Philosophy of Technology by Marc Champagne
Science and Engineering Ethics, vol. 29, no. 4, pp. 1–26.
As artificial intelligence becomes more sophisticated and robots approach autonomous decision-mak... more As artificial intelligence becomes more sophisticated and robots approach autonomous decision-making, debates about how to assign moral responsibility have gained importance, urgency, and sophistication. Answering Stenseke's (2022a) call for scaffolds that can help us classify views and commitments, we think the current debate space can be represented hierarchically, as answers to key questions. We use the resulting taxonomy of five stances to differentiate -- and defend -- what is known as the "blank check" proposal. According to this proposal, a person activating a robot could willingly make themselves answerable for whatever events ensue, even if those events stem from the robot's autonomous decision(s). This blank check solution was originally proposed in the context of automated warfare (Champagne & Tonkens 2015), but we extend it to cover all robots. We argue that, because moral answerability in the blank check is accepted voluntarily and before bad outcomes are known, it proves superior to alternative ways of assigning blame. We end by highlighting how, in addition to being just, this selfinitiated and prospective moral answerability for robot harm provides deterrence that the four other stances cannot match.
Philosophy and Technology, vol. 28, no. 1 (March 2015) pp. 125–137.
Sparrow argues that military robots capable of making their own decisions would be independent en... more Sparrow argues that military robots capable of making their own decisions would be independent enough to allow us denial for their actions, yet too unlike us to be the targets of meaningful blame or praise—thereby fostering what Matthias has dubbed “the responsibility gap.” We agree with Sparrow that someone must be held responsible for all actions taken in a military conflict. That said, we think Sparrow overlooks the possibility of what we term “blank check” responsibility: A person of sufficiently high standing could accept responsibility for the actions of autonomous robotic devices—even if that person could not be causally linked to those actions besides this prior agreement. The basic intuition behind our proposal is that humans can impute relations even when no other form of contact can be established. The missed alternative we want to highlight, then, would consist in an exchange: Social prestige in the occupation of a given office would come at the price of signing away part of one's freedoms to a contingent and unpredictable future guided by another (in this case, artificial) agency.
Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics, vol. 30, no. 3 (2021), pp. 448–454.
Do we suddenly become justified in treating robots like humans by positing new notions like “arti... more Do we suddenly become justified in treating robots like humans by positing new notions like “artificial moral agency” and “artificial moral responsibility”? I answer no. Or, to be more precise, I argue that such notions may become philosophically acceptable only after crucial metaphysical issues have been addressed. My main claim, in sum, is that “artificial moral responsibility” betokens moral responsibility to the same degree that a “fake orgasm” betokens an orgasm.
Forthcoming in The Palgrave Handbook of Classical Liberalism, edited by Leslie Marsh, Mikayla Novak, and Mark Pennington. London: Palgrave Macmillan.
Studies in History and Philosophy of Science, vol. 75 (2019), pp. 12–22.
The recent wave of data on exoplanets lends support to METI ventures (Messaging to Extra-Terrestr... more The recent wave of data on exoplanets lends support to METI ventures (Messaging to Extra-Terrestrial Intelligence), insofar as the more exoplanets we find, the more likely it is that “exominds” await our messages. Yet, despite these astronomical advances, there are presently no well-confirmed tests against which to check the design of interstellar messages. In the meantime, the best we can do is distance ourselves from terracentric assumptions. There is no reason, for example, to assume that all inferential abilities are language-like. With that in mind, I argue that logical reasoning does not have to be couched in symbolic notation. In diagrammatic reasoning, inferences are underwritten, not by rules, but by transformations of self-same qualitative signs. I use the Existential Graphs of C. S. Peirce to show this. Since diagrams are less dependent on convention and might even be generalized to cover non-visual senses, I argue that METI researchers should add some form of diagrammatic representations to their repertoire. Doing so can shed light, not just on alien minds, but on the deepest structures of reasoning itself.
Metascience, vol. 30, no. 1 (2021), pp. 153–156.
Thanks to advances in astronomical measurement and computer modeling, “now we know thousands of w... more Thanks to advances in astronomical measurement and computer modeling, “now we know thousands of worlds” (Deacon 2020, 7). By contrast, “in 1990 all we could say was that one star, the Sun, out of hundreds of billions, definitely hosted planets” (ibid., 18). The word “definitely” does a lot of work here. Knowledge does not require, and indeed rarely attains, certainty, so we might rephrase the foregoing as “in 1990 all we could say with sufficient assurance was that one star, the Sun, out of hundreds of billions, hosted planets”. Yet, long before recent breakthroughs, many suspected that other planets orbited other stars...
Phaneroscopy and Phenomenology: A Neglected Chapter in the History of Ideas, edited by Mohammad Shafiei and Ahti-Veikko Pietarinen, pp. 25–55. Cham: Springer.
Peirce and Husserl both realized that our habits and habitual conceptions, though vital to the su... more Peirce and Husserl both realized that our habits and habitual conceptions, though vital to the success of most activities, nevertheless occlude large portions of the experiential canvass. So, unless preparatory work puts us in the right mindset, we risk perceiving the world—not as it is—but rather as we expect it to be. While Peirce and Husserl were predominantly concerned with supplying a better observational basis for inquiries like science, semiotics, and mathematics, I draw on their phaneroscopic/phenomenological tools to combat the addictive and mind-narrowing effects of technology. I go over several examples to show how, when we (try to) rid ourselves of presuppositions and relax the pursuit of efficiency, we enable contemplative possibilities conducive to flourishing and the pursuit of meaning. My overall message is that, in an age when we increasingly depend on devices like Smartphones (and soon VR) to form flat and one-sided worldviews, re-establishing an unmediated contact with our everyday surroundings can have tangible existential benefits, nipping in the bud tyrannical trends as well as wasted lives.
Are you worried about the many valuable experiences already rendered obsolete by Smartphones and ... more Are you worried about the many valuable experiences already rendered obsolete by Smartphones and social media -- and now look with concern at GPT4's AI, Meta's VR, and Tesla's bots?
A technological sea change is coming. So, to weather this onslaught of virtuality and artificiality, we must be grounded in reality as deeply as possible.
Join the many subscribers who, each month, receive philosophical confidence to skip such bandwagons and stick to what really brings meaning.
Philosophy of Mind by Marc Champagne
Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, vol. 12, no. 1 (2013), pp. 145-162.
Shaun Gallagher has actively looked into the possibility that psychopathologies involving “though... more Shaun Gallagher has actively looked into the possibility that psychopathologies involving “thought insertion” might supply a counterexample to the Cartesian principle according to which one can always recognize one’s own thoughts as one’s own. Animated by a general distrust of a priori demonstrations, Gallagher is convinced that pitting clinical cases against philosophical arguments is a worthwhile endeavor. There is no doubt that, if true, a falsification of the immunity to error through misidentification would entail drastic revisions in how we conceive the boundary between self and other. However, I argue that (1) the idea of unearthing an exception to the Cartesian thesis is, on further reflection, not a realistic prospect and that (2) this casts doubt on the attempt to conjoin first-person phenomenology and third-person cognitive science in the service of philosophical debates.
Symposium: Canadian Journal of Continental Philosophy, vol. 18, no. 2 (Fall 2014), pp. 209–232.
In response to the claim that our sense of will is illusory, some philosophers have called for a ... more In response to the claim that our sense of will is illusory, some philosophers have called for a better understanding of the phenomenology of agency. Although I am broadly sympathetic with the tenor of this response, I question whether the positive-theoretic blueprint it promotes truly heralds a tenable undertaking. Marshaling a Schopenhauerian insight, I examine the possibility that agency might not be amenable to phenomenological description. Framing this thesis in terms of Charles S. Peirce’s semiotic framework, I suggest a way to integrate the idea of streaming experiences with that of bodily strivings, which, owing to their primitive structure, can never be represented.
Dialogue (Cambridge University Press), vol. 53, no. 1 (March 2014), pp. 135-182.
This paper suggests that reference to phenomenal qualities is best understood as involving iconic... more This paper suggests that reference to phenomenal qualities is best understood as involving iconicity, that is, a passage from sign-vehicle to object that exploits a similarity between the two. This contrasts with a version of the ‘phenomenal concept strategy’ that takes indexicality to be central. However, since it is doubtful that phenomenal qualities are capable of causally interacting with anything, indexical reference seems inappropriate. While a theorist like David Papineau is independently coming to something akin to iconicity, I think some of the awkwardness that plagues his account would be remedied by transitioning to a more inclusive philosophy of signs.
Springer, 2018
It is often thought that consciousness has a qualitative dimension that cannot be tracked by scie... more It is often thought that consciousness has a qualitative dimension that cannot be tracked by science. Recently, however, some philosophers have argued that this worry stems not from an elusive feature of the mind, but from the special nature of the concepts used to describe conscious states. Marc Champagne draws on the neglected branch of philosophy of signs or semiotics to develop a new take on this strategy.
The term “semiotics” was introduced by John Locke in the modern period – its etymology is ancient Greek, and its theoretical underpinnings are medieval. Charles Sanders Peirce made major advances in semiotics, so he can act as a pipeline for these forgotten ideas. Most philosophers know Peirce as the founder of American pragmatism, but few know that he also coined the term “qualia,” which is meant to capture the intrinsic feel of an experience. Since pragmatic verification and qualia are now seen as conflicting commitments, Champagne endeavors to understand how Peirce could (or thought he could) have it both ways. The key, he suggests, is to understand how humans can insert distinctions between features that are always bound.
Recent attempts to take qualities seriously have resulted in versions of panpsychism, but Champagne outlines a more plausible way to achieve this. So, while semiotics has until now been the least known branch of philosophy ending in –ics, his book shows how a better understanding of that branch can move one of the liveliest debates in philosophy forward.
The American Journal of Semiotics, vol. 35, nos. 3–4 (2019), pp. 443–462.
I will be talking about the limits of cognitive science. I won’t be talking about contingent shor... more I will be talking about the limits of cognitive science. I won’t be talking about contingent shortcomings that could perhaps be remedied with, say, more time, resources, or ingenuity. Rather, I will be concerned with limitations that are “baked into” the very enterprise. The main blind spot, I will argue, is consciousness—but not for the reasons typically given...
Cybernetics and Human Knowing, vol. 23, no. 2 (2016), pp. 39–49.
C. S. Peirce is often credited as a forerunner of the verificationist theory of meaning. In his e... more C. S. Peirce is often credited as a forerunner of the verificationist theory of meaning. In his early pragmatist papers, Peirce did say that if we want to make our ideas clear(er), then we should look downstream to their actual and future effects. For many who work in philosophy of mind, this is enough to endorse functionalism and dismiss the whole topic of qualia. It complexifies matters, however, to consider that the term qualia was introduced by the founder of pragmatism himself. Peirce was adamant that only triadic relations can support language and cognition. Even so, he insisted on purely logical grounds that, when we analyze triadic signs all the way, we are left with a qualitative residue he called Firstness. Such an isolated relatum could never be studied experimentally. Yet, given that this primitive state can be confirmed by means of a formal or prescissive distinction, I believe the Peircean account can do justice to many of the intuitions that generate the so-called hard problem of consciousness. My goal, then, is to show that Peirce's semiotic commitment to qualia is compatible with his foundational statements about pragmatism.
Philosophical Psychology, vol. 26, no. 1 (February 2013), pp. 129-138.
Following recent work by Don Ross (Ross, 2000; Ross & Spurrett, 2004), I contrast the influential... more Following recent work by Don Ross (Ross, 2000; Ross & Spurrett, 2004), I contrast the influential theories of Daniel Dennett and Paul Churchland in information-theoretic terms. Dennett makes much of the fact that the morphological shorthand which emerges before a witness as she looks upon cohesive aggregates of matter commands some measure of predictive power. This, for him, speaks against eliminating recourse to an intentional vocabulary. By contrast, the eliminative materialism defended by Churchland does not gloss such informational compressibility as an explanatory desideratum, and thus regards the informational noise which accrues at higher levels of description as patently unacceptable. Yet, since it is unlikely, as Ross et al. (2007) have recently suggested, that anything remains once we subtract the appeal to patterns, I argue that the ubiquity of informational compression in scientific explanation seriously undermines the claim that talk of the mental could be eliminated.
Dialogue (Cambridge University Press), vol. 48, no. 1 (March 2009), pp. 145-183.
This paper suggests that it is largely a want of notional distinctions which fosters the "explana... more This paper suggests that it is largely a want of notional distinctions which fosters the "explanatory gap" that has beset the study of consciousness since T. Nagel's revival of the topic. Modifying Ned Block's controversial claim that we should countenance a "phenomenal module" which exists in its own right, we argue that there is a way to recuperate the intuitions he appeals to without engaging in an onerous reification of the facet in question. By renewing with the full type/token/tone trichotomy developed by C. S. Peirce, we think the distinctness Block (rightly) calls attention to can be seen as stemming not from any separate module lurking within the mind, but rather from our ability to prescind qualities from occurrences.
Proceedings of the Semiotic Society of America, ed. by John N. Deely and Leonard G. Sbrocchi, pp. 557-564. New York, Ottawa, and Toronto: Legas Press, 2009.
"Representation" is one of those Janus-faced terms that seems blatantly obvious when used in a ca... more "Representation" is one of those Janus-faced terms that seems blatantly obvious when used in a casual or pre-theoretic manner, but which reveals itself far more slippery when attentively studied. Any allusion to "metarepresentation," it would then seem, only compounds these difficulties. Taking the metarepresentationalist framework in its roughest outline as our point of departure, we shall instead try to articulate four key "structural" features that appear binding for any such theory.
Epistemology by Marc Champagne
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Philosophy of Technology by Marc Champagne
A technological sea change is coming. So, to weather this onslaught of virtuality and artificiality, we must be grounded in reality as deeply as possible.
Join the many subscribers who, each month, receive philosophical confidence to skip such bandwagons and stick to what really brings meaning.
Philosophy of Mind by Marc Champagne
The term “semiotics” was introduced by John Locke in the modern period – its etymology is ancient Greek, and its theoretical underpinnings are medieval. Charles Sanders Peirce made major advances in semiotics, so he can act as a pipeline for these forgotten ideas. Most philosophers know Peirce as the founder of American pragmatism, but few know that he also coined the term “qualia,” which is meant to capture the intrinsic feel of an experience. Since pragmatic verification and qualia are now seen as conflicting commitments, Champagne endeavors to understand how Peirce could (or thought he could) have it both ways. The key, he suggests, is to understand how humans can insert distinctions between features that are always bound.
Recent attempts to take qualities seriously have resulted in versions of panpsychism, but Champagne outlines a more plausible way to achieve this. So, while semiotics has until now been the least known branch of philosophy ending in –ics, his book shows how a better understanding of that branch can move one of the liveliest debates in philosophy forward.
Epistemology by Marc Champagne
A technological sea change is coming. So, to weather this onslaught of virtuality and artificiality, we must be grounded in reality as deeply as possible.
Join the many subscribers who, each month, receive philosophical confidence to skip such bandwagons and stick to what really brings meaning.
The term “semiotics” was introduced by John Locke in the modern period – its etymology is ancient Greek, and its theoretical underpinnings are medieval. Charles Sanders Peirce made major advances in semiotics, so he can act as a pipeline for these forgotten ideas. Most philosophers know Peirce as the founder of American pragmatism, but few know that he also coined the term “qualia,” which is meant to capture the intrinsic feel of an experience. Since pragmatic verification and qualia are now seen as conflicting commitments, Champagne endeavors to understand how Peirce could (or thought he could) have it both ways. The key, he suggests, is to understand how humans can insert distinctions between features that are always bound.
Recent attempts to take qualities seriously have resulted in versions of panpsychism, but Champagne outlines a more plausible way to achieve this. So, while semiotics has until now been the least known branch of philosophy ending in –ics, his book shows how a better understanding of that branch can move one of the liveliest debates in philosophy forward.
do it all the time with great success. Reading Group Agency, though, makes
it look like rocket science...
What is common to all humans, regardless of their background? Is complete knowledge ever possible? What would constitute a meaningful life? Why have humans evolved the capacity for intelligence? Should one treat others as individuals or as members of a group? Is a single person powerless in the face of evil? What is the relation between speech, thought, and action? Why have religious myths and narratives figured so prominently in human history? Are the hierarchies we find in society good or bad?
After devoting a chapter to each of these questions, Champagne unites the different strands of Peterson’s thinking in a handy summary. Champagne then spends the remaining third of the book articulating his main critical concerns. He argues that while building on tradition is inevitable and indeed desirable, Peterson’s individualist project is hindered by the non-revisable character and self-sacrificial content of religious belief.
This engaging multidisciplinary study is ideal for those who know little about Peterson’s views, or for those who are familiar but want to see more clearly how Peterson’s views hang together. The debates spearheaded by Peterson are in full swing, so Myth, Meaning, and Antifragile Individualism should become a reference point for any serious engagement with Peterson’s ideas.
tradition does not ensure professionalism, nor indeed, clear-mindedness.
https://marcchampagnephilosopher.online/wp-content/uploads/2024/10/11-Lectures-and-Readings-on-C.-S.-Peirces-Entire-Philosophy.pdf
I am also in the initial stages of putting together a special guest-edited issue of Cosmos+Taxis on Sowell’s ideas. If you are an accomplished scholar and would like to contribute, you may send me an informal expression of interest at
marc.champagne@kpu.ca
Thanks—Share—Enjoy!
MC