Plato and Platonism

Contrairement aux interprétations coutumières il y a un dialogue permanent entre la République, le Politique et les Lois et non une rupture ou un changement substantiel de la pensée politique de Platon. Une analyse minutieuse de Leg. V 739a1-740a2 montre clairement cette cohérence, en particulière la tournure "dieux ou fils des dieux" qu'y apparaît se rattache à l'état ordonné de l'âme et plus spécifiquement à la connaissance philosophique et n'indique pas l'abandonnement des positions de la République. De cette façon sont réfutées les thèses soutenues par A. Laks depuis quelques années sur le rapport entre la République et les Lois.
In spite of the usual interpretations there is a continuous dialogue between the Republic, the Statesman, and the Laws and not a break or a substantial change in Plato's political thought. A detailed analysis of Laws V 739a1-740a2 shows beyond all doubt this strict coherence, especially the expression "gods or children of gods" that appears in this passage is related to the ordered state of the soul and more specifically to the philosophical knowledge and does not point to a revision of the doctrines defended in the Republic, so that the interpretation of the relationship between the Republic and the Laws defended since the beginning of the 90'ties by A. Laks can be considered as definitively refuted.

Many have argued that Plato’s intermediates are not independent entities. Rather, they exemplify the incapacity of discursive thought (διάνοια) for cognizing Forms. But just what does this incapacity
consist in? Any successful answer will require going beyond the intermediates themselves to another aspect of Plato’s mathematical
thought - his attribution of a quasi-numerical structure to Forms (the ‘eidetic numbers’). For our purposes, the most penetrating account
of eidetic numbers is Jacob Klein’s, who saw clearly that eidetic numbers are part of Plato’s inquiry into the ontological basis for all counting:
the existence of a plurality of formal elements, distinct yet combinable into internally articulate unities. However, Klein’s study of the Sophist
reveals such articulate unities as imperfectly countable and therefore opaque to διάνοια. Only this opacity, I argue, successfully explains
the relationship of intermediates to Forms.

In henadological Platonism, the significance of “the One” is understood to lie, not in an eminent singular entity, but in the modes of unity and the ways of being a unit. The science of units qua units is a systematic ground and counterweight to substance-based ontology, and manifests an organic bond with theology as the science of relation to supra-essential individuals or Gods. Because of the basic nature of unity relative to being, doctrines respecting unity tend to situate themselves as critiques of ontology; they exhibit both an analytical and a soteriological value. For its part, bhakti is not a mere sectarian movement but rather an inquiry at once speculative and practical into the nature of the relationship between the human and the divine. It bridges the diverse genres of ancient Indian thought (including the theophanic/cultic, the epic, along with diverse philosophical perspectives) and displays key commonalities with henadological Platonism. This paper begins the process of identifying these common themes with particular reference to the Bhagavadgītā. Chief among its themes is the distinction between structuring cause and structured mixture, which runs through Platonism from the Phaedo to the doctrine of principles, and which parallels the account of action in the Gītā as freedom independent of result, insofar as the latter pertains to the solidarity of worldly causality heteronomous to the agency of the ātman.

La diffusione dell’Utopia di Thomas More coincide con momenti di straordinaria tensione politica e sociale. La sua fortuna editoriale, col favorire un’ampia circolazione delle idee dell’autore anche negli ambienti vicini alla Riforma radicale, poteva suscitare prima o poi il desiderio di tradurle in pratica. Quando ai primi di maggio del 1525 apparve il libretto luterano contro i contadini tedeschi, la loro rivolta aveva raggiunto la massima espansione. Lutero attaccava con veemenza Thomas Müntzer, associandolo ai contadini nell’accusa di banditismo per delegittimarne l’azione e smascherarlo come falso profeta. Müntzer possedeva tuttavia una cultura notevole e conosceva Erasmo, Platone e probabilmente anche More. La condivisione dei beni, che avvicinava Platone e l’umanista More al cristianesimo evangelico, sarà per il riformatore di Allstedt – diventata l’anti-Wittenberg – un sogno profetico da realizzare in un Regno terreno di Cristo senza empi e peccatori, regolato da principi di moralità e giustizia in coerenza con la parola di Dio. Ma Lutero, con la sua realistica apologia della repressione, poneva le premesse teoriche per il massacro di Frankenhausen e la nascita di un ethos militare della Riforma.

The famous argument for the existence of God is analyzed with a survey of the Greek and Arabic influences of Avicenna's system.

Turning to the text, The Salvation, ‘’Metaphysics,’’ II. 12, it is stated that ‘’at any one and the same time there cannot be for anything that is possible in itself a cause that is possible ad infinitum’’ (II.12.2). Here he’s saying that a possible being cannot have an infinite amount of causes at the same time. Because if that infinite totality of causes would itself have either an internal cause or an external necessary cause. It can’t be internal, because it would either be (a) necessary, which is not an option because everything internal to that totality is possible; then (b) an internal possible cause – which is not an option because that would make it a part of the totality and a part can’t be a cause of the whole. So if that cause is not internal, then it has to be external. It can’t be possible, because all of the possible causes have been established in that inner totality. Therefore it has to be necessary. He concludes the argument by stating that:
Thus, things existing possibly terminate in a cause existing necessarily, in which case not every effect that exists as something possible will have simultaneously with it a cause that exists as something possible, and so an infinite number of causes existing at a single time is impossible. (II.12.2)
This argument can be considered as a subsidiary conclusion to Avicenna’s main argument for the proof of God’s existence (McGinnis 166-67). There are considered to be four main categories of arguments: (1) the metaphysical proof from necessity; (2) the proof from movement; (3) the proof from causality; (4) the proof from ontology (Netton 172-73). The themes are similar to the discussions on the problem of infinite causal regress as discussed for example in book two of Alexander of Aphrodisias’ On Aristotle’s Metaphysics. I think that he is essentially concerned with establishing a logical argument that integrates a hierarchy of ontological causality rather than simply natural causality. In that sense, it could be considered similar to the ‘’a posteriori cosmological arguments’’ of the quinque via  of ThomasAquinas (Netton 173).

Przysługujący widmom wywrotowy, niemalże rewolucyjny potencjał został odsunięty oraz zagubiony poprzez pozbycie się tej kontrowersyjnej kategorii z terytorium metafizyki i zbyt pośpieszne odesłanie jej do przestrzeni badań nad literaturą, sprowadzając ją jedynie do roli użytecznego, bezpiecznego narzędzia interpretacji.

Książka Andrzeja Marca odzyskuje niepokojący charakter widmontologii i ponownie wprowadza widma do myśli metafizycznej. Czym nawiedzona i przeniknięta jest tradycyjna metafizyka, co właściwie ją dręczy, nie daje spokoju oraz nieustannie podmywa jej stabilność?

Kategoria widma Derridy posłużyła Marcowi przede wszystkim do rozważań nad charakterem współczesności i przeobrażeń, jakie dokonały się w obrębie myśli ponowoczesnej. Współczesna kultura, zdaniem Marca, stała się miejscem powstawania widm, nieustannie powracających z przeszłości. Uznając, że nie jesteśmy już w stanie tworzyć utopijnych wizji przyszłości, autor stara się zdać sprawę z widmowego charakteru współczesnej kultury, analizując m. in. strategie vintage, retro, nurt no future w kulturze lat 70. czy nurt fantastyki naukowej w literaturze.

La diffusione dell’Utopia di Thomas More coincide con momenti di straordinaria tensione politica e sociale. La sua fortuna editoriale, col favorire un’ampia circolazione delle idee dell’autore anche negli ambienti vicini alla Riforma radicale, poteva suscitare prima o poi il desiderio di tradurle in pratica. Quando ai primi di maggio del 1525 apparve il libretto luterano contro i contadini tedeschi, la loro rivolta aveva raggiunto la massima espansione. Lutero attaccava con veemenza Thomas Müntzer, associandolo ai contadini nell’accusa di banditismo per delegittimarne l’azione e smascherarlo come falso profeta. Müntzer possedeva tuttavia una cultura notevole e conosceva Erasmo, Platone e probabilmente anche More. La condivisione dei beni, che avvicinava Platone e l’umanista More al cristianesimo evangelico, sarà per il riformatore di Allstedt – diventata l’anti-Wittenberg – un sogno profetico da realizzare in un Regno terreno di Cristo senza empi e peccatori, regolato da principi di moralità e giustizia in coerenza con la parola di Dio. Ma Lutero, con la sua realistica apologia della repressione, poneva le premesse teoriche per il massacro di Frankenhausen e la nascita di un ethos militare della Riforma.

Platon'un Kratylos'u, dil felsefesinin başlangıç noktası, dilbilimin kaçınılmaz başvuru kaynağı, dille ilgili kafamızı kurcalayan onlarca sorunun ilk defa telaffuz edildiği metindir. Platon'un dil kullanımı Kratylos'un labirentlerinde rafine edilirken, aslında Klasik Atina'nın entelektüel çevrelerindeki en popüler tartışmalarından biri gözler önüne serilmektedir: Adların Doğruluğu. Kratylos, dilin bilimsel, felsefi, dinsel yönlerini sorgulayan bir dizi hâlâ cevapsız soruyla gündemdeki yerini korumaktadır. Bunlardan sadece birkaçı söyle sıralanabilir: Bir adı doğru yapan nedir? Adların bir doğruluğu varsa bu doğruluk uylaşımsal mıdır yoksa doğal mıdır? Söz konusu doğruluğun üzerinde yükseldiği zemin nedir, anlam mı, yoksa sözcüklerin kendileri mi? Kullandığımız dilin iletişimde sağladığı ortaklıktan nasıl emin olabiliriz?
Platon'un Kratylos'u Türkçede okuyucunun karşısına ilk defa çıkmıyor. Ancak elinizdeki kitapta yer alan çeviri Yunanca orijinal metnin titiz bir incelenmesinin, satır satır, kimileyin hece hece, hatta harf harf, kılı kırk yaran bir filolojik bir dakikliğin ürünü olduğu iddiasını taşımaktadır. Çünkü bu çalışma, diyalogda başvurulan deneysel dil cambazlıklarında ya da etimolojik sözcük oyunlarındaki zeka parıltısını kaybetmemeye çalışan bir çeviri pratiğiyle ortaya çıkmıştır. Bu zeka pırıltısı bir yandan okurun gözlerini kamaştırırken, öte yandan dilin, dilbilimin, dil felsefesinin karanlık dehlizlerini aydınlatmaktadır. Kratylos'un sunduğu sorunsal alan, Kratylos’a Yorumlar: Physis-Nomos Karşıtlığı Bağlamında Filolojik ve Yorumbilimsel Bir İnceleme başlıklı ikinci ciltteki yorumlarla bir nebze daha net bir görünüme kavuşmaktadır.

Ebat: 13,5x21 cm
Sayfa Sayısı: 236
ISBN: 978-975-995-700-1
Fiyatı: 13 TL
Felsefe Serisi 34

CURRENTLY UNDERGOING SOME SERIOUS REVISIONS - WILL RETURN (IN MUCH BETTER SHAPE) SOON!

Against an Orthodoxy of Platonic Theology: Why the Demiurge is not Nous
Jason G. Rheins

In this paper I argue against the thesis that in Plato’s dialogues the Divine Craftsman or Demiurge (dēmiourgos - δημιουργός) represents or is equivalent to Intellect (nous - νοῦς). This claim (abbreviated as ΔΝ throughout) has been central to interpretations of Plato’s theology since antiquity, and it has been nearly universally conceded among Platonists. It has continued to be taken for granted in modern scholarship. Despite their many disagreements about Plato’s theology and cosmology, all the major interpretive camps have accepted the ΔΝ. By explicitly rejecting the ΔΝ, I argue that we can resolve several persistent and long-standing dilemmas that have undermined attempts to reconstruct a coherent Platonic view about the gods or to give an adequate reading of Plato’s late dialogues, especially the Timaeus.
In §I, I briefly introduce the central debates concerning Plato’s views about the nature of the gods and explain how the concepts of immanent and transcendent hypostases can be used to clearly frame these issues. In §II I lay out three key theses endorsed by Plato that any adequate position must be able to embrace. They are: 1. Immanence of Intellect; 2. Distinctness of Demiurge from Soul; 3. Venerability of the World-soul. These Platonic theses are all textually well supported, so rejecting any one of them from a reconstruction of Plato’s theology is not a viable option. I outline and categorize the major views that modern scholars have taken in terms of their commitments with respect to these theses. I show that each camp fails to account for one of the three theses and that they seem jointly incompatible. However, it is only in conjunction with the ΔΝ that the theses become incompatible; without the ΔΝ all three can be endorsed in tandem coherently. Thus I show that it is their further commitment to the ΔΝ that undermines all the major positions.
One of the three theses in particular, what I call the “Immanence of Intellect” principle, has been especially controversial. In §III I present the evidence for the principle and address the most prominent text that has been used as a reason to reject it, Philebus 30a8-b7. This text has been widely misread; I correct the misreading and show that when properly construed the passage provides no evidence for rejecting or attenuating the Immanence of Intellect principle.
In §IV I present several other reasons why the ΔΝ has been embraced, and I reexamine the textual evidence that has been adduced in its support. For instance, interpreters have mistakenly made this assumption on the grounds that the Demiurge is called the best of causes in the Timaeus, while intellect seems to be the cause of all good and generated things in the Philebus. The latter part of that argument is doubly mistaken; intellect is neither presented as the maker of soul (which Plato came to regard as a generated thing in his late dialogues), nor as the cause of all things that come to be. It is only identified as belonging to and being an exemplar of the class of things that are causes/makers of generated things. In all but one instance, these texts fail to provide evidence for the ΔΝ thesis, and in some cases it will be shown that they do not refer to the Demiurge at all. One passage, however, Timaeus 47e5-48a5, does seem to refer to the Demiurge with the term ‘nous’. I will argue that while it refers to the Demiurge by means of the word “nous” and makes an association between the two, it is not a completely clear case of Plato actually identifying the Demiurge with nous. For the sake of argument, I will grant the passage as evidence for ΔΝ, but I will show that in spite of it, the full range of texts that must be considered do not support the ΔΝ thesis.
In §§V several arguments are presented that show that the Demiurge can be equated neither with intellect nor soul. Thus the body of evidence weighing against the ΔΝ, both within the Timaeus and in other works, dwarfs the one solid piece of evidence that stands in its favor.

Para salir de la sombra protectora representada por el propio maestro Platón, Aristóteles toma en consideración la teoría de las ideas y la somete al propio corte intelectual, selectivo y crítico, a través del cual busca primero desapoderar la separación platónica (inteligible-sensible) y después reorientar la carga formal según finalidades consideradas como naturales, resultados de un proceso por el cual los seres en general pasan del estado de la potencia al - experimentado y convergente, concretamente y no abstractamente inevitable - del acto.

Barrionuevo, S. J. (2019). El platonismo de Leo Strauss y su recepción neoconservadora. Res Publica. Revista De Historia De Las Ideas Políticas, 22(2), 425-443

RESUMEN: La recepción del pensamiento platónico se torna un elemento clave en el contexto de re-configuración de "los grandes relatos", en tanto constituye uno de los ejes sobre el cual se estructuran una serie de trabajos en torno a la comprensión de nuestro tiempo. En el presente artículo me propongo mostrar que la recuperación del pensamiento platónico en el marco de los debates políticos contempo-ráneos establece una desarticulación de la "lógica política platónica". Para ello analizo la rehabilitación del pensamiento platónico por parte de Leo Strauss y su construcción del "platonismo".

ABSTRACT: The reception of Platonic thought becomes a key element in the context of reconfiguration of "great stories", as it is one of the axes on which a series of works are structured around the understanding of our time. In this paper I intend to show that the recovery of Platonic thinking in the context of contemporary political debates establishes a disarticulation of "Platonic political logic". For this, I analyze the rehabilitation of Platonic thinking by Leo Strauss and his construction of "Platonism".

Rick Strassman, a well-educated man who wanted to head his academics of great depth towards psychedelic research. Upon earning further educational credentials to start his research, he decided to conduct experiments on human consumption of a psychedelic substance called Dimethyltryptamine (DMT), a compound of the tryptamine family. He conducted these experiments in New Mexico at a University School of Medicine. At the end of his research, Strassman wrote a book containing the results of those experiments. Here I present an article challenging the data from his experiments and from the information contained in his book “DMT: The Spirit Molecule”.

In the thought of Plotinus, the imagination is responsible for the apprehension of the activity of Intellect. If creativity in the arts involves an exercise of the imagination, the image-making power that links sense perception to noetic thought and the nous poietikos, the poetic or creative intellect, then the arts exercise the apprehension of intellectual activity. According to John Dillon in “Plotinus and the Transcendental Imagination,” Plotinus’ conception of the imagination led to the formulation of the imagination as a basis of artistic creativity. In Plotinus, imagination operates on several different levels: it produces images in sense perception, it synthesizes images in dianoetic thought, and it produces images in correspondence with the articulation through logos of noetic thought. The imagination is what connects the intelligible in intellect and the form in sense perception. Plotinus imagines an art which is a product of noetic thought as made possible by the imagination. The primary principle of beauty is Intellect, from which all images should be taken, as facilitated by imagination. Forms of art, like the forms of nature, are the product of Intellect. The production of a work of art is an intellectual or spiritual exercise of the imagination that allows apprehension of Intellect and noesis in nous poietikos. All art is metaphysical, and is an expression of intelligible form in imagination, an expression of an intellectual idea that can be differentiated from sensible form in intellectual apprehension. There are many ways in which the tenets of the thought of Plotinus become currents of art and aesthetic theory as it develops to the present day.

For decades, now, debates on “Science versus Religion” have remained by and large inconclusive.[1] Could this be due to the debates’ having been systematically framed conceptually by one of the two poles for the sheer sake of proving that our “scientific societies” are so liberal as to allow all religions to thrive?  Had debates not taken for granted their “scientific” framework, they would have readily and openly acknowledged that the science/religion dichotomy camouflages an underlying scientistic agenda.

Resumen: Se intentará postular que las críticas a la escritura presentes en los «auto-testimonios» de los diálogos platónicos traen aparejada una caracterización concomitante sobre lo que la filosofía «es». A partir de eso, intentaremos problematizar la perspectiva inter-pretativa que la Escuela platónica de Tubinga ha tenido sobre la llamada «doctrina secreta» de Platón. Palabras clave: Platón. Hans Krämer. Doctrina secreta. Escuela de Tubinga.

Abstract: We attempt to postulate that the criticisms of writing present in the "self-testimonies" of the Platonic dialogues deploy a concomitant characterization of what philosophy "is". From here, we will try to problematize the interpretative perspective that the Tübingen School of Plato's studies has had on Plato's so-called "secret doctrine". Keywords: Plato. Hans Krämer. Secret doctrine. Tübingen School of Plato's studies.

This book develops for the readers Plato's Socrates' non-formalized "philosophical practice" of learning-through-questioning in the company of others. In doing so, the writer confronts Plato's Socrates, in the words of John Dewey, as the "dramatic, restless, cooperatively inquiring philosopher" of the dialogues, whose view of education and learning is unique: (1) It is focused on actively pursuing a form of philosophical understanding irreducible to truth of a propositional nature, which defies "transfer" from practitioner to pupil; (2) It embraces the perennial "on-the-wayness" of education and learning in that to interrogate the virtues, or the "good life," through the practice of the dialectic, is to continually renew the quest for a deeper understanding of things by returning to, reevaluating and modifying the questions originally posed regarding the "good life." Indeed Socratic philosophy is a life of questioning those aspects of existence that are most question-worthy; and (3) It accepts that learning is a process guided and structured by dialectic inquiry, and is already immanent within and possible only because of the unfolding of the process itself, i.e., learning is not a goal that somehow stands outside the dialectic as its end product, which indicates erroneously that the method or practice is disposable. For learning occurs only through continued, sustained communal dialogue. Reviews "Through a keen philosophical exegesis of Plato's Socrates and his teachings, Magrini addresses and attempts to correct the problematic and long-standing doctrinal interpretation of the Socratic "method." In doing so, Magrini brings back to life Socrates' original pedagogical vision and resuscitates education's long-deceased concern for the being of its students. This text is a touchstone for all educators concerned with the ethical and ontological disposition of their students." ~ Dr. Matthew D. Dewar-Author of Education and Well-Being: An Ontological Inquiry "With Plato's Socrates: Philosophy and Education, James M. Magrini has succeeded in writing a book that reflects his in-depth knowledge of Plato's philosophy and how Plato's Socrates is important for thinking through the present day educational situation. By adopting a non-doctrinal perspective in his reinterpretation of Plato, Magrini's book speaks to students and educators who are looking for new ways to engage with the Socratic method of learning-through-questioning. Magrini is thorough, succinct, and scholarly in his analyses, and he provides a critical and refreshing view on modern education. This is an excellent book." ~ Elias Schwieler, Associate Professor of Education, Stockholm University, Sweden "The relative absence of philosophical questioning in schools is not only an intellectual and pedagogical problem; it poses risks and consequences for our broader society. To help combat this problem, James M. Magrini argues that we should appropriate Plato's

Dans les Lois et dans le Minos attribué à Platon, on retrouve la même définition de la loi comme δόγμα πόλεως. L’article propose une interprétation de cette convergence et permet de formuler une hypothèse sur la nature de cet écrit.
Dans la première partie, on démontre que, même si la définition de la loi comme δόγμα πόλεως est une reprise des Lois, le Minos utilise cette expression dans un sens différent de celui qu’elle avait dans la bouche de l’Athénien dans les Lois. En se fondant sur la polysémie du mot δόγμα et sur sa contiguïté sémantique avec δόξα, l’auteur montre que, tout en étant une « décision de la cité », la loi n’est telle que si elle est fondée sur l’opinion des experts, de ceux qui possèdent une τέχνη.
Dans la deuxième partie, on analyse la portée philosophique de l’argumentation du Minos. Affirmer que la loi est certes un δόγμα, mais un δόγμα fondé sur une δόξα correcte, dont les seuls détenteurs sont les ἐπιστήμονες, permet à l’auteur du Minos de défendre une conception originale de la loi qui se présente comme une version intéressante du droit naturel : la  vraie loi est la même pour toutes les sociétés, même celles apparemment très différentes entre elles, car elle doit être écrite par les ἐπιστήμονες détenteurs d’une τέχνη et d’une « correcte opinion », qui sera la même partout.

https://www.lesbelleslettres.com/livre/3694-le-parmenide-au-miroir-des-platonismes

Prix Reinach de l'Association des Etudes grecques (2019)

CR :
Philosophie antique (G. Aubry ) : https://journals.openedition.org/philosant/1790
BMCR (R. Matoso) : http://bmcr.brynmawr.edu/2019/2019-07-27.html

Il volume è il risultato di una ricerca sull’atteggiamento di medici e filosofi di fronte alla peste, dalle prime reazioni nel ‘300 fino al maturo ‘400, con particolare attenzione all’umanesimo fiorentino e alla figura di Marsilio Ficino. Si è voluto mostrare come l’avvento del morbo abbia profondamente inciso sulla produzione della letteratura filosofica, accelerando l’osmosi tra i saperi e le tendenze culturali, calamitando l’attenzione di molti sull’urgenza medica. La trattazione si concentra sulle opere di Marsilio Ficino, soprattutto sul Consilio contro la pestilentia, pubblicato per la prima volta a Firenze nel 1481 e da allora testo di riferimento per la tradizione posteriore. Attraverso l’analisi delle fonti e della fortuna di quest’opera si possono rileggere le questioni fondamentali che sono al centro della letteratura medico-filosofica contro la peste. In Appendice si presenta un’edizione accompagnata da alcune annotazioni critiche, con un Glossario essenziale di termini notevoli.

RESUMO: Erixímaco, desde o início de sua fala no Banquete de Platão (Smp. 186a3), deixa claro que a alma não será protagonista em seu discurso sobre Erōs. Ele desenvolve um discurso materialista, cujas bases são sua própria technē, a medicina. Com isso, parte da historiografia Banquete no século XX enxerga em Erixímaco uma caricatura dos tratados hipocráticos. No entanto, a partir de Edelstein há tentativas de ressignificar o lugar do discurso de Erixímaco na estrutura do Banquete de Platão. Nesta comunicação, estabeleceremos uma discussão entre as leituras que, de um lado, descaracterizam o discurso de Erixímaco para a compreensão do diálogo e outras que, por outro lado, consideram-no relevante para o desenvolvimento dialético do Banquete, com o objetivo de estabelecer um panorama mais abrangente dos possíveis caminhos a serem trilhados na interpretação do discurso de Erixímaco neste diálogo platônico.

Palavras-Chave: Platão, Banquete, Erixímaco, dialética

ABSTRACT: Eryximachus, from the beginning of his speech in Plato's Symposium (Smp. 186a3), makes it clear that the soul will not be a protagonist in his speech about Erōs. He develops a materialistic discourse, whose basis is his own technē, medicine. Thus, part of the historiography of the Symposium in the twentieth century sees Eryximachus as a caricature of the hippocratic corpus. However, since Edelstein there are attempts to resignify the place of Eryximachus' speech within the structure of Plato's Symposium. In this paper we will establish a discussion with readings that, on the one hand, plays down the speech of Eryximachus to the interpretation of the dialogue and others that, on the other hand, consider him relevant to the dialectical development of the Symposium, aiming to achieve a broader overview of the possible paths to read the speech of Eryximachus in this platonic dialogue.

Keywords: Plato, Plato's Symposium, Eryximachus, dialectics

La película Los amores imaginarios del director canadiense Xavier Dolan relata las distintas facetas del deseo y el amor. Las encontramos retratadas en algunos testimonios de jóvenes sobre sus experiencias amorosas y en la historia principal, en donde Dolan le da un giro contemporáneo a la clásica historia de dos amigos que se enamoran de la misma persona. Nos proponemos aquí analizar algunos de estos aspectos de la locura amorosa a la luz de ciertos pensadores que han colocado este tema en un lugar central de sus filosofías. Pasaremos por los franceses contemporáneos Roland Barthes y Alain Badiou para centrarnos en uno de los primeros en percibir y describir extraordinariamente el poder de Éros y las implicancias filosóficas que puede tener este sentimiento: Platón. Más allá de la distancia temporal, las ideas del filósofo ateniense podrían ayudar a explicar lo que parece inexplicable, y a darle un sentido metafísico al aparente absurdo del torbellino que es el deseo amoroso.

Η παρούσα εργασία επιχειρεί να συγκρίνει τα πλατωνικά κείμενα (Συμπόσιον, Φαῖδρος) με την πραγματεία Περὶ νοητοῦ Κάλλους του Πλωτίνου αναφορικά με το ζήτημα της ομορφιάς. Ειδικότερα, η έρευνα επικεντρώνεται στην Ιδέα του Κάλλους και στον τρόπο με τον οποίο αυτή παρουσιάζεται στην διοτιμική κλίμακα (Συμπόσιον) και στον μύθο του πτερωτού άρματος της ψυχής (Φαίδρος) αλλά και στην πλωτινική πραγματεία.