Philosophy Of Law

This is a draft version of the paper. To view the final product through Springer (open access), click here: https://rdcu.be/bJm8m

Brain-computer interfaces allow agents to control computers without moving their bodies. The agents imagine certain things and the brain-computer interfaces read the concomitant neural activity and operate the computer accordingly. But the use of brain-computer interfaces is problematic for criminal law, which requires that someone can only be found criminally responsible if they have satisfied the actus reus requirement: that the agent has performed some (suitably specified) conduct. Agents who affect the world using brain-computer interfaces do not obviously perform any conduct, so when they commit crimes using brain-computer interfaces it is unclear how they have satisfied actus reus. Drawing on a forthcoming paper by Allan McCay, I suggest three potential accounts of the conduct that satisfies actus reus: the agent’s neural firings, his mental states, and the electronic activity in his brain-computer interface. I then present two accounts which determine how actus reus may be satisfied – one a counterfactual and the other a minimal sufficiency account. These accounts are lent plausibility because they are analogous to the but-for and NESS (Necessary Element in a Sufficient Set) tests for causation which are generally accepted tests for causation in legal theory. I argue that due to the determinations of these accounts and considerations regarding the relationship between the mind and brain, actus reus is satisfied by either the agent’s neural activity or brain-computer interface electrical activity. Which of these satisfies actus reus is determined by how well the brain-computer interface is functionally integrated with the agent.

"Andreas Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos opens the book with his latest contribution to his comprehensive project of re-theorising spatial justice with a piece titled ‘Spatial Justice in a World of Violence’. Through a close reading
of the photographic series Fortunes of War, Life Day by artist Eric Lesdema,
Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos is interested in how these images reveal peripheral
spaces at the edge of violence which impose an ethic of spatial responsibility on the
viewer in the act of turning away and looking elsewhere. While no acts of explicit
violence are shown in the images, we are left with no doubt that violence is ubiquitous
along the spatio-temporal continuum. This continuum of violence between
bodies raises questions of complicity and responsibility. Do we submit to a state
of affairs in which space is saturated with the everyday and immobilised violence
of the ‘engineered atmosphere’ – or is it also possible for bodies to withdraw from
the atmosphere, through ruptures and folds within the continuum? Such a notion
raises the ethical possibility of the ‘emergence of spatial justice’." Chris Butler and Edward Mussawir (eds)

Not-guilty verdicts, mistrials, and impunity for the Bundy family and many of their supporters in the armed confrontations over public land use in Nevada and Oregon. Expanded access for private oil, gas, mining, and logging industries and the downsizing of national monuments such as Bears Ears lead by Secretary of the Interior Ryan Zinke. A number of highly contentious debates and sensationalized events have again focused attention on land held in the public domain by the United States. This essay argues that federal land policy as a form of colonial administration has been constitutive for the logic of expectation as property in what is now the United States. From the state land cessions negotiated on behalf of the Articles of Confederation to the preemption acts (1830–1841) to the homestead acts (1862–1916) to present-day demands for land transfer, the acquisition and disposal of the so-called public domain have been central to westward colonization, the consolidation of the nation-state, and the promise of land ownership as the ostensible foundation of individual liberty. These dynamics are evident in contemporary conflicts over public lands and arguments for the transfer of public lands to either state or private ownership. Approaching the Bundy occupations as flashpoints that illuminate competing interpretations and claims to land within the history of westward colonization, this essay seeks to demonstrate the ways in which expectation emerges from particular economies of dispossession of indigenous peoples that have historically worked through and across the division of public and private property.

El presente artículo, partiendo de la concepción de
la teoría práctica de las reglas y, en cocnreto, de la
regla de reconocimiento de Herbert Hart, trata de
abordar dos problemas iusfilosóficos fundamentales
que aún hoy quedan abiertos en el estudio de la
regla de reconocimiento, los cuales afectan tanto a
sus posibilidades de existencia como a su viabilidad
como instrumento normativo. Así, y a pesar de
apuntar algunas otras cuestiones, se abordará, por
un lado, la viabilidad conceptual de una regla de
reconocimiento que incorpore criterios morales de
validez y, por otro, los diferentes enfoques desde los
que se puede entender que una regla de
reconocimiento es una regla obligatoria.

This Court should not follow the Panel’s suggestion that Petersons’ challenge to personal jurisdiction be waived because no party made this argument to either this Court or the Court of Appeals. Under our system of government, the role of courts is not to advance arguments in
support of any of the adverse parties. United States v. Sineneng-Smith, 140 S. Ct. 1575 (2020)(“In our adversarial system of adjudication, . . . in both civil and criminal cases, in the first instance and on appeal . . ., we rely on the parties to frame the issues for decision and assign to courts the role of neutral arbiter of matters the parties present.” Id. at 140 S. Ct at 1579 (quotation marks omitted).) Cf. English v. Buss, supra., at **11-14 (unpublished) (Held one judge could review the order of another judge where lack of procedural due process was apparent.) See also RAP 2.5.
Had Division One panel’s waiver argument been made by the opposing party and its counsel the Petersons, through their counsel, would have been able to demonstrate this position should be rejected because the record reflects the Petersons never agreed to waive their right to adequate, non-fraudulent service of process, which includes being “duly cited to appear.” As to this right, see e.g., Hovey v. Elliott, 167 U.S. 409, 418 (1897); Garrison v. Cheeney, 1 Wash. Terr, 489, 503 (1875); Galpin v. Page, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 350, 368-69 (1873) (“It is a rule, old as the law, . . . , that no one shall be personally bound until he has had his day in court, by which is meant, until he has been duly cited to appear, and has been afforded an opportunity to be heard.”)

As to the law that waiver of constitutional rights must be knowing, intelligent, and voluntary, see State v. Herron, 183 Wn.2d 737, 743-45, 356 P.3d 709, 712-13 (2015). In fact, a court must “indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver of fundamental rights.” State v. Frawley, 181 Wn.2d 452, 461, 334 P.3d 1022 (2014). Under these constitutional principles there was no waiver of the Petersons’ right, asserted in their answer and other pleadings, not to be hailed into
a court that had no personal jurisdiction over them.

Another reason that failure to file a specific motion to dismiss for a lack of personal jurisdiction pursuant to KCLR 7(b)(5) was not required is because CR 12(h)(1) specifically provides “A defense of lack of jurisdiction over the person, improper venue, insufficiency of process, or insufficiency of service of process is waived . . . (B) if it is neither made by motion under this rule nor included in a responsive pleading or an amendment thereof permitted by rule 15(a) to be made as a matter of course.” Here, these personal jurisdiction defenses were clearly asserted in the Petersons’ Answer, Affirmative Defenses, and Response to the Bank’s motion for summary judgment. And even if it was the intent of this superior court to require persons to file motions to dismiss under these circumstances, a superior court does not have the authority to
compel this result as local rules cannot alter the Washington Rules of Civil Procedure. See Parry v. Windermere Real Estate/East, 102 Wn. App. 920, 928-29 (2000)(Local Rule cannot waive right under CR 12(h) to assert personal jurisdiction defenses in answer); See also Harbor Enters. v. Gudjonsson, 116 Wn.2d 283, 293 (1991); State v. Chavez, 111 Wn.2d 548, 554 (1988)(Local court rules are subordinate to state rules of civil procedure).

In summary, and with such respect as is due the Panel’s suggestion that the Bank’s motion to amend should be granted, it is Petersons’ contention that judges must respect citizens constitutional rights and not waive them without a factual basis for doing so. Similarly, with
respect, the Panel had no constitutional authority—and violated the Petersons’ right to due process of law—when it invented an argument to help the Bank, which was inconsistent with the Civil Rues and cases interpreting them. Thus, this Court should also not waive the Petersons’ right to adequate service of process before granting a motion to amend because such a result would be futile under existing law, notwithstanding anything the Court of Appeals panel has said. Colvin v. Inslee, 195 Wn.2d 879, 899-901 (2020)
                                      *                                  *                                  *

Not since the United States Supreme Court’s constitutionally and morally bankrupt decision in Sanford v. Scott, 60 U.S. 393 (1857)2 has the integrity of America’s judicial system been more in doubt than it is now. See e.g., The Wall Street Journal, “131 Federal Judges Broke the Law
by Hearing Cases Where They Had a Financial Interest” (September 28, 2021); House Judiciary Committee, Nadler & Johnson Statement on Reports Federal Judges Broke the Law by Hearing Cases
Where They Had a Financial Interest (September 29, 2021)4. The problem an economically biased judiciary poses for our democratic republic is that it undercuts the basic premises upon which this
nation was founded, i.e., separation of powers, checks and balances, federalism, and due process of law. Unfortunately, for us, the People, these constitutional structures are not self enforcing, but must be enforced by those who have been economically incentivized to promote the interests of government workers—and their creditor allies—against this nation’s citizens.

in "Rivista Internazionale di Filosofia del diritto", 2/2021.

ABSTRACT: Definisco “normativismo trascendentale” la concezione per la quale le norme giuridiche non sono oggetto di una conoscenza possibile, ma sono ciò attraverso cui è possibile una conoscenza giuridica. Questa concezione – che è certamente di ispirazione kantiana e, per questo tramite, recupera anche alcuni spunti dal pensiero di Kelsen e di quello di Amedeo Conte – implica che le norme svolgano la funzione trascendentale di rendere possibile l’esperienza di ciò su cui esse vertono.

Il volume raccoglie otto contributi di studiosi che si sono confrontati, in tempi diversi, con le ricerche di Amedeo G. Conte, nella prospettiva – a volte anche critica – di problematizzare e approfondire alcune sue intuizioni e le relative categorie concettuali da lui proposte. In particolare, si è scelto di focalizzare l'attenzione sul tema, centrale nel pensiero contiano, della costitutività (di regole e di atti), raccogliendo, da un lato, quattro articoli (di Gianfranco A. Ferrari, Riccardo Guastini, Mario Jori, Piero Pollastro) pubblicati negli anni Ottanta del secolo scorso e collocabili nell'ambito di un dibattito sorto in quel periodo, attorno all'idea di regola costitutiva; dall'altro lato, quattro lavori (di Tommaso Gazzolo, Andrea Rossetti, Corrado Roversi, Marco Q. Silvi) scritti in questi ultimi anni, alcuni inediti, sempre a partire dalle ricerche di Conte sulla costitutività. Questi otto scritti – collocati in posizione quasi simmetrica nel tempo, in una sorta di gioco di specchi che Conte avrebbe forse apprezzato – si spera possano offrire un'immagine che riflette l'attualità e la fecondità del pensiero di un grande studioso, capace di stimolare allievi e non a misurarsi con temi importanti e ambiziosi, e con l'obiettivo (per riprendere le sue parole) di "spostare in avanti i confini della ricerca".

The projected inclusion of the subsidiarity principle and the margin of appreciation doctrine in the preamble to the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) is a legal turn that deserves special attention. Is it a welcomed reform which will enhance the Strasbourg Court’s often-questioned legitimacy vis-à-vis member states? Does it represent, as some non-governmental organizations have claimed, a setback for human rights in Europe? This article elaborates on these questions by first entering into the current debate on the nature of human rights. I suggest that a “cooperative” political understanding of these rights, which is based on claims of relational justice, is a suitable ground for a normative theory of international human rights adjudication. I then use this political conception to present a non-statist reading of the subsidiarity principle, which is in accord with an incrementalist approach to human rights requirements and with a rationalized version of the margin of appreciation doctrine. My holistic reading is consistent with the axiological aims of the ECHR system as a regional driver of human rights protection without damaging Strasbourg’s legitimacy.

Fresh off a California court victory in the Cindy Brown vs. Bank of New York Mellon case, this report showcases the ongoing crisis of inequalities in access to civil justice facing all Americans regardless of income or race and sets the stage for a long-awaited trial court showdown on March 15, 2022.

Il libro, giovandosi degli insegnamenti che la dottrina processualcivilistica ha impartito nel corso degli anni sul tema del precedente giudiziale, aspira a ricondurli a un discorso più organico e unitario. A tal fine, il contributo, senza trascurare l’apporto della giurisprudenza, predilige un approccio che attinge – cum grano salis – anche ad altre discipline, come la teoria generale o il diritto comparato e ad esperienze straniere. Dall’indagine, che prende le mosse dalle ricadute delle riforme processuali sul modo in cui «si crea» e «si usa» il c.d. formante giurisprudenziale, sviluppandone anche in chiave critica le implicazioni più rilevanti, scaturisce l’immagine di un precedente che, lungi dal risolvere l’ambiguità di fondo, di cui soffre da tempo la Corte suprema, la esaspera, fino a sospingerne il ruolo – nel pendolarismo fra «giudice» e «maestro» – verso un inquietante tertium non datur.

Abstrak Konflik seolah-olah merupakan warisan kehidupan sosial yang selalu muncul dalam berbagai keadaan. Konflik dalam kenyataannya seringkali terjadi akibat dari menguatnya ketidakpuasan dan ketidaksetujuan atau kontroversi dan pertentangan di antara dua pihak atau lebih secara terus menerus. Adanya kelompok-kelompok di dalam masyarakat selain dapat menciptakan hubungan yang saling melengkapi akan tetapi dapat pula melahirkan konflik. Perbedaan pandangan antar kelompok masyarakat di suatu wilayah kerap menjadi pemicu pecahnya bentrok antar mereka. Terkadang di tengah konflik itu ada saja orang yang memanfaatkan situasi itu sehingga menjadi konflik berkepanjangan. Motif terjadinya konflik sosial dapat bermacam-macam diantaranya berupa: persaingan secara ekonomis, perbedaan keyakinan, persaingan politik, kesenjangan sosial, konflik perbatasan wilayah dll. Apapun motifnya setiap konflik sosial harus dapat dicegah dan diatasi. Kata kunci: konflik sosial, masyarakat, keadilan bermartabat. Pendahuluan Konflik berasal dari kata kerja Latin configere yang berarti saling pukul. Secara sosiologis, konflik sosial berarti suatu proses sosial antara 2 orang atau lebih (bisa juga kelompok) dimana salah satu pihak berusaha menyingkirkan pihak lain dengan menghancurkannya atau membuatnya tidak berdaya. Pada dasarnya konflik sosial merupakan bentuk interaksi yang ditandai keadaan saling ancam, menghancurkan, melukai, dan melenyapkan di antara pihak yang terlibat. Konflik sosial mengakibatkan rasa aman hilang, rasa takut, lingkungan dan pranata sosial rusak, kerugian harta benda, korban jiwa, dendam, benci, antipati antara pihak yang berkonflik. Tentu hal tersebut dapat menghambat terwujudnya kesejahteraan umum. Penyebab terjadinya konflik sosial adalah perbedaan yang dibawa individu dalam suatu interaksi. 2 Konflik sosial pada dasarnya adalah suatu bentuk interaksi yang ditandai oleh keadaan saling mengancam, menghancurkan, melukai, dan melenyapkan di antara pihak-pihak yang terlibat. Konflik sosial dapat menyebabkan hilangnya rasa aman, timbulnya rasa takut, rusaknya lingkungan dan pranata sosial, kerugian harta benda, jatuhnya korban jiwa, timbulnya trauma psikologis (dendam, benci, antipati), serta melebarnya jarak segresi antara para pihak yang berkonflik sehingga dapat menghambat terwujudnya kesejahteraan umum. Bagi bangsa Indonesia tentu hal itu dapat mengancam sendi-sendi kehidupan berbangsa dan bernegara dalam wadah Negara Kesatuan Republik Indonesia (NKRI). 3 Motif terjadinya konflik sosial dapat bermacam-macam diantaranya berupa: persaingan secara ekonomis, perbedaan keyakinan, persaingan politik, kesenjangan sosial,

How is the global epistemic community of legal philosophers structured or patterned? How and why is the epistemic community of legal theorists unified/divided? What are the lines of division that generate exclusion/inclusion, centre/periphery?
These are some of the questions we will discuss in a special workshop at the IVR2022 world congress of legal philosophy.
Paper proposals can be submitted by 30 April 2022.

Jacques Derrida nos convida a refletir sobre a Universidade Incondicional que não existe, mas pode ser inventada como um lugar de resistência e crítica, com a capacidade desafiadora de transformar questões apropriadas por saberes dogmáticos e se opor a um grande número de poderes que limitam o horizonte democrático.
Essa universidade heterogênea e frágil, independente e perturbadora, em permanente desconstrução e renascimento, só poderá ser engendrada se contar com aqueles que professam a condição instável de não se conformar, e de resistir cotidianamente aos poderes que a sitiam.
Derrida explora os fundamentos da universidade incondicional na busca da verdade não acabada, que está por vir e seu valor, referindo-se ao direito primordial de dizer tudo, publicamente, de publicar, ainda que seja sob a forma de ficção ou experimentação.
A universidade incondicional se constitui por trabalhos que gestam acontecimentos, zombam do performativo dogmático, reverberam, desconstroem e abrem espaços para o debate, para a dúvida, a dissidência, muito além do saber e saber fazer, lançando-se no campo do que está por definir.
Orientada por esses compromissos e munida desses instrumentos, a universidade tem obstáculos a enfrentar entre eles a soberania e seus avatares: “A desconstrução do conceito de soberania incondicional é sem dúvida necessária e está em curso, pois trata-se de uma herança de uma teologia que mal acabou de ser secularizada.”(DERRIDA, 2003, p. 22).
O fio condutor da desconstrução da soberania, segundo Derrida, atravessa “performativos jurídicos”, ou “produções performativas do direito (direito do homem, conceito do crime contra a humanidade)” para substituí-los pela invenção, o dom, o perdão, a hospitalidade a justiça, a amizade (DERRIDA, 2003, p. 73). Derrida afirma que esses “motivos” estão no centro de suas publicações e seminários dos últimos quinze anos de sua jornada filosófica. (DERRIDA, 2003, p. 78).
O dom, a amizade, o perdão, a justiça e a hospitalidade põem em questão o humano, o homem, a humanidade, o humanismo. A hospitalidade sem limitações vem orientada pela ideia que o humano que chega é diferente do outro que o recebe em sua terra. É estranho, estrangeiro, mas mesmo assim humano, que espera a hospitalidade incondicional e se depara com a hospitalidade condicionada, obturada pelo performativo jurídico do direito humanitário, do direito internacional, seus conceitos e instrumentos jurídicos e burocráticos dos Estados.

A key focus of much scholarly attention is on the (theoretical) relationship between legal orders. The practical question I intend to answer in this article is the following: how can we know who has the final say – international, European Union (EU) or national law? I proceed in three steps. First, I critically sketch major current theories – monism and dualism, as well as global legal pluralism and global constitutionalism. However, because none of them offers a satisfactory answer to the question posed, I move to the reconceptualization stage of the theoretical relationship between legal orders. In the second step, I offer my account of how to think about the relationship between legal orders by introducing the theory of the law creators' circle (TLCC). The TLCC provides a theoretical foundation for deciding on the source of the decisive norm. It does not, however, provide a general solution which fits any norm conflict stemming from overlapping legal orders. Thus, the purpose of this article is to develop a legal theory which facilitates the understanding of the interaction between international law, EU and national law. Third, I use a doctrinal analysis to show the results of the TLCC application. For instance, in the famous Kadi saga, according to the TLCC, the EU should have either claimed that the UN Security Council was acting ultra vires or considered the UN Security Council Resolution faulty because UN human rights (instead of EU human rights) had been violated.

IL VOLUME ANALIZZA I DUE VOLUMI DEL PROF. MARIO CATTANEO ORDINARIO DI FILOSOFIA DEL DIRITTO ALL'UNIVERSITA' STATALE DI MILANO . IL PRIMO LIBRO RIGUASRDA LE OPERE DI CARLO GOLDONI ED ALESSANDRO MANZONI ED I LORO RAPPORTI CON L'ILLUMINISMO, IL SECONDO VOLUME ANALIZZA LE OPERTE DI NUMEROSI LETTERATI EUROPEI DANTE, PARINI,FOSCOLO,HEINE,HUGO,DOSDTOEVSKIJ,TOLSTOI,WILDE,GIDE. KAFKA E HAVEL ED I LORO INFLUSSI SULLA EVOLUZIONE DEL DIRITTO PENALE . IL LIBRI DI PAOLA BELLOLI ANALIOZZA IL CONCETTO DI COLPA IN DOSTOEVSKIJ, FREUD ED HEIDEGGER, IL LIBRO DI ARIANNA SANSONE ESOINE L'EVOLUZIONE DEGLI STUDI SU DIRITTO E LETTERATURA IN EUROPA ED USA E LA SCUOLA DEL LAW AND LITERATURE IN USA, IL VOLUME DI SERGIO SPADONI TRATTA DI KARL KRAUS E DELL'USO DELLA SATIRA NEL DIRITTO NELL'IMPERO AUSTRO-UNGARICO 
THE BOOK CONCERNS THE RELATIONS BETWEEN LAW AND LITERATURE IN EUROPE AND USA AND THE INFLUENCE OF THE FAMOUS BOOKS ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF PENAL LAW

Il filo conduttore dei saggi raccolti in questo volume è il "ciclo della datificazione", vale a dire quella modalità di organizzazione dell'esperienza che si muove attraverso la sequela ricorsiva eventi-dati-conoscenza-decisione-azione-eventi. Quello che è il tipico modo di pensare l'efficientamento di un'organizzazione sta divenendo la struttura fondamentale dello sviluppo complessivo delle società più evolute, assurgendo a nuovo paradigma universale di interpretazione e di orientamento della prassi che ha nella manipolabilità il suo tratto essenziale. Riflettendo su ciascun momento della datificazione, l' Autore indaga i profili ideologici, epistemologici e giuridico-sociali di una trasformazione che ha già sfidato la capacità di resistenza delle categorie fondamentali della comprensione giuridica contemporanea espresse in particolare nei diritti della persona.

“Power is war, the continuation of war by other means”: Foucault’s reversal of Clausewitz’s formula has become a staple of critical theory — but it remains highly problematic on a conceptual level. Elaborated during Foucault’s 1976 lectures (“Society Must Be Defended”), this work-hypothesis theorises “basic warfare” [la guerre fondamentale] as the teleological horizon of socio-political relations. Following Boulainvilliers, Foucault champions this polemological approach, conceived as a purely descriptive discourse on “real” politics and war, against the philosophico-juridical conceptuality attached to liberal society (Hobbes’s Leviathan being here the prime example).
However, in doing so, Foucault did not interrogate the conceptual validity of notions such as power and war, therefore interlinking them without questioning their ontological status. This problematic conflation was partly rectified in 1982, as Foucault proposed a more dynamic definition of power relations: “actions over potential actions”.
I argue, somewhat polemically, that Foucault’s hermeneutics of power still involves a teleological violence, dependent on a polemological representation of human relations as essentially instrumental: this resembles what Derrida names, in “Heidegger’s Ear”, an “anthropolemology”. However, I show that all conceptualisation of power implies its self-deconstruction. This self-deconstructive (or autoimmune) structure supposes an archi-originary unpower prior to power: power presupposes an excess within power, an excessive force, another violence making it both possible and impossible. There is something within power located “beyond the power principle” (Derrida). This (self-)excess signifies a limitless resistantiality co-extensive with power-relationality. It also allows the reversal of pólemos into its opposite, as unpower opens politics and warfare to the messianic call of a pre-political, pre-ontological disruption: the archi-originary force of différance. This force, unconditional, challenges Foucault’s conceptualisations of power, suggesting an originary performativity located before or beyond hermeneutics of power-knowledge, disrupting theoreticity as well as empiricity by pointing to their ontological complicity.
The bulk of this essay is dedicated to sketching the theoretical implications of this deconstructive reading of Foucault with respect to the methodology and conceptuality of political science and social theory.

The aim of this Article is to re-conceptualize the debate about the (theoretical) relationship between international and national law, which has been debated for centuries. Generally, the floor is divided between dualism as developed by Heinrich Triepel and monism developed mainly by Hans Kelsen. In the light of new developments since their inception, I argue that these theories can no longer comprehensively explain the relationship between international or European Union (EU) and national law. Yet, the Article is based on the conviction that a common denominator of international and national law is elementary (i.e. here " the law creators' circle, " in German, " Die Theorie des Rechtserzeugerkreises, " in short " TREK ") in order to solve possible norm conflicts between different but overlapping legal orders. Therefore, pluralism is also limited in my eyes because it does not offer a satisfying prescriptive account. This common legal framework, however, must not be understood as the “constitutionalization” of international (or EU law) either, as this easily implies too many substantial values, which are not (yet) a common reality.

http://ojs.francoangeli.it/_omp/index.php/oa/catalog/book/510?fbclid=IwAR1kePaq_Yq-hpJUZ63DNFlz1dpKcQfE3UXX8VdxRnZYQmnWuyUTl3CpL7o

Il volume riunisce contributi che, rispondendo ad un’esigenza oggi molto sentita, si interrogano sui concetti di libertà, responsabilità e imputazione: si tratta di categorie fondamentali non solo in ambito morale, per definire la colpa del soggetto agente, ma anche in ambito giuridico, per definire una pena che sia equa e giusta.
I saggi qui presentati analizzano, da un lato, le condizioni di attribuzione di responsabilità e di libertà all’essere umano; dall’altro, rintracciano forme di libertà anche in riferimento alla natura (tradizionalmente compresa come regno della necessità) e all’indagine filosofica stessa. Si dispiegano così differenti prospettive, che risultano complementari nella comune ricerca di un fondamento filosofico.
A partire da un classico della filosofia antica, Platone, si giungerà, passando attraverso le concezioni della libertà di Leibniz, Kant e Fichte, alla filosofia di Hegel, di cui proprio nel 2020 si celebra il duecentocinquantesimo anniversario della nascita, proseguendo da qui verso la contemporaneità. Ci si interrogherà, infine, sul significato della pratica filosofica e sulla responsabilità che essa comporta.

Scritti di: G. Battistoni, G. Erle, S. Fuselli, P. Giuspoli, F.L. Marcolungo, F.
Menegoni, A. Moretto, A. Schmidt, K. Vieweg.

By means of the current communication one will
try to outline, with solution of continuity, the way
in which the Juridical Methodology Trialist, it
turns out capable of generating an interpretive
modus with a view to the construction of the Law,
which comes out the formalisms and mere
normative stadiums, and that it allows to whom
they it study and experience with attention, to do
valuations that rise for on the legality understood
as the alone respect to the legality. It he tries to
reconcile, finally, the vision of pure complexity and
the dialectics of complementarity in the system of
interpretation of the Law.

L’errore giudiziario è una manchevolezza che può derivare, e non di rado deriva, da un uso inadeguato degli strumenti lato sensu logici che il giudice ha a disposizione.
La presente indagine si propone di approfondire proprio il rapporto tra logica del giudice ed errore giudiziario, seguendo un percorso tanto lineare quanto impegnativo.
Innanzitutto, illustrerò le caratteristiche generali dell’errore umano, le peculiarità dell’errore giudiziario e le varie accezioni di “errore giudiziario” che queste consentono di definire (in senso latissimo, lato, stretto e strettissimo) (§ 2).
Inoltre, ponendomi nella prospettiva delle due grandi concezioni della conoscenza giudiziale (intellettualismo e razionalismo), tratterò le cause salienti delle due componenti dell’errore giudiziario (errore qualificatorio ed errore probatorio), in particolare le cause razionali (suddistinte in cause ineluttabili e cause contrastabili dal giudice) (§ 3).

Transcendence and Power. Carl Schmitt's Political Theology

L' opera di CarI Schmitt (1888-1985) rappresenta una delle più forti provocazioni del pensiero del Novecento. La sua ricerca intellettuale e politica spazia nei diversi ambiti del diritto costituzionale e internazionale, della filosofia e della scienza della politica, della storia delle istituzioni, della letteratura e della teologia e si intreccia singolarmente con le vicende più drammatiche della storia contemporanea, in particolare
con la fine della repubblica di Weimar e con i primi anni del regime nazista, che lo vedono coinvolto in ruoli di primo piano. Il suo pensiero, riscoperto in questi ultimi anni, si trova oggi al centro di un serrato dibattito e di accese controversie.
Una delle provocazioni più significative di Schmitt è quella legata alla sua interpretazione del concetto di "teologia politica", un concetto destinato, pur con diverse interpretazioni, ad avere notevole fortuna nel pensiero teologico del '900, tanto da essere ancora oggi al centro dell'attenzione. Questo volume ricostruisce analiticamente, a partire dai primi
scritti fino alle ultime elaborazioni, la genesi, lo sviluppo e le applicazioni del concetto di "teologia politica" collocandolo sullo sfondo della sua ricerca e analizzando le reazioni e le critiche suscitate negli ambienti filosofici e teologici. Dall'angolo visuale della "teologia politica" l'intera opera schmittiana riceve una nuova e suggestiva luce e assume in certo senso valore di simbolo dell'itinerario della riflessione contemporanea sul politico, sul potere e sul suo ineliminabile riferimento alla trascendenza.

This paper examines the idea that commercial law has the capacity to evolve spontaneously in the absence of a clear state authority because of its unique nature. I argue that the manner of interaction implied by commerce plays a crucial role in this ability as it involves a high degree of overall engagement. This I term “high engagement,” which I divide into two elements: repetition and the creation of clear cycles of interaction. Together they produce identifiable legal norms and subsequent compliance. Game theorists have long recognized the importance of repeated interaction in inducing cooperation; however, how the manner of commercial interaction itself facilitates this process has been left largely unexamined. Part I presents a brief overview of the concept of reciprocity and spontaneous law theory. In Part II, a more detailed explanation of the notion of high engagement is offered. Here I set out exactly how high engagement is instrumental in the emergence of legal norms. Finally, the paper concludes that the element of high engagement indeed plays a decisive role in commercial law’s ability to evolve and function in a decentralized, spontaneous fashion—an important insight in terms of the future international development of the modern law merchant as it emerges in the absence of a single legislative authority.

Um curioso aspecto do pensamento de Pessoa foi deixado por ele esparso, e o que parece totalmente ao acaso dos investigadores: o Direito. Em política, temos até um auto-retrato bastante completo, e a sucessão de textos que foi escrevendo, em prosa e em verso, facilmente nos permite reconstruir um percurso, a partir das suas bases ideológicas. Mas o que pensaria Pessoa do Direito? Neste caso, o “fingidor” não fingiu, não posou para a sua tão cuidadosamente preparada fama póstuma. Estamos, assim, perante um aspecto da sua vida mental que parece ter escapado à composição para um público (ainda que futuro), o que é, afinal de contas (sem fazer das fraquezas forças) uma situação apesar de tudo invejável... O presente artigo procura surpreender Pessoa a dialogar com um texto jurídico, elaborando um texto jurídico: um texto de resposta a um edital de um concurso para um lugar...

While still fragmented, we are witnessing the emergence of a global commercial legal order independent of any one national legal system. This process is unfolding both on the macro-level of state actors as well as that of private individuals and organizations. On the macro-level, the sources of this legal order are complex international agreements; on the micro-level, private contracts employing commercial customary practices and arbitration are driving this process forward. Yet there is no comparable evolution occurring (in any substantial sense) in non-commercial areas of law such as criminal, tort, or family law. There is an overall asymmetry in the development of transnational legal order. But why is this happening? This paper argues that the emergence of a global commercial legal order may be partially attributed to the unique structural nature of trade. The paper gives a structuralist account, positing that unlike legal order of a non-commercial nature, commercial legal order has built-in mechanisms that make it particularly suited to evolve in a transnational context—i.e. to evolve and sustain itself in the absence of a central legislative or coercive authority. The paper identifies and explores these built-in mechanisms. The paper concludes that because commercial legal order is uniquely predisposed to emerge without the State, we should expect this asymmetry to not only continue, but likely grow even more extreme.

This paper explains why so much soft law is widely adopted and followed despite lacking legal and coercive force. It argues that legal standards are susceptible to network effects. Network effects occur when the value of a standard to a user increases as the number of other agents using the same standard grows, which in turn draws more users to the standard. This can trigger a spontaneous coalescence around a standard in a " snowball effect " fashion. The paper argues that many areas of soft law exhibit strong network effects, rendering such soft law uniquely calibrated to induce voluntary adoption and even compliance. The model helps explain why certain soft law gains traction, and has important implications for international governance. Finally, the paper argues that policy-makers can strategically harness this dynamic to stimulate legal harmonization, but cautions that policy-makers must also remain mindful of the negative consequences that network effects can generate.

This Paper explores and summarises the Director's Duties of the UK Companies Act 2006 with emphasis on "the duty to promote the success of the company.

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It is sometimes argued that the non-therapeutic, non-consensual alteration of children’s genitals should be discussed in two separate ethical discourses: one for girls (in which such alterations should be termed ‘female genital mutilation’ or FGM), and one for boys (in which such alterations should be termed ‘male circumcision’). In this article, I call into question the moral and empirical basis for such a distinction, and argue that all children—whether female, male, or intersex—should be free from having parts of their genitals removed unless there is a pressing medical indication.

A formação adequada de uma teoria da decisão judicial – ainda que sempre provisória - só poderá, algum dia, florescer dentro do imaginário do Direito brasileiro quando se abordar uma crise que assola o terreno jurídico do país. Essa crise é formada por três condutas que ainda permeiam essa realidade, o decisionismo, o solipsismo e o ativismo judicial, aliadas a um modelo e leitura liberal-individualistas que percorrem o imaginário jurídico brasileiro: a resistência positivista diante da virada hermenêutica constitucional e um ensino jurídico ainda inserido nesse contexto.. De forma a perceber a incidência desses três fatores endógenos de erosão do Direito, é preciso voltar as atenções ao giro hermenêutico do início do século XX no anseio de encontrar soluções satisfatórias ao problema posto. A partir desse pressuposto, é enunciado que o Novo Código de Processo Civil representa um projeto de constitucionalização do Processo Civil no Brasil. A tríade de artigos 371, 489 e 926 apresenta esse desejo inicialmente constituinte e anuncia a possibilidade de formação de uma teoria da decisão judicial através da esquematização formulada pelo próprio Código. Essa formação é possível através da internalização de alguns conceitos concretos: o fim do livre convencimento motivado no artigo 371, o dever de fundamentação (ou justificação) das decisões judicias no artigo 489 e o dever de integridade, coerência e estabilidade na jurisprudência dos Tribunais no artigo 926. Para tanto, e para além de uma simples esquematização formal de uma teoria da decisão, é preciso internalizar que o dever de fundamentação é condição do Estado Democrático de Direito, já que, numa democracia, nem todos têm direito a tudo, mas têm direito de serem efetivamente ouvidos em seus argumentos.

People abused by angry discipline as children, may tend to abuse or overly punish other people or themselves for perceived wrongs in their adult life. In some individuals, aggressive personality traits may be genetically inherited. The aggressive personality may feel weakened by having guidelines or boundaries for anger. Anger is a normal human emotion, and these guidelines can help express anger in a healthy way.

Some of Law and Economics’ basic claims have come to be criticized as a result of empirical findings that question their viability. Particularly, the premise that agents consistently act rationally and with their self-interest in mind seems problematic. What the consequences of the criticism mean for Law and Economics’ tenability depends largely on the questions whether (1) some elements are unassailable to the alternative’s objections and (2) the alternative is a systematic whole. It is argued that Law and Economics may be salvaged, if it is minimized and its ambitions are tempered. This means focusing on the stable, a priori, elements inherent to it.

N.B. The interested reader is invited to turn to the expanded and more fully annotated Hebrew version of this article, to appear in the volume Ma'or va-Shemesh: History, Philosophy, Lore and Legacy, edited by Levi Cooper, Ariel Evan Mayse and Zvi Mark (Ramat-Gan: Bar-Ilan University Press, forthcoming).

This essay interrogates the legal discourse of Shulḥan ha-Tahor, a curious-and curiously understudied-work of Hasidic halakhah written by Rabbi Yitzḥak Ayzik Yehudah Yehiel Safrin of Komarno. The book is, at heart, a systematic reformulation of Jewish law in light of Kabbalah, Hasidism, and the quest for personal mystical experience. Shulḥan ha-Tahor offers a rare case study for the interface of mystical experience , Hasidic devotional values, and kabbalistic doctrine as they explicitly shape the codified forms-and norms-of halakhah. The essay reveals a different side of Jewish modernity through a close reading of an exceptional nineteenth-century legal code.

This article combines historical and philosophical analysis to examine and critique the ideas motivating Christian conservative legal activism. Such activists routinely claim to be motivated by a Christian worldview, which they define as a comprehensive explanation of reality that determines all their thinking and action, including their legal activism and argumentation. Examination of the historical and philosophical roots of the concept of worldview identified by Christian thinkers reveals two understandings of the concept: an analytic tool for rationally comparing the evidence for different social philosophies, and a pre-theoretical lens that determines what counts as evidence in the first place. Christian conservatives have largely favored the first sense of worldview as a tool to understand issues like sexuality and gender identity in an essentialist way and to demonstrate with foundationalist logic the rational superiority of their legal conclusions about these issues. However, a comparison of the Christian conservative worldview and the queer theory worldview illustrates how this understanding of worldview as a tool fails because there is no neutral perspective outside of any worldview, from which one could examine and compare one to another. The idea of worldview as a pre-theoretical, historically, and socially contingent lens can be more productive. Embracing this notion of worldview in a personalist way is necessary to build a culture of dialogue that uses narrative to pursue the truth while also respecting and honoring the different perspectives from which these narratives are told.

Descartes’s argument for the sceptical conclusion that we can know nothing about the external world is one of the world’s great philosophical paradoxes. Its deceptively simple structure has resulted in epistemologists either accepting the sceptical conclusion or attempting to re-evaluate the very nature of knowledge in order to avoid it. This paper will endeavour to present the Cartesian argument in its most persuasive form and explain the challenges that arise from it. Although I am sympathetic to the view that any conception of knowledge is deficient if it leads to Cartesian scepticism I will argue that the efforts to address the Cartesian argument by deeper analysis of what constitutes knowledge fail to provide satisfactory accounts. In this paper I will take a third route to confronting the sceptical challenge that will rely only on intuitive conceptions of knowledge but will nevertheless reject that the Cartesian paradox is sound. Under this evaluation the Cartesian argument is at best incomplete and at worst circular returning the burden of proof to the sceptic. In order to do this I will argue that the Cartesian argument makes an implicit assumption that one cannot have knowledge of the external world which is exactly to say that it assumes its conclusion.