Socrates

Wie kann man sich dem sokratischen Rätsel stellen? Dieses Buch bietet einige Anhaltspunkte, um das Problem von Sokrates und den sokratischen Philosophien aus verschiedenen Perspektiven anzugehen. Behandelt werden Sokrates und das sokratische Umfeld; das Problem des Sokrates bei Platon; die sokratischen Linien (darunter Antisthenes, die Megariker, die Cirenäer und Aischines) und die sokratische Rezeption bei Aristoteles, der epikureischen Tradition und Cicero.

The present thesis is an exploration of the relation between atheistic and religious existential philosophy with a focus on the concept of subjectivity. What are the implications of the two positions in relation to understanding subjectivity? This exploration will lead to a discussion about how existential philosophy can play a role in the field of social work, which includes homelessness, addiction and psychiatry. More specifically, I discuss the concepts of subjectivity connected to the atheistic and religious existential philosophy respectively in relation to social work.

The thesis consists of four main chapters. I start by introducing the historical background of the emergence of existential philosophy. I show the relation between the transition from modernity to late modernity – which is characterized by the dissolution of the great universal narratives -, and the emergence of the movement of existential philosophy. Furthermore, I show how this relates to the transition from transcendental to existential phenomenology. Included is an interpretation of the paradox of Meno, which provides the basis for the exploration of the subject’s access to knowledge. Following this, I put forth Pierre Hadot’s existential interpretation of the figure of Socrates in order to illustrate certain insights that are widely drawn upon in existential philosophy. This is further elaborated on through a reading of Hannah Arendt and Pico.

The second chapter Religious and atheistic existential philosophy consists of an analysis of relevant parts of primarily two works of Søren Kierkegaard, a more general presentation of Heidegger’s Being and Time along with an account of Sartre’s explicit atheistic position. Finally, I draw upon Ricoeur to provide a critique of the aetheistic position aimed at illustrating the ontological axioms and concepts of subjectivity of the religious and aetheistic positions respectively.

In the third chapter Two concepts of subjectivity – Self-realization and self-transcendence, I draw on the accounts of the aetheistic and religious position outlined in the previous chapter. I elaborate on the two concepts of subjectivity connected to these two positions: the concept of the subject as self-realization and the concept of the subject as self-transcendent. I return to Pierre Hadot and relate the perspectives of both Hadot and Michel Foucault to the religious and aetheistic position. The aim is to expand the understanding of the two positions in relation to the two concepts of subjectivity and spirituality. And finally, I draw upon Karl Jaspers to further elaborate on the relation between the two concepts of subjectivity and the religious position more specifically.

In the last chapter of the thesis Discussion relating to praxis, I turn to the field of social work. I provide a brief historical sketch of some of the latest changes within the field of social work and relate this to a discussion of relation between individualizing and structural approaches. I illustrate how social work plays out in a paradoxical field of tension between autonomy and control, between subjectification and objectification, which relates to the contradicting individualizing and structural understandings. This is connected to the two central concepts of subjectivity, the concept of the subject as self-realizing and the subject as self-transcendent, outlined earlier in the thesis, in order to show how the existing framework of social work can be said to encourage reductive objectification of the lives of the homeless and the problems connected to homelessness. Furthermore, these frameworks are discussed in relation to the existential perspectives presented in the thesis and to the two concepts of subjectivity. I close the chapter with an account of Ronald D. Laing’s critique of biomedical psychiatry, and illustrate how the same critique can be applied to social work in general.

The explorations of the four main chapters all lead to a problematization of existing professional approaches within the field of social work rather than a final conclusion. By relating the existential philosophical perspectives addressed throughout the thesis to the field of social work, I show how the theoretic understandings employed in praxis can lead to a reduction of the homeless and their life problems. This is not due to the theories themselves, but to the fact that these are ascribed more power of explanation than what they actually possess, which results in both professionals and homeless being misled to equate their own self-understanding with the theoretical constructions they are reduced to in the meeting with one another. Like Hadot criticizes Foucault and Ricoeur criticizes Sarte, I argue that the concept of the subject as self-realization places too much weight on the self. Hereby, the spiritual dimension of being is reduced into an object of a technology that in principle enables the subject to an arbitrary negation of being. This not only supports an individualizing discourse, but actually results in an absolute individualizing discourse.

However, I show that no matter where you stand on a spectrum of a pure structural or pure individualized theoretical understanding, this dualism will entail a reduction of real life human problems. On this background, I conclude that to the extent that the existential conditions are not considered in social work, this will lead to a reduction of human beings to dysfunctional objects that may be healed by means of themselves or by others, medicated, or must be declared totally or partly useless/incompetent. Likewise, I argue, social workers are reduced from fellow human beings to mere functions, who are supposed to possess specific professional knowledge and skills to enable such a healing or to declare efforts to do so totally of partly fruitless.

Following this, I argue that in the field of social work, we must include a dimension of non-knowledge if we are to avoid reducing both professionals to functions and homeless to dysfunctional objects. When reflecting on how you should position yourself as a professional, this inadequacy of theoretic professionalism must be considered.

We are left with the question about whether we may in any way overcome the inadequacy of professionalism by adding to it a sort of professionalism of inadequacy. If we hereby mean that it is possible to overcome the distance between professionalism and its object, we have already stepped into a professional self-adequacy, which reduces a person to an object. Thus, the emphasis must be placed on the inadequacy, not on professionalism, if we wish to contain, meet and understand another person in an existential sense.

Hynek Bartoš
Hippocratic Dietetics and Philosophical Care of the Soul
Summary:
The aim of my essay is to discuss Hippocratic dietetics as a model for construing philosophical ethics in the Classical Era of ancient Greece. I shall demonstrate how  the author of De victu and other Hippocratic authors presented medicine (or more specifically dietetics) as a therapeutic technique aiming at independence from the traditional religious beliefs and practices, from the role of chance in our lives, from disadvantages of our particular natural conditions and predispositions, and even from the need of professional medical care. I will also try to distinguish the object of the dietetic health care from the object of the philosophical “care of soul” advocated by Socrates, his contemporaries and followers.

Ulrich Wollner
The Care of the Self in Xenophon’s Memorabilia
Summary: The paper deals with Socrates’ conception of the care of the self in Xenophon’s work Memorabilia. The first part is intended to analyze the relationship between human body and soul. It shows that the main task of the soul is to rule over the body. Accordingly, the man has to know himself, and the self-knowledge is one of the preconditions of the self-care. The second precondition of the care of the self is the continence. Its aim is to dominate the physical needs and pleasures. They play the role of obstacles that the man has to fight against. To be able to defeat one own’s weaknesses, the wise man needs the lifelong training both of his body and soul. Finally, I discuss the self-sufficiency as the main objective of the human endeavour.

Jakub Jirsa
Plato: self-knowledge as care of oneself
Summary:
My text presents some main features of Plato’s ethics connected with the care of one’s soul, namely his moral psychology situated within the framework of the teleological cosmos. First, I discuss the identification between the self and the soul in the Alcibiades I; further I explain the complexity of the soul and its ethical relevance in the Republic. The final section discusses Plato’s ethical maxim “becoming like god” as presented in the Theaetetus, Republic and Timaeus. In this sense, I believe, one can explain why in the Phaedrus Plato’s Socrates situates his own self on the scale with two limits: a cultivated being with a share in divine on the one hand and the mythical furious beast Typhon on the other (229e-230a). The self (soul) moves on this scale in dependence on the amount of care, which Plato presents in very intellectualistic terms.

Vladislav Suvák
Antisthenes: logos as ēthos
Summary:
The paper deals with Antisthenes' account of language (logos) as well as with the role the logical paradoxes played in Antisthenes' ethical thought (ēthos). The author doesn't see An¬tisthenes' logical investigations as a part of the early "Sophistic" writings. Rather he tries to show the connection between Antisthenes' using of the logic and Socratic ethics of taking care of the self. Socratic thought in Antisthenes' fragments is neither skeptical nor dialectical. Contrary to both of these "intellectualistic" tendencies An¬tisthenes underlines the continual ethical activity of the wise. Antisthenes' using of logical paradoxes (mainly ouk estin antilegein) should have probably served as a de-monstration of an anti-Platonic conviction: Ethics is always prior to metaphysics and logic.
Keywords: Antisthenes – Plato – Cynicism – Language – Logical paradoxes – Ethics of taking care of the self.

Pavol Sucharek
Knowledge as a care for the other or „How to get ahead of Socrates?“
Summary:
This study will analyze the different nature of dialogue as reflected by Socrates and Levinas. The purpose is to show the possibility of non-epistemological speaking of that kind of knowledge, which mediates the dialogue as a conversation of two. In a certain sense it can be said that we replace the maieutics of Socrates by the dialectics of Plato. This dialectics points to how an ordinary dialogue is being transformed into a relationship of a higher order, or a relationship through which the very meaning of what belongs to the higher or divine order shines through. “To get ahead of Socrates” means in the levinasian perspective to accept “the idea of the infinite” – the infinite demand of the impracticable Good. Therefore a dialogue can be perceived, in this sense, as the starting point of every speculation about ethical knowledge in the primary sense as “a care for the other.”

Eugen Andreanský
Donald Davidson and the modern understanding of akratic action
Summary: The paper deals with the nature of akrasia (weakness of will, incontinency). In the first section the emphasis is put on the action theory of Donald Davidson. Davidson’s treatment of incontinent action is a brilliant example of modern approach to old philosophical and ethical issues. The second section introduces a few critical notes to the theory presented by Davidson. The paper also draws attention to the interconnection between akrasia and the problem of irrationality as well as the problem of internalism in action theory.