Philosphy of Language

Témou príspevku je jednak analýza Heglovej koncepcie ideovej („obsahovej“) roviny umeleckého diela, a zároveň polemika o životaschopnost i Heglovej umeleckej estetiky.
Prácou usilujem najmä o zodpovedanie otázky, či Heglovo myslenie koliduje s predpokladom o nevysloviteľnosti významu umeleckého diela, ktorého legitimitu som doposiaľ zdôvodňoval na pôde Kantovej, Schopenhauerovej a Wittgensteinovej filozofie.
Prácou vysvetľujem, že ak o Heglom konštituovanej
idey môžeme uvažovať v kontraste s (platónskou) teóriou idey
v diele Arthura Schopenhauera, koniec dejín umenia, avšak jedine v systéme (Heglovho) logického myslenia, sa tým objasňuje ako nevyhnutný.
Kľúčové slová: Hegel, umenie, idea, pojem, ideál, absolútny
duch, náboženstvo, filozofia, koniec umenia, Schopenhauer.

The faculty of uttering words represents the most characteristic bio-cognitive activity of the human being. The uniquely human ability to learn how to speak and understand verbal language is deeply rooted in the physical structure of our body. It is the extraordinary result of the very long evolutionary history, which led to the human species. This foundation lies in the peculiarities of our brain, in our organs of perception and speech production, in their connections and in the ways in which the development of these structures and the circuits that connect them that is in turn encoded in the human genome. In our genome, it is not decoded which language we will speak, but rather that we will be able to speak a language. It is very likely that this responsibility cannot be attributed to a single gene. Knowing the biological constraints of our more specific mode of access to the world, the one that most distinguishes us from other animal species, which means taking a fundamental path to understanding our nature that is "being speakers". There are numerous evidences which support the hypothesis that the human brain is genetically predisposed to the production and understanding of language (spoken or marked), regardless of whether it is a simple predisposition or innate "linguistic competence". The ability to fully acquire a language simply by being exposed to it from birth. Without resorting to specific training, just think that even a child with a socio-cultural disadvantage or an adult with a low level of education can nonetheless master with ease complex grammatical structures, however, is a sort of "timed" device that is realized in childhood "during a precise training window". This means that it is maximum in the first four to five years of life, an age in which brain plasticity is greater, but is drastically reduced after puberty, regardless of the type of language considered, up to atrophy, especially in the absence of linguistic stimuli, as we age. A dramatic testimony of what can happen if a child is completely deprived of language before puberty, which is offered to us by cases of enfants sauvages, or fierce children. Those children who for different reasons (often due to the parents' abjection) have been abandoned, detained or marginalized, in some cases bred by animals and lived in complete isolation until puberty or even beyond. One of the best-known cases of a literature that, over years it has gradually enriched Victor, the wild child found in the Aveyron forest in 1798 at the age of about twelve and described by Jean-Marc ltard, the doctor who took care of his education. Victor acquired several skills but was never able to speak. Equally, another incredible story of Genie, a "wild child" discovered in California in 1970 and described by the psychologist S.

These are, or were thought to be, the foundation voices of our cultures. As such, I would have expected that we have developed what they taught, not just ignored or overthrown it. Great Souls is an attempt to uncover the voices of Jesus, Lao Tzu, Confucius, Socrates and the Buddha as teachers. As such, it is an argument for the re-centering of ethical questions in the art of teaching language. How these great souls taught may still hold lessons for us now as we struggle with the various assaults on the humanities in our universities. The hole in the heart of teaching that is becoming more apparent with each new technological innovation that is used to replace the teacher and the student as thinking human beings may be remedied by going back to the sources of our knowledge and learning from these teachers. This book offers an attempt to reconnect the arts of literature, language and teaching in the personal context of a writer working in Asia where the hegemonic influence of the West is too often accepted as different and new. Instead of this view, the writer suggests that the underground streams in our cultures may still be flowing, if we listen for them.

In this paper, I try to answer the following questions: what are objects in Wittgenstein’s Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus? What function does a name perform in a sentence according to Wittgenstein? What is the Bedeutung of a name? I argue that answers to these questions come from the Wittgensteinian vision of logic. The first part of the article concerns Frege and Russell’s universalist conception of logic, which is the main object of Wittgenstein’s attack. The second part of the article is about Wittgenstein’s conception of logic and some consequences of this conception for the interpretation of Tractatarian objects and names. My main result is that the meaning of a name should be understood as a truth-value potential of an expression. The last part concerns the connections between the so-called ontological parts of the Tractatus and Wittgenstein’s views on an ideal formal language.

This article aims to deepen our understanding of Nicolas Beauzée's (1717–1789) attempt to establish a science of grammar modeled upon natural philosophy. At this endeavor’s heart stood Beauzee's analysis of grammatical time. Beauzée's tense theory, first published in 1765, had a profound impact on our understanding of tense as a complex system of reference, establishing order relations between events described within discourse and the moment of speech. While historians of linguistics have recognized Beauzée's contribution to the theory of tense, its greater significance has not been hitherto appreciated: Beauzée reinvented general grammar as a modern science combining Cartesian and Newtonian principles. Building on Port Royal’s notion of general grammar, Beauzée sought to establish “grammatical metaphysics”—a sure foundation for a science of grammar. This aspiration, especially evident in his theory of grammatical time, together with Beauzée's numerous references to physics, astronomy, geography, geometry, and metaphysics, amounted to an elaborate strategy of scientification, taking the natural sciences not merely as inspiration but as a coveted epistemological ideal for general grammar’s scientific remodeling.

My book, "Deflationism & Semantic Theories of Truth",  is available as a paperback via Amazon:

https://www.amazon.com/dp/0993594549/

https://www.amazon.co.uk/dp/0993594549/

To say that the sentence “snow is white” is true, is to say that snow is white, and nothing more.  Because of this apparent redundancy of the truth predicate for sentences, deflationists maintain that truth is a notion lacking in content and therefore not a worthy subject for philosophical analysis.  This book builds on the work of Jeffrey Ketland in demonstrating that semantic definitions of truth for formalised languages, in particular those of Alfred Tarski and Saul Kripke, are richer than their deflationary rivals, in the sense that they enable us to derive results that cannot be derived via deflationary theories.  This deductive power of semantic theories of truth suggests that truth is, contrary to the deflationists’ view, a substantive notion that warrants continued philosophical analysis.

Las aproximaciones conceptuales a la actividad interpretativa son tan variables como variables son los objetos que se ofrecen a la interpretación, desde el mundo físico considerado qua mundo fí- sico, hasta las múltiples manifestaciones de la interioridad huma- na, como la expresión gestual, la comunicación lingüística oral y escrita, coloquial, institucional, artística, científica. A fuerza de no vaciar de contenido al concepto debe ser posible, sin embargo, señalar un “caso central” o “analogado principal”, que trascienda la diversidad de sentido con que se utiliza el concepto cuando se lo refiere a cada uno de estos —y otros posibles— objetos de in- terpretación.1 En otras palabras, ¿qué tienen en común la interpretación espontánea artística, gestual, y lingüística en general, para que pue- da hablarse en todos los casos de “interpretación”? En todos los casos hay una identidad de intención en el intérprete que permite uniicarlos en el concepto de “interpretación”: se trata de descu- brir el sentido, la orientación, el núcleo de inteligibilidad que las manifestaciones del espíritu humano ofrecen a la inteligencia. Lo que distingue al movimiento del gesto y al ruido del lenguaje en la interpretación lingüística es la intención de sentido en quien se expresa, y la pregunta por este mismo sentido en quien inter- preta.2 Dado que el derecho es una práctica mediada por el lenguaje, la interpretación jurídica no escapa a la regla general según la cual el sentido de los términos y de las expresiones jurídicas se determina en el contexto en que se emiten e interpretan. Qué quisieron decir el legislador o el juez, depende no sólo de la idea general signiicada por las palabras utilizadas, sino también del contexto en que esas palabras fueron utilizadas. En este orden de ideas, explica Massini que en toda interpretación jurídica pueden detectarse tres contextos que deben ser tenidos en cuenta para la determinación del sentido normativo: el lingüístico, el sistémico y el funcional. Desde la perspectiva del contexto lingüístico, el sentido de las palabras normativas depen- de de las reglas de uso del lenguaje en que se expresan. Desde el contexto sistémico, se acota el número de posibilidades signii- cativas que arroja el contexto lingüístico sólo a aquellas que son compatibles o coherentes con la totalidad de la práctica jurídica. Finalmente, desde el contexto funcional, se acotan una vez más las posibilidades interpretativas a aquellas que son compatibles con los ines, valores o bienes que la práctica en su totalidad tiende a realizar.

Partout où nous affirmons quelque chose, nous devons être capables, au moins en principe, de dire comment la vérité de notre affirmation peut être testée, sans quoi nous ne savons pas de quoi nous parlons 1. Pour Dieu, dire, c'est faire : dei dicere est suum facere. Cette affirmation ne vient assurément pas de John L. Austin mais de Maître Eckhart. Comme Irène Rosier-Catach l'a montré, les auteurs médiévaux n'ont pas attendu les théories analytiques du langage pour mettre en oeuvre une efficacité de la parole basée sur l'entrecroisement de l'usage du signe et de la causalité. Or, Eckhart fait précisément le choix d'un discours théologique qui interdit au signe de renvoyer directement à Dieu via un concept identifiable. Il mobilise les signes en vue d'un schème opératif. La théologie dont Jean Ladrière tente de brosser le portrait type dans L'articulation du sen existe déjà. Cependant, si elle est derrière nous, elle nécessite un regard neuf afin de la voir surgir devant nous.

This paper explains Wittgenstein’s understanding of the ‘grammar’ of our (or any) language, tracing its origins in the Tractatus’s concept of logical syntax, and then examining the senses in which Wittgenstein, in his later work, viewed grammar as being ‘arbitrary’. Then, armed with this understanding, it moves on to the task of examining how, within the framework of a Wittgensteinian view of language, we should understand the inescapable ‘compellingness’ of logical necessity – what Wittgenstein calls the “hardness of the logical must”. Whereas it is often thought that Wittgenstein’s views on the nature of the ‘grammar’ of our concepts leads him towards a vitiatingly conventionalist or anti‐realist understanding of necessity, in which its logical ‘superhardness’ becomes problematic, this paper will argue that there is actually no such tension in Wittgenstein’s thought. In fact an understanding of the ways in which our conceptual grammar is arbitrary casts a great deal of light on how it is that our concepts can nevertheless support a logically superhard, and normatively commanding, notion of necessity. In support of this view, I distinguish Wittgenstein’s views on necessity from the ‘classical’ conventionalism of the Vienna Circle, and from the radical conventionalism of Michael Dummett, and defend Wittgenstein's view from a powerful recent attack from Quassim Cassam.

Tous les juristes connaissent la distinction entre les décisions administratives et les actes administratifs non décisoires. Cette distinction détermine, en principe, la recevabilité du recours contentieux. Elle a fait l'objet de nombreux travaux. Les distinctions entre les actes non décisoires restent en revanche très largement méconnues. Or, la prise en compte des actes non décisoires par les instances juridictionnelles, aussi bien administratives que judiciaires, incite à repenser la place reconnue à ces actes, à la fois dans la pratique et dans la théorie du droit.

En effet, certains de ces actes - comme les recommandations de bonnes pratiques médicales - peuvent faire l'objet d'un recours pour excès de pouvoir et sont pleinement invocables devant le juge. Les autres - comme les voeux, ou les circulaires - échappent le plus souvent à toute contestation, et ne peuvent pas être utilement invoqués en justice. D'autres enfin - comme les actes préparatoires, ou les "lignes directrices" - sont soumis à un régime juridique intermédiaire : insusceptibles de faire l'objet d'une contestation directe, ces actes font l'objet d'une exception d'illégalité et les justiciables peuvent s'en prévaloir à l'appui de leurs prétentions. Comment expliquer ces différences ?

En tentant de répondre à cette question, l'auteur constate que l'hétérogénéité actuelle du droit souple n'est pas toujours justifiée. D'où l'idée d'une simplification possible, qui consisterait à soumettre les actes non décisoires à un régime juridique plus homogène, et qui permettrait de leur réserver un traitement juridictionnel plus uniforme. Cette simplification n'est pourtant envisageable que si l'on franchit au préalable les barrières théoriques qui séparent le droit "souple" et le droit "dur". En s'appuyant sur les acquis de la philosophie générale du langage, l'auteur propose ainsi une systématisation des connaissances, en intégrant les actes non décisoires dans la famille des actes unilatéraux, traditionnellement considérés comme nécessairement contraignants. La simplification de la pratique jurisprudentielle suppose donc une sorte d'unification théorique. Tels sont les principaux objectifs de la présente thèse.

¿Qué lleva a que concibamos el mundo del modo en que lo hacemos? ¿Por qué distintas culturas lo imaginan y piensan conforme a sus peculiares maneras de hacerlo? En este singular ensayo, desarrollado con admirable precisión, Andrés Claro examina cómo las formas de lenguaje exploran la representación de la realidad y sintetizan mundos posibles. Mediante una aproximación comparativa a los comportamientos del poema, el autor nos hace experimentar hasta qué punto las figuraciones dominantes de la imagen, tal como se verifican en poetas clásicos de tradiciones ejemplares –la metáfora en Horacio, el paralelismo en Du Fu y el montaje en Ezra Pound–, proyectan las configuraciones metafísicas características de sus respectivas culturas –el dualismo entre lo sensible y lo ideal de la ontología clásica, el Proceso correlativo o Tao de la tradición china, y esa simultaneidad interruptiva, trascendencia en la inmanencia, que ha redefinido dramáticamente nuestros modos de habitar contemporáneos.

In “On Denoting” Bertrand Russell uses the phrase “the present King of France” as an example of a denoting phrase that does not actually refer to an existent object. This is opposed to phrases that denote to existent objects, such as “the present queen of England”, or denote ambiguously, like “that man”. Russell shows with his theory of denoting that propositions containing a non-denoting phrase still has a definite truth-value. That is, the proposition, “the present King of France is bald” is false. Russell manages this by first asserting that our referring phrases contain hidden existential premises and then by translating the English propositions into symbolic logic.
P. F. Strawson responds to this, claiming that non-denoting phrases are neither true nor false. It is only when a phrase successfully denotes an object that one can say whether or not the use of the phrase was true or false. Russell responds to his criticisms almost dismissively, asserting he and Strawson are not using terms the same way. I will briefly explain Russell’s theory as it applies to the proposition “the present King of France is bald” and how it is false. Then I will describe Strawson’s arguments against Russell as well as Russell’s rebuttal. Finally, I will show how, while Russell is ultimately correct logically, one aspect of Strawson’s idea on usage is correct.

a cura di Adriano Bertollini e Roberto Finelli - Soglie del linguaggio compie una ricognizione e una messa in comunicazione delle molteplici anime che nel Dipartimento di Filosofia, Comunicazione e Spettacolo lavorano, da prospettive diverse e da più anni, sulla tematica del linguaggio. Si è voluta creare così l'opportunità di un dialogo tra l'area di studiosi che guardano più al rapporto tra linguaggio e versante scientifico (biologia, etologia, neuroscienze, psicologia) e l'area volta più allo studio della dimensione sociologico-storico-politica, o fenomenologico-estetica, o psichiatrico-psicoanalitica, o, infine, di pensiero della differenza, con cui guardare all'esperienza linguistica. Partecipano al volume anche studiosi esterni, secondo lo spirito della collana Colloquia Philosophica, il cui intento è quello di facilitare un dialogo non solo all'interno del Dipartimento FILCOSPE, ma anche con altri esponenti della comunità scientifica che vogliano contribuire al confronto su temi e problemi comuni.

Occasione, direzione e struttura dell’indagine

Senza vita la forma non si salva, ma senza forma è la vita a non salvarsi.

L’incipit allude al risultato atteso di una indagine in corso di svolgimento, della quale in questo saggio richiamerò l’occasione, delimiterò l’ambito, anticiperò le questioni, tratteggerò le linee di fondo, farò segno agli obiettivi, offrirò i primi riferimenti bibliografici e consegnerò i primi risultati .
Sembrerà bizzarro che, dopo aver dedicato una vita all’approfondimento del diritto processuale e della giustizia civile, io abbia intrapreso una ricerca su un problema di filosofia teoretica, prima ancora che di filosofia politica e di filosofia del diritto, come quello delle dimensioni alienanti e salvifiche che la forma può assumere rispetto alla vita. I fattori che hanno sollecitato l’indagine ne offriranno altresì la scansione e la misura. La ricerca è stata occasionata dalla raccolta di saggi, editi e inediti, che ho scritto in un arco temporale di oltre trent’anni, dalla seconda metà degli anni ‘80 del XX secolo, quando iniziai l’attività universitaria di studioso di diritto, fino al 2019. Mi sono dedica-to al lavoro dalla metà del 2015, dopo il rientro in Europa da un soggiorno di studio di un anno negli Stati Uniti, mentre maturavo il proposito di lasciare anticipatamente il ruolo nell’Università degli Studi di Firenze, presso la quale ho prestato servizio negli stessi trent’anni. L’opera riunisce contributi che trattano prevalentemente di temi di diritto processuale e giustizia civile, svolti entro il peri-metro segnato dall’accezione tradizionale della branca. La raccolta si inserisce in un programma che prevede la pubblicazione di altre collettanee, ove riunirò saggi appartenenti a ulteriori stagioni e approcci dell’attività di studioso .
Gli autori che non riescano a sottrarsi alla vanità di riunire propri studi in una pubblicazione avvertono l’esigenza di scrivere una introduzione che sia di guida agli eventuali lettori. Tale fu il proposito che ispirò l’inizio. Senonché, habent sua sidera anche gli scritti introduttivi e la realizzazione ha imboccato una strada opposta. Invece che introduzione, avrei desiderato chiamarla “estrazione”, per alludere alla traiettoria contraria che ho percorso. Non introdurrò i lettori agli Studi di giustizia civile, ma li condurrò fuori da essi, in ambiti anteriori e coevi, estraendo la vita che si era alienata in quelle forme giuridiche. Ciò spiega che, nel titolo della raccolta di saggi, il sintagma “dogmatica giuridica” sia affiancato dalla parola “vita”, che funge da ponte simbolico gettato tra il passato e il futuro delle ricerche. Ciò sollecita l’impressione che un vitalismo sgangherato e torbido venga contrapposto alle forme del diritto. Già la riga d’esordio afferma il contrario: senza forma non vi è salvezza. Proverò a rimettere gli ambiti della vita che estrarrò in una forma che ne possa esprimere la pienezza. Peraltro, l’impressione di vitalismo è troppo imbarazzante per essere lasciata nell’aria. Ho evitato di offrire una risposta apodittica e consegno pertanto questo scritto
Le linee fondamentali sulle quali l’esplorazione si è progressivamente svolta sono segnate dalla serie di titoli degli Studi di giustizia civile, nell’ordine segnato dal loro avvicendarsi nella mente: Dogmatica giuridica e processo civile; Dogmatica giuridica e giustizia civile; Dogmatica giuridica e valori; Dogmatica giuridica valori e politica; Dogmatica giuridica e vita.
L’indagine non guarda fuori dal campo del diritto processuale. Si volge piuttosto al cuore della materia. Peraltro, non intendo infliggere a chi sia interessato unicamente a profili di diritto processuale e giustizia civile, delineati battendo sentieri consueti, la perdita di tempo di leggere uno scritto che si disloca temporaneamente da un’altra parte per mettere meglio a fuoco la materia. Costoro vorranno affrettarsi a consultare il penultimo paragrafo (prima delle dediche), che funge da nota editoriale .
Il testo si articola in sei sezioni, distribuite in numero identico in due parti, sebbene queste ultime non siano indicizzate formalmente. Nella prima parte tratteggerò il perimetro, argomenterò le questioni sul tappeto, compiendo altresì qualche piccolo carotaggio. Nella seconda parte discuterò l’occasione autoriflessiva della ricerca, nei profili che hanno orientato tutta l’operazione, compresa la provvisoria limitazione temporale ad un quarantennio (1979-2019). Chiuderò il testo con due aperture generali di senso per il futuro delle ricerche . Paragrafi che reputo maturi per la pubblicazione si alternano a indicazioni di tracce specifiche per l’ulteriore riflessione (segnalate in note a piè di pagina), nonché a brani che camminano tra aporie, delineando alternative in forma di più o meno espliciti aut aut. Mostro la ricerca nel suo farsi e l’affido, rebus sic stantibus, al giudizio dei lettori. Ho eliminato le reiterazioni più fastidiose, ma non sono riuscito ad arginare più di tanto “la bramosia di parla-re di tutto in una volta” , né a mantenere quindi la determinazione di scrivere un testo breve.
Sono consapevole che ogni pagina e quasi ogni passaggio argomentativo avrebbe richiesto di es-sere discusso con le molte persone che ne sanno più di me sui singoli aspetti e di essere arricchito di studi preliminari per limitare gli errori che ho commesso. Sono grato a chi vorrà indicarmeli affinché li corregga. Inoltre, chiederò ai lettori di inserirsi nei vuoti, negli interstizi e nelle discontinuità che si presenteranno sotto l’enorme campata disegnata dall’ambito dell’indagine, per integrare la narrazione con i loro ricordi. A seconda della età del lettore, ciò allungherà o restringerà l’angolatura temporale della narrazione. Sarei grato di osservazioni e critiche, al fine di identificare aree meritevoli di ulteriori ricerche o focalizzazioni. In questo modo, il campo dell’indagine potrà ampliarsi. Ogni parte di questo scritto sarà ripensata ed eventualmente rifusa in successive versioni. Tuttavia, nella sua versione attuale, il testo risponde a una esigenza interiore, che spero non sia scambiata per arroganza o presunzione, e appartiene a questa raccolta di saggi, come il rovescio appartiene a una medaglia o la potenza trasformatrice appartiene a un mondo che si trasforma.

This paper attempts to explain the problem of trying to obtain a prescriptive definition from a descriptive source by mathematical comparatives. New Atheists seemingly often fallaciously attempt to use general parlance sources, such as common dictionary that describes usages, to claim that is how a word must be used prescriptively.

Every writer knows putting words on paper is a difficult task.
Sometimes the difficulties become insurmountable. He got
himself into a state of frustration in writing when the flow of ideas
stopped. A writer got stuck and banged his head against the wall
for long hours instead of writing. His struggle becomes futile
without getting the desired result. Despite being armed with
knowledge and language ability, he cannot execute his task. The
objective is primarily to understand the cognitive processes in
writing employing different approaches: mechanistic writing and
developmental organic writing models. This understanding is
derived and inferred from some learning theories such as the
behaviourist and mechanical models coupled with issues related
to the functions of brains and ‘mind’ in writing as expounded by
some known linguists and writers. It is hoped that by
understanding the cognitive processes at work in writing, anyone
who intends to write can benefit in terms of enhancing his writing
skill and making writing a challenging and enjoyable task. The
study is on a qualitative analysis of abook written by Peter Elbow
on `Writing Without Teachers` and `Writing with Power`.
Compared to the researchers, the data collected from his
experiences will embark on the meaning of `organic writing`.

This paper, written in fulfillment of my Concepts of Modernity graduate seminar, explores the relationship (barring the explicit cultural divergence) between prominent 20th century cultural theorist, Walter Benjamin, and Continental, German philosopher, Martin Heidegger. I focus mainly on Benjamin's "The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction" and Heidegger's "The Question Concerning Technology" with commentary from Theodor W. Adorno is a critical intermediary of sorts.

Professor Noam Chomsky recently gave a youtube interview, at age 91, mentioning how, when asked, he does not have the time to meditate. The irony of his life as longevity and his lack of time presented itself as proof of what he called the focus of his career in cognitive studies: the study of the Inner Mind. And so just as Chomsky refers to the Pre-Socratic Heraclitus, then science needs to consider that possibly its logic thus far, based on symmetric commutative logic, has been wrong.

il s'agit du point irréductible extrême où le geste est un corps, un espace, une figure. l'extrême irréductible de tel point est son obscénité: ce point-là n'est ni physique ni géométrique; il est la mémoire de ce qu'est le mouvement dans tout corps. Mais ce dernier est aussi bien affecté de cette mémoire inverse: le corps est une limite dans le mouvement. Cette réversion est infinie.

If there should be a general prohibition on paying for sex, it has recently been argued, an exception should be made for those with disabilities. In this chapter, adapted from a longer journal article, I argue that defining disability in this context leads to a dilemma: either the definition will turn out to be so broad as to include almost anyone, or it will be so narrow as to be an unreliable proxy for the real underlying moral issue (namely, the difficulty that some people have in finding a willing sexual partner without having recourse to payment).

Here, I want to discuss Wittgenstein and psychology. The stance taken in this paper is that central to an understanding of anything psychological is an understanding of the role of language in human affairs. But what is the part it plays? As we know, Wittgenstein thought of it in his earlier and later work in two distinctly different ways: In the Tractatus (Wittgenstein, 1922) its role was representation - language functions to provide 'pictures' of states of affairs in the world; while in the Investigations (Wittgenstein, 1953) its role is communication - it is used within certain, circumscribed ways in people relating themselves to one another while within particular forms of life - for, as we shall see, when all the testing and checking of people's claims comes to an end, "what has to be accepted, the given, is - so one could say - forms of life" (Wittgenstein, 1953, p.226). If in this view it still seems that words are used to represent things, then that is only because 'representation' is one of the many uses to which one can put one's language in sustaining the forms of life in question.

In this introductory video I would like to explain what knowledge representation is, how to build and apply them. There are basically three phases involved in the process of building a knowledge representation. Acquisition of data (which includes staging), collation and the representation itself. The collation and the representation phases of the process are mentioned here, but I will explain them further in future videos.

The topic of the paper is an inquiry about Carlo Michelstaedter's reference to the Kabbalah, and the relationship existing between his attention for Jewish mystic and his reference to Spinoza's philosophy. In a letter sent to his friend Chiavacci, Michelstaedter quotes in a sentence about mystic both Kabbalah and Spinoza. Analyzing this passage, where Nietzsche is quoted too, the paper discusses Michelstaedter's reference to the Kabbalah, through Spinoza, about the problem of the philosophical statute of language and the nature of his orders, so central for his theoretical research concerning the conditions of reality and the dispositions of its moments.

Education is a life-long process of learning. Its aim is to develop a particular country as a whole by imparting knowledge, skills, and values to its citizens using the world latest technology. Education is meant to produce individuals who are competent, diligent, creative, patriotic, responsible, righteous and virtuous and who will transform the country into one of the best developed, peaceful, and harmonious places in the world.

Edward Witherspoon distinguishes Wittgenstein’s conception of nonsense from Rudolf Carnap’s.  The latter does not fully take into account the fact that, if something really is nonsense, it has no more meaning than ‘Ab sur ah’ and therefore cannot have any logical properties.  He finds the Carnapian conception even in professed Wittgensteinians such as Peter Hacker and Gordon Baker who think of themselves as rejecting it.  My question is where this leaves the notion of PHILOSOPHICAL nonsense.  Could anything that was utterly devoid of content play the crucial deceptive role that nonsensicalists, including Wittgensteinians, assign it?  Could it ever be detected if it did?

This paper suggests that reference to phenomenal qualities is best understood as involving iconicity, that is, a passage from sign-vehicle to object that exploits a similarity between the two. This contrasts with a version of the ‘phenomenal concept strategy’ that takes indexicality to be central. However, since it is doubtful that phenomenal qualities are capable of causally interacting with anything, indexical reference seems inappropriate. While a theorist like David Papineau is independently coming to something akin to iconicity, I think some of the awkwardness that plagues his account would be remedied by transitioning to a more inclusive philosophy of signs.

This is a reference to the scriptural verse from the Quran 2:31, which states that God revealed language as names (asmāʾ) to Adam: "And He taught Adam all the names (asmāʾ), then showed them to the angels, saying: inform me of the names of these, if ye are truthful." Those who advocated that language is divinely revealed often quote this verse in Muslim discussions. All the Quranic verses provided in this paper will be based on the Muhammad Abdel Haleem's translation (See Abdel Haleem 2010). 12 Druart 2015, 7.

„Zeichensetzer – Schriftsteller: Kierkegaard – Adorno“, in: Helga Lutz, Nils Plath u. Dietmar Schmidt (hgg.): Satzzeichen. Szenen der Schrift, Berlin (Kadmos) 2017, S. 196–202

On punctuation in Soren Kierkegaard and Theodor W. Adorno, scenes of reading, and the materiality of writings. (in German)

В статье рассматривается различение понятий «термин» и «имя» в философии имени П.А. Флоренского в сопоставлении, с одной стороны, с идеей «генезиса научной терминологии» (В.П. Зубов), а с другой – с концепцией «судьбы имени» (А.Ф. Лосев).
Эти подходы взаимосвязаны друг с другом единым полем
понимания – или дискуссии. Цель статьи – очертить границы
этого поля и зафиксировать основные образующие его смыслы. Показано, что ключевыми понятиями для всех представителей философии имени (помимо категории имени) являются понятия сущность, ипостась и энергия. Реальность=мир и язык коррелятивны друг другу, и ни один не является функцией друг друга.

En 1677 parut à Amsterdam le Compendium grammatices linguae Hebraeae de Baruch Spinoza, dans la collection de ses OEuvres posthumes. De tous ses ouvrages, la Grammaire de la langue hébraïque, inachevée, est la moins connue et étudiée. Notre colloque vise à reconsidérer le Compendium comme un traité original, essentiel, au sein du corpus spinozien. Il s'agira d'éclairer la méthode élaborée par Spinoza dans sa Grammaire en relation avec les concepts développés dans ses autres traités. Nous étudierons le rapport qui existe entre les idées linguistiques de Spinoza et les principes de sa philosophie, ainsi que la question des sources du Compendium. Nous nous interrogerons pour savoir à qui s'adressait la Grammaire dans le contexte culturel, religieux et intellectuel d'Amsterdam au XVIIe siècle, en relation avec le marranisme et les débats philosophiques et théologiques de son temps.

RESUMEN:
El presente ensayo se ocupa de la novela de Adolfo Bioy Casares La invención de Morel (1940) novela fundacional de la literatura de anticipación, en la que a través de la ficción científica, policíaca y amatoria, concurren los tópicos del ingenio técnico, la reduplicación de la vida, los periplos de inmortalidad, los archivos de imágenes, los simulacros y finalmente los hologramas, alumbrado el estatuto ontológico de las imágenes en la nueva ecología de medios, cuestiones  problematizadas por teóricos de la imagen como Jean Baudrillard y Paul  Virilio. Dando lugar, finalmente, a una reflexión en torno al complejo paso de lo real a lo virtual en el cual el mundo de las imágenes amenaza por suplantar al mundo real.

Adolfo Vásquez Rocca, "La invención de Morel; simulacro, seducción y periplos de inmortalidad", en KONVERGENCIAS, Revista de Filosofía y Culturas en Diálogo, Capital Federal, Argentina, Nº. 13, 2006, PUBLICACIÓN DEL ATENEO Y LA SOCIEDAD ARGENTINA DE FILOSOFÍA.
http://konvergencias.net/vasquezrocca45.htm

O discurso do ódio (hate speech) é um dos mais tormentosos casos difíceis do Direito nos dias atuais. De um lado, se posicionam os defensores da liberdade de expressão irrestrita e da livre exposição das ideias. Do outro, se colocam aqueles que entendem serem as ideias veiculadas pelo discurso do ódio improdutivas e nocivas ao livre debate, bem como violadoras de princípios tais como a dignidade da pessoa humana. Neste trabalho, será proposto um novo enfoque para se tentar analisar tal problema. Partindo da filosofia pragmática da linguagem, especialmente da denominada “teoria dos atos de fala” – ou dos performativos – desenvolvida por J. L. Austin, com as contribuições de Judith Butler, procuraremos desconstruir a suposta diferenciação existente entre ideia e ação, pressuposto que tem norteado o debate tradicional, defendendo que a linguagem, por si mesma, não só interfere no mundo tal como uma conduta física, como carrega em si uma violência que lhe é peculiar. A partir desta base teórica, defenderemos uma tarefa para o Direito, consistente no uso da interpretação jurídica para se reapropriar e ressignificar o discurso do ódio, e reanalisaremos as correntes em disputa sobre a questão para tentar descobrir qual delas melhor se coaduna com esta tarefa.

In the following paper, I will attempt to analyze our usage of language and subsequently rethink the ontology of it by utilizing H. P. Grice’s work on conversational implicature and Martin Heidegger’s famous tool-analysis. Specifically, I will utilize Grice’s account of conversational implicature in “Logic and Conversation” and Heidegger’s account of the broken tool in Being and Time to make the case that our use of language can be understood under the traditional Heideggerian dichotomy of ready-to-hand/present-at-hand. Indeed, it is my contention that Heidegger’s tool-analysis has implications far beyond understanding Dasein’s usage of what are traditionally considered “tools.” In what follows, I will argue that when we engage in conversation and nothing “goes wrong,” our relationship with language is one of readiness-to-hand. Conversely, when one (or more) maxims of the Gricean cooperative principle are flouted – that is to say, something “goes wrong” –, the language we are using becomes foregrounded and we thus enter a present-at-hand relationship with it. Understanding language as a tool, in the Heideggerian sense, allows us not only to examine the ways in which language works, but also to create an ontological parallel between “tools” and conceptual apparatuses which, ultimately, helps us flatten ontology and rethink the existential status of objects.

Pada dasarnya, bahasa Melayu merupakan bahasa rasmi dan bahasa kebangsaan di Malaysia seperti yang dinyatakan dalam perkara 152 Perlembagaan Persekutuan. Namun begitu, sejak kebelakangan ini, bahasa Melayu menghadapi masalah yang sengit, terutamanya pada abad ke-21. Ini dapat dilihat melalui penggunaan bahasa Inggeris sebagai bahasa global pada masa kini yang telah memberikan persaingan yang hebat terhadap pemerkasaan bahasa Melayu, seterusnya mencabar kedudukan bahasa ini sebagai bahasa rasmi di Malaysia. Baru-baru ini, kita didedahkan dengan usaha kerajaan yang ingin melaksanakan pengajaran sains dan matematik di dalam bahasa Inggeris, sehinggalah ia dimansuhkan pada tahun 2012 melalui kenyataan menteri pelajaran Malaysia pada ketika itu, Tan Sri Muhyiddin Yassin, ekoran bantahan yang berterusan daripada parti politik, ibu bapa cendekiawan, gerakan pelajar dan mahasiswa, pakar bahasa dan sasterawan di Malaysia. Namun begitu, timbul persoalan di sini: Adakah bahasa Melayu mempunyai keupayaan untuk menghadapi cabaran-cabaran di abad ke-21, seterusnya mampu hidup dan berdaya saing di peringkat antarabangsa? Berbalik kepada sejarah bahasa Melayu, bahasa Melayu pada zaman dahulu telah menjadi bahasa antarabangsa sejak zaman Empayar Srivijaya pada abad ke-7 Masihi sehingga menjadi bahasa perdagangan dan bahasa perhubungan antarabangsa atau lingua franca di rantau ini, seterusnya dijadikan bahasa rasmi dan persuratan bagi pusat-pusat pemerintahan di seluruh rantau ini. Namun begitu, kegemilangan bahasa Melayu sebagai lingua franca bagi rantau ini telah terjejas pada permulaan abad ke-20 disebabkan oleh penjajahan kuasa Barat ke atas kepulauan-kepulauan Melayu. Selain itu, mereka telah memaksa penduduk-penduduk di bawah jajahan takluk mereka untuk menggunakan bahasa mereka sebagai bahasa rasmi dan bahasa pengantar pendidikan. Apabila rantau ini diberikan kemerdekaan secara rasminya, barulah Bahasa Melayu dikembalikan statusnya sebagai bahasa rasmi atau lingua franca di rantau ini. Permulaan abad ke-21 menyaksikan perkembangan teknologi maklumat yang pesat di seluruh dunia dalam era globalisasi yang mencabar ini. Kita semua telah mengetahui bahawa bahasa teknologi maklumat yang paling dominan pada masa kini ialah bahasa Inggeris. Keperluan yang mendesak untuk menguasai bidang ini secara langsung memberikan petanda bahawa penggunaan bahasa Inggeris menjadi penting dan tidak dapat dielakkan oleh masyarakat dunia. Ini sedikit sebanyak telah memberikan impak terhadap penggunaan bahasa Melayu di Malaysia, terutamanya yang berkaitan dengan bahasa teknologi maklumat. Oleh itu, pengaruh bahasa Inggeris dalam teknologi maklumat seharusnya diterima dengan hati yang terbuka dan

Descartes’ substance dualism can be plausibly seen as an ontological solution to epistemic puzzles surrounding the seemingly privileged, first-person access we have to our own minds. His is an attempt to answer the question:
What must (or could) a Self be so that each of us could have the sort of privileged basic self-knowledge – knowledge of all (and only) our own present states of mind – that we appear to have?
In this paper, I disentangle various semantic and epistemological issues surrounding uses of “I” to refer to ourselves and uses of non-evidential (or ‘base-less’) self-attributions of present states of mind – “avowals” – to produce true claims about our states of mind. I juxtapose two dilemmas that have informed my treatment of “I” and of avowals  – one due to Elizabeth Anscombe, the other due to Richard Rorty. I use the juxtaposition to revisit certain (neglected) aspects of the motivation and defense I have provided for my neo-expressivist approach to the security of avowals, to self-knowledge, and to capturing the mental/nonmental divide.
In Section 1, I outline Anscombe’s Dilemma – which concerns uses of “I” ‘as subject’ – and my preferred, non-Cartesian way of avoiding it. In Section 2, I discuss Rorty’s Dilemma – which concerns so-called first-person authority. In Section 3, I suggest that our discussion of the mental/nonmental divide should begin with a question that I take to be prior to the Cartesian question articulated above, namely:
What must (or could) states of mind be so that, as subjects of such states, we could be in a position to express all (and only) our present states of mind through our behavior, thereby enabling others to have immediate uptake of them?
I conclude with some comments on potential implications of neo-expressivism for our understanding of the metaphysical nature of mental states and the mental/nonmental divide.