Hylomorphism

VII-ARISTOTLES HYLOMORPHISM RECONCEIVED MARY LOUISE GILL Metaphysics Θ treats potentiality (δύναμις) and actuality (ἐνέργεια), and many scholars think that Aristotle broaches these topics once he has answered his main questions in Ζ and Η. In Ζ he asked, what is primary being? After arguing in Ζ.1 that substance (οὐσία) is primary being-a being existentially, logically, and epistemologically prior to quantities and qualities and other categorial beings-he devotes the rest of the book to οὐσία itself, investigating what it is, to decide what entities count as primary substances. I differ from the leading interpretative consensus that ΖΗ adequately answer the questions about primary substance, and contend instead that Metaphysics Θ continues the same investigation as ΖΗ and, using δύναμις and ἐνέργεια as tools, arrives at a striking new conception of hylomorphism, different from that in ΖΗ, which enables Aristotle to defend the substantial primacy of living organisms consisting of matter and form.

It is hard to think of an area of Christian theology that provides more scope for interdisciplinary conversation than the doctrine of creation. This doctrine not only invites reflection on an intellectual concept: it calls for contemplation of the endlessly complex, dynamic, and fascinating world that human being inhabit. But the possibilities for wide-ranging discussion are such that scholars sometimes end up talking past one another. Productive conversation requires mutual understanding of insights across disciplinary boundaries. Knowing Creation offers an essential resource for helping scholars from a range of fields to appreciate one another's concerns and perspectives. In so doing, it offers an important step forward in establishing a mutually-enriching dialogue that addresses, amongst others, the following key questions:

- Who is the God who creates?
- Why does God create?
- What is "creation"?
- What does it mean to recognize that a theology of creation speaks of a natural world that is subject to the observation of the natural sciences? What does it mean to talk about both a "natural" order and a "created" order?
- What are the major tensions that have arisen between the natural sciences and Christian thinking historically, and why? How can we move beyond such tensions to a positive and constructive conversation, while also avoiding facile notions such as a "god of the gaps"?
- Is it feasible for a natural scientist to maintain a belief in God's continuing creative activity?
- In what ways might a naturalistic understanding of the natural world be said to be limited?
- How can biblical studies, theology, philosophy, history, and science talk better together about these questions?

At a time when the doctrine of creation - and even a mention of "creation" - has been disparaged due to its supposed associations with anti-scientific dogma, and theological offerings sometimes risk appearing a little more than reactionary exercises in naive apologetics, ill-informed by science or distinctly wary of engagement with it, it is more important than ever to offer a cross-disciplinary resource that can voice a positive account of a Christian theology of creation, and do so as a genuinely broad-ranging conversation about science and faith.

This is an earlier paper (1992), published in the journal of Ancient Greek philosophy, Apeiron. In de Anima Aristotle considers several candidate definitions aiming to answer the question, "What is a living thing?" And "What distinguishes living from non-living things?" I argue that, contrary to some commentators, Aristotle doesn't complete this task until DA II 3-4, and that his conception of a living thing is both teleological-- but also ecological. This alternative reading of de Anima has some modestly surprising implications for Aristotle's hylomorphism.

Iste articulus proponit summam brevem hylemorphicae philosophiae naturalis et metaphysicae Divi Thomae Aquinatis contrarie iuxtapositam ad "reinventiones hodiernae" hylemorphismi ad usum hodiernae metaphysicae et philosophiae mentis. Propositio principalis articuli est quod quamdiu istae contemporaneae conceptiones non cognoscunt et admittunt strictam connexionem logicam inter Aquinatis notiones formae et entis secundum quam esse est actualitas formae et correspondenter quaelibet forma distincta ab esse suo est determinatio actus essendi sui, tamdiu philosophi hodierni non possunt proprie attingere mentem Aquinatis, quamobrem eorum conatus ad identificandum formam substantialem sicut 'structuram' vel 'configurationem' materiae erunt fataliter irriti de perspectiva Thomistica. Conclusiones finales discussionis faciunt connexionem inter conceptionem Thomisticam formae substantialis substantiae materialis sicut actus primus materiae primae et conceptiones novissimae hodiernae physicae de "fragmentis energiae". 0. Abstract This paper proposes to provide a succinct account of Aquinas' hylomorphist natural philosophy and metaphysics, contrasted with the growing trend of "rediscovering" hylomorphism for contemporary metaphysics and philosophy of mind. The main claim of the paper is that as long as the contemporary accounts do not recognize the strict logical connection between Aquinas' notions of form and being, according to which being (esse) is the actuality of form, and, correspondingly, any form distinct from its being is a determination of its act of being (actus essendi), they will not properly be able to engage Aquinas' account, which is why their attempts to identify substantial form as 'structure' or 'configuration' of matter will, from a Thomistic point of view, be doomed to be abortive. The concluding remarks of the paper will also relate Aquinas' metaphysical conception of material substantial form as the primary act of prime matter to the newest ideas in contemporary mathematical physics concerning "fragments of energy".

Functionalism remains the most promising strategy for 'naturalizing' the mind. We argue that when functions are defined in terms of conditionals, whether indicative, probabilistic or counterfactual, the resulting version of functionalism is subject to devastating finkish counterexamples. Only functions defined within a powers ontology can provide the right account of normalcy, but the conception of powers must follow classical, Aristotelian lines, since the alternative (an evolutionary account of normativity as proposed by Ruth Garrett Millikan) is inconsistent with a plausible principle of the supervenience of the mind on local conditions.

The so-called Many Worlds Interpretation of quantum mechanics has been extant now for nearly sixty years, beginning as H. Everett III’s doctoral dissertation in 1957 [?], with further contributions by B. DeWitt and N. Graham in their 1973 book, The Many Worlds Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics [?]. The Everett approach takes quantum mechanics both realistically and as a stand-alone, autonomous theory of the world, not in need of a separate theory of measurement to bridge the apparent gap between the deterministic evolution of the wave-function in a highly abstract, probabilistic space and empirically observable statistics in the laboratory. Instead, Everett proposed that all of the apparently contradictory macroscopic results assigned some finite probability by the theory are equally real, coexisting in distinct sets of relative states. DeWitt and others later identified these clusters of mutually consistent relative states with distinct and co-existing worlds or branches of the w...

The relationship between self-consciousness, Aristotelian ontology, and Cartesian duality is far closer than it has been thought to be.  There is no valid inference either from considerations of Aristotle’s hylomorphism or from the phenomenological distinction between body and living body, to the undermining of Cartesian dualism.  The claims that Descartes introspectively encounters the self and that the Cartesian extent of inner space is self-contained are profound errors, distortions through the lenses of modern theories.  Descartes’ conception of the self as both a reasoning and willing being informs his conception of personhood; a person for Descartes is an unanalysable, integrated, self-conscious, and autonomous human being.

Body-soul theory is one of "the most intensely studied subjects in the history of philosophy" (Davidson, 1992). Socrates was the first ancient thinker to suggest that the psyche (soul) be the essence of the human being. Plato then built on this by breaking it into three parts, known as the Platonic soul (Plato, 2013). Aristotle delved further into the debate in his major treatise on the nature of living things, De Anima. In this, Aristotle attempts to improve upon the ideas set forward by his philosophical predecessors by stating the claim that the soul is mortal and not eternal. Importantly he also adds that the soul is not capable of being reborn in subsequent bodies, as his teachers had thought. Aristotle’s definition of the soul is particularly thorough, and within this he relies upon his theory of universals which leads to his concept of hylomophism and his account of substance. With this information, Aristotle comes to the conclusion that an animated body is inseparable from the soul and vice versa; “affections of soul are inseparable from the material substratum of animal life” (Aristotle, 2001).  In this assignment, I will examine Aristotle’s method of defining the soul, by explanation of hylomorphism among other ideas, before arguing for Aristotle’s definition and then reacting and quashing possible objections.

This paper explores medieval Aristotelian perspectives on the phenomenon which we refer to today as a “congenital disability,” i.e. a disability present at or before birth. It was common in the Middle Ages to view congenital disabilities as caused by parental sexual sin or the mother’s misuse of her imagination during pregnancy. In contrast with these views, medieval Aristotelians explained congenital impairments in terms of failures of natural causes. Albert the Great, in particular, developed a detailed taxonomy of types of birth defects and their natural causes within the Aristotelian framework of the four causes. In addition to being relevant to the history of medicine and disability studies, medieval Aristotelian explanations of congenital disabilities are significant for the history of philosophy as such. In the early modern period, the reality of congenital disabilities provided an important battleground for those who sought to overturn the Aristotelian philosophy of nature. Early modern mechanists, such as Francis Bacon and John Locke, claimed that those born with impairments were evidence against the Aristotelian hylomorphic conception of nature. The birth of an organism which appeared to be lacking the features which normally belong to member of its species (e.g. a child born blind or cognitively impaired) was supposed to show that there were no substantial forms in material substances. The paper will discuss how medieval Aristotelians would have approached this challenge, as well as their position that  human beings born with severe impairments are fully human and have equal moral status.

'Toward Responsive Architectures' is a part of the exploration of the interconnectedness of what surrounds us. The focus of the Responsive Architectures: Subtle Technologies collection is on a new generation of interactive systems within science, art and architecture that are based on constantly evolving relationships. Using a wide definition of architecture that includes both built and natural realms, we examine dynamic systems and environments of scales from molecules to cities. A responsive environment can be described as a networked structure that senses action within a field of attention and responds dynamically with programmed and designed logic. Focusing the issue of responsiveness more precisely within the field of architecture raises multiple questions: which parameters of such environments might a designer address in order to imaginatively employ their capacities for dynamic transformation and interaction? These projects cast light on the subject of responsive architecture from diverse viewpoints derived from current architecture, science, and art practices. They examine the relation between a physical environment and its inhabitants and focus in particular on professional practice. How do responsive systems affect us? Scientific research, art and architecture come together in this multidisciplinary forum documenting the 2006 Subtle Technologies Festival of Art and Science. Subjects include electronic art and performance installations, research in cell structures and natural systems, and design of interactive buildings. Discussions include historical context and contemporary implications.

Despite an infelicitous tradition downgrading their status, technical artefacts are increasingly acquiring their place in contemporary ontology. However, although most metaphysicians currently allow for an ontological consideration of artefacts, they define the class of artefacts differently and disagree on the essence of artificial objects. In this paper, I present a handful of recent accounts of artefacts, with particular regards to the hylomorphic framework. I make an attempt at reconstructing the debate on the spectrum of artefacts and the ways in which artefacts’ essences are singled out. Moreover, I indicate special cases, such as ready-mades and malfunctioning objects, which seem to constitute a threat for the presented accounts. Thereafter, I propose that Aristotle’s account of artefacts embraces the challenges of the contemporary debate. I also attempt to demonstrate that his theory of artefacts escapes the abovementioned threats. While unfolding Aristotle’s conceptual tools against such threats, I present his account of artefacts as hylomorphic and, hence, essentialist.

Ce premier volume du dossier d'habilitation à diriger des recherches expose l'unité de mon travail depuis la maîtrise (nouvellement nommée Master 1) et résume quelques-uns de mes principaux travaux depuis la thèse de doctorat "Sens et connaissance". Les quatre sections qui composent ce mémoire de synthèse correspondent aux quatre rubriques du Volume 2, où sont réunis des travaux publiés. C'est pourquoi elles s'intitulent respectivement "Études simondoniennes", "Études de philosophie française contemporaine", "Études de philosophie allemande contemporaine" et "Publications préparatoires à La Société de l'invention/La Philosophie du paradoxe".

In this paper, I offer an analysis of Plotinus’ argument for the existence of a quasi-psychic entity, the so-called ‘trace of soul’, that functions an immanent cause of life for an organism’s body. I argue that Plotinus posits this entity primarily in order to account for the body’s possession of certain quasi-psychic states that are instrumental in his account of soul-body interaction. Since these quasi-psychic states imply that an organism’s body has vitality of its own (a claim for which Plotinus also finds support in the Phaedo), and Platonic souls are no part or aspect of any body, Plotinus draws the conclusion that the soul must be a cause of the body’s life by imparting a quasi-psychic qualification to it. In so doing, Plotinus introduces elements of hylomorphism into Platonist psychology, and addresses a problem for the animation of the body that Platonic soul-body dualism may plausibly be thought to face.

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This book is aimed at helping those who are not experts in medieval thought to begin to enter into Thomas’s philosophical point of view.  Along the way, it brings out some aspects of his thought that are not often emphasized in the current literature, and it offers a reading of his teaching on the divine nature that goes rather against the drift of some prominent recent interpretations.
  The excerpt that can be downloaded is used with Permission of Wipf and Stock Publishers.  Softcover and epub versions are available from their webpage.  Amazon has a kindle version.

This chapter proposes that Aquinas's philosophy of the human person is fundamentally motivated by his vision of the distinctive unity of the human way of life, illustrated by (a) his account of the human soul as the " horizon " of the bodily and spiritual worlds, and (b) his definition of the human being as 'rational animal'.  Commitment to this vision is essential for any attempt to revive Aquinas's anthropology today.  In this chapter, I also problematize the standard way of labeling Aquinas's anthropology as "Aristotelian," and make a case for rejecting such labels, not only in evaluating his own work, but also in evaluating receptions of Aquinas's own thought.

In this chapter, I argue that Aristotle's doctrine of hylomorphism, which conceived the natural world as consisting of substances which are metaphysically composed of matter and form, is ripe for rehabilitation in the light of quantum physics. I begin by discussing Aristotle's conception of matter and form, as it was understood by Aquinas, and how Aristotle's doctrine of hylomorphism was 'physicalised' and eventually abandoned with the rise of microphysicalism. I argue that the phenomenon of quantum entanglement, and the emergence of irreducibly macroscopic phenomena in finite temperature quantum systems, have given us good reasons to doubt the truth of microphysicalism. In support of my argument, I show how to construct a hylomorphic interpretation of the de Broglie-Bohm theory that posits a single Cosmic Substance. I then show how to construct a hylomorphic interpretation of an alternative 'contextual' wave function collapse theory (recently proposed by the physicists Barbara Drossel and George Ellis) which posits a plurality of Thermal Substances. Both of these neo-Aristotelian ontologies reject the microphysicalist dogma that nature consists fundamentally of some set of microscopic constituents.

This article is the second part of a two-part essay. The first part was published as: "Hylomorphic Animalism, Emergentism, and the Challenge of New Mechanisms in Neuroscience" Scientia et Fides 5 (2) /2017, 9-38

Abstract for Part II:
This article, the second of a two-part essay, outlines a solution to certain tensions in Thomist philosophical anthropology concerning the interaction of the human person's immaterial intellectual or noetic operations with the psychosomatic sensory operations that are constituted from the formal organization of the nervous system. Continuing with where the first part left off, I argue that Thomists should not be tempted by strong emergentist accounts of mental operations that act directly on the brain, but should maintain, with Aquinas, that noetic operations directly interact with psychosomatic operations. I develop a Thomist account of noetic-psychosomatic interactions that expands upon the first part's rapprochement between the new mechanist philosophy of neuroscience and psychology and hylomorphic animalism. I argue that noetic-psychosomatic interactions are best understood as analogous to the way diverse higher and lower order psychosomatic powers interact by actualizing, coordinating, and directing the operations of other psychosomatic powers. I draw on James Ross's arguments for the immateriality of intellectual operations as realizing definite pure functions in order to elucidate the way noetic operations uniquely actualize, coordinate, and direct the psychosomatic operations they interact with. I conclude with a conjectural sketch of how this presentation of Thomist philosophical anthropology understands the noetic and psychosomatic deficits brought about by damage to the nervous system.

In this paper, I investigate the foundations of Plotinus’ innovative theory that prime matter is unaffectable. I begin by showing that Plotinus’ main arguments for this thesis (in Ennead 3.6) all rely upon the controversial assumption that the properties prime matter underlies are not properties of prime matter itself. It is then argued that prime matter’s privation of sensible qualities has its conceptual basis in an idiosyncratic understanding of form-matter composition generally, and its primary doctrinal basis in Aristotle’s critical reports on the Platonists’ substratum in Physics 1.9. While Plotinus finds Platonic authority for unaffectable matter in the Receptacle passage of the Timaeus, it is Aristotle’s testimony that provides the crucial impetus for reading that text in this way. On this basis, Plotinus develops a Platonist conception of form’s inherence in matter with distinctively non-Aristotelian features.

The leading idea of the book is to focus on the common roots of Islamic and Western traditions and to increase awareness of the chances of systematic philosophical dispute, with the aim to promote a substantial dialogue on an academic level. Most of the collected papers in this edition are results of contributions to a workshop, organized by the editors of the volume, as an integrated part of a visit to the Imam Khomeini Education and Research Institute (IKERI) of Qom by a delegation of philosophers from the University of Innsbruck in May 2008. The organizational frame of the workshop and also of this edition is the partnership between the IKERI and the University of Innsbruck—the first formal high-level academic partnership between an Iranian Institution and a European University. The contributions in this edition investigate the topic “Soul” in an interdisciplinary and comparative way: Psychologists, Philosophers, and Theologians from both, Islamic and Western traditions, should be brought into dialogue with the focus on the general theme.

"Mark Spencer is a rising star among Catholic philosophers. This is a big book in every sense. In confident and accessible prose, Spencer argues that the mystery of human personhood can best be understood by drawing together perspectives and schools of thought often deemed incompatible: phenomenology and traditional metaphysics, Thomism and Scotism, Balthasar and Aquinas, and many more. Sure to provoke a number of arguments due to the extraordinary range and boldness of the work, this book succeeds in showing that its 'aesthetic method' has a tremendous amount to offer to the study of human (liturgical) personhood in its manifold dimensions. A rich, exciting, vastly erudite, and immensely fruitful debut."―Matthew Levering, James N. and Mary D. Perry Jr. Chair of Theology, Mundelein Seminary

"Mark Spencer has given us a tour de force, an extremely ambitious and irenic work of synthesis in which he attempts to sketch out a philosophical portrait of the human person, attentive to beauty, that does not suffer from various opposing kinds of reductionism. He brings phenomenology, Thomism, Scotism, Eastern Orthodoxy, Nouvelle théologie, and analytic philosophy into dialogue as he ventures into debates on metaphysics, aesthetics, ethics, nature and grace, affectivity, liturgy, and eschatology. In doing so he also proposes synthetic solutions to many nodal metaphysical and anthropological problems, including the interactions of divine causality and human freedom, divine simplicity and energeia, and the spiritual soul and the body, here and in heavenly beatitude."―Lawrence Feingold, Kenrick-Glennon Seminary

"Mark Spencer has produced a remarkable work of reconciliation. He proposes to harmonize strands of thought in the Catholic philosophical tradition that are too often at odds with each other. In particular, he wants to harmonize the work of those who take seriously the modern turn to the subject, with the work of pre-modern Catholic thinkers who smell subjectivism in the turn to the subject and who want to build on a more "objective" and "metaphysical" basis. Spencer wants to capture the truth in each position, and to root out the onesidedness (he speaks of the reductionist tendencies) in each. On this basis he wants to work towards a new Catholic synthesis. This is an original project, and much needed in a world in which Catholic philosophers seem to prefer refuting each other to harmonizing their views. Spencer also maintains the original idea that this new synthesis is achieved by a certain kind of aesthetic imagination. Spencer brings to his ambitious project a vast knowledge of the different movements of thought within the Catholic tradition."―John F. Crosby, Franciscan University at Steubenville

"I can think of few if any books so comprehensively synthetic. Spencer draws from traditional – and nontraditional – Thomism, the personalist tradition, phenomenology (which overlaps with but is not identical to personalism), the Fathers, the work of thinkers in Eastern Christianity, and several contemporary secular sources; it is a work of extremely impressive breadth and learning."―Christopher Tollefsen, University of South Carolina

Catholic philosophical anthropologists have defended views of the human person on which we are irreducible to anything non-personal. For example, it is not the case that we are nothing but matter, souls, or parts of society. But many Catholic anthropologies have overlooked ways in which we are irreducible and so have not given an adequate account of the uniqueness of each human person. This book presents a philosophical portrait of human persons that depicts each way in which we are irreducible, with the goal of guiding the reader to perceive, wonder at, and love all the unique features of human persons. It builds this portrait by showing how claims from many strands of the Catholic tradition can be synthesized. These strands include Thomism, Scotism, phenomenology, personalism, nouvelle théologie, analytic philosophy, and Greek and Russian thought. The book focuses on how these traditions' claims are grounded in experience and on how they help us to perceive irreducible features of persons. While many metaphysical claims about persons are defended, the picture of persons that ultimately emerges is one on which persons are best grasped not through abstract concepts but through aesthetic perception and love, as unique kinds of beauty.

This book also explores irreducible features of our subjectivity, senses, intellect, freedom, and affections, and of our souls, bodies, and activities. It includes discussions of divine simplicity and causality, and of the nature of angels, matter, organisms, and artifacts, all of which must be understood to fully grasp our irreducibility. In showing how to synthesize various traditions' claims, the book also offers new solutions to a number of debates in Catholic philosophy. These include debates over natural law, the natural desire to see God, the separated soul, integralism and personalism, idealist and realist phenomenology, and scholastic accounts of the act of existence.

Many proponents of methodological nonreductionism in contemporary science find the notion of downward causation (DC) a sine qua non of the strong (ontological) version of emergence (EM), which strives to give an account of the irreducible character of the complex levels of the organization of matter. But what for many is the essence of nonreductionist physicalism, carries with it quite a bevy of problematic issues, and becomes a stumbling block and an obstacle for those, who acknowledge the metaphysical and logical inconsistencies of the emergent theory based on the idea of DC. For how can physicalism be non-reductionist? How can DC be reconciled with the causal closure of physics? What do “higher” and “lower” levels refer to? What is causal in DC? What is being caused (acted upon)? What is the very nature of DC?

I will argue that the defense of DC requires from us a broader notion of causation, which goes beyond the efficient causes accepted and described in modern science. I want to argue in favor of the retrieval of formal causation in particular. Its acceptance not only makes EM and DC plausible, but also helps to overcome and replace Humean causation of events with the causation of living and non-living beings, explained in terms of their causal powers and dispositions. I hope to show, in the course of my presentation, that true non-reductionism needs to be philosophically grounded. Yet it can still remain compatible with science provided it values and is open to the reflection offered by philosophy of nature. My position follows new Aristotelianism developed within the analytic tradition, although an explicit reintroduction of formal cause goes beyond it to the original thought of Aristotle.

In this essay I argue that contemporary versions of Aristotelian hylomorphism and the “new mechanist philosophy” in biology, neuroscience, and psychology share significant commitments about the reality of the organized causal components of mechanisms. My aim is to challenge the well-known narrative that hylomorphic and mechanistic ontologies are fundamentally incompatible by establishing that the new mechanist philosophy and Neo-Aristotelian hylomorphism are not only complementary, but are defending many of the same ontological claims.
I begin with a brief sketch of the fundamental claims of hylomorphism (§I). I then situate the new mechanist philosophy (NMP) within recent developments in philosophy of science, before introducing the basic framework of NMP. In the last two sections of the paper I argue for the compatibility of hylomorphism and NMP. I start with the major points of agreement between hylomorphism and NMP (§III). Significantly, I establish that NMP is committed to organization or structure realism (a touchstone of hylomorphism), and neo-Aristotelian hylomorphism is committed to the reality of mechanisms or causal powers that produce, underlie, or maintain the behavior or capacity of (i) phenomena that are constituted through the (ii) spatial, temporal, and active organization of their (iii) component entities and (iv) component activities (the four hallmarks of NMP). In the last section (§IV) I introduce some possible points of disagreement between these two positions pertaining to hylomorphism’s substance–attribute ontology, emergence, downward causation, and teleology. I show that the disagreements about these topics do not distinguish hylomorphists from new mechanists, but represent disagreements among hylomorphists and among new mechanists. I conclude that Neo-Aristotelian hylomorphism should not been seen as fundamentally opposed to mechanisms, but that it can and should embrace the many complementary features of the new mechanist philosophy in biology, neuroscience and psychology.

Neither Aristotle nor Aquinas assumes the reality of the evolution of species. Their systems of thought, however, remain open to the new data, offering an essential contribution to the ongoing debate between scientific, philosophical, and theological aspects of the theory of evolution. After discussing some key issues of substance metaphysics in its encounter with the theory of evolution (hylomorphism, transformism of species, teleology, chance, the principle of proportionate causation), I present a Thomistic response to its major hypotheses. Concerning the philosophy of Aquinas I trace what might be seen as a preliminary description of natural selection in his commentary on Aristotle’s Physics. Turning toward theology, besides addressing the topics that were referred to in the past—such as: Aquinas’ reading of Genesis, his account of creation as dependence in being, secondary and instrumental causality, and univocal/equivocal predication of God—I bring into discussion Thomas’ concept of the perfection of the universe, which has been virtually unused in this context.

The greatest challenge to the fundamental reality of human agency comes from physicalism—more specifically, microphysicalism.  Defenders of physicalism (e.g., Brian McLaughlin, Jaegwon Kim, David Papineau) often point to the ontological reduction of chemistry to quantum physics as a paradigm for the reduction of the rest of reality (including the biological, psychological, and social) to a microphysical foundation. This argument is based, however, on a profound misreading of the philosophical significance of the quantum revolution. A hylomorphic interpretation of quantum theory, in which parts and wholes stand in a mutually determining relationship, fits the both the empirical facts and the actual practice of scientists much better than microphysical imperialism. The “emergence” (or, as I prefer, “ontological escalation”) of chemistry from physics provides a useful model for thinking about the hierarchical dynamic structure of nature.

There is clearly some intimate relation between Aristotelian form and the structure or organization of a composite thing. In recent years, some neo-Aristotelian philosophers have proposed that this relation is simply identity: forms are structures. I will argue both that Aristotelian forms (especially substantial forms) are essential elements in an adequate ontology and that they form a sui generis category. Substantial forms are not identical to the structure of composite substances: instead, they are metaphysical components of substances that constitute the metaphysical ground of that structure, in a sense of ground that has been rehabilitated in recent years by Kit Fine, Jonathan Schaffer, Gideon Rosen, and others. Forms are that in virtue of which substances are structured internally as they are.

Since the Galilean Scientific Revolution in the 17 th century, and especially since the death of vitalism and the rise of Darwinian evolutionary theory in the late 19 th and early 20 th centuries, biologists have treated the Aristotelian notion of 'teleology' (the existence of functions or purposes in nature) as utterly outdated or, at best, as a heuristic device or useful fiction. This is however an untenable position, since biological inquiry exists primarily for the sake of biological knowledge, and biological knowledge is inextricably bound up with teleological concepts, like that of gene or enzyme. Moreover, the very possibility of rational thought and knowledge depends upon a teleological foundation. Alexander Pruss and I have argued that the Functionalist theory of mental states can only work in a teleological setting. In 1 I would like to acknowledge the support during the 2014-15 academic year of the James Madison Program in American Ideals and Institutions at Princeton University (for a Visiting Fellowship) and the University of Texas at Austin (for a faculty research grant).

Abstract for Part 1. "Hylomorphic Animalism, Emergentism, and the Challenge of the New Mechanist Philosophy of Neuroscience"

This article, the first of a two-part essay, presents an account of Aristotelian hylomorphic animalism that engages with recent work on neuroscience and philosophy of mind. I show that Aristotelian hylomorphic animalism is compatible with the new mechanist approach to neuroscience and psychology, but that it is incompatible with strong emergentism in the philosophy of mind. I begin with the basic claims of Aristotelian hylomorphic animalism and focus on its understanding of psychological powers embodied in the nervous system. Next, I introduce the new mechanist approach to neuroscience and psychology and illustrate how it can enrich the more abstract ontological framework of Aristotelian hylomorphic animalism. In the third section of this article I establish in detail the many ways Aristotelian hylomorphic animalism is incompatible with strong emergentism in the philosophy of mind. Based on these fundamental differences I show why a criticism leveled against emergentism by the new mechanist philosophy does not hamper my proposed rapprochement between hylomorphism and the new mechanist philosophy. This conclusion, however, leaves untouched the problem I address in the second article, namely, is the new mechanist philosophy compatible with Aristotelian philosophical anthropology’s contention that intellectual operations are immaterial and interact with the psychosomatic operations of the rational animal?

Abstract for Part 2. "The Interaction of Noetic and Psychosomatic Operations in a Thomist Hylomorphic Personalism"

This article, the second of a two-part essay, outlines a solution to certain tensions in Thomist philosophical anthropology concerning the interaction of the human person’s immaterial intellectual or noetic operations with the psychosomatic sensory operations that are constituted from the formal organization of the nervous system. Continuing with where the first part left off, I argue that Thomists should not be tempted by strong emergentist accounts of mental operations that act directly on the brain, but should maintain, with Aquinas, that noetic operations directly interact with psychosomatic operations. I develop a Thomist account of noetic–psychosomatic interactions that expands upon the first part’s rapprochement between the new mechanist philosophy of neuroscience and psychology and hylomorphic animalism. I argue that noetic–psychosomatic interactions are best understood as analogous to the way diverse higher and lower order psychosomatic powers interact by actualizing, coordinating, and directing the operations of other psychosomatic powers. I draw on James Ross’s arguments for the immateriality of intellectual operations as realizing definite pure functions in order to elucidate the way noetic operations uniquely actualize, coordinate, and direct the psychosomatic operations they interact with. I conclude with a conjectural sketch of how this presentation of Thomist philosophical anthropology understands the noetic and psychosomatic deficits brought about by damage to the nervous system.

This paper examines the hylomorphic theory (the doctrine that body and soul constitute the Form and Matter, respectively, of a human being) espoused by Mark Eugenikos (1392-1445) in his treatise 'On the Resurrection.' It seeks, specifically, to determine whether Mark's anthropology here is influenced by the writings of Thomas Aquinas, whose impact on late Palaiologan theology was extensive. It compares Mark's metaphysics, including his angelogy, with the classic formulations of Thomistic thought, ultimately determining that there are important differences between the Latin Master and the future Archbishop of Ephesos. Yet even in spite of these differences, the treatise of Mark Eugenikos evinces many important points of contact with the basic sources and concerns of Aquinas, pointing to deeper commonalities between Byzantine and Scholastic thought than mere external influence.

Uncorrected proofs. Caveat lector.

FR: Forme et relation – L’inquiétante étrangeté de la scène du matérialisme. Cet article entend chercher un matérialisme largement ignoré dans les discussions philosophiques actuelles, qui tire son origine de spéculations sur la matérialité des formes. En suivant la critique de Simondon et de Heidegger, il rejette l’hylémorphisme en raison de la priorité qu’il accorde une forme pure et abstraite en dehors de la matière ; de même, il se distingue des propositions actuelles qui valorisent un retour à la matière, à l’image de la matière vibrante de Jane Bennett ou du principe de factualité de Quentin Meillassoux, en esquissant une généalogie des conditions matérielle de l’individuation des formes. Cet article s’efforce de comprendre l’évolution du concept de forme au fil des différentes étapes du développement technique : artisanal, machinique ou systémique (au sens des systèmes technologiques), tel qu’exemplifié par le Web. Au fond il entend suggérer qu’une pensée de la matérialité des formes n’est pas seulement concevable mais également et surtout nécessaire au développement d’une métaphysique spéculative et d’une théorie critique des machines.
EN: This article seeks a materialism that is largely ignored in current philosophical discussion, which originates from speculation on the materiality of forms. Following the critique of Simondon and Heidegger, this article rejects hylomorphism which gives substantiality to forms rather than matter; at the same time, this proposition also wants to distinguish itself from the current proposals of a return to matter, such as the vibrant matter of Jane Bennett or the principle of factuality of Quentin Meillassoux, by outlining a genealogy of the material conditions for the individuation of forms. The article endeavours to understand the evolution of the concept of form in different stages of technological development: crafts, machines, technological systems exemplified by the web. The article suggests that the materiality of form is not only thinkable, but also necessary for the development of a speculative metaphysics and critical theory of machines.

The anti-reductionist character of the recent philosophy of biology and the dynamic development of the science of emergent properties prove that the time is ripe to reintroduce the thought of Aristotle, the first advocate of a “top-down” approach in life-sciences, back into the science/philosophy debate. His philosophy of nature provides profound insights particularly in the context of the contemporary science of evolution, which is still struggling with the questions of form (species), teleology, and the role of chance in evolutionary processes. However, although Aristotle is referenced in the evolutionary debate, a thorough analysis of his theory of hylomorphism and the classical principle of causality which he proposes is still needed in this exchange. Such is the main concern of the first part of the present article which shows Aristotle's metaphysics of substance as an open system, ready to incorporate new hypothesis of modern and contemporary science. The second part begins with the historical exploration of the trajectory from Darwin to Darwinism regarded as a metaphysical position. This exploration leads to an inquiry into the central topics of the present debate in the philosophy of evolutionary biology. It shows that Aristotle's understanding of species, teleology, and chance – in the context of his fourfold notion of causality – has a considerable explanatory power which may enhance our understanding of the nature of evolutionary processes. This fact may inspire, in turn, a retrieval of the classical theology of divine action, based on Aristotelian metaphysics, in the science/theology dialogue. The aim of the present article is to prepare a philosophical ground for such project.

I have two objectives. First, I want to argue that the neo-Aristotelian vision of how biological entities fit into the physical world (which I shall begin by describing) is inconsistent with ‘the Physical Given’ (which I shall endeavour to characterise). Secondly, I want to raise doubts about whether this conception of physical reality is something given to us by our ‘best physics’ so much as imposed on it. Having cleared space for a more expansive conception of nature, which includes teleology at the inorganic level, I will briefly reflect on an existing teleological model of the quantum physical world and its possible extension to the biological.