Freedom Of Expression

This article recovers “evangelical toleration” as a neglected tradition in early modern political thought with important consequences for contemporary political theory and practice.  Many political theorists dismiss the prudential arguments made by “proto-liberal” thinkers like Roger Williams or John Locke in favor of toleration as a necessary precondition for evangelism and conversion as intolerant, unacceptably instrumental, and inessential to their deeper theories. By contrast, critics of liberalism treat them as smoking gun evidence for an imperial and civilizing mission underlying liberal toleration. I argue that both sides underestimate evangelical toleration’s genealogical and theoretical importance. Not only were evangelical considerations essential in shaping the particular institutions associated with toleration in England and America, the varieties of evangelical toleration represented by Williams and Locke shed significant light on the very different institutions—and intuitions—governing the expression of religious difference in liberal democracies today.

Ce mémoire a pour but d’évaluer le rôle de la société civile dans le processus de consolidation démocratique sud-coréen à travers l’exemple de la mobilisation sociale ayant suivi le naufrage du ferry Sewol en avril 2014. La préoccupation principale est de déterminer si la société civile est toujours mobilisée vingt-cinq ans après la transition à un régime démocratique. La mobilisation du Sewol montre que la société civile sud-coréenne s’est remobilisée et participe de la politisation d’enjeux afin de mettre à l’agenda des réformes démocratiques destinées à être entreprises par l’Etat. Néanmoins le gouvernement et plus généralement la société politique sud-coréenne est immobilisée, léthargique et ne prend pas la mesure des aspirations de la société civile. Ainsi le dialogue entre société civile et société politique, crucial dans ce contexte de consolidation démocratique, est miné. En raison du manque de confiance entre les deux parties, les membres de la société civile et plus généralement les citoyens ont tendance à contourner le jeu des partis politiques, ce qui pourrait être dangereux pour le futur de la consolidation démocratique sud-coréenne.

Mots-clés : Corée du Sud – Sewol – société civile – société politique – transition démocratique – consolidation démocratique – politisation – mouvements sociaux

This thesis is intended to assess the role of civil society in South Korean democratic consolidation process through the example of the social mobilization following the April 2014 Sewol ferry tragedy. The main concern is to determine whether civil society is still mobilized or not twenty five years after the transition to a democratic regime. The Sewol mobilization shows that South Korean civil society re-mobilized and is currently politicizing issues in order to push for democratic reforms to be implemented by the state. However the government and generally speaking South Korean political society is immobilized, lethargic and does not understand civil society’s aspirations. Therefore the dialogue between civil society and political society, crucial in this democratic consolidation context, is undermined. As a consequence of the lack of trust between both parties, civil society members and citizens more generally tend to bypass the political parties arena, which could be dangerous for the future of South Korean democratic consolidation.

Key-words: South Korea – Sewol – civil society – political society – democratic transition – democratic consolidation – politicization – social movements

A partir da análise de centenas de decisões judiciais e da literatura mais atualizada sobre o tema, o livro, que é adaptação da tese de doutorado do autor, busca trazer ao leitor o panorama mais completo possível sobre os conflitos entre liberdade de expressão humorística e direitos da personalidade no Brasil. /// Grounded in the analysis of hundreds of court decisions and the most recent literature on the subject, this book (developed from the author's doctoral dissertation), seeks to bring the reader a complete overview of the conflicts between freedom of humorous speech and reputational rights.
https://loja.editoradialetica.com/humanidades/o-humor-e-os-limites-da-liberdade-de-expressao-teoria-e-jurisprudencia

La Sentencia T-713 de 2010 de la Corte Constitucional de Colombia resolvió el caso de un estudiante de un colegio privado que fue sancionado por haber participado en un grupo de la red social Facebook creado bajo la denominación “Yo también quiero cambiar la rectora de La Presentación” y al que pertenecían más de 150 estudiantes de la misma institución. En esta reseña formulamos las siguientes cuatro críticas a la estructura formal y material de la decisión de la Corte colombiana: 1. el problema jurídico creado y desarro-llado por la Corte es incorrecto; 2. la Corte elude la tensión entre derechos que representan las nuevas tecnologías; 3. examina cuestiones ajenas al caso revisado y 4. la sentencia está mal escrita.

Cryptocurrencies such as Bitcoin and Ether encourage the owners of computing resources to bring ever-increasing levels of processing power to bear in validating the distributed ledger of cryptocurrency purchases and sales.  Initial coin offerings (ICOs) involve the sale of cryptocurrency coins or tokens with the aid of on white papers.  Crypto coin white papers involve a mixture of scientific, sociopolitical, and economic speech.  They often contain extended arguments for how users of the coins and the Internet or society in general could benefit from a new way of organizing economic relations, assembling and deploying assets, or exchanging messages or entitlements.  While they share some similarities with forms of commercial speech that enjoy quite limited First Amendment protection, they are arguably more similar to other economic statements that enjoy First Amendment protection against censorship, or to direct advertisements that are deemed insufficiently misleading to result in civil liability.  Nevertheless, some interpretations of U.S. securities and commodities law would prohibit authors of such white papers from raising funds for crypto coin platforms if the coin's users expect to earn a return on their investment and rely on the coin issuer's expertise or representations. 

This article explores principles of free expression that could shield truthful speech and subjective opinions about new crypto coins from some of the worst chilling effects of U.S. laws.  It examines ways in which crypto coins may benefit marketplace participants and economic efficiency, including by providing a beneficial alternative to traditional software app stores, logistics infrastructures, or banking and payment systems.  It then surveys the First Amendment and other constitutional issues that onerous regulations raise, and draws analogies to doctrines that reconcile the freedom of economic expression with the cause of consumer or investor protection under the Lanham Act, the Securities Exchange Act, state deceptive practices laws, and the law of warranties.  Several themes in the case law are ripe for application to ICOs: the need for precision and proportionality in framing regulation, the proscription against regulatory overkill and one-size-fits-all approaches, and the requirement that basic freedoms be preserved.  More specifically, the securities or commodities are not properly read as applying to many crypto coin offering papers, and describes other concepts such as virtual commodities or virtual barter systems from other jurisdictions that may be a better fit. 

The article urges American lawyers and judges to probe thoroughly whether the interests served by prohibitions and penalties on crypto coin speech justify the burdens imposed on information providers. Regulating false statements of existing fact and enhancing the remedies for making them will be more effective and less constitutionally infirm measures than those aimed at preempting merely potential harm.  Courts must balance the values of fraud prevention and remediation with the values of freedom of expression and expanded economic opportunity.  Analogous fields of law provide several tools with which to achieve this balance, including the distinction between general or universal fraud prohibitions and narrower securities or commodities regulation regimes, the difference between forward-looking and other statements in several area of fraud law, First Amendment principles governing professional and occupational licensing, and rules against vague or discriminatorily enforced regulations. 

keywords: cryptocurrencies, tokens, appcoins, altcoins, coins, coin offerings, ICOs, "initial coin offerings", free speech, freedom of speech, freedom of expression, freedom of information, cloud computing, virtualization, virtual communities,  virtual currencies, virtual commodities, digital barter, securities law, regulation, consumer protection, false advertising, Lanham Act, misleading, First Amendment, commercial speech, least restrictive means, overbreadth, vagueness, Fifth Amendment, due process, human rights, Telegram, TON, Kik, Kin, Kik Interactive, Bitcoin, Ether, smart contracts, crowdfunding, SEC, The DAO, CFTC, CFPB, European Union, EU, banking, risk, innovation, technology, financial technology, payment systems, multistakeholder governance, polycentric governance, puffery, bespeaks caution doctrine, California, New York, Texas, occupational licensing, libertarianism

Press freedom plays a significant role in creating public awareness via accurately informing the society. It performs this duty within the framework of respect to diversity of opinions and individual right to self-governance, which is particularly indispensable to liberal democracies.
Press freedom is a different form of freedom of expression, which is included in the most fundamental human rights documents such as the UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the UN Universal Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). Freedom of expression has been protected under Article 10 of the ECHR. This article draws the boundaries of this right as freedom to hold opinions and impart information and ideas without interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers. The article then instructs the acceptable limits of this freedom. In order for a restriction of freedom of expression be valid, it must be prescribed by law first, and secondly, it must be necessary in a democratic society, and finally it must be only aimed for the listed legitimate causes as specified in this article.
Despite the protection of the ECHR Article 10, Turkey has seen frequent interventions on the press due to political pressure and the ownership structure of the media in the country. And consequently, numerous violation judgments have been delivered by the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), which will be analyzed in terms the reasons for violations and the cases of legitimate restrictions on press freedom. Additionally, this book will give a detailed trajectory of press freedom in Turkey in the light of court decisions, European Union Progress Reports and statements of press unions.

To download click here : https://archive-ouverte.unige.ch/unige:23569

La promulgation de la loi du 23 février 2005 « portant reconnaissance de la Nation et contribution nationale en faveur des Français rapatriés » donne lieu à un important débat public et à la diffusion d’une pétition d’historiens exigeant l’abrogation de toutes les lois dites mémorielles (loi de 2005 en cause, mais aussi loi Gayssot de 1990, loi reconnaissant le génocide arménien et loi Taubira de 2001). Cette pétition repose sur une dénonciation qui présuppose que lesdites lois, mises sur le même plan, auraient une fonction et un objet identiques. Or ce double présupposé est critiquable : d’une part, le fait d’appréhender ces textes comme ayant la même fonction, celle de sanctionner un comportement, est basé sur une confusion qu’il s’agit de clarifier ; d’autre part, considérer qu’ils ont le même objet, en l’occurrence l’établissement d’une vérité officielle par le Parlement ou les juges, relève d’un malentendu qu’il convient de dissiper s’agissant des lois de 1990 et de 2001. Ainsi le problème ne serait pas tant celui d’une inflation législative alarmante de lois scélérates, établissant une vérité d’Etat ; mais plutôt celui du sens, à peine caché, de l’adoption d’un texte tel que l’article 4 de la loi de 2005, qui impose une interprétation légitimement contestée par les historiens.
Sévane Garibian

Efforts at Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) online have become an important focus for social networks. CVE targets extremist ideologies, tackling them through alternate narratives that focus on peace-building. It is an invaluable tool to supplement counterterrorism strategies worldwide. To identify effective counter-speech on Facebook, ORF conducted a study analysing posts and comments on prominent public pages posting in India. A counter-narrative that emerged and needs to be encouraged was one that appealed to a sense of common decency and humanity. Among the report’s recommendations is that through Facebook’s own messaging and content, users can be encouraged to become a part of an ecosystem that promotes dialogue and community.

This report analyses the situation in member and observer states of the Council of Europe and their different legal approaches to the phenomenon of the public expression of praise, justification and other forms of support for terrorism and terrorists, referred to in this study as "apologie du terrorisme" and "incitement to terrorism".

Greece, as EU member, was called to transpose the Framework Decision 2008/913 on combating certain forms and expressions of racism and xenophobia by means of criminal law (hereafter FD) into the Greek legal order. Such an endeavour had as a prerequisite the examination of the following primary questions: is the criminalization of hate speech in general and of negationism in particular legitimate in a liberal and democratic state functioning under the rule of law? In the affirmative case, under what specific terms and conditions? 
The article examines both questions, taking into consideration the preconditions and the limits of criminalization of hate speech and negationism in the European public order, as they are portrayed in the case law of the European Court of Human Rights. In this context, Criminal Law 4285/2014 that transposed Framework Decision 2008/913 into the Greek legal order is analysed, highlighting the legislative choices made in the case of negationism. What is more, the criminal case against the German history professor Heinz Richter for the publication of his book The Battle of Crete (Athens: Govostis, 2011, in German: Operation Merkur: Die Eroberung der Insel Kreta im Mai 1941, Ruhpolding: Rutzen 2011) is concisely discussed. Richter was charged on the basis of article 2 of Law 4285/2014 for “condoning, denying or grossly trivialising Nazi crimes and war crimes committed by Nazi forces during the Second World War against the people of Crete recognised as such by the Greek Parliament”. The Court decision issued on 10-2-2016 acquitted Richter and ruled on the unconstitutionality of the crime of negationism as stipulated in Greek Criminal Law. Nonetheless, the University of Crete recanted the honoris causa award given to Richter for his work on 2014. Richter case is an emblematic case concerning the application of criminal laws on history in general and the criminalization of negationism in particular.

Het is niet waar dat we de vrijheid van meningsuiting bevorderen door onwelgevallige personen of groepen te beledigen, zoals sommige opiniemakers en cartoonisten, maar ook politici sinds de eeuwwisseling lijken te denken. Integendeel: waar polarisatie toeneemt, komt vroeg of laat de vrijheid van meningsuiting onder druk te staan.

A lowered value-added tax (VAT) rate is the most common form of indirect state subsidy available to the newspaper industry in the EU, with the great majority of Member States applying a reduced rate to print newspapers. These range from 2.1% (France) to 13% (Croatia), but in some countries newspapers are exempted from paying VAT entirely, while in others newspapers do not benefit from any reduction.

Our new report provides a general overview of the landscape in the EU. We hope that it will contribute to the ongoing global discussions concerning indirect press subsidies.

While the EU rules have allowed printed newspapers to benefit from reduced VAT rates, this regime does not cover digital publications, to which the standard rate applies. Yet in 2015, some Member States extended the reduced VAT rate to digital publications, resulting in the European Commission opening a procedure of infringement against them.

Late last year, the European Commission released a proposal that, if approved, would allow Member States to align VAT rates between print and digital publications.

Although scientific enquiry has the potential to cause harm, it can be argued that scientific enquiry should nonetheless be free from formal restrictions. I consider two such arguments, based on the value of knowledge and freedom of expression, respectively. Both, according to my analysis, fail. Instead, I submit that there should be formal restrictions on freedom of scientific enquiry whenever it is deemed likely that such enquiry will lead to violations of fundamental human rights.

Abstract:

This article gives an overview about the exercise of the right to Freedom of Expression in Mexico. We hypothesize that three of the most important aspects that violate this law are the State speech that blames the drug dealers of attacks against journalists; the indifference, inaction and simulation of the Mexican State; and the state of crisis in public safety. The comparison of Mexico with a similar case suffered by Colombia, as well as data submitted by national or international organizations are alarming. It is warned that the Academy is one of the suitable areas for finding solutions to this conflict. Research and publication of it become a tool in the absense of policies, plan sor programs that limit and prevent the violation of this right.


Resumen:

Este artículo presenta un panorama acerca del ejercicio del derecho a la Libertad de Expresión en México. Se postula que tres de los aspectos más importantes que vulneran este derecho son el discurso del Estado que culpa al narcotráfico de agresiones contra periodistas; la indiferencia, inacción y simulación del Estado mexicano; y un estado de crisis en materia de seguridad pública. La comparación de México con el caso similar sufrido por Colombia, así como cifras presentadas por organismos nacionales o internacionales, resultan alarmantes. Se advierte que la Academia es uno de los espacios idóneos para encontrar soluciones a este conflicto. La investigación y divulgación del mismo se convierten en una herramienta ante la falta de políticas, planes o programas que limiten, e impidan, la vulneración de este derecho.

The essay opens with some background information about the period in which J.S. Mill wrote. The discussion revolves around the concept of blasphemy which Mill considered to be highly problematic. Tagging unpopular views as ‘blasphemous’ amounted to abuse of governmental powers and infringed on the basic liberties of the out-of-favour speakers. The discussion on blasphemy sets the scene to the understanding of Mill's concerns, his priorities and consequently his emphasis on the widest possible liberty of expression. Section 2 presents the Millian principles that are pertinent to his philosophy of free speech: liberty and truth. Section 3 analyzes Mill's very limited boundaries to freedom of expression, asserting that the consequentialist reasoning had led Mill to ignore present tangible harm. It is argued that democracy is required to develop protective mechanisms against harm-facilitating speech.

This chapter takes issue with C.E. Baker’s stance that the Free Speech Principle should protect even the most harmful and vile expression because such protection would promote individual self-government, enhance personal autonomy, and promote critical thinking. It is argued that a balance needs to be struck between these goods and the impact of the speech in question on its target group. The protection of free speech cannot be offered in isolation from its wider consequences, not only those that affect the speaker but also those that affect those whom the speaker intended to influence. Furthermore, the content of the speech should be evaluated on its face value. Incitement and grave offenses, morally on a par with physical harm, should be excluded from the Free Speech Principle.

The ARTICLE 19 project Asylum seekers, refugees and freedom of expression in the UK, aimed to explore the ways in which the issue of asylum, and asylum seekers and refugees, are represented in the media, the extent to which asylum seekers and refugees feel able to participate in the public debate on asylum and immigration, and the impact media coverage has on their everyday lives.

The research project was conducted in partnership with Cardiff University School of Journalism and developed in consultation with organisations concerned with supporting the rights and welfare of asylum seekers and refugees. The direct involvement of asylum seekers and refugees as researchers and as interviewees was a central feature of the project. In May 2003, the initial findings of the research were published in a case study of media coverage of asylum and refugee issues surrounding the story of the closure of the Red Cross centre at Sangatte.

These findings were presented at the seminar: ‘INSIGHT OR INCITE?’, on 15th May 2003, which brought together refugee organisations, journalists and refugees, the discussions of which are reflected in this final report.

Bien que le droit de la liberté d'expression ait été défendu tout au long de l'histoire, jusqu'à la déclaration des droits de l'homme, il a malheureusement eu la censure comme un obstacle, une ombre, un instrument légitime qui régule la vie humaine, par la suppression d'une liberté intellectuelle, éparpillée sur plusieurs moyens d'expression artistiques tels que la littérature, le théâtre, la peinture et le cinéma, dans lequel chaque réalisateur utilise son film comme moyen de communication pour transmettre ses messages à son public, tout en pouvant faire face à des hauts et des bas tout au long de l'horloge biologique dudit film, qui commence comme un foetus fécondé dans la pensée d'un cinéaste, pour naître ensuite sous la forme de scénario et dialogue, qui croît à travers ses différents cycles de vie artistiques, législatifs et productifs, jusqu'à sa sortie en salles pour le grand public, qui représente le stade de maturité de l'oeuvre. Et à chacune de ces étapes du cycle de vie d'un film, l'auteur peut bien faire face à une censure, menant à l'emprisonnement de ses idées, et parfois même leur enterrement avant de naître. A traves notre communication, nous essayerons de démontrer la multitude des cas de censure dans n'importe quel stade de l'horloge biologique d'un film, dont le résultat peut varier entre un drap à variable transparence et un linceul qui emmène l'oeuvre à son enterrement avant de voir le jour.

To download click here : https://archive-ouverte.unige.ch/unige:23565

Tant le langage courant que le langage historiographique contemporain définissent le négationnisme comme une doctrine ou une position idéologique consistant à nier la réalité du génocide du peuple juif et, plus particulièrement, l’existence des chambres à gaz. Qu’en est-il en droit ? Dans l’ordre juridique français, c’est la loi dite Gayssot du 13 juillet 1990 qui pose l’interdit. De par ses termes très restrictifs, elle ne permet que la condamnation pénale de propos négationnistes visant les crimes nazis, et le caractère exclusif de la protection apportée par la loi transparaît clairement, tant en amont qu’en aval du texte. L’interdit est cadré par de nombreuses limites qui garantissent sa conformité aux libertés fondamentales propres à un Etat démocratique. Ainsi cette loi n’est-elle pas liberticide contrairement à l’opinion de ses principaux détracteurs. Elle est néanmoins critiquable, pour une raison différente : le caractère exclusif de l’interdit qu’elle pose se justifie aujourd’hui difficilement et une discussion sur son extension s’impose.
Sévane Garibian

Terence McKenna argued that sovereignty over one’s consciousness is the next great civil rights struggle after sexism, racism, and homophobia. “Coming out” about one’s psychedelic identity, interests, and/or experiences is an important part of redefining the public perception of psychedelics and of those who choose to experience their effects. Even non-using “allies” (comparable to LGBTQ allies) can join the conversation in supportive roles. In light of the shifting legal status of psychoactive plants and chemicals, what might it mean to identify as psychedelic in a post-prohibition world?

Two ways that free and open access to information is established are through the library
and through the internet. The term ‘library’ is used loosely here, and can also apply to any
information-containing, collection-driven entity that strives to preserve and share information.
Sipley (2003) writes that “libraries nurture children’s curiosity, and use it to instill a sense of
‘information entitlement.” As Americans, we all have our share of entitlement feelings
regarding information, almost regarding it as a basic human right. Tiwari (2010) argues that
access to information should absolutely “be treated a basic human right.”

Este estudo tem como objetivo principal verificar em que medida elementos trazidos pela performance “Selvagem”, apresentada no filme Rutan, podem sugerir critérios limitativos à liberdade na performance artística. Utilizando metodologia dedutiva de caráter bibliográfico e exploratório, em um primeiro momento, situa-se a performance artística como manifestação do direito humano à liberdade de expressão; posteriormente, elementos da performance “Selvagem” são utilizados como suporte fático para a reflexão. Conclui-se que os elementos analisados contribuem para a proposição de parâmetros à liberdade de expressão na performance artística a partir do princípio da dignidade da pessoa humana e da proteção aos direitos de personalidade.

South Korean advertising has been historically subjected to rigorous scrutiny by various authorized and self-appointed organizations. By the early 2000s, however, interference with advertising grew harder to justify even to the censors themselves, as liberal freedom became a hegemonic ideal. I draw on ethnographic observation at a quasi-government censorship board, the Korea Communications Standards Commission, to explore how advertising censors navigated the contradictory demands to protect the unwary public and to respect advertisers' freedom. Suggesting that the censors’ quandaries exemplified the deadlock in the liberal ideologies of freedom, I argue that advertising censorship, though ostensibly limiting advertising discourses, ultimately produced “smart” consumers, to use the censors' parlance—subjects whose cynical distance toward advertising allowed maximum freedoms for advertisers.

This paper suggests the democratic direction in which the right of freedom of expression should be conceived and applied. In the first two sections it suggests some counter-examples to, and diagnoses, of the libertarian and liberal conceptions of freedom of expression, taking Scanlon (1972) and Scanlon (1979), respectively, to be their chief proponents. The paper suggests that these conceptions cannot take into account clear examples, like fraudulent propaganda, which should not be legal. The democratic conception takes it to heart that the pillars upon which the right of freedom of expression is founded are individual and collective autonomy, the right to know facts of public interest and information necessary for effective democratic control of government. The paper suggests that in a time when private powers seriously threaten these pillars, it is correct for the government to step in to provide the framework in which genu- ine discussion geared toward fulfilling the objectives of these pillars can take place.

In this Essay, I sketch out some First Amendment and Due Process issues that arise from recent efforts by the World Intellectual Property Organization (“WIPO”) to revise U.S. copyright law. My focus will be on the WIPO Treaty on Audiovisual Performances (the “AV Treaty” for short). The AV Treaty expands upon other efforts to make it unlawful to reproduce or use nonliteral material having substantial value to another author; display or perform fragmentary content having substantial value to a record company or movie studio; or make a movie or YouTube video by transforming, recasting, or adapting information having substantial value to a corporation. Under WIPO's leadership, U.S. copyright law is moving to transfer more of the social value associated with copyrighted work to the copyright owner, and away from subsequent authors and consumers.

The Essay describes WIPO and its role in expanding copyright-like rights via the AV Treaty and statutes such as the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (“DMCA”). It analyzes key provisions of the AV Treaty for whether they change U.S. law, or merely globalize its existing rules. Article 5 of it states that independently of any economic rights, and even after the transfer of them, a performer has a right as to his or her fixed, live performances, to object to any distortion, mutilation or other modification of his performances that would be prejudicial to his reputation, taking due account of the nature of audiovisual fixations. Article 6 seems to grant a broad new right to restrict the “communication” of unfixed performances not already broadcast, to which right some exceptions “may” be granted, but do not have to be granted. Article 12 contemplates additional royalties to be paid to performers; irrespective of existing contracts relating to performances embodied in movies, songs, television shows, or video games. Article 15 of the AV Treaty could provide legal reinforcement to efforts to utilize digital rights management and technological protection measures so as to restrict the fair use of performances. Article 16 of the AV Treaty requires parties to provide civil remedies against those who negligently facilitate the availability or distribution of a performance, knowing or having reason to know that the credits or terms of use have been omitted.

The Essay describes the threat posed to the First Amendment by the AV Treaty’s proposed changes to U.S. law. The AV Treaty alters the traditional contours of copyright in the United States by introducing moral rights, and outlawing the making available of performances even without distributing them. The Essay analyzes these First Amendment threats using the rubric provided by Eldred v. Ashcroft. It also outlines the Due Process concerns that arise from the AV Treaty’s vague language and arbitrary distinctions. The statutory damages that may be available under U.S. law if ordinary copyright remedies are extended to performance rights will threaten the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment, as well as Due Process. Moreover, the Essay points out that the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement may multiply all of the censorial provisions of the AV Treaty, by stating that criminal copyright infringement shall include instances of related rights infringements that have no direct or indirect motivation of financial gain. The AV Treaty may also interact with proposals such as the Stop Online Piracy Act, which would make it easier for corporations or executive agencies to seize web sites that do not themselves infringe copyrights, but that might facilitate acts of infringement.

World Intellectual Property Organization, WIPO, audiovisual, performances, treaty, WCT, WPPT, phonograms, fixation, unfixed, authorship, copyright, fair use, First Amendment, Due Process, YouTube, Facebook, Pinterest, Twitter, eBay, Amazon.com, Google, Yahoo!, Flava, SOPA, moral rights

Continental European law on hate speech may be read - against the historically strict hierarchical societies - as forms of levelling up of ‘dignity’ which was traditionally reserved to the upper classes. This democratisation of dignity which underlies European understanding of citizenry, recognises public insult and humiliation as tools for disempowerment and exclusion, and as inconsistent with legal and political equality. Yet, this construction of empowered citizenship enabled by the State inter alia through hate speech laws is at odds with the American view of empowered citizenry. There free speech jurisprudence is based on ‘liberty’ and deeply inscribed with settler mentality, one of self-reliance and self-rule and distrust of government, whether the old-world governments left behind, or the colonial administrations belatedly encountered in the new world. This paper argues that this binary opposition in the divergent treatment of hate speech hides non-binary preoccupations that reflect different primary fears which do not fall along the same ‘scale’. European liberal democracies fear the consequences of hate speech being left uncensored in the public domain (a WHAT concern), whilst America fears the consequences of content interventions by government (a WHO concern). Flowing from this, this paper proposes that the German Network Enforcement Law (NetzDG) of 2017 which requires major platforms to moderate content in response to user takedown notices based on German legally imposed speech standards delivers a compromise solution, a bridge, between American and European speech traditions. The mechanism which NetzDG adopts, namely public standards embedded in private processes, is arguably uniquely adept at simultaneously assuaging the primary European fear about the absence of effective speech controls in the public domain and the primary American fear about the presence of governmental censorship.

Academic freedom is considered to be one of the most important pillars of educational institutions. It is a prerequisite for quality education, essential for complete development of human  personality. However, it has been subjected to constant restraint from both governmental and non-governmental entities. Further, violation of academic freedom also leads to breach of other human rights.

That the significance of the notion freedom in global media policy is ubiquitous, is already known. The conviction ‘marketplace of ideas’ holds that the truth will rise up out of the opposition of thoughts in free, straightforward public talk. This idea is frequently connected to dialog of patent law and additionally freedom of the press and the duties of the media in a liberal vote based system. The paper below elaborates the ways the doctrine has been enlivened despite tireless disparities in global communication and the inability to essentially democratize the universal communications framework. The paper also illustrates the market theory, the generic idea of free trade of ideas, stated by the English poet Milton; the metaphor of marketplace of ideas by Jon Stuart Mill; the First Amendment which adheres to freedom of ideas. The breaking down of the idea; the contextualization of free flow information and the modern ideas of freedom of information. UNESCO’s, NWICO’s UN’s, WSIS’s influence to the formulation of the free flow of information has been discussed below.
Key words: marketplace of ideas, free flow doctrine, Milton, Mill, the 1st Amendment, global media, modern ideas of freedom, UNESCO, NWICO, UN, WSIS.

Personality rights enjoy strong protection under various legal systems as a result of twentieth century legal developments. For a long time, it did not even occur to anyone that the level of this protection should be differentiated according to the type of statements that are harmful to an individual’s reputation, or that this level should be reduced for certain types of persons. False statements and statements that are harmful to an individual’s reputation were naturally regarded as constitutionally unprotected statements, until the emergence of the idea that certain statements relating to public debates and which may be harmful to the reputation of public figures should be afforded special protection. Such special protection is necessitated by the paramount importance of the freedom to engage in public debates. The development of the protection of reputation in modern times is difficult to reconcile with the recognition of privileged statuses and the fact that an individual is active in public life is regarded as one that automatically reduces the scope of such protection. This approach is essential to a fundamental feature of democratic societies: open debates on public matters are more important—up to a certain limit—than the protection of the personality rights of the persons being criticised. Persons participating in public life voluntarily waive their opportunity to enforce their personality rights in general. The limited protection of the reputation and honour of public figures thus became acknowledged in all legal systems which recognise the above distinction.
It is an almost uniform feature of European legal systems that this reduction of the scope of the protection of the reputation of public figures is not provided for in codified law; the manner of the application of the law in this special case is left to the case law of the courts. Only a couple of states form an exception to this but, even in their case, it is usually only in the field of criminal justice that the legal code of the branch of the law offers any guidance. Common European law, respecting the specific, organically evolved solutions applied by the member states, has not attempted a uniform resolution of this issue; however, the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), which is traditionally very active in these areas, has successfully drawn up the foundations that the various states are required to take into account when applying the law.
In this study, we present the international background of the question under review. Then we provide a brief overview of the solutions applied in specific European countries, broken down by the most important problems. Later sections take a closer look at the Hungarian regulations and the jurisprudence of the Constitutional Court (CC) and ordinary courts, and examine the Strasbourg cases relating to Hungary, but with lessons for those outside the country too.