John R. Searle

사회 세계 (MSW)를 aking에 자세히 언급하기 전에 m나는 먼저 철학 (설명 심리학)과 Searle (S)와 비트 겐슈타인 (W)의 작품에서 예시로 현대 심리학 연구와의 관계에 대한 몇 가지 의견을 제공 할 것입니다, 나는 이것이 행동에 Searle 또는 어떤 해설자를 배치하는 가장 좋은 방법이라고 생각하기 때문에, 적절한 관점에서. 그것은 크게 설명 심리학의이 두 천재에 의해 PNC, TLP, PI, OC, TARW 및 기타 책의 내 리뷰를 볼 도움이 될 것입니다.

S는 TLP의 메커니즘으로 W의 선견지명 진술과 그의 후기 작업에서 그의 파괴에 대한 언급을하지 않습니다. W, S는 행동의 이러한 기계적 견해의 주요 해체자가되었다, 그리고 가장 중요한 설명 심리학자 (철학자), 하지만 W가 그를 완전히 예상하고, 크게, 다른 사람을 수행 (하지만 W, 튜링과 AI에 프라우드 풋과 코플랜드의 많은 논문과 책을 참조하십시오). S의 작품은 W보다 훨씬 쉽게 따라할 수 있으며, 일부 전문 용어가 있지만 올바른 방향으로 접근하면 대부분 극적으로 분명합니다. 자세한 내용은 W S 및 기타 책에 대한 내 리뷰를 참조하십시오.

전반적으로, MSW는 작업의 S의 반세기에서 발생하는 Wittgenstein을 통해 많은 실질적인 발전의 좋은 요약이지만, 내 보기에, W는 여전히 그가 말하는 것을 파악하면 기본 심리학에 대한 타의 추종을 불허합니다 (내 리뷰 참조). 이상적으로,  그들은 함께 읽어야한다 : S1 / S2의 운영W의 기발한 예와 함께 설명 S2 / S3의 운영에 명확한 일관된 산문과 일반화에 대한 Searle, 그의 화려한 격언. 제가 훨씬 어렸을 때, 저는 그 일을 하는 책을 쓰곤 했습니다.

현대 의 두 시스템 보기에서인간의 행동에 대한 포괄적 인 최신 프레임 워크를 원하는 사람들은 내 책을 참조 할 수 있습니다'철학의 논리적 구조, 심리학, 민d와 루드비히  비트겐슈타인과 존 Searle의언어'  2nd ed (2019). 내 글의 더 많은 관심있는 사람들은 '이야기 원숭이를 볼 수 있습니다-철학, 심리학, 과학, 종교와 운명 행성에 정치 - 기사 및 리뷰 2006-2019 3 rd 에드 (2019) 및 21st  세기 4번째  에드 (2019)  및 기타에서 자살 유토피아 망상.

Was ist es, was eine Maschine, einen Computer oder einen
Menschen überhaupt intelligent macht? Diese Frage ist weitaus schwerer zu beantworten, als man zunächst erwarten würde. Man kann hier etwa auf die Fähigkeit des Denkens oder auf eine bestimmte Art des Handelns abstellen. Der Ansatz, dass sich Künstliche Intelligenz daran festmachen ließe, ob eine Maschine den gleichen Output wie ein Mensch nachahmen kann, ist seit den Anfangstagen der Fachdisziplin der Künstlichen Intelligenz bis heute stark verbreitet. Doch ebenso lange wird auch darüber diskutiert, ob damit der Wesensbereich menschlicher Intelligenz
überhaupt erfasst wird. Seit den 50er Jahren wird darüber
debattiert, ob die Simulation eines intelligenten Outputs ausreichend
sein kann für die Frage, ob ein System intelligent ist oder nicht
und ob zur menschlichen Intelligenz nicht gerade etwas hinzuzuzählen
ist, das über einen entsprechenden Abgleich von Outputs gar nicht zu
erfassen ist. Mit dieser Kritik an der Verifikationsmethode ist eine Kritik
an der Idee, dass Maschinen prinzipiell das Niveau menschlicher Intelligenz überhaupt erreichen könnten, eng verbunden. Die Idee, dass
dies prinzipiell erreichbar ist, wird einem Vorschlag von John Searle
folgend auch als starke KI-These bezeichnet, während die Kritiker nur
einer schwachen KI-These zustimmen können, wonach artifizielle Systeme lediglich Teilaspekte menschlicher Intelligenz erfolgreich simulieren können, aber eben nie im vollen Umfang als intelligent zu bezeichnen wären.
Zwei Kritikpunkte an der Vorstellung einer starken KI sind bis heute extrem wirkmächtig:
1.: Künstliche Intelligenz könne niemals ‚wirklich‘ intelligent sein,
weil das selbstbewusste ‚Ich‘ fehle, an dem nicht nur das Denken i.e.S.,
sondern wahlweise auch Intentionalität, Emotionen, phänomenale Bewusstseinszustände, freier Wille, Intuition und Ähnliches mehr hingen.
2.: Künstlicher Intelligenz fehle es an einer Verkörperung und
menschlichen Sozialisation, sie sei nicht eingebettet in eine Welt, in der
sie lernen und mit der sie reziprok und kontinuierlich in Verbindung
steht, was aber konstitutiv für die menschliche Art von Intelligenz sei.
Diese Art der Kritik und der Gegenentwurf von Befürwortern der
starken KI-These zeigen, dass die philosophische Debatte
um Künstliche Intelligenz untrennbar mit den ganz zentralen Fragen
der Philosophie des Geistes der letzten Jahrhunderte verbunden ist. Die
KI-Debatte wirft Fragen auf, deren Antworten von den Grundpositionen
abhängen, die in ihr eingenommen werden. Drei große kartographieren das Feld: Die erste Frage lautet, was das Selbst eigentlich ist, das sich in unserem Geist seiner selbst bewusst wird: Ist es eine Seele, also eine vom Körper zu trennende Substanz, oder handelt es sich um ein stark emergentes Phänomen, das jenseits physikalischer Gesetzmäßigkeiten aus dem Zusammenspiel unseres Gehirns entsteht oder aber ist es schlicht ein besonders kluger Trick der Evolution, der im Rahmen darwinistischer Prozesse entstanden und in keiner Weise mysteriös ist, sondern auch physikalisch erklärt werden kann. Die zweite ist die metaphysische Frage nach unserer Realität, ob das Sein also monistisch oder dualistisch zu verstehen ist, ob es letztlich aus den physikalischen Elementarteilchen und den zwischen ihnen wirkenden Kräften besteht, ober ob im Falle des menschlichen Geistes etwas Spirituelles hinzukommt. Und die dritte schließlich ist die anthropologische Frage nach dem, was der Mensch ist: Ist er etwas Herausgestelltes und Besonderes, das etwa kraft seiner Vernunft allem anderen Leben enthoben ist, oder ist er ein evolutionär besonders weit entwickeltes Tier oder aber ist er letztlich auch nur eine Maschine? Je nach Position zu diesen drei Fragen ergibt sich ein anderer Raum von Optionen, wie die starke KI-These zu beurteilen ist.

I start with some famous comments by the philosopher (psychologist) Ludwig Wittgenstein because Pinker shares with most people (due to the default settings of our evolved innate psychology) certain prejudices about the functioning of the mind and because Wittgenstein offers unique and profound insights into the workings of language, thought and reality (which he viewed as more or less coextensive) not found anywhere else. The last quote is the only reference Pinker makes to Wittgenstein in this volume, which is most unfortunate considering that he was one of the most brilliant and original analysts of language.

In the last chapter, using the famous metaphor of Plato’s cave, he beautifully summarizes the book with an overview of how the mind (language, thought, intentional psychology) –a product of blind selfishness, moderated only slightly by automated altruism for close relatives carrying copies of our genes--works automatically, but tries to end on an upbeat note by giving us hope that we can nevertheless employ its vast capabilities to cooperate and make the world a decent place to live.

Pinker is certainly aware of but says little about the fact that far more about our psychology is left out than included. Among windows into human nature that are left out or given minimal attention are math and geometry, music and sounds, images, events and causality, ontology (classes of things), dispositions (believing, thinking, judging, intending etc.) and the rest of intentional psychology of action, neurotransmitters and entheogens, spiritual states (e.g, satori and enlightenment, brain stimulation and recording, brain damage and behavioral deficits and disorders, games and sports, decision theory (incl. game theory and behavioral economics), animal behavior (very little language but a billion years of shared genetics). Many books have been written about each of these areas of intentional psychology. The data in this book are descriptions, not explanations that show why our brains do it this way or how it is done. How do we know to use the sentences in their various way (i.e., know all their meanings)? This is evolutionary psychology that operates at a more basic level –the level where Wittgenstein is most active. And there is scant attention to context.

Nevertheless this is a classic work and with these cautions is still well worth reading.

Those wishing a comprehensive up to date framework for human behavior from the modern two systems view may consult my article The Logical Structure of Philosophy, Psychology, Mind and Language as Revealed in Wittgenstein and Searle 59p(2016).  For all my articles on Wittgenstein and Searle see my e-book ‘The Logical Structure of Philosophy, Psychology, Mind and Language in Wittgenstein and Searle 367p (2016). Those interested in all my writings in their most recent versions may consult my e-book  Philosophy, Human Nature and the Collapse of Civilization  - Articles and Reviews 2006-2016  662p (2016).

All of my papers and books have now been published in revised versions both in ebooks and in printed books. 

Talking Monkeys: Philosophy, Psychology, Science, Religion and Politics on a Doomed Planet - Articles and Reviews 2006-2017 (2017)    https://www.amazon.com/dp/B071HVC7YP. 

  The Logical Structure of Philosophy, Psychology, Mind and Language in Ludwig Wittgenstein and John Searle--Articles and Reviews 2006-2016 (2017)  https://www.amazon.com/dp/B071P1RP1B.

Suicidal Utopian Delusions in the 21st century: Philosophy, Human Nature and the Collapse of Civilization - Articles and Reviews 2006-2017 (2017)    https://www.amazon.com/dp/B0711R5LGX 

Suicide by Democracy: an Obituary for America and the World (2018) https://www.amazon.com/dp/B07CQVWV9C

In addition to the Frege point, Frege also argued for the force-content distinction from the fact that an affirmative answer to a yes-no question constitutes an assertion. I argue that this fact more readily supports the view that questions operate on and present assertions and other forceful acts themselves. Force is neither added to propositions as on the traditional view, nor is it cancelled as has recently been proposed. Rather higher level acts such as questioning, but also e.g. conditionalizing, embed assertive or directive acts that are forceful and committal, while suspending commitment to them. The Frege point confounds different varieties of force and the question whether something is merely presented for consideration with the question what is so presented. Force is representational: through assertoric and directive force indicators subjects non-conceptually present positions of theoretical or practical knowledge, while interrogative acts indicate positions of wondering which strive for such knowledge.

Estudio sobre la teoría de los actos de habla de Searle y Habermas. Tras analizar los principales puntos de conflicto entre ambos autores, se defiende la posición de Habermas a partir de los problemas de la taxonomía de los actos de habla propuesta por Searle.

John Searle The Construction of Social Reality című könyvében a társadalom ontológiájának egy igen kidolgozott elméletét nyújtja. Elképzeléseit a legtöbben hagyományos metafizikai teóriaként értelmezik, Joshua Rust John Searle and The Construction of Social Reality című munkájában azonban amellett érvel, hogy azokat sokkal inkább a Max Weber által használt ideáltípus fogalmának segítségével kell megértenünk – olyan fogalmi segédeszközként, mely ugyan hasznunkra van a társadalmi jelenségek magyarázatakor, ám nem képez le semmiféle valós tényállást. Írásomban a következő tézis mellett foglalok állást: Rust olvasata üdvözlendő eredményekkel jár, mivel egyrészt lényegi belátásokat nyújt Searle elméletének természetéről, másrészt lehetőséget biztosít arra is, hogy megvédjük azt néhány komoly ellenvetéstől, ontológiai előfeltevései ugyanakkor igen problémásak. Rust értelmezése ugyanis azon a neo-kantiánus metafizikai állásponton nyugszik, hogy a társadalmi létezők végtelenül összetettek és nem rendelkeznek önálló jogukon struktúrával. Ez az igen kontraintuitív feltevés azonban helyettesíthető egy jóval természetesebb, pluralista elgondolással is, amely szerint a társadalom ontológiája nem végtelenül összetett, mindössze rendkívül sokféle – ez magyarázza Searle nézeteinek ideáltipikus tulajdonságait. Ez az erős intuitív alapokkal bíró megoldás lehetőséget biztosít úgy Searle, mint Rust eredményeinek megőrzésére, épp ezért úgy vélem, minden okunk megvan elfogadni azt, még ha a társadalom egységes ontológiai elméletének eszméje nem is fér össze vele.

Reading Wahrheit und Rechtfertigung (1999) and more specifically what Jürgen Habermas writes in the "Introduction" to this book, I try to explain his answer to the epistemological problem of realism. Habermas wants to hold on to the moment of unconditionality that is part of the correspondence idea of truth, while retaining an internal relation between truth and justifiability. His aim is to work out a theory of truth that is inherently pragmatic yet retains the idea of an unconditional truth claim. In light of Habermas’s criticism, in 1996, of Richard Rorty’s pragmatic turn, his early treatment of a pragmatic theory of truth is important. What Searle tries to show in 1995, in The Construction of Social Reality, is that “external realism” is presupposed by the use of large sections of a public language: for a large class of utterances, each individual utterance requires for its intelligibility a publicly accessible reality that he characterized as representation independent. There is nothing epistemic about realism so construed. The presupposition of realism is not just one claim among others, but is, he insists, “a condition of possibility of my being able to make publicly accessible claims at all”. Metaphysical realism and conceptual relativism are then perfectly consistent.

The book introduces Tadeusz Kotarbiński’s philosophy of action into the mainstream of contemporary action-theoretical debates. Piotr Makowski shows that Kotarbiński–Alfred Tarski’s teacher and one of the most important philosophers of the renowned Lvov-Warsaw school—proposed a groundbreaking, original, and (in at least a few respects) still fresh perspective in action theorizing. The book examines and develops Kotarbiński’s ideas in the context of the most recent discussions in the philosophy of action. The main idea behind Kotarbiński’s action theory—and thus, behind this book—is the significance of the philosophical investigations of the general conditions of effectiveness, efficiency, and economy of intentional actions. Makowski presents and reinterprets Kotarbiński’s views on these dimensions of our activities and sheds new light on the most important areas of action theory.

Après un demi-siècle dans l’oubli, la nature de la conscience est maintenant le sujet le plus chaud dans les sciences du comportement et la philosophie. Commençant par le travail pionnier de Ludwig Wittgenstein dans les années 1930 (les Livres Bleus et Brown) et des années 50 à nos jours par son successeur logique John Searle, j’ai créé la table suivante comme un heuristique pour la poursuite de cette étude. Les lignes montrent divers aspects ou façons d’étudier et les colonnes montrent les processus involontaires et les comportements volontaires comprenant les deux systèmes (deux processus) de la Structure Logique de la Conscience (LSC), qui peuvent également être considérés comme la structure logique de la rationalité (LSR-Searle), du comportement (LSB), de la personnalité (LSP), de la réalité (LSOR), de l’intentionnalité (LSI) - le terme philosophique classique, la psychologie détative , la psychologie descriptive de la pensée (DPT) - ou mieux, le langage de la psychologie descriptive de la pensée (LDPT), termes introduits ici et dans mes autres écrits très récents.
Ceux qui souhaitent un cadre complet à jour pour le comportement humain de la vue moderne de deuxemssyst peuvent consulter mon livre 'The Logical Structure of Philosophy, Psychology, Mind and Language in Ludwig Wittgenstein and John Searle' 2nd ed (2019). Ceux qui s’intéressent à plus de mes écrits peuvent voir «Talking Monkeys --Philosophie, Psychologie, Science, Religion et Politique sur une planète condamnée --Articles et revues 2006-2019 3e ed (2019) et Suicidal Utopian Delusions in the 21st Century 4th ed (2019) et autres.

This collection of articles was written over the last 10 years and edited them to bring them up to date (2017). The copyright page has the date of the edition and new editions will be noted there as I edit old articles or add new ones. All the articles are about human behavior (as are all articles by anyone about anything), and so about the limitations of having a recent monkey ancestry (8 million years or much less depending on viewpoint) and manifest words and deeds  within the framework of our innate psychology as presented in the table of intentionality.  As famous evolutionist Richard Leakey says, it is critical to keep in mind not that we evolved from apes, but that in every important way, we are apes.  If everyone was given a real understanding of this (i.e., of human ecology and psychology to actually give them some control over themselves), maybe civilization would have a chance.  As things are however the leaders of society have no more grasp of things than their constituents and so collapse into anarchy is inevitable.

The first group of articles attempt to give some insight into how we behave that is reasonably free of theoretical delusions. In the next three groups I comment on three of the principal delusions preventing a sustainable world— technology, religion and politics (cooperative groups). Certainly each has much of value, but as currently implemented, they are all band aids on the cancer of selfishness and stupidity, and as handmaidens of selfish genetics lead straight to Hell on Earth.

It is critical to understand why we behave as we do and so the first section presents articles that try to describe (not explain as Wittgenstein insisted) behavior.  I start with a brief review of the logical structure of rationality, which provides some heuristics for the description of language (mind, rationality, personality) and gives some suggestions as to how this relates to the evolution of social behavior.  This centers around the two writers I have found the most important in this regard, Ludwig Wittgenstein and John Searle, whose ideas I combine and extend within the dual system (two systems of thought) framework that has proven so useful in recent thinking and reasoning research. As I note, there is in my view essentially complete overlap between philosophy, in the strict sense of the enduring questions that concern the academic discipline, and the descriptive psychology of higher order thought (behavior). Once one has grasped Wittgenstein’s insight that there is only the issue of how the language game is to be played, one determines the Conditions of Satisfaction (what makes a statement true or satisfied etc.) and that is the end of the discussion.

The key to everything about us is biology, and it is obliviousness to it that leads millions of smart educated people like Obama, Chomsky, Clinton and the Pope to espouse suicidal utopian ideals that inexorably lead straight to Hell On Earth.  As W noted, it is what is always before our eyes that is the hardest to see.  We live in the world of conscious deliberative linguistic System 2, but it is unconscious, automatic reflexive System 1 that rules. This is the source of the universal blindness described by Searle’s The Phenomenological Illusion (TPI), Pinker’s Blank Slate and Tooby and Cosmides’ Standard Social Science Model.

The next section describes the digital delusions, which confuse the language games of System 2 with the automatisms of System one, and so cannot distinguish biological machines (i.e., people) from other kinds of machines (i.e., computers).  The ‘reductionist’ claim is that one can ‘explain’ behavior at a ‘lower’ level, but what actually happens is that one does not explain human behavior but a ‘stand in’ for it.  Hence the title of Searle’s classic review of Dennett’s book (“Consciousness Explained”)— “Consciousness Explained Away”.  In most contexts ‘reduction’ of higher level emergent behavior to brain functions, biochemistry, or physics is incoherent. Even for ‘reduction’ of chemistry or physics, the path is blocked by chaos and uncertainty.  Anything can be ‘represented’ by equations, but when they ‘represent’ higher order behavior, it is not clear (and cannot be made clear) what the ‘results’ mean.  Reductionist metaphysics is a joke, but most scientists and philosophers lack the appropriate sense of humor.

Other digital delusions are that we will be saved from the pure evil (selfishness) of System 1 by computers/AI/robotics/ nanotech/genetic engineering created by System 2.  The No Free Lunch principal tells us there will be serious and possibly fatal consequences.  The adventurous may regard this principle as a higher order emergent expression of the Second Law of Thermodynamics. Hi-tech enthusiasts hugely underestimate the problems resulting from unrestrained motherhood, and of course it is neither profitable nor politically correct (and now with third world supremacism dominant, not even possible) to be honest about it.

The last section describes The One Big Happy Family Delusion , i.e., that we are selected for cooperation with everyone, and that the euphonious ideals of Democracy, Diversity and Equality  will lead us into utopia, if we just manage things correctly (the possibility of politics).  Again, the No Free Lunch Principle ought to warn us it cannot be true, and we see throughout history and all over the contemporary world, that without strict controls, selfishness and stupidity gain the upper hand and soon destroy any nation that embraces it. In addition, the monkey mind steeply discounts the future, and so we cooperate in selling our descendant’s heritage for temporary comforts, greatly exacerbating the problems.

I describe versions of this delusion (i.e., that we are basically ‘friendly’ if just given a chance) as it appears in some recent books on sociology/biology/economics. I end with an essay on the great tragedy playing out in America and the world, which can be seen as a direct result of our evolved psychology manifested as the inexorable machinations of System 1.  Our psychology, eminently adaptive and eugenic on the plains of Africa from ca. 6 million years ago, when we split from chimpanzees, to ca. 50,000 years ago, when many of our ancestors left Africa (i.e., in the EEA or Environment of Evolutionary Adaptation), is now maladaptive and dysgenic and the source of our Suicidal Utopian Delusions. So, like all discussions of behavior (philosophy, psychology, sociology, biology, anthropology, politics, law, literature, history, economics, soccer strategies, business meetings, etc.), this book is about evolutionary strategies, selfish genes and inclusive fitness (kin selection).
The great mystic Osho said that the separation of God and Heaven from Earth and Humankind was the most evil idea that ever entered the Human mind.  In the 20th century an even more evil notion arose—that humans are born with rights, rather than having to earn privileges.  Thus every day the population increases by 200,000, who must be provided with resources to grow and space to live, and who soon produce another 200,000 etc.  And one almost never hears it noted that what they receive must be taken from those already alive. Their lives diminish those already here in both major obvious and countless subtle ways.  Every new baby destroys the earth from the moment of conception. There cannot be human rights without human wrongs.  It cannot be more obvious, but one will never see the streets full of protesters with banners protesting motherhood.

America and the world are in the process of collapse from excessive population growth, most of it for the last century and now all of it due to 3rd world people. Consumption of resources and the addition of 4 billion more ca. 2100 will collapse industrial civilization and bring about starvation, disease, violence and war on a staggering scale. Billions will die and nuclear war is all but certain. In America this is being hugely accelerated by massive immigration and immigrant reproduction, combined with abuses made possible by democracy. Depraved human nature inexorably turns the dream of democracy and diversity into a nightmare of crime and poverty. China will continue to overwhelm America and the world, as long as it maintains the dictatorship which limits selfishness. The root cause of collapse is the inability of our innate psychology to adapt to the modern world, which leads people to treat unrelated persons as though they had common interests. This, plus ignorance of basic biology and psychology, leads to the social engineering delusions of the partially educated who control democratic societies.  Few understand that if you help one person you harm someone else—there is no free lunch and every single item anyone consumes destroys the earth beyond repair. Consequently social policies everywhere are unsustainable and one by one all societies without stringent controls on selfishness will collapse into anarchy or dictatorship. Without dramatic and immediate changes, there is no hope for preventing the collapse of America, or any country that follows a democratic system.  Hence my concluding essay “Suicide by Democracy”.

John Searle’s account of collective intentions in action appears to have all the theoretical pros of the non-reductivist view on collective intentionality without the metaphysical cons of committing to the existence of group minds. According to Searle, when we collectively intend to do something together, we intend to cooperate in order to reach a collective goal. Intentions in the first-person plural form therefore have a particular psychological form or mode, for the we-intender conceives of his or her intended actions as singular contributions by means of which – or: by way of which – a collective goal is pursued. Accordingly, we-intentions are held to have a psychological mode with a “collective goal by means of (viz. by way of) singular contribution” structure, which makes them primitive and irreducible to intentions in the I-form. It is further contended that, albeit primitive and irreducible, we-intentions are not the mental states of an alleged group mind but always of an individual’s mind. This paper targets Searle’s claim of irreducibility by developing an argument whose aim is to show that, pace Searle, it is possible to track the idea of intentions with a psychological mode structured in terms of “collective goal by means of (viz. by way of) singular contribution” back to the concept of intentions in the I-form. The argument mainly relies on the idea that Searle’s technical expressions “being a collective goal by means of singular contribution intention in action” or “being a collective goal by way of singular contribution intention in action” are susceptible to conceptual analysis. The upshot of this analysis is that we-intentions can be reduced to complex bundles of mental states, all of which come in the first-person singular form. If this argument is sound, Searlean we-intentions do not belong to a primitive kind of mental states.

Con Darwin y Nietzsche se podría decir que inicia el proceso de naturalización del hombre. Para la religión el hombre fue creado con un objetivo y finalidad muy específica. Este fue creado con una doble ontología: una biológica (natural) y otra sobrenatural (divina). La filosofía de Nietzsche parte de la vida. Está en contra de la moral tradicional, que se fundamenta en Sócrates, Platón y el Cristianismo. El considera que esta moral es una moral contra la naturaleza porque va contra los instintos. Searle, a diferencia de Descartes, no cree que la mente, la conciencia y todo lo que tiene que ver con fenómenos de la mente, pertenezca a otro mundo diferente del mundo biológico. Según el Dr. Crick, las sensaciones, alegrías, penas, libertad, voluntad e identidad personal, son el resultado de la interacción de una innumerable cantidad de neuronas.

O tema da Linguagem ocupa um lugar central na Filosofia do século XX. Sob o influxo do giro linguís-tico, a Filosofia redefine não só a Ontologia como também a Epistemologia, a Ética, a Estética e a Lógica. Os estudos que compõem esta obra cons-tituem uma espécie de álbum de onde se pode vi-sualizar certas notas características do grande debate a respeito do tema. Reunindo pesquisadores de diferentes universidades o livro pretende ocupar um espaço que sirva de referência não somente para os que iniciam suas pesquisas como também para aqueles que pretendem ampliar o debate em Filosofia da Linguagem.

Judith Jarvis Thomson and others contend that rights are pro-tanto rather than absolute, that is, that rights may permissibly be infringed in some circumstances. Alan Gewirth maintains that there are some rights that are absolute because infringing them would amount to unspeakable evil. However, there seem to be possible circumstances in which it would be permissible to infringe even those rights. Specificationists, such as Gerald Gaus, Russ Shafer-Landau, Hillel Steiner and Kit Wellman, argue that all rights are absolute because they have implicit exceptions, the exceptions being either right-voiding or right-compatible. Specificationists have charged pro-tantoism with preventing rights from being action-guiding, and pro-tantoists have levelled the same charge against specificationism. I show that both charges are mistaken. Pro-tantoists claim that specificationists cannot account for the moral remainder that we recognise in some circumstances and which can be explained by reference to a permissible right-infringement. Specificationists retort that the moral remainder can be explained by invoking compensation-rights. I show that the pro-tantoist claim is true and that the specificationist retort is false on two counts: explanation in terms of compensation-rights is not applicable to all cases; and it fails to account for the moral dynamic in the cases to which it is applicable. The contention that rights are pro-tanto does not conflict with the substance of the contention that rights are trumps, despite claims of specificationists to the contrary.

Dewey’s social ontology could be characterized as a habit ontology, an ontology of habit qua second nature that offers us an account of intentionality, social statuses, institutions, and norms in terms of habituations. Such an account offers us a promising alternative to contemporary intentionalist and deontic approaches to social ontology such as Searle’s. Furthermore, it could be the basis of a social ontology better suited to explain both the maintenance and the transformation of social reality.
In the first part I will characterize Dewey’s model as a social ontology based on the notion of habit, and present it as an alternative to intentionalist approaches to social reality. In the second part I will argue that habit ontology offers us an account of social norms that is based on a peculiar understanding of the notion of ‘status’, and represents an alternative to deontic accounts. In the third part I will claim that Dewey’s notion of “public” offers us a dynamic understanding of social institutions and a ‘reactive’ notion of collective intentionality as an achievement rather than as a presupposition of social practices. In the final section I will summarize some advantages of the Deweyan over the Searlean social ontology concerning our understanding of acceptance, maintenance and transformation of statuses, and of the role played by the ‘background’.

הטיעון שלי הוא שטבלת הכוונות (הרציונליות, התודעה , הנפש, המחשבה, השפה, האישיות וכדומה) שתכונות בולטת כאן מתארות פחות או יותר מדויק, או לפחות משמשת כיוריסטיל, כיצד אנו חושבים ומתנהגים, ולכן היא כוללת לא רק פילוסופיה ופסיכולוגיה, אלא כל דבר אחר (היסטוריה הערה במיוחד כי הכוונות והרציונליות כפי שאני (יחד עם סריל, Wittgenstein ואחרים) להציג אותו, כולל מערכת לשונית מודעת מודע 2 מודע אוטומטי prelinguistic מערכת 1 פעולות או רפלקסים.

אני מספק סקר קריטי של חלק מהממצאים העיקריים של שניים מהתלמידים הבולטים ביותר של התנהגות הזמנים המודרניים, לודוויג ויטגנשטיין וג סריל, על המבנה הלוגי של הכוונות (המוח, שפה, תודעה,  התנהגות), שלוקחים כנקודת המוצא של התגלית הבסיסית של ויטגנשטיין – שכל הבעיות הפילוסופיות הקיימות הן זהות – בלבולים לגבי אופן השימוש בשפה בהקשר מסוים, ולכן כל הפתרונות זהים – בהסתכלות בשפה שניתן להשתמש בהם בהקשר בנושא, כך שתנאי האמת (תנאי ש הבעיה הבסיסית היא שאפשר לומר  כל דבר , אבל אחד לא יכול להתכוון (המדינה ברורה כי) כל אמירה שרירותית ומשמעות אפשרית רק בהקשר ספציפי מאוד. אני מנתח כתבים שונים על ידי ועליהם מנקודת המבט המודרנית של שתי מערכות מחשבה (לפופולרי כמו "חשיבה מהירה, חשיבה איטית"), העסקת שולחן חדש של כוונות הכוונות החדש של מערכות כפולות מינוח. אני מראה שזוהי היוריסטירבת עוצמה לתיאור התנהגות.

לכן, כל ההתנהגות קשורה באופן אינטימי אם האדם מקבל את נקודת המבט הנכונה. האשליה הפנומנולוגית (השכחה למערכת האוטומטית שלנו 1) היא אוניברסלית והיא מתרחבת לא רק במהלך הפילוסופיה, אלא במהלך החיים. אני בטוח שחומסקי, אובמה, צוקרברג והאפיפיור היו מאוד בטוחים אם אמרו שהם סובלים מאותה בעיה כמו הגל, Husserl והיידגר, (או כי הם נבדלים רק במידה מסמים ומכורים למין בלהיות מונעים על ידי גירוי של מערבולות הקדמית שלהם על ידי משלוח של דופמין (ויותר מ 100 כימיקלים אחרים) דרך tegmentum והגרעין האקומבדים), אבל זה נכון בבירור. בעוד שphenomenologists בזבזו הרבה זמן של אנשים, הם מבזבזים את האדמה ואת עתידו של הצאצא שלהם.

[English abstract]

In this thesis I examine the mode of existence (or, rather, non-existence) of super-individual entities of power, i.e. those entities, like the State, supposed to transcend the individual and exercise power over it. I claim that the consequential and necessary inscription of these entities in a fictional context makes it impossible to derive deontologically compelling obligations from them, thus identifying a contradiction in Searle’s justification of “Y-independent terms” in his Making the Social World. I suggest a role of scientific authoritative speeches in this ontological and normative crisis.
In order to consistently explain the actual effects of power and domination of those inexistent entities, I subsequently combine Searle’s analytical account of social reality and his background notion with Foucault’s historical enquiries over disciplinary mechanisms, subjection devices and subjectivation practices. On the basis of their theories, I develop and try to define the concepts of linguistic entification of institutions, and of eidetic conditioning, i.e. the shaping of historical subjects in relation to an entified linguistic representation. As both notions are grounded in language, I apply them to a functional analysis of historical justification speeches about the State, focusing in particular on classical and contemporary contractarianism and its relation with theoretically defined ahistorical subjects and historically shaped individual ones.
Finally, I advance some theoretical, moral and practical considerations about the duty, for the individual, to oppose him/herself to the super-individual power as both ontologically deceptive and contrary to the autonomy imperative.

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[Indice]

1. Introduzione: la problematica natura del potere sovraindividuale
1.1 Ciò che a tutti è comune
1.2 Nέμεζις (la Nemesi)
1.3 Scienza, tecnica e potere sovraindividuale: una curiosa dialettica
1.4 Per un'analisi critica del potere sovraindividuale
1.5 Struttura dell'analisi
  1.5.1 La natura linguistica delle istituzioni esplicite e l’esistenza finzionale degli enti istituzionali
  1.5.2 Il rapporto tra potere, linguaggio e realtà extra-linguistica
  1.5.3 Sfondo e storicità del soggetto
1.6 Un‟applicazione del dispositivo analitico: il caso del contrattualismo
1.7 Verso la dissoluzione dell'oggetto dell'analisi

2. L’esistenza finzionale degli enti istituzionali
2.1 Un'esperienza mancata
2.2 L'interpretazione istituzionale dei fenomeni
2.3 L'intenzionalità in forma collettiva
2.4 Agire con le parole: le dichiarazioni come atti linguistici
2.5 La teoria generale dei fatti istituzionali e delle istituzioni di Searle
2.6 Lo strano caso dell‟esistenza delle “entità fittizie”

3. Trame complesse. Tra potere, linguaggio, e realtà
3.1 Chiusure inutili e confronti necessari
3.2 Searle e Foucault a confronto sul tema della verità
  3.2.1 Searle
  3.2.2 Foucault
  3.2.3 Lo scontro degli opposti
3.3 Atti linguistici: dal silenziamento al contesto di potere
3.4 Orwell: la verità come funzione di potere
3.5 Un‟ipotesi sul rapporto tra linguaggio e realtà

4. La storicità del soggetto: come si è resi ciò che si è
4.1 La durevole inesistenza: dal potere al dominio sovraindividuale
4.2 La nozione di Sfondo in Searle
4.3 La storicità del soggetto in Foucault
4.4 Soggettività ed esperienza
4.5 Come si è resi ciò che si è
4.6 Il pregiudizio a favore del reale: esistenza, esperienza e consistenza

5. Legittimazione e assoggettamento: il contrattualismo comedispositivo linguistico
5.1 Conseguenze politologiche dell'analisi ontologica
5.2 Analisi generale del contrattualismo classico
5.3 Da Kant a Rawls
5.4 Una teoria (circolare) della giustizia
5.5 La teoria delle dominazioni
5.6 Bilancio dell‟analisi e prospettive di sviluppo

6. La libertà in gioco
6.1 Tre accezioni dell'imperativo di autonomia
6.2 Tre possibili atteggiamenti nei confronti del discorso filosofico-giuridico
6.3 Tre possibili dispositivi filosofico-giuridici per l‟azione politica
  6.3.1 Il rispetto come vincolo collaterale alle azioni individuali
  6.3.2 L’autorità legittima come tensione al proprio superamento
  6.3.3 La legittimazione dinamica dello Stato

7. Conclusioni: solo il nulla èconcluso
7.1 Intuizioni, obbiettivi e tattiche
7.2 Guadagni teorici
7.3 Oltre la fine
7.4 Augurio conclusivo

8. Bibliografia

Este artigo tem por intuito debater a intenção autoral tendo por base os processos criativos de obras artísticas. Não utilizaremos nenhum relato criativo ou obra artística em específico, mas nos voltaremos para a análise do que considero ser apenas um problema de confusão com o termo " intenção " , diante do consenso arbitrário que faz Jacques Derrida com o conceito referido, sem ao menos expor o problema, tornando-o essencialmente um dogma para sua teoria comunicativa. Gostaria de principiar por uma distinção básica. Ao narrar o processo de uma obra artística, um artista em específico não está a falar de sua obra em si. Há uma diferença substancial entre narrar os percursos para se chegar a " x " , e descrever como é " x " , em que o primeiro momento é um ato de gênese, e o segundo, um ato descritivo ou valorativo. Falar sobre as escolhas feitas para se chegar à instalação, ou de que modo utilizei o projetor para ter um resultado que esperava encontrar não é uma única e mesma coisa que dizer que minha obra tem um apelo por demonstrar a transformação das experiências que tive em minha cidade natal. A primeira coisa é um relato de meu percurso para alcançar minha intenção poética, a segunda é avaliar ou estabelecer juízos sobre minha obra. Assim, acredito que o processo aponta para um caminho específico, intencionado por mim, mas ele não nos diz que aquele é o único caminho para se chegar ao lugar determinado. Serei norteado pelo seguinte questionamento, que me coloco desde já: o que queremos dizer quando falamos sobre a intenção nos processos criativos artísticos? Acredito que esse assunto em especial gera algumas confusões e polêmicas, nos estudos das humanidades e das artes. Contudo, ao longo de minha análise, procurarei sustentar que o engano partiria do modo como colocamos a pergunta (" o que queremos dizer quando falamos sobre a intenção nos processos criativos artísticos? " ou " ao dizer intenção autoral nos escritos literários o que teríamos em mente? "), mais do que de uma dificuldade intrínseca em lidar com o conceito, o que acaba por torná-lo um dogma para as artes, teoria do cinema ou a teoria literária em geral.

La presente tesis trata de la construcción de una visión metaética que comprenda la diversidad
de valores morales a lo largo de la historia y a lo ancho del espacio, es decir, de carácter
relativista, pero que además permita la convergencia de los valores morales dentro de grupos
socioculturales. Esto, con el objetivo de que la moral posea una flexibilidad tal que permita
la diferencia de opiniones, pero que también permita la generación de normas morales que
regulen la conducta de los miembros de los grupos sociales en su interacción con otros. Con
vistas a este objetivo, se abordan las teorías metaéticas de los filósofos David Hume y Jesse
Prinz, para establecer una forma de moral empirista, es decir, construida a partir de la
experiencia y, por lo tanto, relativa a la misma. Además, se analiza la posibilidad de integrar
la propuesta moral empirista al espectro de la realidad social pragmática de John Searle, de
tal manera que al componente relativista del empirismo se sume la normatividad proveniente
de los rasgos de la realidad social, cumpliendo así con el objetivo principal, en que se conjuga
lo subjetivo individual y lo intersubjetivo.

This collection of articles was written over the last 10 years and the most important and longest within the last year. Also I have edited them to bring them up to date (2016). The copyright page has the date of this first edition and new editions will be noted there as I edit old articles or add new ones. All the articles are about human behavior (as are all articles by anyone about anything), and so about the limitations of having a recent monkey ancestry (8 million years or much less depending on viewpoint) and manifest words and deeds  within the framework of our innate psychology as presented in the table of intentionality.  As famous evolutionist Richard Leakey says, it is critical to keep in mind not that we evolved from apes, but that in every important way, we are apes.  If everyone was given a real understanding of this (i.e., human ecology and psychology) in school, maybe civilization would have a chance.

In my view these articles and reviews have many novel and highly useful elements, in that they use my own version of the recently (ca. 1980’s) developed dual systems view of our brain and behavior to lay out a logical system of rationality (personality, psychology, mind, language, behavior, thought, reasoning, reality etc.) that is sorely lacking in the behavioral sciences (psychology, philosophy, literature, politics, anthropology, history, economics, sociology etc.). 

The philosophy centers around the two writers I have found the most important, Ludwig Wittgenstein and John Searle, whose ideas I combine and extend within the dual system (two systems of thought) framework that has proven so useful in recent thinking and reasoning research. As I note, there is in my view essentially complete overlap between philosophy, in the strict sense of the enduring questions that concern the academic discipline, and the descriptive psychology of higher order thought (behavior). Once one has grasped Wittgenstein’s insight that there is only the issue of how the language game is to be played, one determines the Conditions of Satisfaction (what makes a statement true or satisfied etc.) and that is the end of the discussion.

Now that I think I understand how the games work I have mostly lost interest in philosophy, which of course is how Wittgenstein said it should be. But since they are the result of our innate psychology, or as Wittgenstein put, it due to the lack of perspicuity of language, the problems run throughout all human discourse, so there is endless need for philosophical analysis, not only in the ‘human sciences’ of philosophy, sociology, anthropology, political science, psychology, history, literature, religion, etc., but in the ‘hard sciences’ of physics, mathematics, and biology.  It is universal to mix the language game questions with the real scientific ones as to what the empirical facts are. Scientism is ever present and the master has laid it before us long ago, i.e., Wittgenstein (hereafter W) beginning principally with the Blue and Brown Books in the early 1930’s.

"Philosophers constantly see the method of science before their eyes and are irresistibly tempted to ask and answer questions in the way science does. This tendency is the real source of metaphysics and leads the philosopher into complete darkness." (BBB p18)

Nevertheless, a real understanding of Wittgenstein’s work, and hence of how our psychology functions, is only beginning to spread in the second decade of the 21st century, due especially to P.M.S. Hacker (hereafter H) and Daniele Moyal-Sharrock (hereafter DMS), but also to many others, some of the more prominent of whom I mention in the articles.

When I read ‘On Certainty’ a few years ago I characterized it in an Amazon review as the Foundation Stone of Philosophy and Psychology and the most basic document for understanding behavior, and about the same time DMS was writing articles noting that it had solved the millennia old epistemological problem of how we can know anything for certain. I realized that W was the first one to grasp what is now characterized as the two systems or dual systems of thought, and I generated a dual systems (S1 and S2) terminology which I found to be very powerful in describing behavior.  I took the small table that John Searle (hereafter S) had been using, expanded it greatly, and found later that it integrated perfectly with the framework being used by various current workers in thinking and reasoning research.

Since they were published individually, I have tried to make the book reviews and articles stand by themselves, insofar as possible, and this accounts for the repetition of various sections, notably the table and its explanation. I start with a short article that presents the table of intentionality and briefly describes its terminology and background.  Next, is by far the longest article, which attempts a survey of the work of W and S as it relates to the table and so to an understanding or description (not explanation as W insisted) of behavior.

The key to everything about us is biology, and it is obliviousness to it that leads millions of smart educated people like Obama, Chomsky, Clinton and the Pope to espouse suicidal utopian ideals that inexorably lead straight to Hell On Earth. As W noted, it is what is always before our eyes that is the hardest to see.  We live in the world of conscious deliberative linguistic System 2, but it is unconscious, automatic reflexive System 1 that rules. This is Searle’s The Phenomenological Illusion (TPI), Pinker’s Blank Slate and Tooby and Cosmides Standard Social Science Model. Democracy and equality are wonderful ideals, but without strict controls, selfishness and stupidity gain the upper hand and soon destroy any nation and any world that adopts them. The monkey mind steeply discounts the future, and so we sell our children’s heritage for temporary comforts. Thus I end with an essay on the great tragedy playing out in America and the world, which can be seen as a direct result of TPI.

The astute may wonder why we cannot see System 1 at work, but it is clearly counterproductive for an animal to be thinking about or second guessing every action, and in any case there is no time for the slow, massively integrated System 2 to be involved in the constant stream of split second ‘decisions’ we must make. As W noted, our ‘thoughts’ (T1 or the thoughts of System 1) must lead directly to actions.

It is my contention that the table of intentionality (rationality, mind, thought, language, personality etc.) that features prominently here describes more or less accurately, or at least serves an heuristic for how we think and behave, and so it encompasses not merely philosophy and psychology but everything else (history, literature, mathematics, politics etc.). Note especially that intentionality and rationality as I (along with Searle, Wittgenstein and others) view it, includes both conscious deliberative System 2 and unconscious automated System 1 actions or reflexes.

Thus all the articles, like all behavior, are intimately connected if one knows how to look at them. As I note, The Phenomenological Illusion (oblivion to our automated System 1) is universal and extends not merely throughout philosophy but throughout life. I am sure that Chomsky, Obama, Zuckerberg and the Pope would be incredulous if told that they suffer from the same problem as Hegel, Husserl and Heidegger, but it’s clearly true.  While the phenomenologists only wasted a lot of people’s time, they are wasting the earth.

Those wishing a comprehensive up to date framework for human behavior from the modern two systems view may consult my book ‘The Logical Structure of Philosophy, Psychology, Mind and Language in Ludwig Wittgenstein and John Searle’ 2nd ed (2019). Those interested in more of my writings may see ‘Talking Monkeys--Philosophy, Psychology, Science, Religion and Politics on a Doomed Planet--Articles and Reviews 2006-2019 3rd ed (2019), The Logical Structure of Human Behavior (2019), and Suicidal Utopian Delusions in the 21st Century 4th ed (2019)

A partir de mi experiencia en la clínica psicoanalítica y en la danza-improvisación, revisito y amplifico la tesis doctoral y algunos ensayos anteriores. Persigo una filosofía de lo carnal apuntada por Maine de Biran a través de la teoría del trauma delineada por Sigmund Freud y de la hermenéutica nacionalsocialista de Martin Heidegger para rescatar la intuición mística del cuerpo disuelto en la práctica artística de la performance.

A la performance académica -y traumática- del debate Searle-Derrida, paradigma de deshonestidad intelectual y crisis de la universidad, contrapongo los estudios de Jerzy Grotowski, el Kundance de Dominik Borucki y el método Gaga de Ohad Naharin como prácticas de disolución del cuerpo social que nos acercan a la realidad del cuerpo continuo.

La hipótesis de trabajo consiste en que solo superficialmente somos cuerpos contiguos, por lo que no solo no existe "individuo" sino que también "la sociedad" carece de existencia. Así, por ejemplo, el género no es siquiera una construcción social porque lo social es efecto de la misma psicosis que separó el habla de la emoción primordial.

Experiencias terminales del lenguaje sugieren que el espejismo de la identidad se pierde al aparecernos el cuerpo continuo; y que esto no sea repetible pero sí testimoniable significa un cambio de paradigma científico donde el presente inefable es el único posible verdadero.

La Filosofia e l'Intelligenza Artificiale sono due discipline che, nel corso del tempo, hanno interagito e si sono impegnate in un dialogo fruttuoso: è innegabile, ad esempio, che l'IA abbia plasmato il modo in cui i filosofi concepiscono la mente umana e, viceversa, le diverse concezioni della mente hanno avuto un impatto in merito alla ricerca nel campo dell'IA. Siffatte interazioni hanno avuto luogo in quanto gli obiettivi che l'IA si pone l'hanno resa una disciplina di notevole interesse per molti filosofi.

A tal proposito, in quest'elaborato verranno analizzati due esperimenti mentali molto famosi, cioè il "Turing Test" ed il "Chinese Room Argument", formulati rispettivamente da Alan Turing e John R. Searle. Entrambe queste prove mirano a rispondere, in maniera più o meno diretta, all'interrogativo "Le macchine possono pensare?": Turing afferma di essere molto fiducioso, mentre Searle si dichiara assai scettico a riguardo.

Tale domanda non è ovviamente stata dibattuta solo da Turing e Searle, poiché ha dato vita ad una smisurata molteplicità di rivoli interpretativi: esistono infatti approcci anche radicalmente differenti alla disciplina dell'IA. Tramite questo paper non si ambisce ad una trattazione approfondita e rigorosa della domanda poc'anzi citata e neppure di tutti gli interrogativi suscitati dai testi presi in esame. Purtuttavia, l'elaborato mira a fornire alcuni spunti di riflessione limitatamente ad alcuni aspetti relativi all'intelligenza artificiale e alle implicazioni più immediate dei due esperimenti mentali che son stati esaminati.

This paper, by focusing on the different views of the constructivist and discursive camps on topics including agency, consciousness, causality and by reference to the literature on various forms of social identities such as gender, sexual orientation, and class; draws on works of thinkers such as Michel Foucault, Ernesto Laclau, and Chantal Mouffe to provide a poststructuralist critique of constructivist notion of identity. To enrich the argument, the paper builds upon a wide range of theoretical accounts, from John Searle’s analytical philosophy in explanation of social constructionism, to the theoretical debate between Max Weber and Emile Durkheim on the unit of analysis for the study of culture.

The relationship between intention, intentional action, and moral assessment is of fundamental importance to ethical theory. In large part, moral responsibility is based on an assessment of agent responsibility, which in turn is based on the connection between an agent's intentions and the actions which they cause. In the last twenty-five years, there has been a debate in contemporary action theory about the relationship between intentions and intentional action. Objecting to what he calls the "Simple View," which he characterizes as the view that all intentional actions are intended under some description, Michael Bratman, among others, argues that not all intentional actions are intended. In this dissertation, we will defend the Simple View by appealing to Aristotle's theory of action as developed in his psychological and ethical works. In the first part of the dissertation, we argue that all intentional actions are intended under some description; however, we argue that distinctions between different types of intention are essential: specifically, the distinction between deliberate and non-deliberate intentions and the distinction between the intention of the end and the intention of the means. Our account centers on Aristotle's concept of prohairesis, which he identifies as the distinctly human principle of action. The term prohairesis in Aristotle's works seems to have at least three senses: 1) primarily, the deliberate intention with which a person acts, an `occurent' choice; 2) the habitual or `dispositional' choice or resolve of `decent' people; and 3) general purposes that men have which may encompass voluntary action as a whole. The first sense of the term is the primary one that properly signifies the concept. Prohairesis fits within the general framework of animal motion which Aristotle sets out in the De Anima and De Motu Animalium. For Aristotle, orexis or desire is the cause of all animal motion, including human motion. Prohairesis is a deliberate desire for the means to an end. It is a principle of action peculiar to mature human beings capable of deliberating, as it is the intention which is the result of deliberation. It marks off a narrow but important stretch of intentional action. Prohairesis is set off against other types of intention, like boulesis, which is an intention of the end, and epithumia (bodily appetite) and thumos (anger), which are non-deliberate intentions relating to non-rational appetites like lust and anger. Aristotle, in contrast to contemporary accounts of intentional action, is unusually specific in his designation of the different kinds of intention. Different orexeis differ not only with regard to specific objects but also with regard to time, planning, and detail. Aristotle traces both the causal and moral responsibility agents have for their actions to the action of these internal principles of desire. Moral assessment is linked to the operative internal principle of an act. This allows for an action to be voluntary and intentional, even if the agent does not fully understand or plan for the consequences of an action. Intention, for Aristotle, if we correctly understand it as orexis and what results from orexis, is not reducible to one mode but is irreducibly plural. Furthermore, each person's capacity for intentional action is shaped by his character, and each character has correspondingly different kinds of intention, both with respect to the objects of intention and in their relation to action. Finally, the scope of intention is not definite, and depending on the agent, can include those things which attend to the means of which he has cognizance, for instance, harmful side-effect consequences or other costs of his action. In the second part of the dissertation, we examine at length the objections to the Simple View, lodged by Bratman, Gilbert Harman, and Joshua Knobe. We give an overview of objections by Bratman, Harman, and Knobe which center on three cases and four objections. The cases are: 1) a hypothetical video game; 2) unexpected success; and 3) unintended consequences. The objections are: 1) with respect to the hypothetical video game, the Simple View ascribes an irrational intention to a gamer playing the game; 2) When agents are doubtful of the success of an action they undertake, the Simple View requires that they intend the act the perform rather than that they merely try to perform the act, which opponents argue that this is irrational and false; 3) The Simple View entails the rejection of the distinction between intention and foresight which itself entails that agents intend all the results of their actions, even when those results are merely foreseen and not intended; 4) The Simple View does not adequately explain ordinary language usage with respect to ascriptions of intention for side-effect consequences, and therefore does not reflect basic, commonly shared notions of intentional action. The first two objections center on cases where it seems irrational for an agent to intend the act he performs. In the case of the video game, the scenario is so set up that the player wins a prize for hitting either target but knows that he cannot hit both or the game will shut down. It seems irrational for him to intend to hit both if he cannot; however, in order to maximize his chance winning, it would be rational to aim at both. In the case of unexpected success, it seems that agents do not intend acts whose chances of success they doubt because intending seems to require the positive belief that one will succeed; rather, it is argued that agents merely try but do not intend the act they perform. Against these cases and objections, we argue that agents are capable of conditional and complex intentions, such that one may conditionally intend to hit whichever target is opportune, while aiming at both. Likewise, we argue that intending to act does not require the positive belief that one will succeed; only that it is possible for one to succeed. Furthermore, the distinction between trying and intending is specious. Finally, we respond to the third and fourth objections centering on the intentionality of side-effect consequences. It is argued by Bratman et al. that the Simple View entails the rejection of the distinction between intention and foresight, and that such a rejection further entails consequentialism. Likewise it is also argued that the Simple View fails to account for ordinary language ascriptions of intentionality for side-effect consequences. We agree that the Simple View entails rejecting the distinction between intention and foresight as it is currently applied, but deny that this entails consequentialism, i.e., the view that the consequences of an action are the primary basis for moral evaluation and not the agent's intentions. Likewise, we agree that the Simple View does not model ordinary language ascriptions of intention; however, this is not necessarily a defect since such ascriptions are inconsistent and imprecise. Furthermore, we argue that the Simple View might be used to more adequately explain such usage. We center our response to these objections on the Doctrine of Double Effect. We argue that the doctrine arises from a mistaken interpretation of St. Thomas Aquinas' treatment of defensive killing. We argue that Aquinas does not hold that the death of an attacker is a foreseen but not intended side-effect, as proponents of Double Effect and opponents of the Simple View hold; rather it is intended as a means to the end of self-defense. Therefore, the two effects are not the desired end and a side-effect but rather the intended end and the intended means. Furthermore, we argue that this does not entail doing evil for the sake of good because Aquinas' Aristotelian account of action specification incorporates circumstances as essential components of intentions which give an act its moral quality. Furthermore, the necessary references to an agent's intentions show how the rejection of the application of the distinction between intention and foresight does not entail consequentialism. Finally, we tackle the underlying assumptions about intention and desire which lead to the rejection of the Simple View. Opponents of the Simple View hold that intention is not a form of desire because then it would not have an essential role in the genesis of action or in rational deliberation. We, however, argue that the major objections to the Simple View are defeasible once one understands intention as a species of desire, i.e. a deliberate desire, whose scope includes consequences beyond acts performed and goals achieved. The paradoxes at the heart of the debate hinge on the ambiguity of the English word `intention' and its usage, as well as the inherent difficulty of examining psychological concepts. `Intention' has several senses unified by the purposiveness of the mental states to which the word is referred. These senses can often, but not always, be distinguished in English usage by the degree and kind of deliberation attendant to them.

El cerebro es un producto de la selección natural. La capacidad comunicativa de las neuronas es una herencia de la habilidad comunicativa de las bacterias. Especulamos que este es el posible origen de la facultad del lenguaje. La mente, la conciencia y los estados mentales son producidos por los procesos de bajo nivel del cerebro. La mente no tiene una ontología distinta a la ontología del mundo real. La visión de Searle es anti-dualista y anti-reduccionista. La concepción de la mente de Searle es un monismo no reduccionista. La mente humana, la conciencia y estados mentales son irreductibles al dualismo y a ningún tipo de reduccionismo como: el funcionalismo, materialismo, computacionalismo y demás teorías reduccionistas. El funcionalismo solo se limita a describir los fenómenos y eventos externos a nuestro cerebro, pero no tiene la capacidad de describir lo que pasa dentro. Es imposible crear máquinas con las mismas capacidades cognitivas humanas con la tecnología que existe en la actualidad. Pensar y actuar como un ser humano va más allá de la manipulación de símbolos y la ejecución de reglas. Para pensar se necesitan organismos que sean capaces de tener semántica. El lenguaje es un puente que relaciona la mente con la realidad. Es el elemento constitutivo y fundacional de la realidad que crea el individuo. El lenguaje permite que podamos marcar, etiquetar y nombrar las cosas del mundo para poder organizarlas, conocerlas y procesarlas. Fuera del lenguaje los seres humanos no pueden conocer y acceder a la realidad. Gracias a la mente y al lenguaje, el ser humano ha creado la 'realidad-mundo'. Una realidad mediada por el lenguaje. La teoría social de Searle hace posible sentar las bases para explicar el mundo en términos monistas.

El lenguaje y la construcción de la realidad social han llegado a consolidarse como un tema de interés de un extenso debate dentro de dicha disciplina. Son varios los autores que han tratado la cuestión, pero en el presente texto se tratarán los enfoques de cinco de ellos: Michel Foucault, Alfred Schütz, John R. Searle, John Peter Berger y Thomas Luckmann. De este modo, se pretende exponer los argumentos a los que estos autores recurren para explicar cómo es posible la comunicación, así como analizar los puntos en común y las diferencias que existen entre unos y otros en determinados aspectos.

This research will argue about which theory of mind between Searle’s and Dennett’s can better explain human consciousness. Initially, distinctions between dualism and materialism will be discussed ranging from substance dualism, property dualism, physicalism, and functionalism. In this part, the main issue that is tackled in various theories of mind is revealed. It is the missing connection between input stimulus (neuronal reactions) and behavioral disposition: consciousness. Then, the discussion will be more specific on Searle’s biological naturalism and Dennett’s multiple drafts model as the two attempted to answer the issue. The differences between them will be highlighted and will be analyzed according to their relation to their roots: dualism and materialism. The two theories will be examined on how each answer the questions on consciousness. It will be revealed in this research that consciousness can have different brands. Dennett’s as one brand, operational consciousness, and...

El presente trabajo caracteriza brevemente la teoría cuántica de la mente desarrollada por Roger Penrose y Stuart Hameroff y ofrece algunas críticas sobre la misma.

This paper explains in short the quantic theory of mind developed by Roger Penrose and Stuart Hammeroff and offers some criticism on it

This paper presents a detailed analysis of Baudelaire's poem ''L'Invitation au voyage''. It aims to understand the general meaning of this poem, showing that Baudelaire's ''voyage'' comes less to an ideal paradise than to a kind of voluptuous purgatory. It brings together dimensions of the poem that are usually treated separately : biographical background, stylistic and intertextual borrowings (orientalized Holland, Goethe's Mignon, popular song and romance, Weber's music, Biblical episodes), formal structure and cognitive effects. The method of analysis is based on Benoît de Cornulier's theory of metrics, Searle and Vanderveken's speech act theory and Marc Dominicy's theory of poetic evocation. As Dominicy's theory is quite recent, the article provides substantial summary and clarification of its main theoretical and methodological hypothesis.

W artykule niniejszym omawiam kilka klasycznych sposobów podejścia do problemu intencjonalności. Zaczynam od ogólnego naszkicowania problemu. Następnie przechodzę do konkretnych propozycji. Najpierw omówiona zostanie ogólna postać teorii wprowadzającej byty zapośredniczające typu Fregowskiego, następnie teoria przedmiotów intencjonalnych, tak jak występuje ona u Brentana, Ingardena czy Meinonga, a także w wersji operujących ontologią światów możliwych. Kolejnym podejściem będą „przysłówkowe” teorie treści mentalnych, teorie kauzalne, teorie funkcjonalistyczno-reprezentacjonalistyczne oraz teorie behawiorystyczno-funkcjonalistyczne, głoszące pierwszeństwo intencjonalności językowej. Artykuł pomyślany jest jako wprowadzenie do problematyki, i w związku z tym nie znajdą się w nim ani wszystkie istotne zagadki ani też pełne i precyzyjne wersje argumentacji. Starałem się jednak pokazać podstawowe problemy oraz wewnętrzną logikę preferowania tych czy innych podejść.

The monograph focuses on handwritten signature as a frequently used medium, but still a neglected topic in
philosophy, semiotics and media studies. The goal of the research presented in this book is to characterize the specific semantic „message“ generated by signature, a medium that can be defined as a picture of the author's name drawn manually by the author himself, which is supposed to represent the author's civil identity. The book compares three different discursive expectations from signature in psychological graphology, forensic analysis and digital cryptography. The hierarchized knowledge of these three disciplines founds contemporary Czech legal mediation politics. By means of Derrida's deconstruction, the book proposes to rethink three aporias corresponding to the three metaphysical expectations from handwritten signature, which are shared in graphology and forensic analysis. The first metaphysical expectation from signature is the ability to let us recognize the writer: signature is understood as a "natural" picture of the author's name, which has the same qualities as the author himself. The second metaphysical expectation from signature is the ability to guarantee "authenticity": signature is taken as a proof of physical contact between the signed document and the writing instrument held by the author's hand. The third metaphysical expectation from signature is the capability of eternal and perpetual manual reproduction: handwritten signature is considered to be a personal logo, a graphical convention, which guarantees the author's legal "identity". By analyzing the mentioned metaphysical expectations and aporias generated by them, the book proposes a media semiotics of signature inspired by both Derrida's deconstruction and Eco's semiotics of conventional realism. The book brings a complex philosophical research of discursive and metaphysical conditions of possibility of the handwritten signature's interpretation.

The last several years have brought a renewed willingness to take seriously the phenomena we stab at with such terms and phrases as “subjectivity,” “consciousness,” and “the character of human existence.” The tone of today’s discussion, however, is very different from that which surrounded these words a half-century ago. Then, “existentialism” referred to issues of individual authenticity and commitment, “consciousness” was closely linked with concerns about action and with notions of social and historical determination, and Jean-Paul Sartre was the master thinker. The context in which existence, subjectivity, and consciousness were discussed was predominantly moral and political. In an important sense, as today’s talk about “subject position” and “the performance of identity” suggests, that discussion is still very much alive, though the terms are different, the context has changed from History-with-a-capital-“H” to matters of justice and liberty here and now, and Michel Foucault has displaced Sartre. At the same time, though, a different kind of inquiry into existence, subjectivity, and consciousness has taken shape, focused more squarely on the nature of these phenomena: on what sort of “thing” consciousness is, for example, on whether it can be explained, and, if so, what sort of explanation is required, and on why and how it matters.

O objetivo deste trabalho é propor um estudo comparativo envolvendo duas diferentes perspectivas teóricas para o estudo da consciência situadas no contexto da Filosofia Contemporânea da Mente e das Ciências Cognitivas. Analisaremos criticamente seus pressupostos, suas divergências e o alcance de suas propostas considerando os filósofos da mente John R. Searle e Daniel C. Dennett como paradigmas representantes de cada uma das duas perspectivas. A filosofia da mente de John Searle caracteriza-se por levar em consideração os aspectos subjetivos dos estados conscientes em uma perspectiva que nunca permite dispensar ou desconsiderar os dados de primeira pessoa no estudo da consciência. Estes dados geralmente dizem respeito às experiências conscientes e às peculiares impressões e sensações internas tais como os qualia. Por outro lado, Daniel Dennett adota a perspectiva de terceira pessoa no estudo da consciência, buscando critérios científicos para o desenvolvimento deste estudo sustentado por dados publicamente observáveis e intersubjetivamente definíveis. Estes dados levam em conta as evidências comportamentais, informacionais ou neurofisiológicas que remetem a aspectos mentais, tentando assim estabelecer uma relação explicativa destes com o que se entende por consciência. No atual campo de pesquisas da Filosofia da Mente junto às Ciências Cognitivas não há consenso sobre o método mais adequado para o estudo da consciência sendo, ao contrário disso, composto por várias divergências. Por este motivo, consideramos relevante uma confrontação entre as principais perspectivas utilizadas no estudo do assunto. Buscaremos realizar esta tarefa analisando as contribuições das teorias estudadas para a elucidação da relação subjetividade/objetividade dos estados conscientes.

Basta con conocer in situ los distintos modos de hacer filosofía que imperan a cada lado del canal de la Mancha -o del océano Atlántico- para tomar consciencia de que la filosofía contemporánea está dividida. Aunque lo más desconcertante de esta escisión es que no suele haber enfrentamientos explícitos, sino que la mayoría de los filósofos, tanto los llamados analíticos como los continentales, consigue hoy en día desatender durante la mayor parte del tiempo las aportaciones de la facción contraria, asumiéndolas como el ruido de fondo que uno ha de ignorar para ponerse a trabajar en lo que verdaderamente importa. Afortunadamente hay excepciones, y aquí se analiza una de ellas: el fallido debate que tuvo lugar entre John Searle y Jacques Derrida desde finales de los años setenta, en torno a la teoría de los actos de habla de John L. Austin.

Este ensayo no sólo estudia minuciosamente el desencuentro entre Searle y Derrida, sino que, esforzándose por superar la violencia y la incomprensión entonces manifiestas, ofrece sendas visiones retrospectivas de las tradiciones de los dos filósofos, a fin de contextualizar los motivos de su disputa y hacer de ella lo que no fue: una controversia respetuosa, sensata y fructífera. Se aprovecha así el episodio para retratar algunos momentos cruciales de la filosofía contemporánea y reflexionar sobre la peculiar naturaleza de esta disciplina, plasmada en prácticas intelectuales tan heterogéneas que cabe dudar de su unidad y su coherencia. De fondo, los grandes problemas de la filosofía del lenguaje y de la mente: la palabra como instrumento de comunicación, la intencionalidad de la conciencia y la diferancia como aspecto constitutivo de todo texto.

The author contends that a number of steps should
be taken if we want to honestly upgrade the thinking
instruments of a person, in particular of the Filipino.
Since logical reasoning is contextually rooted in
everyday discourse, it is argued that we replace the
logical term proposition with the term constative.
Secondly, if we intend to train ourselves to think
abstractly, then the Polish notation, rather than the
Hilbert-Ackermann notation, can better do this
function. At any rate, the Polish notation can serve as
an alternative just as perfectly as the Hilbert-Ackermann
notation. Thirdly, it is suggested⎯especially for
Filipino seminaries⎯to go symbolic since it is
economical and convenient, while at the same time
cleansing our modes of thinking of emotive barriers.
Lastly, for one to be completely logical, one needs to
understand that a three-unit course in modern logic,
while in the right direction, is insufficient.

John Searle'ün zihin felsefesinin temel fikirlerine dayanak noktası olarak görülebilecek ve onun zihin felsefesi sahasında edindiği önemli konumun başlıca etmenlerinden birisi olarak gösterilebilecek Çin odası argümanı bu çalışmanın araştırma konusudur. Çin Odası argümanı temelleri Alan Turing'e dayanan güçlü yapay zekâ teorisine karşı öne sürülmüş, bilgisayar programları gibi sentaktik işleyişe sahip olan yapıların anlamsal içeriğe sahip olamadıklarından onlara ait bir zihnin varlığından söz etmenin yanlış olacağını gerekçelendirmeyi amaçlayan bir düşünce deneyinden oluşmaktadır. Bu çalışmada, bu gerekçelendirmenin sistematik yapısı ayrıntılı olarak ele alınacak olup, iddialarına karşı sunulan anti-tezlerin haklılıkları da objektif bir yaklaşım ile değerlendirilmeye çalışılacaktır. Searle, güçlü yapay zekâ teorisine hem zihni beyinle bir ve aynı şey olarak gören özdeşlik teorisinin bir uzantısı olması hem de zihnin işleyişini sadece biçimsel yönden ele alması dolayısıyla karşı çıkmaktadır. Bu çalışmadaki amaç, Çin Odası argümanını hem Searle'ün kendi bütüncül felsefesi içerisinde değerlendirmek hem de bu düşünce deneyinin zihin felsefesi literatürüne sağladığı katkıyı ve kapı araladığı tartışma alanlarını göstermektir. Çin Odası düşünce deneyi, zihin-beden problemine hem monist hem de düalist yaklaşımların karşısında duran Searle'ün, zihin felsefesindeki genel tavrının bir yansımasıdır. Bu düşünce deneyine yöneltilen eleştiriler ve Searle tarafından bu eleştirilere verilen cevaplar ile birlikte zihin felsefesini uzunca bir süre meşgul etmiş olan tartışmalarla ulaşılan sonuçlar bu çalışmanın temel içeriğini oluşturmaktadır.

Questo progetto di tesi triennale fornisce una panoramica circa gli atteggiamenti delle espressioni referenziali du due diversi piani dell'analisi linguistico filosofica. Il primo, centrato sull'analisi semantica dei termini singolari, partendo dall'archetipico caso del Cratilo di Platone, tratta della cruciale diatriba tra posizione descrittiviste, concetti conglomerati teorie non descrittive. Il secondo, invece, colloca l'analisi dei sintagmi nominali all'intero del paradigma pragmatico, sia a livello contestuale che a livello semiotico.

・SUMMARY
In this paper, I trace the origin and historical vagaries of the term pragmatics from Morris' and Carnap's development of the notion down to its place in the work of John Austin, a leading proponent of ordinary language philosophy and a key figure in contemporary philosophy of natural language. First, the origin of the term pragmatics will be briefly summarized, in order to indicate some usages of the term that are divergent from the usage in this article. Secondly, we will review some definitions of the field, which will serve to indicate the rough scope of linguistic pragmatics. Thirdly, some reasons for the our interest in this field will be explained, and we finally will illustrate some basic kinds of pragmatic phenomena. Using a method to study performative utterances and the theory of speech acts, I provide some indications about the scope of linguistic pragmatics, situating it within three major philosophical systems —those of Austin, Grice, and Searle— and delineating its development from one system to the next. In passing, some analytical notions that are useful as a background will be introduced. Ultimately, my comparison of their systems reveals that the concept of the pragmatics, however specific its role in each system, remains linked to a communicative strategy.

・RÉSUMÉ
L'objectif de cet article est tout d'abord de montrer le réseau des contraintes conceptuelles dans lequel l'acte de langage se déroule. Je vais tout d'abord retracer l'origine et l'arrière-plan historique de la notion de pragmatique, telle qu'elle a été élaborée par Morris et Carnap, jusqu'aux travaux de John Austin, principal représentant de la philosophie contemporaine du langage ordinaire ou naturel. Dans un premier temps, l'origine de la pragmatique sera brièvement récapitulée, afin de faire apparaître quelques utilisations de ce terme qui diffèrent de celles que nous retenons dans notre article. Nous passerons ensuite en revue les définitions de ce champ pragmatique proposées par certains auteurs. Nous expliquerons enfin pour quelles raisons cette discipline nous intéresse et nous illustrerons les aspects essentiels des phénomènes pragmatiques. En utilisant la méthode d'approche de l'énonciation performative et la théorie des actes de langage, je ne présenterai que les visées essentielles de la pragmatique linguistique, au travers notamment de trois systèmes philosophiques (Austin, Grice, Searle), et je retracerai brièvement l'évolution des critères méthodologiques d'un système à un autre. Chemin faisant, un certain nombre de notions analytiques seront introduites. La comparaison des systèmes fera en fin de compte apparaître que le concept de pragmatique est inséparable des intentions contingentes des locuteurs et de leurs stratégies de communication.