Skip to main content

Fraser MacBride

The University of Manchester, Philosophy, Faculty Member

Followers

326

Following

49

Co-authors

2

Public Views

I am Chair of Logic & Metaphysics at the University of Manchester and, since 2016, the Editor of the Monist. Previously I was a Reader at the University of Cambridge, Chair of Logic & Rhetoric at the University of Glasgow, and the Bertrand Russell Visiting Professor at McMaster University where the Russell Archive is held. I have also been a Reader at the University of St. Andrews, where I was a Director of Arché, and at Birkbeck College London.

My recent articles concern meta-ontology, truth-making, neo-Fregeanism and essentialism, and my recent monograph on the history of early analytic philosophy, On the Genealogy of Universals (OUP, 2018) emphasizes the neglected works of the early Moore, Stout, and Whitehead, as well as offering a new understanding of the contributions of Russell, Wittgenstein and Ramsey to the Problem of Universals. I am now writing a book on the metaphysics of relations.

less

InterestsView All (7)

Uploads

book by Fraser MacBride

On the Genealogy of Universals: The Metaphysical Origins of Analytic Philosophy, OUP 2018

The concepts of particular and universal have grown so familiar that their significance has becom... more The concepts of particular and universal have grown so familiar that their significance has become difficult to discern, like coins that have been passed back and forth too many times, worn smooth so their values can no longer be read. On the Genealogy of Universals seeks to overcome our sense of over-familiarity with these concepts by providing a case study of their evolution during the late nineteenth century and early twentieth century, a study that shows how the history of these concepts is bound up with the origins and development of analytic philosophy itself. Understanding how these concepts were taken up, transfigured, and given up by the early analytic philosophers, enables us to recover and reanimate the debate amongst them that otherwise remains Delphic. This book begins from the early, originating texts of analytic philosophy that have hitherto baffled commentators, including Moore's early papers, and engages afresh with the neglected contributions of philosophical figures that historians of analytic philosophy have mostly since forgotten, including Stout and Whitehead. This sheds new light upon the relationships of Moore to Russell, Russell to Wittgenstein, and Wittgenstein to Ramsey.

Truth, meta-philosophy by Fraser MacBride

Against Second-Order Logic: Quine and Beyond in Higher-Order Metaphysics (OUP)

Why Lewis Would Have Rejected Grounding

In Perspectives on the Philosophy of David K. Lewis OUP, 2022

We argue that Lewis would have rejected recent appeals to the notions of 'metaphysical dependency... more We argue that Lewis would have rejected recent appeals to the notions of 'metaphysical dependency', 'grounding' and 'ontological priority', because he would have held that they're not needed and they're not intelligible. We argue our case by drawing upon Lewis's views on supervenience, the metaphysics of singletons and the dubiousness of Kripke's essentialism.

RUDOLF CARNAP AND DAVID LEWIS ON METAPHYSICS: A QUESTION OF HISTORICAL ANCESTRY

Journal of History of Analytical Philosophy, 2021

In an unpublished speech from 1991, David Lewis told his audience that he counted 'the metaphysic... more In an unpublished speech from 1991, David Lewis told his audience that he counted 'the metaphysician Carnap (not to be confused with the anti-metaphysician Carnap, who is better known)' amongst his historical ancestors. Here I provide a novel interpretation of the Aufbau that allows us to make sense of Lewis's claim. Drawing upon Lewis's correspondence, I argue it was the Carnap of the Aufbau whom Lewis read as a metaphysician, because Carnap's appeal to the notion of founded relations in the Aufbau echoes Lewis's own appeal to the metaphysics of natural properties. I further maintain that Lewis was right to read Carnap this way and that the notion of a founded relation has a legitimate claim to be both logical and metaphysical. I also argue that Carnap's initial response to Goodman's puzzle about 'grue' relies upon a metaphysics of simple properties which also prefigures Lewis's own response to Goodman invoking natural properties.

W.V. QUINE AND DAVID LEWIS: STRUCTURAL (EPISTEMOLOGICAL) HUMILITY

by Fraser MacBride and Frederique Janssen-Lauret

Quine, Structure and Ontology, Oxford University Press, 2020

In this paper we argue that W.V. Quine and D.K. Lewis, despite their differences and their diffe... more In this paper we argue that W.V. Quine and D.K. Lewis, despite their differences and their different receptions, came to a common intellectual destination: epistemological structuralism. We begin by providing an account of Quine’s epistemological structuralism as it came to its mature development in his final works, Pursuit of Truth (1990) and From Stimulus to Science (1995), and we show how this doctrine developed our of his earlier views on explication and the inscrutability of reference. We then turn to the correspondence between Quine and Lewis which sets the scene for Lewis’s adoption of structuralism vis-a-vis set theory in the Appendix to his Parts of Classes (1990). We conclude, drawing further from Lewis’s correspondence, by arguing that Lewis proceeded from there to embrace in one of his own final papers, ‘Ramseyan Humility’ (2001), an encompassing form of epistemological structuralism, whilst discharging the doctrine of reference magnetism that had hitherto set Lewis apart from Quine.

Lewis's Global Descriptivism and Reference Magnetism (Australasian Journal of Philosophy)

by Fraser MacBride and Frederique Janssen-Lauret

Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 2020

In ‘Putnam’s Paradox’, Lewis defended global descriptivism and reference magnetism. According to ... more In ‘Putnam’s Paradox’, Lewis defended global descriptivism and reference magnetism. According to Schwarz [2014], Lewis didn’t mean what he said there, and really held neither position. We present evidence from Lewis’s correspondence and publications which shows conclusively that Lewis endorsed both.

David Lewis's Place in the History of Late Analytic Philosophy: His Conservative and Liberal Methodology

by Frederique Janssen-Lauret and Fraser MacBride

Philosophical Inquiries, 2018

In 1901 Russell had envisaged the new analytic philosophy as uniquely systematic, borrowing the m... more In 1901 Russell had envisaged the new analytic philosophy as uniquely systematic, borrowing the methods of science and mathematics. A century later, have Russell’s hopes become reality? David Lewis is often celebrated as a great systematic metaphysician, his influence proof that we live in a heyday of systematic philosophy. But, we argue, this common belief is misguided: Lewis was not a systematic philosopher, and he didn’t want to be. Although some aspects of his philosophy are systematic, mainly his pluriverse of possible worlds and its many applications, that systematicity was due to the influence of his teacher Quine, who really was an heir to Russell. Drawing upon Lewis’s posthumous papers and his correspondence as well as the published record, we show that Lewis’s non- Quinean influences, including G.E. Moore and D.M. Armstrong, led Lewis to an anti- systematic methodology which leaves each philosopher’s views and starting points to his or her own personal conscience.

Meta-Ontology, Epistemology and Essence, published in The Monist

by Frederique Janssen-Lauret and Fraser MacBride

A priori reflection, common sense and intuition have proved unreliable sources of information abo... more A priori reflection, common sense and intuition have proved unreliable sources of information about the world outside of us. So the justification for a theory of the categories must derive from the empirical support of the scientific theories whose descriptions it unifies and clarifies. We don’t have reliable information about the de re modal profiles of external things either because the overwhelming proportion of our knowledge of the external world is theoretical—knowledge by description rather than knowledge by acquaintance. This undermines the traditional idea that to be an object of category C is to be an object with such-and-such characteristic possibilities of combination. But this is no loss because de re modal thought lacks utility for creatures like us.

Analytic Philosophy and its Synoptic Commission: Towards The Epistemic End of Days, published in Philosophical Traditions, (CUP)

ABSTRACT: I argue that whilst there is no such thing as 'analytic philosophy', conceived as a spe... more ABSTRACT: I argue that whilst there is no such thing as 'analytic philosophy', conceived as a special discipline with its own distinctive subject matter or peculiar method, there is an analytic task for philosophy that distinguishes it from other reflective pursuits, a global or synoptic commission: to establish whether the final outputs of other disciplines and common sense can be fused into a single periscopic vision of the Universe. This explains why philosophy is difficult, why can't rely upon our intuitions and why the history of philosophy matters.

For Keeping Truth In Truthmaking, Published in Analysis

Is the truthmaker principle a development of the correspondence theory of truth? So Armstrong int... more Is the truthmaker principle a development of the correspondence theory of truth? So Armstrong introduced the truthmaker principle to us, but Lewis (2001) influentially argued that it is neither a correspondence theory nor a theory of truth. But the truthmaker principle can be correctly understood as a development of the correspondence theory if it's conceived as incorporating the insight that truth is a relation between truth-bearers and something worldly. And we strengthen rather than weaken the plausibility of the truthmaker principle if we conceive of truth as performing a substantial rather than deflationary role in the truthmaker principle.

How Truth Depends Upon Being, Published in Analysis

According to Armstrong (amongst others) 'any truth, should depend for its truth for something " o... more According to Armstrong (amongst others) 'any truth, should depend for its truth for something " outside " it' where this one-‐way dependency is explained in terms of the asymmetric relationship that obtains between a truth and its truthmaker. But there's no need to appeal to truthmakers to make sense of this dependency. The truth of a proposition is essentially determined by the interlocking semantic mechanism of reference and satisfaction which already ensures that the truth-‐value of a proposition depends on how things stand outside it. By contrast, how things stand outside of a proposition is determined by other worldly mechanisms that have nothing to do with truth.

Lewis' Animadversions on the Truthmaker Principle, Published in Truthmakers (OUP)

According to the Truthmaker Principle every truth must have a truthmaker. Lewis has influentially... more According to the Truthmaker Principle every truth must have a truthmaker. Lewis has influentially argued that the principle be rejected, denying there need be truthmakers for contingent predications or negative existentials. Later he withdrew this denial. He maintained instead that the Truthmaker Principle be upheld in full generality. Nevertheless, it is argued, Lewis' animadversions reveal the Truthmaker principle to be quite without grounds.

De re modality, essentialism, and Lewis's Humeanism

by Helen Beebee and Fraser MacBride

Truthmakers, published in Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy

This article for the Stanford Encyclopedia for Philosophy provides a state of the art survey of t... more This article for the Stanford Encyclopedia for Philosophy provides a state of the art survey of the contemporary debate about truth-makers, covering both the case for and against truth-makers. It explores 4 interrelated questions about truth-makers, (1) What is it to be a truth-maker? (2) Which range, or ranges, of truths are eligible to be made true (if any are)? (3) What kinds of entities are truth-makers? (4) What is the motivation for adopting a theory of truth-makers? And adds that there's another question to often put off: (5) What are the truth-bearers?

Review of Peter Unger's Empty Ideas, Published in Analysis Reviews

History by Fraser MacBride

Long review of S. Shieh Necessity Lost: Modality and Logic in Early Analytic Philosophy (OUP), published in Mind 2022

Mind, 2022

I distinguish history of philosophy conceived as philosophical hermeneutics from structural histo... more I distinguish history of philosophy conceived as philosophical hermeneutics from structural history and intellectual biography. I argue that seen from the perspective of philosophical hermeneutics, that both Frege's and Russell's writings on modality can be taken at face value without relying upon preconceptions about absolute truth as per Sanford Shieh's case in his recent book, Necessity Lost.

The Russell-Wittgenstein Dispute: A New Perspective

I argue that Russell’s multiple relation theory of judgment was NOT refuted by Wittgenstein’s fam... more I argue that Russell’s multiple relation theory of judgment was NOT refuted by Wittgenstein’s famous criticisms of it. Russell's theory only came back strengthened as a higher-order theory of belief, a theory which still merits attention today. To see this we need to understand the way in which Russell’s thinking about relations developed, from the view that relations have direction, to the view that that relations are neutral, and back again.

Ramsey on Universals, Published in Ramsey's Legacy (CUP)

According to philosophical folklore Ramsey maintained three propositions in his famous 1925 paper... more According to philosophical folklore Ramsey maintained three propositions in his famous 1925 paper " Universals " : (i) there is no subject-predicate distinction; (ii) there is no particular-universal distinction; (iii) there is no particular-universal distinction because there is no subject-predicate distinction. The 'first generation' of Ramsey commentators dismissed " Universals " because they held that whereas predicates may be negated, names may not and so there is a subject-predicate distinction after all. The 'second generation' of commentators dismissed " Universals because they held that the absence of a merely linguistic distinction between subject and predicate does not provide any kind of reason for doubting that a truly ontological (i.e. non-linguistic) distinction obtains between particulars and universals. But both first and second-generation criticisms miss their marks because Ramsey did not maintain the three identified propositions. The failure of commentators to appreciate the point and purpose of the position Ramsey actually advanced in " Universals " results from (a) failing to consider the range of different arguments advanced there, (b) looking at " Universals " in isolation from Ramsey's other papers and (c) failing to consider Ramsey's writings in the context of the views that Russell and Wittgenstein held during the early 1920s. Seen from this wider perspective Ramsey arguments in " Universals " take on an altogether different significance. They not only anticipate important contemporary developments⎯the resurgence of Humeanism and the doctrine that the existence of universals can only be established a posteriori⎯but also point beyond them.

Whence the Particular Universal Distinction? Published in Grazer Philosophische Studien

In this paper I reflect upon how Russell might have responded to Ramsey’s scepticism (1925) about... more In this paper I reflect upon how Russell might have responded to Ramsey’s scepticism (1925) about the particular-universal distinction. Ruth Marcus argued that Russell in fact incorporated Ramsey’s scepticism into his late philosophy whilst Herbert Hochberg argued that Russell already had a definitive response to Russell available to him in his 1911 paper, ‘On the Relation of Universals and Particulars’, which includes Russell’s celebrated argument against nominalism. By contrast, I argue that both Marcus and Hochberg have it wrong and that Russell’s 1919 paper ‘On Propositions’ provides a better, but still ineffective, basis for a response to Ramsey.

The Cambridge Revolt Against Idealism: Was There Ever an Eden? Published in Metaphilosophy

According to one creation myth, analytic philosophy emerged in Cambridge when Moore and Russell a... more According to one creation myth, analytic philosophy emerged in Cambridge when Moore and Russell abandoned idealism in favour of naïve realism: every word stood for something; it was only after the Fall, Russell's discovery of his theory of descriptions, that they realised some complex phrases ("the present King of France") didn't stand for anything. It has become a commonplace of recent scholarship to object that even before 'the Fall', Russell acknowledged that such phrases may fail to denote. But we need to go further: even before 'the Fall' Russell had taken an altogether more discerning approach to the ontology of logic and relations than hitherto recognized.

On the Genealogy of Universals: The Metaphysical Origins of Analytic Philosophy, OUP 2018

The concepts of particular and universal have grown so familiar that their significance has becom... more The concepts of particular and universal have grown so familiar that their significance has become difficult to discern, like coins that have been passed back and forth too many times, worn smooth so their values can no longer be read. On the Genealogy of Universals seeks to overcome our sense of over-familiarity with these concepts by providing a case study of their evolution during the late nineteenth century and early twentieth century, a study that shows how the history of these concepts is bound up with the origins and development of analytic philosophy itself. Understanding how these concepts were taken up, transfigured, and given up by the early analytic philosophers, enables us to recover and reanimate the debate amongst them that otherwise remains Delphic. This book begins from the early, originating texts of analytic philosophy that have hitherto baffled commentators, including Moore's early papers, and engages afresh with the neglected contributions of philosophical figures that historians of analytic philosophy have mostly since forgotten, including Stout and Whitehead. This sheds new light upon the relationships of Moore to Russell, Russell to Wittgenstein, and Wittgenstein to Ramsey.

Against Second-Order Logic: Quine and Beyond in Higher-Order Metaphysics (OUP)

Why Lewis Would Have Rejected Grounding

In Perspectives on the Philosophy of David K. Lewis OUP, 2022

We argue that Lewis would have rejected recent appeals to the notions of 'metaphysical dependency... more We argue that Lewis would have rejected recent appeals to the notions of 'metaphysical dependency', 'grounding' and 'ontological priority', because he would have held that they're not needed and they're not intelligible. We argue our case by drawing upon Lewis's views on supervenience, the metaphysics of singletons and the dubiousness of Kripke's essentialism.

RUDOLF CARNAP AND DAVID LEWIS ON METAPHYSICS: A QUESTION OF HISTORICAL ANCESTRY

Journal of History of Analytical Philosophy, 2021

In an unpublished speech from 1991, David Lewis told his audience that he counted 'the metaphysic... more In an unpublished speech from 1991, David Lewis told his audience that he counted 'the metaphysician Carnap (not to be confused with the anti-metaphysician Carnap, who is better known)' amongst his historical ancestors. Here I provide a novel interpretation of the Aufbau that allows us to make sense of Lewis's claim. Drawing upon Lewis's correspondence, I argue it was the Carnap of the Aufbau whom Lewis read as a metaphysician, because Carnap's appeal to the notion of founded relations in the Aufbau echoes Lewis's own appeal to the metaphysics of natural properties. I further maintain that Lewis was right to read Carnap this way and that the notion of a founded relation has a legitimate claim to be both logical and metaphysical. I also argue that Carnap's initial response to Goodman's puzzle about 'grue' relies upon a metaphysics of simple properties which also prefigures Lewis's own response to Goodman invoking natural properties.

W.V. QUINE AND DAVID LEWIS: STRUCTURAL (EPISTEMOLOGICAL) HUMILITY

by Fraser MacBride and Frederique Janssen-Lauret

Quine, Structure and Ontology, Oxford University Press, 2020

In this paper we argue that W.V. Quine and D.K. Lewis, despite their differences and their diffe... more In this paper we argue that W.V. Quine and D.K. Lewis, despite their differences and their different receptions, came to a common intellectual destination: epistemological structuralism. We begin by providing an account of Quine’s epistemological structuralism as it came to its mature development in his final works, Pursuit of Truth (1990) and From Stimulus to Science (1995), and we show how this doctrine developed our of his earlier views on explication and the inscrutability of reference. We then turn to the correspondence between Quine and Lewis which sets the scene for Lewis’s adoption of structuralism vis-a-vis set theory in the Appendix to his Parts of Classes (1990). We conclude, drawing further from Lewis’s correspondence, by arguing that Lewis proceeded from there to embrace in one of his own final papers, ‘Ramseyan Humility’ (2001), an encompassing form of epistemological structuralism, whilst discharging the doctrine of reference magnetism that had hitherto set Lewis apart from Quine.

Lewis's Global Descriptivism and Reference Magnetism (Australasian Journal of Philosophy)

by Fraser MacBride and Frederique Janssen-Lauret

Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 2020

In ‘Putnam’s Paradox’, Lewis defended global descriptivism and reference magnetism. According to ... more In ‘Putnam’s Paradox’, Lewis defended global descriptivism and reference magnetism. According to Schwarz [2014], Lewis didn’t mean what he said there, and really held neither position. We present evidence from Lewis’s correspondence and publications which shows conclusively that Lewis endorsed both.

David Lewis's Place in the History of Late Analytic Philosophy: His Conservative and Liberal Methodology

by Frederique Janssen-Lauret and Fraser MacBride

Philosophical Inquiries, 2018

In 1901 Russell had envisaged the new analytic philosophy as uniquely systematic, borrowing the m... more In 1901 Russell had envisaged the new analytic philosophy as uniquely systematic, borrowing the methods of science and mathematics. A century later, have Russell’s hopes become reality? David Lewis is often celebrated as a great systematic metaphysician, his influence proof that we live in a heyday of systematic philosophy. But, we argue, this common belief is misguided: Lewis was not a systematic philosopher, and he didn’t want to be. Although some aspects of his philosophy are systematic, mainly his pluriverse of possible worlds and its many applications, that systematicity was due to the influence of his teacher Quine, who really was an heir to Russell. Drawing upon Lewis’s posthumous papers and his correspondence as well as the published record, we show that Lewis’s non- Quinean influences, including G.E. Moore and D.M. Armstrong, led Lewis to an anti- systematic methodology which leaves each philosopher’s views and starting points to his or her own personal conscience.

Meta-Ontology, Epistemology and Essence, published in The Monist

by Frederique Janssen-Lauret and Fraser MacBride

A priori reflection, common sense and intuition have proved unreliable sources of information abo... more A priori reflection, common sense and intuition have proved unreliable sources of information about the world outside of us. So the justification for a theory of the categories must derive from the empirical support of the scientific theories whose descriptions it unifies and clarifies. We don’t have reliable information about the de re modal profiles of external things either because the overwhelming proportion of our knowledge of the external world is theoretical—knowledge by description rather than knowledge by acquaintance. This undermines the traditional idea that to be an object of category C is to be an object with such-and-such characteristic possibilities of combination. But this is no loss because de re modal thought lacks utility for creatures like us.

Analytic Philosophy and its Synoptic Commission: Towards The Epistemic End of Days, published in Philosophical Traditions, (CUP)

ABSTRACT: I argue that whilst there is no such thing as 'analytic philosophy', conceived as a spe... more ABSTRACT: I argue that whilst there is no such thing as 'analytic philosophy', conceived as a special discipline with its own distinctive subject matter or peculiar method, there is an analytic task for philosophy that distinguishes it from other reflective pursuits, a global or synoptic commission: to establish whether the final outputs of other disciplines and common sense can be fused into a single periscopic vision of the Universe. This explains why philosophy is difficult, why can't rely upon our intuitions and why the history of philosophy matters.

For Keeping Truth In Truthmaking, Published in Analysis

Is the truthmaker principle a development of the correspondence theory of truth? So Armstrong int... more Is the truthmaker principle a development of the correspondence theory of truth? So Armstrong introduced the truthmaker principle to us, but Lewis (2001) influentially argued that it is neither a correspondence theory nor a theory of truth. But the truthmaker principle can be correctly understood as a development of the correspondence theory if it's conceived as incorporating the insight that truth is a relation between truth-bearers and something worldly. And we strengthen rather than weaken the plausibility of the truthmaker principle if we conceive of truth as performing a substantial rather than deflationary role in the truthmaker principle.

How Truth Depends Upon Being, Published in Analysis

According to Armstrong (amongst others) 'any truth, should depend for its truth for something " o... more According to Armstrong (amongst others) 'any truth, should depend for its truth for something " outside " it' where this one-‐way dependency is explained in terms of the asymmetric relationship that obtains between a truth and its truthmaker. But there's no need to appeal to truthmakers to make sense of this dependency. The truth of a proposition is essentially determined by the interlocking semantic mechanism of reference and satisfaction which already ensures that the truth-‐value of a proposition depends on how things stand outside it. By contrast, how things stand outside of a proposition is determined by other worldly mechanisms that have nothing to do with truth.

Lewis' Animadversions on the Truthmaker Principle, Published in Truthmakers (OUP)

According to the Truthmaker Principle every truth must have a truthmaker. Lewis has influentially... more According to the Truthmaker Principle every truth must have a truthmaker. Lewis has influentially argued that the principle be rejected, denying there need be truthmakers for contingent predications or negative existentials. Later he withdrew this denial. He maintained instead that the Truthmaker Principle be upheld in full generality. Nevertheless, it is argued, Lewis' animadversions reveal the Truthmaker principle to be quite without grounds.

De re modality, essentialism, and Lewis's Humeanism

by Helen Beebee and Fraser MacBride

Truthmakers, published in Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy

This article for the Stanford Encyclopedia for Philosophy provides a state of the art survey of t... more This article for the Stanford Encyclopedia for Philosophy provides a state of the art survey of the contemporary debate about truth-makers, covering both the case for and against truth-makers. It explores 4 interrelated questions about truth-makers, (1) What is it to be a truth-maker? (2) Which range, or ranges, of truths are eligible to be made true (if any are)? (3) What kinds of entities are truth-makers? (4) What is the motivation for adopting a theory of truth-makers? And adds that there's another question to often put off: (5) What are the truth-bearers?

Review of Peter Unger's Empty Ideas, Published in Analysis Reviews

Long review of S. Shieh Necessity Lost: Modality and Logic in Early Analytic Philosophy (OUP), published in Mind 2022

Mind, 2022

I distinguish history of philosophy conceived as philosophical hermeneutics from structural histo... more I distinguish history of philosophy conceived as philosophical hermeneutics from structural history and intellectual biography. I argue that seen from the perspective of philosophical hermeneutics, that both Frege's and Russell's writings on modality can be taken at face value without relying upon preconceptions about absolute truth as per Sanford Shieh's case in his recent book, Necessity Lost.

The Russell-Wittgenstein Dispute: A New Perspective

I argue that Russell’s multiple relation theory of judgment was NOT refuted by Wittgenstein’s fam... more I argue that Russell’s multiple relation theory of judgment was NOT refuted by Wittgenstein’s famous criticisms of it. Russell's theory only came back strengthened as a higher-order theory of belief, a theory which still merits attention today. To see this we need to understand the way in which Russell’s thinking about relations developed, from the view that relations have direction, to the view that that relations are neutral, and back again.

Ramsey on Universals, Published in Ramsey's Legacy (CUP)

According to philosophical folklore Ramsey maintained three propositions in his famous 1925 paper... more According to philosophical folklore Ramsey maintained three propositions in his famous 1925 paper " Universals " : (i) there is no subject-predicate distinction; (ii) there is no particular-universal distinction; (iii) there is no particular-universal distinction because there is no subject-predicate distinction. The 'first generation' of Ramsey commentators dismissed " Universals " because they held that whereas predicates may be negated, names may not and so there is a subject-predicate distinction after all. The 'second generation' of commentators dismissed " Universals because they held that the absence of a merely linguistic distinction between subject and predicate does not provide any kind of reason for doubting that a truly ontological (i.e. non-linguistic) distinction obtains between particulars and universals. But both first and second-generation criticisms miss their marks because Ramsey did not maintain the three identified propositions. The failure of commentators to appreciate the point and purpose of the position Ramsey actually advanced in " Universals " results from (a) failing to consider the range of different arguments advanced there, (b) looking at " Universals " in isolation from Ramsey's other papers and (c) failing to consider Ramsey's writings in the context of the views that Russell and Wittgenstein held during the early 1920s. Seen from this wider perspective Ramsey arguments in " Universals " take on an altogether different significance. They not only anticipate important contemporary developments⎯the resurgence of Humeanism and the doctrine that the existence of universals can only be established a posteriori⎯but also point beyond them.

Whence the Particular Universal Distinction? Published in Grazer Philosophische Studien

In this paper I reflect upon how Russell might have responded to Ramsey’s scepticism (1925) about... more In this paper I reflect upon how Russell might have responded to Ramsey’s scepticism (1925) about the particular-universal distinction. Ruth Marcus argued that Russell in fact incorporated Ramsey’s scepticism into his late philosophy whilst Herbert Hochberg argued that Russell already had a definitive response to Russell available to him in his 1911 paper, ‘On the Relation of Universals and Particulars’, which includes Russell’s celebrated argument against nominalism. By contrast, I argue that both Marcus and Hochberg have it wrong and that Russell’s 1919 paper ‘On Propositions’ provides a better, but still ineffective, basis for a response to Ramsey.

The Cambridge Revolt Against Idealism: Was There Ever an Eden? Published in Metaphilosophy

According to one creation myth, analytic philosophy emerged in Cambridge when Moore and Russell a... more According to one creation myth, analytic philosophy emerged in Cambridge when Moore and Russell abandoned idealism in favour of naïve realism: every word stood for something; it was only after the Fall, Russell's discovery of his theory of descriptions, that they realised some complex phrases ("the present King of France") didn't stand for anything. It has become a commonplace of recent scholarship to object that even before 'the Fall', Russell acknowledged that such phrases may fail to denote. But we need to go further: even before 'the Fall' Russell had taken an altogether more discerning approach to the ontology of logic and relations than hitherto recognized.

Review of Hochberg's Introducing Analytic Philosophy, Published in Dialectica

Review of Hochberg Introducing Analytic Philosophy, Dialectica, 2005, 81-7

Review of Gaskin's Unity of the Proposition, Published in Mind

Review of Bostock's Russell's Logical Atomism, Published in Mind

Review of Beaney's Oxford Handbook of Analytic Philosophy, Published in Philosophy

Review of John Heil's Relations. Basic Elements in Metaphysics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2021

Review of John Heil's Relations. Basic Elements in Metaphysics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2021

International Journal of Philosophical Studies, 2023

On the Origins of Order: Non-Symmetric or only Symmetric Relations? Published in Loux & Galuzzo (eds.) The Problem of Universals in Contemporary Philosophy (CUP)

In this paper I argue for the existence of non-symmetric relations. Armstrong and Dorr have argue... more In this paper I argue for the existence of non-symmetric relations. Armstrong and Dorr have argued that (1) non-symmetric relations are trouble, and (2) that we don’t need non-symmetric relations because we can make do with symmetric relations when it comes to accounting for the order we find in nature. But, I argue, Armstrong and Dorr are wrong about both (1) and (2). Their efforts to do without non-symmetric relations presuppose them, whilst their arguments that non-symmetric relations are subject to a tu quoque response. This paper contributes a further plank to the ostrich realism about relations that I advocate in Macbride (2013).

How Involved Do You Want To Be In A Non-Symmetric Relationship, published in Australasian Journal of Philosophy

ABSTRACT: There are three different degrees to which we may allow a systematic theory of the worl... more ABSTRACT: There are three different degrees to which we may allow a systematic theory of the world to embrace the idea of relatedness—supposing realism about non-symmetric relations as a background requirement. (First Degree) There are multiple ways in which a non-symmetric relation may apply to the things it relates—for the binary case, aRb ≠ bRa. (Second Degree) Every such relation has a distinct converse—for every R such that aRb there is another relation R* such that bR*a. (Third Degree) Each one of them applies in an order to the things it relates—with regard to the state that result from R’s applying to a and b, either R applies to a first and b second, or it applies to b first and a second. Whereas the first degree is near indubitable, embracing the second or third generates unwholesome consequences. The second degree embodies a commitment to the existence of a superfluity of distinct converses and states to which such relations give rise. The third degree embodies commitment to recherché facts of the matter about how the states that arise from the application of one non-symmetric relation compare to any other. It is argued that accounts that purport to offer an analysis of the first degree generate unwelcome second or third degree consequences. This speaks in favour of our adopting an account of the application of relations that’s not an analysis at all, an account that takes the first degree as primitive.

Relations & Truth-Making, published in Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society

Can Bradley's Regress be solved by positing relational tropes as truth-makers? No, no more than R... more Can Bradley's Regress be solved by positing relational tropes as truth-makers? No, no more than Russell's paradox can be solved by positing Fregean extensions. To call a trope relational is to pack into its essence the relating function it is supposed to perform but without explaining what Bradley's Regress calls into question, viz. the capacity of relations to relate. This problem has been masked from view by the (questionable) assumption that the only genuine ontological problems that can be intelligibly raised are those that can be answered by providing a schedule of truthmakers.

Neutral Relations Revisited, published in Dialectica

Do non-symmetric relations apply to the objects they relate in an order. According to the standar... more Do non-symmetric relations apply to the objects they relate in an order. According to the standard view of relations, the difference between aRb and bRa obtaining, where R is non-symmetric, corresponds to a difference in the order in which the non-symmetric relation R applies to a and b. Recently Kit Fine has challenged the standard view in his important paper ‘Neutral Relations’ arguing that non-symmetric relations are neutral, lacking direction or order. In this paper I argue that Fine’s theory of neutral relations cannot account for the application of non-symmetric relations to their relata

Order All The Way Down, Published in E. Tegtmeier (ed.) Studies in the Philosophy of Herbert Hochberg (Ontos)

In this paper I investigate the question of how order originates, evaluating the respective merit... more In this paper I investigate the question of how order originates, evaluating the respective merits of the different views about order proposed at different times by Russell and the alternative Russell-inspired proposals made by Hochberg. Whilst I argue that Hochberg makes effective criticism of the Weiner-Kuratowski definition of ordered pairs, I come down in favour of Russell's strategy of deploying heterogeneous relations to analyse homogenous ones.

Review of Metaphysics of Relations, edited by Marmodoro & Yates (OUP), Forthcoming in Philosophy

In this review I take to task the related views of E.J. Lowe, John Heil and Peter Simons accordin... more In this review I take to task the related views of E.J. Lowe, John Heil and Peter Simons according to which relations don't exist because they're dispensable qua truth-makers. I argue that this view is methodologically unstable because we also have reason to believe that relations exist because our best mathematical and scientific theories say so, i.e. quantify over them.

Relations, Published in Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy

In this paper I provide a state of the art survey and assessment of the contemporary debate about... more In this paper I provide a state of the art survey and assessment of the contemporary debate about relations. After (1) distinguishing different varieties of relations, symmetric from non-symmetric, internal from external and relations etc. and relations from their set-theoretic models or sequences, I proceed (2) to consider Bradley's regress and whether relations can be eliminated altogether. Next I turn (3) to the question whether relations can be reduced, bringing to bear considerations from the philosophy of physics as well as metaphysics. Finally, (3) I consider in what sense relations have order, and whether to make sense of this we are required to conceive of relations as having direction or argument positions.

Review of Linnebo's Philosophy of Mathematics (Princeton 2017), forthcoming Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews

Neo-Fregean Meta-Ontology: Just Don't Ask Too Many Questions, forthcoming in Abstractionism (OUP)

Could Nothing Matter, Published in Analysis

In this paper I argue that Neo-Fregeanism is best understood as a a modal epistemological reconst... more In this paper I argue that Neo-Fregeanism is best understood as a a modal epistemological reconstruction rather than a faithful representation of how we ordinarily understand arithmetic. I make the case by considering Robert Black’s complaint that Frege arithmetic is committed to zero but ordinary users aren’t. This paper builds upon a case already begun in my “On Finite Hume” (2000), which argues against a related objection to Neo-Fregeanism raised by Richard Heck

On Finite Hume, Published in Philosophia Mathematica

Neo-Fregeanism contends that knowledge of arithmetic may be acquired by second-order logical refl... more Neo-Fregeanism contends that knowledge of arithmetic may be acquired by second-order logical reflection upon Hume's principle. Richard Heck argues that Hume's principle doesn't inform ordinary arithmetical reasoning and so knowledge derived from it cannot be genuinely arithmetical. To suppose otherwise, Heck claims, is to fail to comprehend the magnitude of Cantor's conceptual contribution to mathematics. Heck recommends that finite Hume's principle be employed instead to generate arithmetical knowledge. But, I argue, a better understanding of Cantor's contribution is achieved if it is supposed that Hume's principle really does inform arithmetical practice. More generally, I argue we do better to conceive neo-Fregeanism epistemology as a revolutionary rather than a hermeneutic exercise.

The Julius Caesar Objection: More Problematic Than Ever, published in Identity & Modality, (OUP)

This paper investigates the meta-ontological problem, what is the Julius Caesar objection? I dist... more This paper investigates the meta-ontological problem, what is the Julius Caesar objection? I distinguish epistemic, metaphysical and semantic versions. I argue that neo-Fregean and supervaluationist solutions to the Caesar objection fails because, amongst other flaws, they fail to determine which version of the problem is in play.

Speaking with Shadows: A Study of Neo-Logicism, Published in British Journal for the Philosophy of Science

This paper provides a study and assessment of the neo-logicist view that mathematical knowledge i... more This paper provides a study and assessment of the neo-logicist view that mathematical knowledge is essentially logical knowledge, as advanced by Hale and Wright. Their view is found to be best understood as a set of related though independent theses: (1) neo-fregeanism - a general conception of the relation between language and reality; (2) the method of abstraction - a particular method for introducing concepts into language; (3) the scope of 2nd order logic - second order logic is logic. The criticisms of Boolos, Dummett, Field and Quine (amongst others) of these theses are explored and assessed. The issues discussed included reductionism, rejectionism, the Julius Caesar objections, and the charge that second order logic is set theory in disguise.

The Julio César Problem

Dialectica, 2005

What constitutes the numerical diversity of mathematical objects? Published in Analysis

Analysis, 2006

Can Ante Rem Structuralism Solve the Access Problem? Published in Philosophical Quarterly

The Philosophical Quarterly, 2007

Against Second-Order Logic: Quine and Beyond

Higher-Order Metaphysics, edited by P. Fritz and N. Jones, 2024

Is second-order logic logic? Famously Quine argued second-order logic wasn't logic but his argume... more Is second-order logic logic? Famously Quine argued second-order logic wasn't logic but his arguments have been the subject of influential criticisms. In the early sections of this paper, I develop a deeper perspective upon Quine's philosophy of logic by exploring his positive conception of what logic is for and hence what logic is. Seen from this perspective, I argue that many of the criticisms of his case against second-order logic miss their mark. Then, in the later sections, I go beyond Quine to develop a novel case that quantification into polyadic predicate position, understood as requiring quantifiers to range over relations, isn't intelligible.

Predicates and Properties: An Examination of P.K. Sen's Theory of Universals, Published in Universals, Concept & Qualities

This paper provides a criticial assessment of the theory of properties and predicates, a form a a... more

Predicate Reference, Published in Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Language

In this paper I examine the case for and against assigning a referential role to predicates, incl... more In this paper I examine the case for and against assigning a referential role to predicates, including an assessment of Quine's 'ostrich nominalism', Quine versus Prior on higher-order quantification, and Frege's concept horse paradox , including my own solution to the paradox in terms of the notion of impure reference.

Impure Reference: A Way Around The Concept Horse Paradox, published in Philosophical Perspectives

ABSTRACT: This paper provides a new solution to the concept horse paradox. Frege argued no name c... more ABSTRACT: This paper provides a new solution to the concept horse paradox. Frege argued no name co-refers with a predicate because no name can be inter-substituted with a predicate. This led Frege to embrace the paradox of the concept horse. But Frege got it wrong because predicates are impurely referring expressions and we shouldn’t expect impurely referring expressions to be intersubstitutable even if they co-refer, because the contexts in which they occur are sensitive to the extra information they carry about their referents.

UNIVERSALS: THE CONTEMPORARY DEBATE, PUBLISHED IN ROUTLEDGE COMPANION TO METAPHYSICS

In this paper, written for metaphysical novices, I lay out my own fast track route from how to in... more

The Particular-Universal Distinction: A Dogma of Metaphysics, Published in Mind

Is the assumption of a fundamental distinction between particulars and universals just another un... more Is the assumption of a fundamental distinction between particulars and universals just another unsupported dogma of metaphysics? F.P. Ramsey famously rejected the particular-universal distinction but neglected to consider the many different conceptions of the distinction that have been advanced. As a contribution to the (inevitably) piecemeal investigation of this issue three interrelated conceptions of the particular-universal distinction are examined: (i) universals, by contrast to particulars, are unigrade; (ii) particulars are related to universal by an asymmetric tie of exemplification; (iii) universals are incomplete whereas particulars are complete. It is argued that these conceptions are wanting in several respects. Sometimes they fail to mark a significant division amongst entities. Sometimes they make substantial demands upon the shape of reality; once these demands are understood aright it is no longer obvious that the distinction merits our acceptance. The case is made via a discussion of the possibility of multigrade universals and the adicity of singular causation.

On How We Know What there is, published in Analysis

Analysis, 1998

The Problem of Universals and the Limits of Truth-Making, published in Philosophical Papers

This paper argues that the problem of universals cannot be resolved by appealing solely to truth... more

Where are Particulars and Universals? Published in Dialectica

Dialectica, 2005

Particulars, Modes and Universals: An examination of E.J. Lowe's Four-Fold Ontology

Dialectica, 2005

Extreme Metaphysics: Hossack on Logical Objects, Facts, Propositions and Universals

Dialectica, 2011

The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 1996

Structuralism Reconsidered

Oxford Handbooks Online, 2007

A structural account of mathematics

Bulletin of Symbolic Logic, 2005

Universals: The Contemporary Debate

phil.cam.ac.uk

1 This 'proof of a universal' self-consciously seeks to parallel GE Moore's famous... more 1 This 'proof of a universal' self-consciously seeks to parallel GE Moore's famous 'proof of an external world' (see his 1939), where he held up his hands to demonstrate the existence of things outside of us and thereby thought to put pay to external world scepticism. It is worth ...

Meta-Ontology, Epistemology and Essence: On the Empirical Deduction of the Categories

The Monist 98(3), Aug 31, 2015

A priori reflection, common sense and intuition have proved unreliable sources of information abo... more A priori reflection, common sense and intuition have proved unreliable sources of information about the world outside of us. So the justification for a theory of the categories must derive from the empirical support of the scientific theories whose descriptions it unifies and clarifies. We don’t have reliable information about the de re modal profiles of external things either because the overwhelming proportion of our knowledge of the external world is theoretical—knowledge by description rather than knowledge by acquaintance. This undermines the traditional idea that to be an object of category C is to be an object with such-and-such characteristic possibilities of combination. But this is no loss because de re modal thought lacks utility for creatures like us.