour of his arguments will challenge metaphysicians to rethink their views on properties.

In recent years, the biographical novel has supplanted the classical historical novel and become a dominant literary form.  But why?  And what exactly is the biographical novel?  How does it picture history differently from the classical historical novel?  How does it uniquely engage and critique the political?  In this book, I answer these and many other questions.  This is the first chapter from the book.  In the other chapters, I examine biographical novels about figures such as Ludwig Wittgenstein, Friedrich Nietzsche, Walter Benjamin, Moses, Herod, Gabriel Prosser, Nat Turner, Sally Hemings, Alfred Rosenberg, and Einar Wegener/Lili Elbe.

According to philosophical folklore Ramsey maintained three propositions in his famous 1925 paper " Universals " : (i) there is no subject-predicate distinction; (ii) there is no particular-universal distinction; (iii) there is no particular-universal distinction because there is no subject-predicate distinction. The 'first generation' of Ramsey commentators dismissed " Universals " because they held that whereas predicates may be negated, names may not and so there is a subject-predicate distinction after all. The 'second generation' of commentators dismissed " Universals because they held that the absence of a merely linguistic distinction between subject and predicate does not provide any kind of reason for doubting that a truly ontological (i.e. non-linguistic) distinction obtains between particulars and universals. But both first and second-generation criticisms miss their marks because Ramsey did not maintain the three identified propositions. The failure of commentators to appreciate the point and purpose of the position Ramsey actually advanced in " Universals " results from (a) failing to consider the range of different arguments advanced there, (b) looking at " Universals " in isolation from Ramsey's other papers and (c) failing to consider Ramsey's writings in the context of the views that Russell and Wittgenstein held during the early 1920s. Seen from this wider perspective Ramsey arguments in " Universals " take on an altogether different significance. They not only anticipate important contemporary developments⎯the resurgence of Humeanism and the doctrine that the existence of universals can only be established a posteriori⎯but also point beyond them.

This paper presents a comprehensive analysis of Maximus' theory of the universals, called immanent realism. According to the interpretation ascribed to Maximus here, the universal is common to particulars and exists as an indivisible whole in each of them. The argument will show that Maximus employs two principles for his doctrine of immanent realism, one dealing with logic and the other with metaphysics, and that Maximus' originality consists in their unique combination under the Platonic influence of Ps.-Dionysius the Areopagite. One important result of this argument is Maximus' innovatory insertion of generic existence within the traditional logic of the genus-species-particulars that opens up the possibility to predicate existence as a generic or universal property of a particular without necessarily considering the particular in a species. This is exactly the case with Christ, who is an individual God-Man without having a species of " Christs " at his origin.

A problem for Aristotelian realist accounts of universals (neither Platonist nor nominalist) is the status of those universals that happen not to be realised in the physical (or any other) world. They perhaps include uninstantiated shades of blue and huge infinite cardinals. Should they be altogether excluded (as in D.M. Armstrong's theory of universals) or accorded some sort of reality? Surely truths about ratios are true even of ratios that are too big to be instantiated - what is the truthmaker of such truths? It is argued that Aristotelianism can answer the question, but only a semi-Platonist form of it.

Tesina per l'esame di Filosofia Medievale (Unipr a.a. 2014-2015), utile per lo studio.

L’assunzione a cui Avicenna si richiama è quella secondo cui l’essenza, intesa come l’oggetto di definizione, non è di per sé universale. Alessandro giustifica questa tesi sostenendo che se esistesse un solo animale al mondo, “animale” non potrebbe essere universale, in quanto si potrebbe predicare di un solo individuo e non di molti. Poiché il fatto che esistono più animali è accidentale, ne consegue che l’applicabilità della definizione di “animale” a più individui è essa stessa accidentale. Detto in altri termini, l’universale non rientra nella definizione dell’essenza, ma pertiene all’essenza come accidente.  Ora, il fatto che l’universale (il genere) possa pertenere all’essenza significa che questa non sarà nemmeno singolare, altrimenti precluderebbe la possibilità di predicazione ai molti. Questa essenza né universale né particolare Alessandro la chiama ‘pragma’, per poi affermare che essa è presente nei molti senza essere la stessa in molti.

It is often said that Scotus and Ockham made significant contributions to the debate about universals and individuation. I argue that no clear view of their theories about properties has emerged. On the contrary, there are deep ambiguities and technical confusions in both the primary and secondary literature. In this paper, I try to outline some of the more important ambiguities and confusions in as clear a way as I can.

This PhD thesis focuses on two chapters of the Miscellaneorum centuria secunda, a work Politian was composing during his
last years as Philosophy Professor at the Florentine Studio (1493-1494): chapter 53 (Universale) and chapter 55 (Enthymema). They deal with two topical questions of Aristotelian philosophy, i. e. the interpretation of the concept of «universal» in Aristotle’s corpus and the appropriate definition of the «enthymeme», that is the rhetorical syllogism.
By a careful inspection of the manuscript of the second Miscellanea (ms. Venezia, Fondazione Giorgio Cini 1), this thesis
will propose a new kind of critical edition of the two chapters, showing the working method of the humanist through the different composition stages of the chapters. A study of the short Greek passages quoted and translated into Latin by Politian and a deep investigation into the diverse sources (such as the manuscripts of the ancient Aristotle’s exegetes) the humanist could have had in hand at his time will also emphasize the modernity of his conclusions. Anticipating the newest exegesis, in chapter 53 Politian clearly explains that there is no contradiction between the concept of ‘universal’ which Aristotle introduces in the Physics and the ‘universal’
he refers to in the Analytics: the difference is not in the meaning of «universal», but in the way the philosopher refers to it, since in the Physics his focus is on gnoseology, whereas in the Organon he is merely concerned with logic matters. Similarly Politian’s conclusions are in advance of his times in chapter 55, where he states that enthymemes are not characterized by the lack of one of the two syllogistic premises (as Medieval thinkers had claimed, especially under the influence of Quintilian’s interpretation of the
Aristotelian passage), but by the content of their argumentation, which is based on likelihood and signs (σηµεῖα), and not on necessity (as it occurs in logical syllogisms). Nevertheless Politian shows an unequivocal debt to Scholasticism, most especially with regard to the use of philosophical terms. By examining carefully the manuscript of his work (which is, in fact, still a draft) it becomes
clear that his corrections often aim at replacing less common words with synonyms taken from the Scholastic tradition. Furthermore, some textual references prove that Politian had close and continuous ties not only with other famous humanists of the Italian Renaissance, like Pico della Mirandola and Ermolao Barbaro, but also with the Scholastic thinkers of his time (like Francesco di Tommaso, a Dominican friar who lectured in Theology at the Studio, was surely a thomist and taught the young Politian Aristotelianlogic).
In conclusion, this thesis will suggest not only that Aristotelian philosophy was a subject of particular interest to a leading
humanist figure such as Politian, but also that the astonishing modernity of his Humanism, as a reflection of an old and contemporary discussion on the philosophy of Aristotle, comes from a renewed use of traditional methods and languages.

Review forthcoming in The Thomist. This excellent book provides a thorough study-to my knowledge, the first of its kind-of the philosophical dimension of Christian doctrine in late antiquity. Like some recent scholars (e.g. Mark Edwards and George Karamanolis), Zachhuber sees a "Christian philosophy" emerging in this period. For him, the label denotes "a set of logical and ontological concepts underlying the articulation of doctrinal statements" (3). These concepts coalesced into theories which, while not

Diese Arbeit analysiert im Detail die Lehre des Johannes Duns Scotus zur "natura comunis", im Zusammenhang des Universalienstreits und der Frage nach dem Individuationsprinzip. Alle relevanten Textstellen aus Ordinatio II, d.3, p. 1, qq. 1- 6 werden untersucht und aus dem lateinischen übersetzt.
This paper offers an overview of Duns Scotus' teaching on common nature in the context of the dispute concerning the problem of universals and the principle of individuation. All relevant passages in Ordinatio II, d.3, p. 1, qq. 1- 6  are reported in Latin (and translated into German).

The present study aims at summarizing the most important theories and classifications concerning the universals of language, a theme regarding the theories and philosophies of language, subject to extensive debates starting with the 1960's.

Lo scritto si propone di esaminare la logica e la semiotica di Guglielmo di Ockham a partire dall'antico problema medievale degli universali. Nella prima parte si osserva come Ockham decostruisca l'esistenza di entità universali, entrando nel merito delle obiezioni che rivolge contro Porfirio e contro Duns Scoto. Nella seconda parte si lascia spazio alla sua gnoseologia a sfondo semiotico, e in particolare la singolare identificazione dell'universale con l'atto stesso di intendere (ipsamet intellectio) e la rottura del triangolo semiotico di origine aristotelica.
La tesi invita infine a prendere sul serio la sfida occamista, che comincia con raffinatezza a tracciare una corrispondenza strutturale tra linguaggio e realtà molto più complessa del "partito" realista.

Is the assumption of a fundamental distinction between particulars and universals just another unsupported dogma of metaphysics? F.P. Ramsey famously rejected the particular-universal distinction but neglected to consider the many different conceptions of the distinction that have been advanced. As a contribution to the (inevitably) piecemeal investigation of this issue three interrelated conceptions of the particular-universal distinction are examined: (i) universals, by contrast to particulars, are unigrade; (ii) particulars are related to universal by an asymmetric tie of exemplification; (iii) universals are incomplete whereas particulars are complete. It is argued that these conceptions are wanting in several respects. Sometimes they fail to mark a significant division amongst entities. Sometimes they make substantial demands upon the shape of reality; once these demands are understood aright it is no longer obvious that the distinction merits our acceptance. The case is made via a discussion of the possibility of multigrade universals and the adicity of singular causation.

“Ostrich” is an epithet that Armstrong employs to label what he considers the weakest form of contemporary Nominalism insofar as it refuses to engage in serious ontological enquiry. This epithet—and the negative judgment that comes with it—has deeply influenced the debate between nominalists and realists, and it is supported by three major arguments put forward by Armstrong, each of which bears on certain drawbacks that allegedly cripple Ostrich Nominalism: the argument from gross facts, the harlot argument, and the truth-maker argument. Deploying this array of arguments, Armstrong aims to show that, in confronting with the problem of the existence of properties, Ostrich Nominalists must do something else than just burying their head in the sand. In what follows, I will first review Armstrong’s three arguments, contending that none of them is fully satisfactory. Then I will sketch a Platonic theory of predication, and I will argue that such a theory, while sharing the “ostrich” feature of Ostrich Nominalism, provides a more adequate response to Armstrong’s three challenges.

In this paper, written for metaphysical novices, I lay out my own fast track route from how to introduce the problem of universals in the first place to scepticism about the particular-universal distinction itself via issues about nominalism, realism and the problem of relations.

This philosophical paper would focus on proving the existence of universals in reality using the own arguments of Peter Abelard, emphasizing the very notion of nominalism and realism. It is to be noted that Peter Abelard was said to be a nominalist, and this paper would focus on the arguments that will consider Abelard to be a realist. I personally believe that universals exist in reality, and through the different readings in Phlo 111 Medieval Philosophy class, other readings related to this, and the group discussion held in the said class, I realized that Abelard’s arguments can be that of a realist. This discussion is important because the problem of universals per se is in itself important (how can you talk about man if you cannot know its’ very form?) and so any rational attempts in answering this question would also be regarded as important. The methodology to be used would be the usage of the meanings of nominalism and realism in proving the claim.

According to Satosi Watanabe's "theorem of the ugly duckling", the number of predicates satisfied by any two different particulars is a constant, which does not depend on the choice of the two particulars. If the number of predicates satisfied by two particulars is their number of properties in common, and the degree of resemblance between two particulars is a function of their number of properties in common, then it follows that the degree of resemblance between any two different particulars is also constant, which is absurd. Avoiding this absurd conclusion requires questioning assumptions about infinity in the proof or interpretation of the theorem, adopting a sparse conception of properties, or denying degree of resemblance is a function of number of properties in common. After arguing against both the first two options, this paper argues for a version of the third which analyses degree of resemblance as a function of properties in common, but weighted by their degree of naturalness or importance.

Resumen: este trabajo presenta una fenomenología de los universales, tanto inma-nentes como trascendentes, y discute su importancia para el debate contemporáneo sobre la metafísica de propiedades. Su punto de partida es un examen de la posición de Husserl sobre la materia en dos trabajos que cubren dos periodos principales de su pens-amiento: las Investigaciones lógicas y Experiencia y juicio. Ambas descripciones fenome-nológicas son presentadas y discutidas. La perspectiva genética más tardía adoptada en Experiencia y juicio contrasta con la presentada en Investigaciones lógicas porque conecta la fenomenología de los universales a variaciones eidéticas guiadas por la fantasía ligada o libre. Se argumenta aquí que la primera perspectiva es la que debe ser preferida. En efecto, la perspectiva de Investigaciones lógicas parece más adecuada para el fenómeno primitivo prelingüístico de los universales. La fenomenología de los universales discuti-da aquí tiene consecuencias importantes para el debate contemporáneo en metafísica de propiedades. Se sigue que los universales deben ser aceptados a menos que exista evidencia en contrario.

Öz: Tümeller sorunu felsefedeki en önemli meselelerden biri olmuş ve olmaya da devam etmektedir. Çeşitli Müslüman düşünürler tarafından tartışılmış olmasına rağmen, ortaya koymuş olduğu zatı bakımından mahiyet kavramıyla uyumlu bir şekilde, tartışmanın belirleyici kavramlarını yeniden yorumlayarak en önemli katkıları gerçekleştiren kişi İbn Sînâ (ö. 1037) olmuştur. İbn Sînâ-doğal tümel olarak da bilinen (el-külliyyü't-tabiî)-koşullanmamış (mutlak) mahiyetin dışarıdaki tikel-lerde, bir parçanın bütünde bulunduğu gibi var olduğunu iddia etmiştir. Bu makale İbn Sînâ'nın teorisi üzerine on dördüncü yüzyıl düşünürü Kutbüddin er-Râzî (ö. 966/1364) tarafından yapılan eleştirileri incelemektedir. Anahtar kelimeler: Tümeller sorunu, İbn Sînâ, Kutbüddin er-Râzî, doğal tümeller, doğalar/tabiatlar.

This paper takes up a disagreement between Augustine and John of Damascus on the relation of the persons of the Trinity to the divine essence. Whereas Augustine rejects speaking of God as a genus or species with the divine persons as subordinate species or individuals, Damascene uses such an analogy freely in different writings. Peter Lombard sides with Augustine but allows for Damascene’s language according to metaphor or similitude. The purpose of this paper is to utilize the trinitarian theology and metaphysical categories of Thomas Aquinas to examine the nature of the unity characteristic of universals like species and whether, in his account, one may predicate such a universal to the Godhead. To this end, the concepts of analogy, essence, person, unity, plurality, transcendental multitude, predication, genus, species, individuation, universality, particularity, communicability, and incommunicability will be examined in detail. I will argue that ultimately an analogy of genus or species cannot properly be applied to the Trinity because it contradicts the doctrine of divine simplicity. The unity of the universal insufficiently characterizes the divine unity of essence. On the other hand, Aquinas does allow for a reading of Damascene similar to that of the Lombard, to the extent that, according to our limited mode of knowledge, the relationship of individuals to a species can help us to understand the mode of communicability unique to God’s essence.

During the past few decades, Graham Priest has advocated for Dialetheism, the controversial position that some contradictions are true. Dialetheism entails that the Law of Non-Contradiction fails. In recent decades the philosophical community has begun to recognize the significant challenge posed by Priest's arguments. Priest has primarily appealed to paradoxes of self-reference, such as the Liar Paradox, to support his position. Following Priest's approach, I offer another argument for Dialetheism, which appeals to a self-referential paradox that has been more or less ignored in the philosophical literature on the subject: the paradox of the missing difference. When we reflect on the question 'what is a concept?' from the perspective of a classical model of conceptual analysis, we arrive at the paradox of the missing difference. Although contradictions may be improbable, when we reflect on the question 'how is the domain of concepts possible?' we are led to a startling principle: without dialetheia any theory concerning concept formation (from a classical perspective on concepts) would be impossible. Dialetheism is a necessary condition for the existence of a domain of concepts in general. As a result, Dialetheism may even be more central to philosophical reflection than even dialetheists themselves have recognized.

What shifts might emerge in theorizations of and debates over " the human " —as a historically specific entity or as nominating a general species difference—if Earth and its variable conditions no longer form the habitual grounds for these arguments? To answer this question, I examine two sites proposed by outer space settlement advocates: the surface of Mars, and the interior of a massive, rotating cylindrical space settlement called Island Three. I argue that these places unsettle habitual critical approaches to the human in outer space by posing radically different conditions through which to make accounts of the specific and the general, including that of humanness. Using gravity as both metaphor for significance and a physical quality and quantity that potentiates worlds and experience, I examine how a variety of problematics about humans and their histories are fixed—from Earth—in the imaginations of both settlement advocates and their critics, and explore problems for both critical theory and space settlement advocacy in thinking " the human " through nonterrestrial sites. I argue that thinking humanness from elsewhere in the cosmos offers new anthropological insights about questions of difference and relation, specificity and universality, Indigeneity and settlement, ontology and epistemology, and habits of embodiment on Earth.

This book has been reviewed by:
- W. Wciórka in Przegląd Tomistyczny 24 (2018), 677-686. http://www.it.dominikanie.pl/przeglad/tom24/29_PT_n-24-2018_-_W_Wciorka_-_Recenzja.pdf
- F. Amerini in I Castelli di Yale 6 (2018), 172-177. http://cyonline.unife.it/article/view/1968/1782
- J. Blanco Mas in Estudios Clásicos 154 (2018), 122-123. http://www.estudiosclasicos.org/estudios-clasicos/

Russell clearly adopts the position of Plato: the universals are placed as essences in a supersensible world, out of the time. The position of Russell is contrary to dialectical thinking whereby one divides into two, ie, in this case, the universal exists simultaneously in the world of static being  and in the world of mental and material becoming. Russell argues that the universal property exists only in the world of static being. It is a misconception.

To understand Aristotle’s conception of form, we have to see clearly the relationship between his account and Plato’s Theory of Forms. I offer a novel interpretation of Aristotle’s Moderate Realism, in which forms are simple particulars that ground the character and mutual similarity of the entities they inform. Such an account has advantages in three areas: explaining (1) the similarity of particulars, (2) the synchronic unity of composite particulars, and (3) the diachronic unity or persistence of intrinsically changing particulars.

This article presents an analytic-continental cross analysis of the problem of universals in properties and particulars. The author contends, however, that it is not enough to divide philosophical arguments about substance only into theories with-and theories without universals. The existence or non-existence of universals is a question of identity, but arguments about substance must also explain instantiation, which the author argues can be divided by either participation or repetition. To this end, the author constructs a four-fold metaontology: Participation with Universals, Participation without Universals, Repetition with Universals, and Repetition without Universals. The author defends a Repetition without Universals program, which, in order to work, must include a non-universalist concept of emergent similarity.