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McDowell and the Hermeneutic Tradition, ed. by D.M. Feige and Th.J. Spiegel, Routledge, 2024
This article highlights from the perspective of the debate in the 1960s between hermeneutics and ... more This article highlights from the perspective of the debate in the 1960s between hermeneutics and critique of ideology some aspects under which both McDowell and Brandom take up some theses of hermeneutics – concerning the relation between language, experience, historicity, tradition, and rational authority – but at the same time give a central role to the question of reflection, and in this sense provide helpful devices to formulate some form of "critical hermeneutics" that responds to at least some of Habermas's concerns about the universality claim of hermeneutics. It will be argued that McDowell's second nature approach is better equipped than Brandom's constructivist model to formulate a model of internal critique understood as a process that is both natural and internal to historical processes, and proceeds as a piecemeal process of open-ended revision and reconstruction. Still, in order to succeed, McDowell's approach to radical critical reflection should take into account the whole spectrum of second nature – and not be limited to just the subjective dimension of rational animals and its virtues – and should rather be extended to the objective side of second nature, and consider how reflection stands between first and second nature.
Justice and Freedom in Hegel, ed. by P.D. Bubbio and A. Buchwalter, Routledge, 2024
This chapter shows in what sense the Aristotelian notion of philia is relevant for Hegel's unders... more This chapter shows in what sense the Aristotelian notion of philia is relevant for Hegel's understanding of the social presuppositions of justice. The path from Aristotle to Hegel is bidirectional. On the one hand, this chapter valorizes the largely Aristotelian heritage present in Hegel's understanding of political dispositions (Gesinnung). But, on the other hand, such a reconstruction will be conducted from a Hegelian perspective, insofar as it will argue that some Hegelian notions-in particular the notion of "recognition"-can help us to make explicit and reconstruct the Aristotelian theory of philia and its relation to the notion of justice.
Translated by G. Donis AhstracI: In this articIe I intend to show the strict relation between the... more Translated by G. Donis AhstracI: In this articIe I intend to show the strict relation between the notions of "second nature" and "recognition". To do so I begin with a problem (circularity) proper ro the theory ofHegelian and post-Hegelian Ane/'kennttng. 1he solution strategy I propose is signilìcant also in terms ofbringing into focus the problems connected with a notion of "space of reasons" that sterns from the Hegelian concept of "Spirit". I thus broach the notion of "second nature" as a bridgeconcept that can play a key role both for a renewal of the theory of Ane/'kenntlng and for a rethinking of the "space of reasons" within the debate between Robert Brandom and John McDowell. Against this background I illustrate the noveltics introduced by the dialectical conception of the relation between lìrst and second nature developed by Hegel and the contribution this idea can make to a revisited theory of recognition as a phenomenon articulated on two levds. I then retum lo the qucstion of the space of reasons to show the contribution the renewed conception of recognition as second nature makcs lo the definition of its intrinsic sociality as something that is not in principle opposed to a sense of naturalncss.
"I that is We, We that is I." Perspectives on Contemporary Hegel, 2016
Italo Testa e Luigi Ruggiu (a cura di) Recensione di Valeria Cesaroni Sotto la celebre formula he... more Italo Testa e Luigi Ruggiu (a cura di) Recensione di Valeria Cesaroni Sotto la celebre formula hegeliana che descrive il concetto di Spirito nel IV capitolo della Fenomenologia dello Spirito-«I that is We, We that is I» [Ich, das Wir, und Wir, das Ich ist]-il volume curato da Italo Testa e Luigi Ruggiu raccoglie gli atti del terzo convegno internazionale Contemporary Hegel, che si è svolto all'Università Ca' Foscari di Venezia nel 2013 1. Il filo rosso che collega gli interventi è la nozione hegeliana di riconoscimento, la quale, indagata nella sua polisemia concettuale, permette di mettere in luce la struttura intersoggettiva della realtà sociale, nonché di attraversare i vari ambiti filosofici tanto del pensiero di Hegel quanto della filosofia contemporanea. Consentendo così agli autori di svolgere un confronto serrato con l'Hegelian turn degli ultimi decenni, il volume esplora pertanto diversi piani di lettura: da una parte, la rinnovata attenzione al pensiero di Hegel, che appare profondamente fecondo per analizzare le dinamiche del mondo sociale contemporaneo, porta gli studiosi ad operare una ricostruzione e rivalutazione critica dei suoi concetti principali, confrontandosi così anche con le interpretazioni più recenti. Dall'altra, gli interventi si propongono di affrontare, con lenti hegeliane, le ineludibili domande che la contemporaneità lascia aperte, in particolare a proposito del rapporto tra individuazione e socializzazione e delle modalità in cui è possibile, a partire dal principio moderno della piena realizzazione della soggettività, individuare un nesso sociale che non riduca il sociale ad una frantumazione in una miriade di Io monadici o a un olismo totalizzante. Il paradigma del riconoscimento, inoltre, si rivela particolar-1 I. Testa e L. Ruggiu (a cura di), «I that is we, We that is I».
In diesem Beitrag werde ich zuerst den skeptischen Begriff von Philosophie rekonstruieren, den He... more In diesem Beitrag werde ich zuerst den skeptischen Begriff von Philosophie rekonstruieren, den Hegel in Frankfurt entwickelt hat: nach diesem Begriff hat die Philosophie die Aufgabe, die Antinomie herzustellen. Hiermit skizziere ich, vom Fragment Glauben und Sein ausgehend, die Vorgeschichte jenes Verständnisses von Antinomie, das Hegel später in Glauben und Wissen weiterentwickeln wird. Danach werde ich zeigen, inwiefern das Problem der Herstellung der Antinomie mit dem Problem einer intersubjektiven Konzeption des Selbstbewußtseins als Identität im Anderssein zu tun hat. Am Ende wird es sich erweisen, wie die Frage nach Anerkennung das Problem der Intersubjektivität mit der skeptischen Methode in Verbindung setzt; das dient auch dazu, den historischen und theoretischen Zusammenhang zwischen Anerkennung als Theorie der Konstitution des Selbstbewußtseins und Anerkennung als logischer Akt zu überprüfen. I. Antinomie, Skepsis und Positivität I.I. Skeptische Methode. Glauben und Sein. Ich werde jetzt zum ersten Punkt kommen und die skeptisch-antinomische Methode darstellen, die Hegel der Philosophie während der Frankfurter Periode zugeschrieben hat. Glauben und Sein, ein Frankfurter Fragment aus dem Jahr 1797, ist der erste Text, wo Hegel die antinomische Methode in seiner Auffassung der philosophischen Methode integriert hat. Die Entgegengesetzten als Glieder einer Antinomie zu erkennen bedeutet, ihr Verhältnis zueinander zu setzen 1 : "um zu vereinigen, müssen die Glieder der Antinomie als widerstreitende, ihr Verhältnis zueinander als Antinomie gefühlt oder erkannt werden". Das heißt, daß sie, als Entgegengesetzte, "Beschränkte" sind: während sie das andere von selbst ausschließen, stehen sie gleichzeitig in Beziehung zu ihm. Die wechselseitige Beziehung der Entgegengesetzten zu erkennen bedeutet deshalb, den Anspruch zu widerlegen, daß sich die Beschränkten und Endlichen von ihrem Entgegengesetzten absondern und sich dadurch verabsolutisieren. Diese im ersten Teil von Glauben und Sein entwickelte antinomische Methode ist im Wesentlichen skeptisch, da sie das theoretische Muster jener Isosthenie reproduziert, welches Sextus Empiricus als "Grundprinzip des
In: Naturalism and Social Philosophy, edited by Martin Hartmann and Arvi Särkelä, Rowman & Littlefield, New York / London, pp. 133-153 (in print), 2023
In this chapter I present a naturalistic understanding of social action based on the notion of ha... more In this chapter I present a naturalistic understanding of social action based on the notion of habit that can be traced back to pragmatism and could be helpful in developing social philosophy as a crossdisciplinary program. I argue that such a socio-ontological understanding of habit overcomes the dualism between routine behavior and skilled action which has dominated so far action theory and phycology, and allows for a plurality of forms of both automation and habituation, taking into account both their flexible and inertial side and the dialectical interplay between them. Furthermore, I argue that habit ontology can account for the two-sided-receptive and spontaneous, passive and active-character of operation of interaction, which is a crucial and underestimated phenomenon as for developing a naturalized understanding of action within both cognitive and social sciences. Such a dual, two-sided way of interaction can be captured by the notion of habit as social attractors, which could be particularly helpful in order to connect embodied and extended cognition models with critical approaches to social practices and institutions.
In this article, the master-servant figure in the Phenomenology of
Spirit is analyzed against the... more In this article, the master-servant figure in the Phenomenology of Spirit is analyzed against the background of Hegel’s ontology of life as an embodied process. It is therefore argued that the theme of this figure is the question of domination in general, understood as a social relationship of subjection that can take on different historical configurations. Domination is understood as a relationship of disparity of status between dominant and dominated subjects. Therefore, domination would have an intersubjective aspect, as constituted by asymmetric relations of recognition, and a material one, as this disparity in recognitive status enacts the extraction of physical and symbolic resources from subordinated subjects.
Abstract:
In this paper I will introduce the notion of ‘natural recognition’, understood as a pr... more Abstract:
In this paper I will introduce the notion of ‘natural recognition’, understood as a primary level of recognitive interaction which belongs to our form of life, and which I articulate through the notions of ‘first’ and ‘second nature’. I will then adopt a reconstructive approach, and develop a theoretical framework for interdisciplinary research on the ‘recognitive manifold’. Here I will argue that recognitive phenomena are multileveled, multilayered, and multidimentional. I will then focus on the subpersonal layer of recognition, distinguish between its ‘material’, ‘functional’, and ‘phenomenal’ aspects, and I will analyze the role this layer plays for the recognitive constitution of personhood. From this vantage point I will analyze the notion of ‘embodied recognition’, assessing the constitutive role played by the subpersonal layer of the body – both in a genetically-causal and structural sense – as for recognitive phenomena. Habit makes intelligible the relation between the different senses of embodiment and how they relate to subpersonal processes. On this basis I will argue that habit is the fundamental socio-ontological operator for a theory of embodied recognition.
In this paper I tackle the normative re-appropriation of the legacy of Charles Taylor’s expressiv... more In this paper I tackle the normative re-appropriation of the legacy of Charles Taylor’s expressivist understanding of Hegel’s theory of action. I argue that a normative understanding of Hegel’s expressivist notion of agency by interpreters such as Robert Pippin, Terry Pinkard, Michael Quante and Robert Brandom, has been obtained at the price of losing sight of the principle of embodiment and of its relevance for our and Hegel’s understanding of social action. I aim at relocating Hegel’s notion of expressive embodiment at the core of his explanation of action. Rather than following Taylor’s hermeneutical reconstruction of the principle of embodiment, I try to reconstruct it by putting at its core the notion of habit formation with the help of conceptual tools taken from contemporary embodied cognition approaches. I first discuss the Anthropology and argue that habit, understood as a sensorimotor embodied life form, is not only an enabling condition for agency, but in fact an ontological constitutive condition for all its levels of manifestation. According to this reading, the Hegelian approach to embodiment offers a model that not only assigns to habit a positive constitutive role in the formation of human mindedness, but also overcomes the dualism between habitual motor routine and intentional activities. If we approach Hegel’s understanding of agency from this vantage point, we can gain a perspective which allows us to appreciate a naturalist strand of Hegel’s expressivism about action and to free it from certain basic anti-naturalistic assumptions of contemporary normative expressivist interpretations of Hegel on social action.
Habits. Pragmatist Approaches from Cognitive Science, Neuroscience, and Social Theory, 2020
In the first section of this introductory essay we first sketch the role that the
notion of habit... more In the first section of this introductory essay we first sketch the role that the notion of habit has played in the work of pragmatist authors such as James, Peirce and Dewey, and give an account of its ambivalent role in the development of psychology and of cognitive sciences from James’s introspectionism, through behaviorism and computationalism, up to 4E cognition and its rediscovery of a pragmatist action-oriented stance to cognition. We then investigate in the second section how the abandonment of the notion of habit in cognitive sciences in the second half of the twentieth century was paralleled by the adoption of a dualism between automatic routine and intelligent action and by an approach to cognition based on the notion of mental representation. This notion was subsequently put under pressure by the emerging paradigm of 4E cognition, whose push toward an antirepresentationalist turn is leading to a reassessment of the notion of habit. In the third section we explore how habit formation has been investigated within contemporary neuroscience in a dynamic perspective based on the interplay between automatism and goal-oriented behavior. This section highlights the role that the pragmatist ideomotor principle plays in autoptic and pragmatic coding approaches to cortical motor systems, and how recent research on mirror neurons pragmatically links action with social cognition and cultural practices. In the fourth section we see how the adoption of the dualism between rational action and mechanical routines also influenced the development of twentieth-century sociological thought, and is nowadays being reconsidered by social theory. Finally, in the fifth section of this introductory essay we provide an overview of the book and a chapter-by-chapter summary.
Habits: Pragmatist Approaches from Cognitive Science, Neuroscience, and Social Theory, 2020
In this chapter I argue that a Pragmatist framework can offer us a common ontological framework f... more In this chapter I argue that a Pragmatist framework can offer us a common ontological framework for both social and cognitive sciences, which represents a promising alternative to both internalist and methodological and ontological individualist approaches to sociality. Accordingly, social interaction is constitutive of cognitive phenomena both at the subpersonal and at the personal level, and at the individual and at the collective level. I reconstruct this model as a form of motor social ontology based on the notion of habit and criticize in this light intentionalist takes on social cognition. Finally, I assess recent arguments in favor of the rediscovery of the notion of ‘habit’ within cognitive sciences, and argue that habit ontology can play a foundational role in embodied cognitive sciences insofar as it can give a unified account of 4E cognition, that is of cognition understood as an embodied, enactive, embedded and extended phenomenon.
In this paper I analyze recognition as a kind of power. I analyze the notion of power in the gene... more In this paper I analyze recognition as a kind of power. I analyze the notion of power in the general sense as some sort of causal capacity, and introduce the distinction between the active power of doing something and the passive power of undergoing something. Such a distinction is needed in order to capture some central features of the phenomenon of recognition, and in particular the way that ‘being recognized’ and ‘recognizing’ are intertwined. I then argue in favor of both the conceptual and genetic priority of the passive power of being recognized over the active power of recognizing. Furthermore, I introduce the notion of ‘attractor’ of recognition as a way to analyze some relevant features of the phenomenon of ‘being-recognized’. My approach to recognition as some kind of power, should here offer some tools not only to bridge the gap between the theory of recognition and the theory of power, but also to get the passive side of both power and recognition right. This could provide a more plausible and phenomenologically adequate understanding of both, and be useful to help capture and read anew within a recognitive grounding of critical theory some aspects of the contemporary debate on biopolitics.
Reading Brandom On A Spirit of Trust, edited by Gilles Bouché, Routledge, London, pp. 140-165, 2020
In this paper I will first trace back Brandom’s understanding of alienation to his understanding ... more In this paper I will first trace back Brandom’s understanding of alienation to his understanding of skepticism in the first and second parts of A Spirit of Trust. I will then analyze, in this light, his take on alienation as both a defective metaphysical structure and a meta-attitude and unveil some tensions that arise between these two aspects and are due to the prevalence of the latter. In the second part of my paper, I will develop some thoughts on the fact that Brandom seems to ignore the distinction between Entäußerung and Entfremdung, and thus, on the one hand, assigns to alienation only the negative meaning of estrangement (ignoring the structural process of alienation as externalization or objectification, which can assume both a negative and a positive meaning) and, on the other hand, conceives alienation basically as subjective alienation (ignoring the objective side of alienation as a structural phenomenon). Finally, I will argue that, once the distinction between Entäußerung and Entfremdung is taken into account, the relations both between alienation and domination and between alienation and work, and consequently the relation between Spirit and nature, should be reconsidered in a way that puts into question the bootstrapping model that Brandom supports.
In this paper, I analyse Rahel Jaeggi’s socio-ontological account of forms of life. I show that h... more In this paper, I analyse Rahel Jaeggi’s socio-ontological account of forms of life. I show that her framework is a two-sided one, since it involves an understanding of forms of life both as inert bundles of practices and as having a normative structure. Here I argue that this approach is based on an a priori argument which assumes normativity as the condition of intelligibility of social criticism. I show that the intimate tension between these two sides is reflected in the socio-ontological model of the constitution of social phenomena, which on the one side is understood in terms of habituation and materialization, and on the other side in terms of constitution through norms. The second side in the end prevails and leads to some sort of normative essentialism which involves a prescriptive meta-theoretical understanding of normativity combined with a socio-ontological model of constitutive rules. I then analyse two arguments that Jaeggi offers in support of her assumption that normative constitution is the deep structure of social practices. I name these the functional-teleological argument, and the crisis developmental argument, and argue that neither succeeds in proving that practices are not normatively underdetermined.
Dewey’s social ontology could be characterized as a habit ontology, an ontology of habit qua seco... more Dewey’s social ontology could be characterized as a habit ontology, an ontology of habit qua second nature that offers us an account of intentionality, social statuses, institutions, and norms in terms of habituations. Such an account offers us a promising alternative to contemporary intentionalist and deontic approaches to social ontology such as Searle’s. Furthermore, it could be the basis of a social ontology better suited to explain both the maintenance and the transformation of social reality. In the first part I will characterize Dewey’s model as a social ontology based on the notion of habit, and present it as an alternative to intentionalist approaches to social reality. In the second part I will argue that habit ontology offers us an account of social norms that is based on a peculiar understanding of the notion of ‘status’, and represents an alternative to deontic accounts. In the third part I will claim that Dewey’s notion of “public” offers us a dynamic understanding of social institutions and a ‘reactive’ notion of collective intentionality as an achievement rather than as a presupposition of social practices. In the final section I will summarize some advantages of the Deweyan over the Searlean social ontology concerning our understanding of acceptance, maintenance and transformation of statuses, and of the role played by the ‘background’.
European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy, 2017
Dewey’s notion of second nature is strictly connected with that of habit. I reconstruct the Hegel... more Dewey’s notion of second nature is strictly connected with that of habit. I reconstruct the Hegelian heritage of this model and argue that habit qua second nature is understood by Dewey as a something which encompasses both the subjective and the objective dimension – individual dispositions and features of the objective natural and social environment.. Secondly, the notion of habit qua second nature is used by Dewey both in a descriptive and in a critical sense and is as such a dialectical concept which connects ‘impulse’ and ‘habit’, ‘original’ or ‘native’ and ‘acquired’ nature, ‘first’ and ‘second nature’. Thirdly, the ethical model of second nature as habituation and the aesthetic model of second nature as art are for Dewey not opposed to one another, since by distinguishing ‘routine’ and ‘art’ as two modes of habit, he makes space for an expressive and creative notion of second nature. Finally, I argue that the expressive dialectics of habit formation plays a crucial role in Dewey’s critical social philosophy and that first and second nature operate as benchmark concepts for his diagnosis of social pathologies.
In this contribution I outline some ideas on what the pragmatist model of habit ontology could of... more In this contribution I outline some ideas on what the pragmatist model of habit ontology could offer us as regards the appreciation of the constitutive role that imagery plays for social action and cognition. Accordingly, a Deweyan understanding of habit would allow for an understanding of imagery in terms of embodied cognition rather than in representational terms. I first underline the motor character of imagery, and the role its embodiment in habit plays for the anticipation of action. Secondly, I reconstruct Dewey's notion of imaginative rehearsal in light of contemporary, competing models of intersubjectivity such as embodied simulation theory and the narrative practice hypothesis, and argue that the Deweyan model offers us a more encompassing framework which can be useful for reconciling these approaches. In this text I am mainly concerned with sketching a broad picture of the lines along which such a project could be developed. For this reason not all questions are given equal attention, and I shall concentrate mainly on the basic ideas, without going directly into the details of many of them.
Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society, 2017
In this paper I will focus on the notion of " dominant patterns " , as revealed by the recently d... more In this paper I will focus on the notion of " dominant patterns " , as revealed by the recently discovered typescript of what we can assume to be Dewey's fragmentary and incomplete preliminary lectures notes for the Lecture Series on Social and Political Philosophy i. I will show that the way the notion of " dominant patterns " is dealt with in the text of the lectures notes is not only consistent with the conceptual content of the whole series of the Lectures in China as published by R. W. Clopton and Tsuin-Chen ii , but also gives us further arguments to appreciate the centrality of this question to the development of Dewey's philosophical project during this period. In particular, I will argue that a comparative reading of the lectures notes and of the Lectures in China allows us to appreciate the central role dominant patterns play for Dewey's understanding of social groupings as embodying habitual patterns of action and the way habit formation shapes and gives content to the interests that groups identify with and are identified by in social practices. Secondly, I will argue that such a comparative reading allows us to appreciate how in the lecture series Dewey has developed the notion of dominant patterns into a theory of social domination which is basically described in terms of habitualized recognitive relations. Hence, the discovery of the lectures notes is also very helpful in deepening our understanding of the Deweyan approach to the question of social recognition – and in particular of the dynamics of institutional recognition and its ideological function – and how it relates to habitualized patterns of dominant-subservient relations.
In this paper I will first reconstruct a Deweyan model of social ontology, based on the process o... more In this paper I will first reconstruct a Deweyan model of social ontology, based on the process of habituation. Habit ontology leads to a social philosophy which is not merely descriptive, since it implies a critical re-description of the social world. I will argue that a habit-modeled social ontology is critical insofar as it includes an account of social transformation and of the inevitability of social conflict. Such an understanding is based on a diagnosis of social pathologies of our life form, and includes an account of the experience of domination, which is described as a matter of an imbalance of recognition which embodies subjugating patterns, and is seen from the critical perspective of freedom understood as emancipation from oppression. This leads to a reconstruction of the genesis of critical attitudes from life’s processes of habituation, which leads to an extended naturalist account of social authority.
McDowell and the Hermeneutic Tradition, ed. by D.M. Feige and Th.J. Spiegel, Routledge, 2024
This article highlights from the perspective of the debate in the 1960s between hermeneutics and ... more This article highlights from the perspective of the debate in the 1960s between hermeneutics and critique of ideology some aspects under which both McDowell and Brandom take up some theses of hermeneutics – concerning the relation between language, experience, historicity, tradition, and rational authority – but at the same time give a central role to the question of reflection, and in this sense provide helpful devices to formulate some form of "critical hermeneutics" that responds to at least some of Habermas's concerns about the universality claim of hermeneutics. It will be argued that McDowell's second nature approach is better equipped than Brandom's constructivist model to formulate a model of internal critique understood as a process that is both natural and internal to historical processes, and proceeds as a piecemeal process of open-ended revision and reconstruction. Still, in order to succeed, McDowell's approach to radical critical reflection should take into account the whole spectrum of second nature – and not be limited to just the subjective dimension of rational animals and its virtues – and should rather be extended to the objective side of second nature, and consider how reflection stands between first and second nature.
Justice and Freedom in Hegel, ed. by P.D. Bubbio and A. Buchwalter, Routledge, 2024
This chapter shows in what sense the Aristotelian notion of philia is relevant for Hegel's unders... more This chapter shows in what sense the Aristotelian notion of philia is relevant for Hegel's understanding of the social presuppositions of justice. The path from Aristotle to Hegel is bidirectional. On the one hand, this chapter valorizes the largely Aristotelian heritage present in Hegel's understanding of political dispositions (Gesinnung). But, on the other hand, such a reconstruction will be conducted from a Hegelian perspective, insofar as it will argue that some Hegelian notions-in particular the notion of "recognition"-can help us to make explicit and reconstruct the Aristotelian theory of philia and its relation to the notion of justice.
Translated by G. Donis AhstracI: In this articIe I intend to show the strict relation between the... more Translated by G. Donis AhstracI: In this articIe I intend to show the strict relation between the notions of "second nature" and "recognition". To do so I begin with a problem (circularity) proper ro the theory ofHegelian and post-Hegelian Ane/'kennttng. 1he solution strategy I propose is signilìcant also in terms ofbringing into focus the problems connected with a notion of "space of reasons" that sterns from the Hegelian concept of "Spirit". I thus broach the notion of "second nature" as a bridgeconcept that can play a key role both for a renewal of the theory of Ane/'kenntlng and for a rethinking of the "space of reasons" within the debate between Robert Brandom and John McDowell. Against this background I illustrate the noveltics introduced by the dialectical conception of the relation between lìrst and second nature developed by Hegel and the contribution this idea can make to a revisited theory of recognition as a phenomenon articulated on two levds. I then retum lo the qucstion of the space of reasons to show the contribution the renewed conception of recognition as second nature makcs lo the definition of its intrinsic sociality as something that is not in principle opposed to a sense of naturalncss.
"I that is We, We that is I." Perspectives on Contemporary Hegel, 2016
Italo Testa e Luigi Ruggiu (a cura di) Recensione di Valeria Cesaroni Sotto la celebre formula he... more Italo Testa e Luigi Ruggiu (a cura di) Recensione di Valeria Cesaroni Sotto la celebre formula hegeliana che descrive il concetto di Spirito nel IV capitolo della Fenomenologia dello Spirito-«I that is We, We that is I» [Ich, das Wir, und Wir, das Ich ist]-il volume curato da Italo Testa e Luigi Ruggiu raccoglie gli atti del terzo convegno internazionale Contemporary Hegel, che si è svolto all'Università Ca' Foscari di Venezia nel 2013 1. Il filo rosso che collega gli interventi è la nozione hegeliana di riconoscimento, la quale, indagata nella sua polisemia concettuale, permette di mettere in luce la struttura intersoggettiva della realtà sociale, nonché di attraversare i vari ambiti filosofici tanto del pensiero di Hegel quanto della filosofia contemporanea. Consentendo così agli autori di svolgere un confronto serrato con l'Hegelian turn degli ultimi decenni, il volume esplora pertanto diversi piani di lettura: da una parte, la rinnovata attenzione al pensiero di Hegel, che appare profondamente fecondo per analizzare le dinamiche del mondo sociale contemporaneo, porta gli studiosi ad operare una ricostruzione e rivalutazione critica dei suoi concetti principali, confrontandosi così anche con le interpretazioni più recenti. Dall'altra, gli interventi si propongono di affrontare, con lenti hegeliane, le ineludibili domande che la contemporaneità lascia aperte, in particolare a proposito del rapporto tra individuazione e socializzazione e delle modalità in cui è possibile, a partire dal principio moderno della piena realizzazione della soggettività, individuare un nesso sociale che non riduca il sociale ad una frantumazione in una miriade di Io monadici o a un olismo totalizzante. Il paradigma del riconoscimento, inoltre, si rivela particolar-1 I. Testa e L. Ruggiu (a cura di), «I that is we, We that is I».
In diesem Beitrag werde ich zuerst den skeptischen Begriff von Philosophie rekonstruieren, den He... more In diesem Beitrag werde ich zuerst den skeptischen Begriff von Philosophie rekonstruieren, den Hegel in Frankfurt entwickelt hat: nach diesem Begriff hat die Philosophie die Aufgabe, die Antinomie herzustellen. Hiermit skizziere ich, vom Fragment Glauben und Sein ausgehend, die Vorgeschichte jenes Verständnisses von Antinomie, das Hegel später in Glauben und Wissen weiterentwickeln wird. Danach werde ich zeigen, inwiefern das Problem der Herstellung der Antinomie mit dem Problem einer intersubjektiven Konzeption des Selbstbewußtseins als Identität im Anderssein zu tun hat. Am Ende wird es sich erweisen, wie die Frage nach Anerkennung das Problem der Intersubjektivität mit der skeptischen Methode in Verbindung setzt; das dient auch dazu, den historischen und theoretischen Zusammenhang zwischen Anerkennung als Theorie der Konstitution des Selbstbewußtseins und Anerkennung als logischer Akt zu überprüfen. I. Antinomie, Skepsis und Positivität I.I. Skeptische Methode. Glauben und Sein. Ich werde jetzt zum ersten Punkt kommen und die skeptisch-antinomische Methode darstellen, die Hegel der Philosophie während der Frankfurter Periode zugeschrieben hat. Glauben und Sein, ein Frankfurter Fragment aus dem Jahr 1797, ist der erste Text, wo Hegel die antinomische Methode in seiner Auffassung der philosophischen Methode integriert hat. Die Entgegengesetzten als Glieder einer Antinomie zu erkennen bedeutet, ihr Verhältnis zueinander zu setzen 1 : "um zu vereinigen, müssen die Glieder der Antinomie als widerstreitende, ihr Verhältnis zueinander als Antinomie gefühlt oder erkannt werden". Das heißt, daß sie, als Entgegengesetzte, "Beschränkte" sind: während sie das andere von selbst ausschließen, stehen sie gleichzeitig in Beziehung zu ihm. Die wechselseitige Beziehung der Entgegengesetzten zu erkennen bedeutet deshalb, den Anspruch zu widerlegen, daß sich die Beschränkten und Endlichen von ihrem Entgegengesetzten absondern und sich dadurch verabsolutisieren. Diese im ersten Teil von Glauben und Sein entwickelte antinomische Methode ist im Wesentlichen skeptisch, da sie das theoretische Muster jener Isosthenie reproduziert, welches Sextus Empiricus als "Grundprinzip des
In: Naturalism and Social Philosophy, edited by Martin Hartmann and Arvi Särkelä, Rowman & Littlefield, New York / London, pp. 133-153 (in print), 2023
In this chapter I present a naturalistic understanding of social action based on the notion of ha... more In this chapter I present a naturalistic understanding of social action based on the notion of habit that can be traced back to pragmatism and could be helpful in developing social philosophy as a crossdisciplinary program. I argue that such a socio-ontological understanding of habit overcomes the dualism between routine behavior and skilled action which has dominated so far action theory and phycology, and allows for a plurality of forms of both automation and habituation, taking into account both their flexible and inertial side and the dialectical interplay between them. Furthermore, I argue that habit ontology can account for the two-sided-receptive and spontaneous, passive and active-character of operation of interaction, which is a crucial and underestimated phenomenon as for developing a naturalized understanding of action within both cognitive and social sciences. Such a dual, two-sided way of interaction can be captured by the notion of habit as social attractors, which could be particularly helpful in order to connect embodied and extended cognition models with critical approaches to social practices and institutions.
In this article, the master-servant figure in the Phenomenology of
Spirit is analyzed against the... more In this article, the master-servant figure in the Phenomenology of Spirit is analyzed against the background of Hegel’s ontology of life as an embodied process. It is therefore argued that the theme of this figure is the question of domination in general, understood as a social relationship of subjection that can take on different historical configurations. Domination is understood as a relationship of disparity of status between dominant and dominated subjects. Therefore, domination would have an intersubjective aspect, as constituted by asymmetric relations of recognition, and a material one, as this disparity in recognitive status enacts the extraction of physical and symbolic resources from subordinated subjects.
Abstract:
In this paper I will introduce the notion of ‘natural recognition’, understood as a pr... more Abstract:
In this paper I will introduce the notion of ‘natural recognition’, understood as a primary level of recognitive interaction which belongs to our form of life, and which I articulate through the notions of ‘first’ and ‘second nature’. I will then adopt a reconstructive approach, and develop a theoretical framework for interdisciplinary research on the ‘recognitive manifold’. Here I will argue that recognitive phenomena are multileveled, multilayered, and multidimentional. I will then focus on the subpersonal layer of recognition, distinguish between its ‘material’, ‘functional’, and ‘phenomenal’ aspects, and I will analyze the role this layer plays for the recognitive constitution of personhood. From this vantage point I will analyze the notion of ‘embodied recognition’, assessing the constitutive role played by the subpersonal layer of the body – both in a genetically-causal and structural sense – as for recognitive phenomena. Habit makes intelligible the relation between the different senses of embodiment and how they relate to subpersonal processes. On this basis I will argue that habit is the fundamental socio-ontological operator for a theory of embodied recognition.
In this paper I tackle the normative re-appropriation of the legacy of Charles Taylor’s expressiv... more In this paper I tackle the normative re-appropriation of the legacy of Charles Taylor’s expressivist understanding of Hegel’s theory of action. I argue that a normative understanding of Hegel’s expressivist notion of agency by interpreters such as Robert Pippin, Terry Pinkard, Michael Quante and Robert Brandom, has been obtained at the price of losing sight of the principle of embodiment and of its relevance for our and Hegel’s understanding of social action. I aim at relocating Hegel’s notion of expressive embodiment at the core of his explanation of action. Rather than following Taylor’s hermeneutical reconstruction of the principle of embodiment, I try to reconstruct it by putting at its core the notion of habit formation with the help of conceptual tools taken from contemporary embodied cognition approaches. I first discuss the Anthropology and argue that habit, understood as a sensorimotor embodied life form, is not only an enabling condition for agency, but in fact an ontological constitutive condition for all its levels of manifestation. According to this reading, the Hegelian approach to embodiment offers a model that not only assigns to habit a positive constitutive role in the formation of human mindedness, but also overcomes the dualism between habitual motor routine and intentional activities. If we approach Hegel’s understanding of agency from this vantage point, we can gain a perspective which allows us to appreciate a naturalist strand of Hegel’s expressivism about action and to free it from certain basic anti-naturalistic assumptions of contemporary normative expressivist interpretations of Hegel on social action.
Habits. Pragmatist Approaches from Cognitive Science, Neuroscience, and Social Theory, 2020
In the first section of this introductory essay we first sketch the role that the
notion of habit... more In the first section of this introductory essay we first sketch the role that the notion of habit has played in the work of pragmatist authors such as James, Peirce and Dewey, and give an account of its ambivalent role in the development of psychology and of cognitive sciences from James’s introspectionism, through behaviorism and computationalism, up to 4E cognition and its rediscovery of a pragmatist action-oriented stance to cognition. We then investigate in the second section how the abandonment of the notion of habit in cognitive sciences in the second half of the twentieth century was paralleled by the adoption of a dualism between automatic routine and intelligent action and by an approach to cognition based on the notion of mental representation. This notion was subsequently put under pressure by the emerging paradigm of 4E cognition, whose push toward an antirepresentationalist turn is leading to a reassessment of the notion of habit. In the third section we explore how habit formation has been investigated within contemporary neuroscience in a dynamic perspective based on the interplay between automatism and goal-oriented behavior. This section highlights the role that the pragmatist ideomotor principle plays in autoptic and pragmatic coding approaches to cortical motor systems, and how recent research on mirror neurons pragmatically links action with social cognition and cultural practices. In the fourth section we see how the adoption of the dualism between rational action and mechanical routines also influenced the development of twentieth-century sociological thought, and is nowadays being reconsidered by social theory. Finally, in the fifth section of this introductory essay we provide an overview of the book and a chapter-by-chapter summary.
Habits: Pragmatist Approaches from Cognitive Science, Neuroscience, and Social Theory, 2020
In this chapter I argue that a Pragmatist framework can offer us a common ontological framework f... more In this chapter I argue that a Pragmatist framework can offer us a common ontological framework for both social and cognitive sciences, which represents a promising alternative to both internalist and methodological and ontological individualist approaches to sociality. Accordingly, social interaction is constitutive of cognitive phenomena both at the subpersonal and at the personal level, and at the individual and at the collective level. I reconstruct this model as a form of motor social ontology based on the notion of habit and criticize in this light intentionalist takes on social cognition. Finally, I assess recent arguments in favor of the rediscovery of the notion of ‘habit’ within cognitive sciences, and argue that habit ontology can play a foundational role in embodied cognitive sciences insofar as it can give a unified account of 4E cognition, that is of cognition understood as an embodied, enactive, embedded and extended phenomenon.
In this paper I analyze recognition as a kind of power. I analyze the notion of power in the gene... more In this paper I analyze recognition as a kind of power. I analyze the notion of power in the general sense as some sort of causal capacity, and introduce the distinction between the active power of doing something and the passive power of undergoing something. Such a distinction is needed in order to capture some central features of the phenomenon of recognition, and in particular the way that ‘being recognized’ and ‘recognizing’ are intertwined. I then argue in favor of both the conceptual and genetic priority of the passive power of being recognized over the active power of recognizing. Furthermore, I introduce the notion of ‘attractor’ of recognition as a way to analyze some relevant features of the phenomenon of ‘being-recognized’. My approach to recognition as some kind of power, should here offer some tools not only to bridge the gap between the theory of recognition and the theory of power, but also to get the passive side of both power and recognition right. This could provide a more plausible and phenomenologically adequate understanding of both, and be useful to help capture and read anew within a recognitive grounding of critical theory some aspects of the contemporary debate on biopolitics.
Reading Brandom On A Spirit of Trust, edited by Gilles Bouché, Routledge, London, pp. 140-165, 2020
In this paper I will first trace back Brandom’s understanding of alienation to his understanding ... more In this paper I will first trace back Brandom’s understanding of alienation to his understanding of skepticism in the first and second parts of A Spirit of Trust. I will then analyze, in this light, his take on alienation as both a defective metaphysical structure and a meta-attitude and unveil some tensions that arise between these two aspects and are due to the prevalence of the latter. In the second part of my paper, I will develop some thoughts on the fact that Brandom seems to ignore the distinction between Entäußerung and Entfremdung, and thus, on the one hand, assigns to alienation only the negative meaning of estrangement (ignoring the structural process of alienation as externalization or objectification, which can assume both a negative and a positive meaning) and, on the other hand, conceives alienation basically as subjective alienation (ignoring the objective side of alienation as a structural phenomenon). Finally, I will argue that, once the distinction between Entäußerung and Entfremdung is taken into account, the relations both between alienation and domination and between alienation and work, and consequently the relation between Spirit and nature, should be reconsidered in a way that puts into question the bootstrapping model that Brandom supports.
In this paper, I analyse Rahel Jaeggi’s socio-ontological account of forms of life. I show that h... more In this paper, I analyse Rahel Jaeggi’s socio-ontological account of forms of life. I show that her framework is a two-sided one, since it involves an understanding of forms of life both as inert bundles of practices and as having a normative structure. Here I argue that this approach is based on an a priori argument which assumes normativity as the condition of intelligibility of social criticism. I show that the intimate tension between these two sides is reflected in the socio-ontological model of the constitution of social phenomena, which on the one side is understood in terms of habituation and materialization, and on the other side in terms of constitution through norms. The second side in the end prevails and leads to some sort of normative essentialism which involves a prescriptive meta-theoretical understanding of normativity combined with a socio-ontological model of constitutive rules. I then analyse two arguments that Jaeggi offers in support of her assumption that normative constitution is the deep structure of social practices. I name these the functional-teleological argument, and the crisis developmental argument, and argue that neither succeeds in proving that practices are not normatively underdetermined.
Dewey’s social ontology could be characterized as a habit ontology, an ontology of habit qua seco... more Dewey’s social ontology could be characterized as a habit ontology, an ontology of habit qua second nature that offers us an account of intentionality, social statuses, institutions, and norms in terms of habituations. Such an account offers us a promising alternative to contemporary intentionalist and deontic approaches to social ontology such as Searle’s. Furthermore, it could be the basis of a social ontology better suited to explain both the maintenance and the transformation of social reality. In the first part I will characterize Dewey’s model as a social ontology based on the notion of habit, and present it as an alternative to intentionalist approaches to social reality. In the second part I will argue that habit ontology offers us an account of social norms that is based on a peculiar understanding of the notion of ‘status’, and represents an alternative to deontic accounts. In the third part I will claim that Dewey’s notion of “public” offers us a dynamic understanding of social institutions and a ‘reactive’ notion of collective intentionality as an achievement rather than as a presupposition of social practices. In the final section I will summarize some advantages of the Deweyan over the Searlean social ontology concerning our understanding of acceptance, maintenance and transformation of statuses, and of the role played by the ‘background’.
European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy, 2017
Dewey’s notion of second nature is strictly connected with that of habit. I reconstruct the Hegel... more Dewey’s notion of second nature is strictly connected with that of habit. I reconstruct the Hegelian heritage of this model and argue that habit qua second nature is understood by Dewey as a something which encompasses both the subjective and the objective dimension – individual dispositions and features of the objective natural and social environment.. Secondly, the notion of habit qua second nature is used by Dewey both in a descriptive and in a critical sense and is as such a dialectical concept which connects ‘impulse’ and ‘habit’, ‘original’ or ‘native’ and ‘acquired’ nature, ‘first’ and ‘second nature’. Thirdly, the ethical model of second nature as habituation and the aesthetic model of second nature as art are for Dewey not opposed to one another, since by distinguishing ‘routine’ and ‘art’ as two modes of habit, he makes space for an expressive and creative notion of second nature. Finally, I argue that the expressive dialectics of habit formation plays a crucial role in Dewey’s critical social philosophy and that first and second nature operate as benchmark concepts for his diagnosis of social pathologies.
In this contribution I outline some ideas on what the pragmatist model of habit ontology could of... more In this contribution I outline some ideas on what the pragmatist model of habit ontology could offer us as regards the appreciation of the constitutive role that imagery plays for social action and cognition. Accordingly, a Deweyan understanding of habit would allow for an understanding of imagery in terms of embodied cognition rather than in representational terms. I first underline the motor character of imagery, and the role its embodiment in habit plays for the anticipation of action. Secondly, I reconstruct Dewey's notion of imaginative rehearsal in light of contemporary, competing models of intersubjectivity such as embodied simulation theory and the narrative practice hypothesis, and argue that the Deweyan model offers us a more encompassing framework which can be useful for reconciling these approaches. In this text I am mainly concerned with sketching a broad picture of the lines along which such a project could be developed. For this reason not all questions are given equal attention, and I shall concentrate mainly on the basic ideas, without going directly into the details of many of them.
Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society, 2017
In this paper I will focus on the notion of " dominant patterns " , as revealed by the recently d... more In this paper I will focus on the notion of " dominant patterns " , as revealed by the recently discovered typescript of what we can assume to be Dewey's fragmentary and incomplete preliminary lectures notes for the Lecture Series on Social and Political Philosophy i. I will show that the way the notion of " dominant patterns " is dealt with in the text of the lectures notes is not only consistent with the conceptual content of the whole series of the Lectures in China as published by R. W. Clopton and Tsuin-Chen ii , but also gives us further arguments to appreciate the centrality of this question to the development of Dewey's philosophical project during this period. In particular, I will argue that a comparative reading of the lectures notes and of the Lectures in China allows us to appreciate the central role dominant patterns play for Dewey's understanding of social groupings as embodying habitual patterns of action and the way habit formation shapes and gives content to the interests that groups identify with and are identified by in social practices. Secondly, I will argue that such a comparative reading allows us to appreciate how in the lecture series Dewey has developed the notion of dominant patterns into a theory of social domination which is basically described in terms of habitualized recognitive relations. Hence, the discovery of the lectures notes is also very helpful in deepening our understanding of the Deweyan approach to the question of social recognition – and in particular of the dynamics of institutional recognition and its ideological function – and how it relates to habitualized patterns of dominant-subservient relations.
In this paper I will first reconstruct a Deweyan model of social ontology, based on the process o... more In this paper I will first reconstruct a Deweyan model of social ontology, based on the process of habituation. Habit ontology leads to a social philosophy which is not merely descriptive, since it implies a critical re-description of the social world. I will argue that a habit-modeled social ontology is critical insofar as it includes an account of social transformation and of the inevitability of social conflict. Such an understanding is based on a diagnosis of social pathologies of our life form, and includes an account of the experience of domination, which is described as a matter of an imbalance of recognition which embodies subjugating patterns, and is seen from the critical perspective of freedom understood as emancipation from oppression. This leads to a reconstruction of the genesis of critical attitudes from life’s processes of habituation, which leads to an extended naturalist account of social authority.
Habits: Pragmatist Approaches From Cognitive Science, Neuroscience, and Social Theory (Cambridge University Press, 2020), 2020
This book evaluates the potential how the pragmatist notion of habit can influence current debate... more This book evaluates the potential how the pragmatist notion of habit can influence current debates at the crossroads between philosophy, cognitive sciences, neurosciences, and social theory. It deals with the different aspects of the pragmatic turn involved in 4E cognitive science and traces back the roots of such a pragmatic turn to both classical and contemporary pragmatism. Written by renowned philosophers, cognitive scientists, neuroscientists, and social theorists, this volume fills the need for an interdisciplinary account of the role of 'habit'. Researchers interested in the philosophy of mind, cognitive science, neuroscience, psychology, social theory, and social ontology will need this book to fully understand the pragmatist turn in current research on mind, action and society.
In "I that is We, We that is I", an international group of philosophers explore the many facets o... more In "I that is We, We that is I", an international group of philosophers explore the many facets of Hegel’s formula which expresses the recognitive and social structures of human life. The book offers a guiding thread for the reconstruction of crucial motifs of contemporary thought such as the socio-ontological paradigm; the action-theoretical model in moral and social philosophy; the question of naturalism; and the reassessment of the relevance of work and power for our understanding of human life. This collection addresses the shortcomings of Kantian and constructivist normative approaches to social practices and practical rationality it involves. It sheds new light on Hegel’s take on metaphysics and puts into question some presuppositions of the post-metaphysical interpretative paradigm. With essays by: Fred Neuhouser, Heikki Ikäheimo, Jean-François Kervégan, Luigi Ruggiu, Robert Stern, Arto Laitinen, Francesca Menegoni, Axel Honneth, Lucio Cortella, Luca Illetterati, Emmanuel Renault, Paolo Vinci, Italo Testa, Alfredo Ferrarin, Franco Chiereghin, Leonardo Samonà, Geminello Preterossi
This book takes as its guiding thread the statement from Hegel's lectures on the philosophy of sp... more This book takes as its guiding thread the statement from Hegel's lectures on the philosophy of spirit of 1805-06, that «cognition is recognition[Erkennen ist Anerkennen]». The gnoseological importance of this solution can be comprehended only if we reconstruct the evolution of Hegel's thought in that span of time in which he most directly tackles the issue of skepsis: that is, from 1797 - the beginning of his Frankfurt period - when he began to occupy himself with gnoseological questions, until the end of his stay in Jena, which begins in 1801 and concludes in 1807 with the writing of the Phenomenology. In the Jena period Hegel developed an epistemological strategy that can be summarized in the following theses: 1. Hegel naturalizes the epistemological questions; 2. to do so he critiques foundationalism qua theory of empirical cognition; 3. and qua theory of epistemic justification; 4. the critique of foundationalism is linked to a critique of the corresponding representationalistic theory of perception, with respect to which Hegel delineates an alternative - pragmatic-interactional - model; 5. this, in turn, is linked to a critique of the monological theories of self-consciousness and to the development of a model - itself practical-interactional - of the rise of self-conscious knowing; 6. Hegel makes use of the tropes of ancient skepticism on one hand to critique the epistemological position responsible for modern skepsis, and on the other to define, in a positive sense, the holistic and recognitive structure of cognition and of rationality, through the tropes of the circle and of the relation; 7. Hegel synthesizes these epistemological views in a theory of cognition qua recognition; 8. Hegel roots this theory in his Naturphilosophie, thus formulating a conception that accounts for the relation between natural recognition and spiritual recognition of a normative-conceptual type. The analysis of the development of the Hegelian theory of cognition - worked out in the first part of my study - is dealt with in the context of a reconstruction of the historico-argumentative constellation within which it matured. The constellation of importance for our analysis is represented by the skeptical crisis - triggered by authors such as Schulze, Maimon and Platner - that invested the post-Kantian galaxy, within which the idealist solutions to the problem of cognition matured. Through the analysis of journals and authors with whom Hegel came directly or indirectly into contact - from Platner to Reinhold, Jacobi, Fichte and Schelling, to Hölderlin and Sinclair, concluding with Zeender, Krug, Bouterwek and Werneburg, and among the journals Fülleborn's Beiträge and Niethammer's Journal in particular - it is possible to map the various solutions proposed for the skeptical problem and see how it is in relation to this problem that the conceptions of self-consciousness evolve and the very concept of "interpersonality" - "intersubjectivity" - emerges for the first time. At the same time, pursuing my objective of broadening the investigation of the phenomenon of recognition, which in my view is not reducible to the field of practical philosophy, I propose a fresh reconstruction of the lexical and conceptual evolution of the various terms - Erkennen, Wiedererkennen, Recognition, Anerkennen - through which the various modalities of the phenomenon of recognition were indicated in the philosophical tradition to which Hegel refers: recognition of objects as perceptive reidentification; reminiscence on the level of theory of memory; recognition of subjects as self-recognition (apperception) and attribution to others of intentionality; logical recognition as recognition of the validity of a proposition; moral recognition, where "recognizing" generally means approving, accepting (more specifically, someone may be "recognized" as an autonomous subject and as a unique, genuine individuality). I focus in particular on the theory of memory as «recognitio» in Wolff and in his school, on the conception of «reconnaissance» in Bonnet, on Kantian «Recognition» and on the theory of «Anerkennen» in Ernst Platner. This investigation serves, on the one hand, to show how the phenomenon of recognition is central for a comprehension of the structure both of the lower and of the higher cognitive faculties. This ought to allow us to understand in what sense Hegel, taking intersubjective recognition as his leading phenomenon, attempts to reunite the various meanings of recognition within a theory of cognition on the basis of which «cognition is recognition». On the other hand, my conceptual and lexicographic investigation also serves to bring to light - in a new way with respect to the studies on Anerkennung - a hitherto unknown problematic constellation and the input of certain authors, such as Werneburg and Platner, whose conceptions may have influenced Hegel's approach. The second part of my study - a reconstruction of the pre-phenomenological Jena writings dealing with «Anerkennung» - dwells on the theme of the notion of natural recognition, whose centrality for the Hegelian conception of recognition has not yet been adequately grasped. This reconstruction of the theory of natural recognition gives due weight to the influence of Schelling on Hegel's understanding of «Anerkennung» - while the critical literature has generally concentrated on Fichte. Analyzing the conception of the animal organism developed in particular in the lectures on the philosophy of nature of 1803-04 brings to light how Hegel already individuates the recognitive phenomenon at the level of sexual reproduction: it is from here that he posits the natural prerequisites for the development of consciousness of self. The category of natural recognition will present itself anew in Hegel's analysis of the human world in the philosophy of spirit, where it concerns sexual love, reproduction and child raising: natural recognition is, then, that on the basis of which Hegel develops his theory that cognition is recognition. Recognition, as a «middle» of spirit, is a cognitive phenomenon that is primitive with respect to linguistically structured human intersubjectivity; it is, properly, that cognitive structure which is necessarily presupposed by a self-conscious subjectivity that expresses itself linguistically: linguistic intersubjectivity expresses various modes of recognition, but not every form of recognition is linguistic. The evolutional theory of cognition as recognition is in fact designed to show how increasingly complex recognitive relations emerge from a basic level of natural interactions to take on a linguistically mediated and universal structure. With the notion of spiritual recognition Hegel indicates just that ensemble of normative relations that constitute the infrastructure of action and thus mediate the formation of socially articulated self-conscious knowing of self. In the lectures on the philosophy of spirit of 1803-04 and of 1805-06 Hegel thus reconstructs the recognitive structure of the social institutions of right, of labor, and of exchange, showing that, within a politically structured community, dyadic (I-you) interactions are mediated by the universal viewpoint of the "we" incarnated in institutions that can be recognized by citizens as their own and by which citizens can be recognized.
Enlightenment, republicanism, and skepticism indicate three distinct and successive periods of t... more Enlightenment, republicanism, and skepticism indicate three distinct and successive periods of the young Hegel's speculative itinerary. But they also indicate, in a certainly more significant way, three currents of thought whose historical and theoretical confluence in Hegel becomes the decisive drive for that relational rethinking of rationality that will be the basis of his subsequent dialectical elaboration. This essay retraces and analyzes these three moments according to the common thread of intersubjectivity: reason is thus defined as a "finding oneself in others", "recognizing oneself in every rational being". It is by this way that Hegel can also address, in a new perspective, that problem of a reform of "public relations" that had kept him occupied since the years of Stuttgart. The encounter with the ancient skepticism, in particular, pushes Hegel not to get rid of reason, but to reconstruct it at all levels in non-dualistic and relational terms. In the awareness, on the other hand, that the intersubjective translation of rationality incorporates into it, as its constitutive moment, the conflictual element. Its neecessity was revealed to Hegel under the forms of the dialectics of the Enlightenment, the Machiavelli's moment of the republic's virtue, the struggle for recognition, and the sceptical-antique antinomicity of reason.
1. AUFKLÄRUNG DELL’UOMO COMUNE. LA FORMAZIONE DI HEGEL A STOCCARDA
1.1. Critica dei rapporti pubblici 1.1.2. La nozione di Aufklärung negli Exzerpte 1.1.3. Religione e dominio 1.2. Aufklärung e scetticismo
2. RIFORMA DELLA SFERA PUBBLICA E RELIGIONE POPOLARE. DA TUBINGA A BERNA.
2.1. Riforma della sensibilità e intersoggettività 2.2. Iluminismo autocritico 2.3. La religione popolare e la sfera pubblica 2.4. La dialettica di ragione e sensibilità 2.4.1 Ragione, storia, dominio 2.4.2 Verstand e Vernunft
3. DIALETTICA DI RAGIONE E POSITIVITÀ. HEGEL A BERNA.
3.1. Agire comune: radicalismo politico e scetticismo religioso 3.2. Critica del dominio 3.2.1. Repubblicanesimo, Cristianesimo e dominio 3.2.2. Cristianesimo e Ragione: La Vita di Gesù 3.3. Dialettica storica del rovesciamento: La Positività della Religione Cristiana
4. DIALETTICA DELLA VIRTÙ: CRITICA DELLA MODERNITÀ E REPUBBLICANESIMO.
4.1. L’integrazione di ethos repubblicano e stato di diritto come compimento della modernità 4.2. Autocritica repubblicana della modernità. Tra Berna e Francoforte 4.3 Il momento machiavelliano e la dialettica della repubblica 4.3.1. Libertà hegeliana e apologia repubblicana del conflitto
5. LE DIALETTICHE DELL’AUFKLÄRUNG
5.1. Il destino della Ragione 5.2. Spirito d’unità e logica del dominio: Lo spirito del cristianesimo e il suo destino 5.2.1. Ragione e conflitto 5.3 Rapporti pubblici e destino: La contraddizione sempre crescente.
6. AUTORIFLESSIONE DELLA CRITICA
6.1. Il rovesciamento della ragione kantiana 6.1.1. L’autoriflessione della critica 6.1.2. Tra ethos critico e critica gnoseologica 6.2. Dialettica dell’amore 6.3. I limiti della religione e il problema conoscitivo
7. RAGIONE E ANTINOMIA
7.1. Tracce scettiche nella formazione di Hegel 7.2. Il principio scettico e la dialettica dell’intersoggettività. 7.3. Riconoscimento e razionalità
BIBLIOGRAFIA
I. OPERE DI HEGEL II. TRADUZIONI CONSULTATE III. FONTI IV. LETTERATURA CRITICA
The book is devoted to a historical and theoretical analysis of argumentation theory, especially ... more The book is devoted to a historical and theoretical analysis of argumentation theory, especially to the approaches based on the idea that argumentation theory should have a pragmatic or descriptive aim but also a normative task: the evaluation of ‘good’ arguments and the analysis of the foundations of rational communication practices. The authors present the most important traditions in the last half-century of developments in argumentation theory, evaluating their approach with respect to the following distinctions: normative and descriptive, formal and informal, rational or grounded in dialogical and dialectical intersubjectivity. The books discusses the new rhetoric by Perelman, Toulmin’s procedural schemes, Grize’s logic, informal logic (Blair et Johnson, Groarke, Govier, Woods, Walton, Gilbert), Lorenzen’s dialogic logic, Hamblin’s dialectic, Barth’s formal dialectics, Hintikka’s interrogative logic, Grice’s conversational logic, the pragma-dialectics by van Eemeren and Grootendorst, the new dialectic by Walton, the theory of interpersonal reasoning by Walton et Krabbe, the theories of normative practices by Habermas, Brandom and Apel. After this critical analysis of several argumentation perspectives, the authors plead for a non-foundationalist account of the investigation on the fundamental elements of argumentation theory.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. La rinascita novecentesca 1. Chaïm Perelman: la nuova retorica 2. Stephen Toulmin: la pratica logica e l’uso degli argomenti 3. Ragionamento e linguaggio: la logica naturale di Jean-Blaise Grize
II. La logica informale 1. Informale vs. formale? 2. Il concetto di argomento 3. La ripresa della teoria di Paul Grice 4. La ricostruzione degli argomenti 5. La valutazione degli argomenti: le fallacie 6. Il network problem
III. Dialogo e dialettica 1. La logica dialogica di Paul Lorenzen 2. Charles L. Hamblin e i sistemi dialettici 3. Else Barth e la dialettica formale 4. Jaakko Hintikka: logica interrogativa e teoria dei giochi
IV. Pragmatica e dialettica 1. La Pragma-Dialectics di van Eemeren e Grootendorst: un ideale filosofico della razionalità 2. Ricostruzione e valutazione degli argomenti 3. L’analisi delle fallacie 4. Fallacie e biases: tra argomentazione e psicologia
V. Intersoggettività e impegni dialogici 1. La New Dialectic e il ragionamento interpersonale: Douglas Walton ed Erik Krabbe 2. Contesti dialogici e commitment store 3. Teoria delle fallacie e presumptive reasoning 4. La fondazione della Informal Logic 5. Argomentazione, informatica e scienza cognitiva
VI. Razionalità e fondazione 1. Razionalità discorsiva: la pragmatica universale di Jürgen Habermas 2. Razionalità inferenziale e semantica: la pragmatica normativa di Robert B. Brandom 3. La pragmatica trascendentale di Karl O. Apel 4. Modelli di razionalità 5. Fondazione o giustificazione
VII. Argomentazione e pratiche sociali 1. Ragionamento pratico 2. Etiche del discorso 3. Diritto e politiche dell’argomentazione
(includes essays by R.B. Brandom, N. Fraser, Ch. Larmore, R. Tuomela,V. Descombes, J.-F. Kervégan... more (includes essays by R.B. Brandom, N. Fraser, Ch. Larmore, R. Tuomela,V. Descombes, J.-F. Kervégan, D. Macbeth, K.R. Dove, H. Ikäheimo, S. Poggi, B. De Giovanni, G. Marramao, U. Fabietti, L. Ruggiu, I. Testa, V. Vitiello, S. Natoli, F. D’Agostini, G. Cantillo, G. Bonacina, F. Di Lorenzo, F. Mora, D. Zucca)
TABLE OF CONTENTS
PREMESSA di Luigi Ruggiu e Italo Testa
SEZIONE I SPIRITO OGGETTIVO E COSTITUZIONE DELLA SOCIALITÀ
I. RAGIONE SOCIALE E OGGETTIVITÀ di Luigi Ruggiu II. IL PROBLEMA DELL’IDENTITÀ COLLETTIVA: IL NOI ISTITUENTE E IL NOI ISTITUITO di Vincent Descombes III. HEGEL: LA SOLITUDINE DELLA RAGIONE COMUNITARIA di Vincenzo Vitiello IV. LA TRAGEDIA NELL’ETICO: SOCIETÀ CIVILE E STATO IN HEGEL TRA BERNA E I PRIMI ANNI DI JENA di Giuseppe Cantillo V. LA MENTE E LE ISTITUZIONI: L’OLISMO ANTROPOLOGICO DI DESCOMBES di Diego Zucca
SEZIONE II SPAZIO GLOBALE E WELTGESCHICHTE
I. GIUSTIZIA ANORMALE: RAGIONE SOCIALE SENZA ‘SOCIETÀ’NELL’ERA DELLA GLOBALIZZAZIONE di Nancy Fraser II. DALLA WELTGESCHICHTE ALLA MODERNITÀ-MONDO. IL PROBLEMA DI UNA SFERA PUBBLICA GLOBALE di Giacomo Marramao III. L’IMPONDERABILITÀ DEL MONDO: FORME PLURALI DELLA RAGIONE E GOVERNO DELLA CONTINGENZA di Salvatore Natoli IV. ALCUNE RIFLESSIONI SU HEGEL E L’ORIENTE MUSULMANO di Giovanni Bonacina
SEZIONE III RICONOSCIMENTO, PERSONA, LIBERTÀ
I. RICONOSCERE LE PERSONE di Charles Larmore II. PERSONA E RICONOSCIMENTO di Heikki Ikäheimo III. CULTURE E RICONOSCIMENTO. UNA PROSPETTIVA ANTROPOLOGICA di Ugo Fabietti IV. RICONOSCIMENTO E LIBERTÀ DEI MODERNI di Biagio De Giovanni
SEZIONE IV NATURA, INTENZIONALITÀ E INTERAZIONE
I. LA STRUTTURA DEL DESIDERIO E DEL RICONOSCIMENTO: AUTO-COSCIENZA E AUTO-COSTITUZIONE di Robert. B. Brandom II. ATTRAVERSANDO IL CONFINE: INTERNO, ESTERNO, INTENZIONALITÀ. ANCORA SU BRANDOM INTERPRETE DI HEGEL di Stefano Poggi III. SECONDA NATURA E RICONOSCIMENTO. HEGEL E LA TEORIA DELLO SPAZIO SOCIALE di Italo Testa IV. UN’ANTINOMIA DEL GIUDIZIO EMPIRICO: BRANDOM E MCDOWELL di Danielle Macbeth V. LA TRAMA DELLA FENOMENOLOGIA DI HEGEL di Kenley R. Dove
SEZIONE V ONTOLOGIA SOCIALE E ISTITUZIONI
I. SOGGETTI, NORME E ISTITUZIONI: CHE COS’È UNA VITA ETICA? di Jean-François Kervégan II. RAGIONI DI GRUPPO E INTENZIONALITÀ COLLETTIVA di Raimo Tuomela III. VINCOLI UNIVERSALI DEL LINGUAGGIO E IMPEGNI DEONTICI NELLA COSTRUZIONE DELLA REALTÀ SOCIALE di Francesca di Lorenzo IV. HEGEL ERA NONEISTA? OGGETTI SOCIALI E OGGETTI FILOSOFICI di Franca D’Agostini V. VITA E SOCIALITÀ DEL GEIST. ALCUNE NOTE SUL FRAMMENTO DI SISTEMA DEL 1800 di Francesco Mora
This volume collects a selection of papers presented on the occasion of the international confere... more This volume collects a selection of papers presented on the occasion of the international conference "Contemporary Hegel. American Readings of Hegel in Comparison with the European Tradition" (Ca' Foscari University of Venice, 16-18 May 2001). The volume is aimed at creating a fruitful dialogue between emerging trends in Anglo-American thought with the European tradition on a number of well-defined theoretical questions, centering on the systematic and historico-exegetic interpretations of German Idealism. The discussion sets out from a hermeneutic hypothesis: namely, that it is possible to read Hegel as a protagonist of contemporaneity once again only if one brings to light the Hegelian roots that underlie the crucial questions of current debate. For this reason the essays have been organized around a number of precise theoretical focal points corresponding to the sections of the book, with each section designed to verify Hegel's incidence on the genesis and structure of specific aspects of the contemporary constellation: the pragmatic turn and its historical origins in American pragmatism (first section); the normative turn (second section); the inferentialist and holistic turn (third section); the linguistic turn (fourth section); the intersubjective turn (fifth section). Hegel's thought thus provides the historical and textual material in which the hidden paths underlying the present can be rediscovered, as well as the conceptual tool capable of defining the reciprocal relation with aspects of the contemporary horizon that have emerged in differentiated and often noncommunicating sectors of philosophical knowing. Following this thematic thread, the essays come to grips with the main disciplinary domains of the contemporary philosophical encyclopedia. This has allowed us to measure the possible range of the Hegelian legacy in the domain of logic (the inferential conception of reasoning clarified by Brandom and Redding); semantics (the holistic vision of meaning analyzed by Brandom and Hösle); theory of knowledge (the linguistic and antifoundationalist turn in epistemology discussed by McDowell, Rockmore, Collins, Maker, Testa); practical philosophy, theory of action, social philosophy (the normative, social and institutional conception of practical rationality and of agency explored by Pippin, Pinkard, Cortella, Ruggiu); ethics and philosophy of religion (the intersubjective approach to the ethical relation examined by Williams and Houlgate); history of philosophy (the Hegelian roots of pragmatism and the pragmatist roots of analytic philosophy brought to light by Rorty, Bernstein, Ruggiu, Maker, Rockmore). In this perspective the challenge of reconstructing a comprehensive system of philosophical knowing on a Hegelian basis is taken up by Robert B. Brandom, whose powerful contribution to the renewal of perspectives on Hegel, in fruitful debate with John McDowell, has been placed at the center of this volume and is verified, extended and criticized in nearly all the essays presented here.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Premessa di Luigi Ruggiu e Italo Testa
Sezione I. Pragmatismo e idealismo
Richard J. Bernstein, Hegel in America. La tradizione del pragmatismo Valerio Verra, Alterne vicende della fortuna di Hegel William Maker, Una lettura americana di Hegel, ovvero come Hegel salva il pragmatismo da se stesso Stefano Poggi, Naturalismo e pluralismo vs. idealismo e monismo, ovvero William James vs. Hegel Alessandro Bellan, Pragmatismo con metodo. Hegel, Rorty e il problema della fondazione
Sezione Il. Razionalità pratica e filosofia sociale
Robert B. Pippin;Hegel e la razionalità istituzionale Lucio Cortella, La libertà come ethos Terry Pinkard, Soggetti, oggetti, normatività: che cosa significa essere un agente? Roberto Racinaro, Tragedia, ironia, comicità. Hegel e il 'nipote' di Diderot
Sezione III. Attualità della ragione oggettiva;
Richard Rorty, Alcuni usi americani di Hegel, Luigi Ruggiu, Hegel: fine della filosofia? Robert B. Brandom, Olismo e idealismo nella Fenomenologia di Hegel Vittorio Hosle, Inferenzialismo in Brandom e olismo in Hegel. Una risposta a Richard Rorty e alcune domande per Robert Brandom Italo Testa, Idealismo e normatività. Robert Brandom e la ricezione americana di Hegel
Sezione IV. Linguaggio e teoria della conoscenza
Tom Rockmore, Hegel e i limiti dello hegelismo analitico Leo Lugarini, Hegel e Heidegger: la dialettica 'impaccio filosofico' Ardis B. Collins, Il ruolo del linguaggio nella critica hegeliana della conoscenza Daniele Goldoni, Hegel e il linguaggio. Quale alterità? Diego Zucca, Linguaggio e conoscenza: il neopragmatismo e Hegel contro la datità
Sezione V. La struttura dell'esperienza
John McDowell, L'idealismo di Hegel come radicalizzazione di Kant Mario Ruggenini, Lo spirito e la parola. Dialettica di soggettività e finitezza Paul Redding, Esplicitare l'inferenzialismo di Hegel Franco Chiereghin, Principio e inizio in Hegel Francesco Berto, Mediazione e immediatezza in Hegel e Wittgenstein
Sezione VI. Intersoggettività e riconoscimento
Robert R. Williams, Forme mancate di intersoggettività nella concezione hegeliana della coscienza nella "Fenomenologia dello Spirito" Aldo Masullo, L'intersoggettività e il fondamento comunitario nella logica hegeliana S. Houlgate, Desiderio, riconoscimento e morte nella Fenomenologia di Hegel, Maurizio Pagano, La 'cosa stessa' e l'intersoggettività
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Prefazione di Rino Genovese
1. Temi
L’immaginazione metafisica, di Italo Tes... more TABLE OF CONTENTS
Prefazione di Rino Genovese
1. Temi L’immaginazione metafisica, di Italo Testa Il fantasma della metafisica e la fallacia delle immagini, di Rino Genovese
2. Jam session Prima giornata Il pensiero iconico e l’espressività delle immagini Estetizzazione e demarcazione tra metafisica e mito Metafora e critica del concetto Animale simbolico o metafisico? Critica della ragione impura Metafisica e dominio Natura umana, totalità, pluralizzazione Seconda giornata Anafora, critica ricorsiva, libertà situata Densità ed epidemicità dell’immagine Mimetismo e riconoscimento Arte e intensificazione dell’immagine Perdita dell’aura e demitizzazione Seconda naturalezza
3. Ex post Metaforica, metafisica, imitazione, di Andrea Borsari Prospettiva e immaginazione metafisica, di Paola Cantù Immaginazione, percezione, comprensione, di Paolo Costa Per una storia delle scienze inesatte, di Francesco Peri
The book is devoted to a historical and theoretical analysis of argumentation theory, especially ... more The book is devoted to a historical and theoretical analysis of argumentation theory, especially to the approaches based on the idea that argumentation theory should have a pragmatic or descriptive aim but also a normative task: the evaluation of ‘good’ arguments and the analysis of the foundations of rational communication practices. The authors present the most important traditions in the last half-century of developments in argumentation theory, evaluating their approach with respect to the following distinctions: normative and descriptive, formal and informal, rational or grounded in dialogical and dialectical intersubjectivity. The books discusses the new rhetoric by Perelman, Toulmin’s procedural schemes, Grize’s logic, informal logic (Blair et Johnson, Groarke, Govier, Woods, Walton, Gilbert), Lorenzen’s dialogic logic, Hamblin’s dialectic, Barth’s formal dialectics, Hintikka’s interrogative logic, Grice’s conversational logic, the pragma-dialectics by van Eemeren and Grootendorst, the new dialectic by Walton, the theory of interpersonal reasoning by Walton et Krabbe, the theories of normative practices by Habermas, Brandom and Apel. After this critical analysis of several argumentation perspectives, the authors plead for a non-foundationalist account of the investigation on the fundamental elements of argumentation theory.
Intervista collettiva a cura di Claudia Boscolo, con la partecipazione di Carlo Baghetti, Monica ... more Intervista collettiva a cura di Claudia Boscolo, con la partecipazione di Carlo Baghetti, Monica Battisti, Mauro Candiloro, Jim Carter, Paolo Chirumbolo e Maria Luisa Mura.
Table of Contents Modality, Intentionality and Discursive Practice Pragmatism, Inferentialism and... more Table of Contents Modality, Intentionality and Discursive Practice Pragmatism, Inferentialism and Modality in Sellars's Arguments against Empiricism Robert Brandom p. 6 Brandom's Five-Step Program for Modal Health Fredrik Stjernberg p. 18 The Status of Intentional Vocabulary in Discursive Practice: Reading Making it Explicit in the Light of" Between Saying and Doing" David Lauer p. 23 Logic, Semantics and the Theory of Meaning Inferentialism and the Normativity of Meaning Jaroslav Peregrin p.
Very recent inquiries into Hegel's philosophy highlight the role of nature in the Hegelian unders... more Very recent inquiries into Hegel's philosophy highlight the role of nature in the Hegelian understanding of human mind, spirit, social interaction, recognition, second nature and normativity. Accordingly, Hegel's naturalism represents a good theoretical perspective for the investigation of the arduous concept of spirit by relating it to the notion of nature and explaining it as emerging from natural prerequisites. May it be assumed that Hegel is a naturalist as he follows the path and the project of the Aristotelian naturalism by dealing with the continuity between life and cognition, nature and spirit in several parts of his works? Moreover, could we by means of this approach understand how Hegel explores the life-mind continuity? Does this issue have relevant interdisciplinary consequences for current philosophy of biology, neurophysiology, evolutionary psychology, and social theory? However, the topic of nature has also been very important and central within the entire philosophical tradition known as German classical philosophy to which Hegel's thinking belongs. It is beyond doubt that his reflection on naturalism was developed within this tradition and by the philosophical debate at that time. Therefore, the conference will address both the theme of naturalism in German classical philosophy from Kant to Hegel and the relevant interdisciplinary and theoretical aspects it attains in Hegelian philosophy.
Call For Papers: The Pragmatist Turn and Embodied Cognition: Habit and Experience at the crossro... more Call For Papers: The Pragmatist Turn and Embodied Cognition: Habit and Experience at the crossroads between Pragmatism, Neurosciences, and Social Ontology (6-7 April, 2017, University of Parma, Italy
dead line: January 20, 2017
To Date Invited Speakers:
Vittorio Gallese (University of Parma) Richard Menary (Macquarie University) Daniel Hutto (University of Wollongong), TBC Teed Rockwell (Sonoma State University) Jessica Lindblom (University of Skoevde) Pierre Steiner (COSTECH/UTC, Paris) Roberto Frega (IMM-CNRS, Paris) Corrado Sinigaglia (Università di Milano) Pentti Määttänen (University of Helsinki) Arvi Särkelä (University of Luzern)
The aim of this chapter is to discuss the central role of the notion of " habit " (Gewohnheit) in... more The aim of this chapter is to discuss the central role of the notion of " habit " (Gewohnheit) in Hegel's theory of " embodiment " (Verleiblichung) and to show that the philosophical outcome of the Anthropology is that habit, understood as a sensorimotor life form, is not only an enabling condition for there to be mindedness, but is more strongly an ontological constitutive condition of all its levels of manifestation. Moreover, I will argue that Hegel's approach somehow makes a model of embodied cognition available which offers a unified account of the three main senses of embodiment understood as both a physiological, a functional, and a phenomenological process. In this sense Hegel's approach to habit can make a useful contribution to the contemporary debate on embodiment in philosophy of mind, the cognitive sciences, and action theory. For a long time habit in 20th century philosophy and science has been mostly read in a negative way, identified with mechanical and repetitive routine. The reconstruction of Hegel’s approach is particularly relevant here and can fruitfully contribute to this discussion, since it offers us not only a model that assigns to habit a positive constitutive role in the formation of embodied human mindedness but which also overcomes the dualism between habitual motor routine and intentional activities that is prevalent nowadays in the cognitive sciences and in action theory, and allows for some sense of natural agency as belonging to animal life. Furthermore, Hegel’s approach cuts across the great divide between associationist and holistic approaches to habit that has for a long time dominated the philosophical debate on habit and still shapes the current opposition between classical cognitive science and embodied cognitive science.
In this paper I will argue that according to Dewey the notion of second nature is first strictly ... more In this paper I will argue that according to Dewey the notion of second nature is first strictly connected with that of habit. Secondly, habit qua second nature is understood as a something which encompasses both the subjective and the objective dimension – individual dispositions and features of the objective natural and social environment. Thirdly, the notion of habit qua second nature is used by Dewey both in a descriptive and in a critical sense and is as such a dialectical concept which connects 'impulse' and 'habit', 'original' or 'native' and 'acquired' nature, 'first' and 'second nature'. Fourthly, the ethical model of second nature as habituation and the aesthetic model of second nature as art are for Dewey not opposed to one another, since by distinguishing 'routine' and 'art' as two modes of habit, he makes space for an expressive and creative notion of second nature. Finally, I will argue that the expressive dialectics of habit formation plays a crucial role in Dewey's critical social philosophy and that first and second nature operate as benchmark concepts for his diagnosis of social pathologies.
My aim in this paper is to reconstruct a model of social ontology in Dewey’s work, to make it exp... more My aim in this paper is to reconstruct a model of social ontology in Dewey’s work, to make it explicit in the light of contemporary theories, and to present it as a promising alternative to Searle’s approach to social reality. In the first part I will characterize Dewey’s model as a social ontology based on the notion of habit, and present it as an alternative to intentionalist approaches. In the second part I will argue that habit ontology offers us an account of social norms that is based on a peculiar understanding of the notion of ‘status’, and represents an alternative to deontic accounts. In the third part I will claim that the Dewey’s notion of “public” offers us a dynamic understanding of social institutions and a ‘reactive’ notion of collective intentionality as an achievement rather than as a presupposition of social practices. In the final section I will summarize some advantages of the Deweyan over the Searlean social ontology concerning our understanding of acceptance, maintenance and transformation of statuses, and of the role played by the ‘background’.
Book Symposium on Michael Thompson's "Life and Action"
(downlodable here: http://fqp.luiss.it/c... more Book Symposium on Michael Thompson's "Life and Action"
The symposium on Michael Thompson's "Life and Action, is organized according to the threefold partition of the book. As for part one, Paolo Costa focuses on the logical and metaphysical understanding of “life-form” and relates it to similar approaches in philosophical anthropology. As for part two, Constantine Sandis examines the role of simple past and progressive tenses in the naïve theory of action and contrasts it with alternative contemporary approaches in action theory. Matteo Bianchin questions Thompson’s rejection of folk psychological accounts by focusing on phenomenal intentionality and action planning. As for part three, Arto Laitinen considers Thompson’s understanding of practices as a source of goodness in the light of the Hegelian distinction between Moralität und Sittlichkeit. Italo Testa discusses Thompson’s anti-individualist account of dispositions and social practices, and assesses its relevance for social philosophy and social ontology. Ingrid Salvatore interrogates Thompson’s understanding of Rawls’s “Two concepts of Rule” and rule-like practices.
Table of Contents:
Paolo Costa, "Where does our undestanding of life come from? The riddle about recognizing living things"
Constantine Sandis, "He buttered the toast while baking a fresh loaf"
Matteo Bianchin, "Intentions and Intentionality"
Arto Laitinen, "Practices as ‘actual’ sources of goodness of actions"
Italo Testa, "Some consequences of Thompson’s Life and Action for social philosophy"
Ingrid Salvatore, "Thompson on Rawls and Practices"
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Alessandro Bellan e Italo Testa
Presentazione
Parte I
Genesi ed epistemolo... more TABLE OF CONTENTS
Alessandro Bellan e Italo Testa Presentazione
Parte I Genesi ed epistemologia delle scienze sociali
Gillian Rose Hegel. Contro la sociologia
Vittorio Hösle Sulla filosofia della storia delle scienze sociali
Parte II Hegel e le scienze sociali. Sociologia, antropologia e psicologia evolutiva
Alessandro Bellan Anomia e alienazione. Scienza ed epistemologia del sociale in Hegel e Durkheim
Andrea Sartori Sull’esistenza sociale in Hegel e Gehlen
Paul Redding G.W.F. Hegel e Pierre Bourdieu: storia, kantismo e teoria sociale
Italo Testa Naturalmente sociali. Per una teoria generale del riconoscimento
Parte III Paradigmi metodologici e filosofia sociale
Michael Quante e David Schweikard “…die Bestimmung der Individuen ist, ein allgemeines Leben zu führen”. La struttura metafisica della filosofia sociale di Hegel
Frederick Neuhouser L’idea hegeliana di ‘scienza’ della società
Cathleen Kantner e Udo Tietz Comunità, identità e istituzioni. Hegel sull’integrazione normativa delle società moderne
https://www.francoangeli.it/riviste/sommario.asp?anno=2017&idRivista=71 Fin dai primi numeri, uno... more https://www.francoangeli.it/riviste/sommario.asp?anno=2017&idRivista=71 Fin dai primi numeri, uno degli elementi che ha caratterizzato " La società degli individui " è stata la costante attenzione verso le molteplici forme che l'individualismo ha assunto nella storia del pensiero filosofico, etico, politico, sociale e religioso, privilegiando i rappresentanti di quella tradizione cui, pur con differenze marcate, potrebbe convenire la dicitura di «individualismo solidale». Questa tradizione cerca di coniugare i valori individualistici della modernità con istanze di appartenenza e di solidarietà, formulando di volta in volta proposte teoriche in cui le diverse espressioni dell'intersoggettività sono identificate e definite all'interno di un processo comune di costituzione delle individualità singole e collettive. Nel quadro di indagine della rivista, la solidarietà, in particolare, è analizzata nella sua compatibilità con l'individualismo 'moderno', ma tale prospettiva non esclude un esame delle forme di solidarietà che si pongano, invece, in alternativa a determinate manifestazioni di tale 'individualismo moderno'. La solidarietà, in effetti, è una parola spesso usata in modo insufficientemente determinato, e che, senza pretesa di esaustività, può richiamare diverse sfere di significato, come quelle che seguono: la fraternité dei rivoluzionari francesi, il legame associativo dei lavoratori, la coesione sociale dei primi sociologi, l'appartenenza comune al genere umano, il mondo dei diritti da allargare agli esclusi, le attività di volontariato e di cooperazione, la fratellanza religiosa. È proprio tale ampiezza di riferimenti a spingerci a interrogare il concetto di solidarietà, a partire dalla possibilità di definirlo in relazione ai differenti contesti in cui è utilizzato, esplicitando il ruolo che riveste in relazione al singolo e alla società. Tale riflessione costituisce, idealmente, lo sfondo concettuale di questo nuovo numero de " La società degli individui " , dedicato al tema della soli-darietà, ripensato in una prospettiva plurale e dialogica, capace di riunire contributi storici e teoretici che possano spaziare tra filosofia, sociologia, antropologia e politica. Con l'intervento di Gian Luca Sanna sono esplorati il tema della dignità e del rispetto della vita umana nelle azioni di solidarietà attraverso l'analisi condotta da Ronald Dworkin in Giustizia per i ricci. Gianluca Verrucci si confronta con il pensiero di Jürgen Habermas, mostrando come la solidarietà sia civica e operante nella cornice di una ...
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Papers by Italo Testa
Spirit is analyzed against the background of Hegel’s ontology of
life as an embodied process. It is therefore argued that the theme
of this figure is the question of domination in general,
understood as a social relationship of subjection that can take on
different historical configurations. Domination is understood as a
relationship of disparity of status between dominant and
dominated subjects. Therefore, domination would have an
intersubjective aspect, as constituted by asymmetric relations of
recognition, and a material one, as this disparity in recognitive
status enacts the extraction of physical and symbolic resources
from subordinated subjects.
In this paper I will introduce the notion of ‘natural recognition’, understood as a primary level of recognitive interaction which belongs to our form of life, and which I articulate through the notions of ‘first’ and ‘second nature’. I will then adopt a reconstructive approach, and develop a theoretical framework for interdisciplinary research on the ‘recognitive manifold’. Here I will argue that recognitive phenomena are multileveled, multilayered, and multidimentional. I will then focus on the subpersonal layer of recognition, distinguish between its ‘material’, ‘functional’, and ‘phenomenal’ aspects, and I will analyze the role this layer plays for the recognitive constitution of personhood. From this vantage point I will analyze the notion of ‘embodied recognition’, assessing the constitutive role played by the subpersonal layer of the body – both in a genetically-causal and structural sense – as for recognitive phenomena. Habit makes intelligible the relation between the different senses of embodiment and how they relate to subpersonal processes. On this basis I will argue that habit is the fundamental socio-ontological operator for a theory of embodied recognition.
notion of habit has played in the work of pragmatist authors such as James,
Peirce and Dewey, and give an account of its ambivalent role in the development
of psychology and of cognitive sciences from James’s introspectionism, through
behaviorism and computationalism, up to 4E cognition and its rediscovery of
a pragmatist action-oriented stance to cognition. We then investigate in the
second section how the abandonment of the notion of habit in cognitive sciences
in the second half of the twentieth century was paralleled by the adoption of a
dualism between automatic routine and intelligent action and by an approach
to cognition based on the notion of mental representation. This notion was
subsequently put under pressure by the emerging paradigm of 4E cognition,
whose push toward an antirepresentationalist turn is leading to a reassessment of
the notion of habit. In the third section we explore how habit formation has been
investigated within contemporary neuroscience in a dynamic perspective based on the interplay between automatism and goal-oriented behavior. This section highlights the role that the pragmatist ideomotor principle plays in autoptic and pragmatic coding approaches to cortical motor systems, and how recent research on mirror neurons pragmatically links action with social cognition and cultural practices. In the fourth section we see how the adoption of the dualism between rational action and mechanical routines also influenced the development of twentieth-century sociological thought, and is nowadays being reconsidered by social theory. Finally, in the fifth section of this introductory essay we provide an overview of the book and a chapter-by-chapter summary.
In the first part I will characterize Dewey’s model as a social ontology based on the notion of habit, and present it as an alternative to intentionalist approaches to social reality. In the second part I will argue that habit ontology offers us an account of social norms that is based on a peculiar understanding of the notion of ‘status’, and represents an alternative to deontic accounts. In the third part I will claim that Dewey’s notion of “public” offers us a dynamic understanding of social institutions and a ‘reactive’ notion of collective intentionality as an achievement rather than as a presupposition of social practices. In the final section I will summarize some advantages of the Deweyan over the Searlean social ontology concerning our understanding of acceptance, maintenance and transformation of statuses, and of the role played by the ‘background’.
Spirit is analyzed against the background of Hegel’s ontology of
life as an embodied process. It is therefore argued that the theme
of this figure is the question of domination in general,
understood as a social relationship of subjection that can take on
different historical configurations. Domination is understood as a
relationship of disparity of status between dominant and
dominated subjects. Therefore, domination would have an
intersubjective aspect, as constituted by asymmetric relations of
recognition, and a material one, as this disparity in recognitive
status enacts the extraction of physical and symbolic resources
from subordinated subjects.
In this paper I will introduce the notion of ‘natural recognition’, understood as a primary level of recognitive interaction which belongs to our form of life, and which I articulate through the notions of ‘first’ and ‘second nature’. I will then adopt a reconstructive approach, and develop a theoretical framework for interdisciplinary research on the ‘recognitive manifold’. Here I will argue that recognitive phenomena are multileveled, multilayered, and multidimentional. I will then focus on the subpersonal layer of recognition, distinguish between its ‘material’, ‘functional’, and ‘phenomenal’ aspects, and I will analyze the role this layer plays for the recognitive constitution of personhood. From this vantage point I will analyze the notion of ‘embodied recognition’, assessing the constitutive role played by the subpersonal layer of the body – both in a genetically-causal and structural sense – as for recognitive phenomena. Habit makes intelligible the relation between the different senses of embodiment and how they relate to subpersonal processes. On this basis I will argue that habit is the fundamental socio-ontological operator for a theory of embodied recognition.
notion of habit has played in the work of pragmatist authors such as James,
Peirce and Dewey, and give an account of its ambivalent role in the development
of psychology and of cognitive sciences from James’s introspectionism, through
behaviorism and computationalism, up to 4E cognition and its rediscovery of
a pragmatist action-oriented stance to cognition. We then investigate in the
second section how the abandonment of the notion of habit in cognitive sciences
in the second half of the twentieth century was paralleled by the adoption of a
dualism between automatic routine and intelligent action and by an approach
to cognition based on the notion of mental representation. This notion was
subsequently put under pressure by the emerging paradigm of 4E cognition,
whose push toward an antirepresentationalist turn is leading to a reassessment of
the notion of habit. In the third section we explore how habit formation has been
investigated within contemporary neuroscience in a dynamic perspective based on the interplay between automatism and goal-oriented behavior. This section highlights the role that the pragmatist ideomotor principle plays in autoptic and pragmatic coding approaches to cortical motor systems, and how recent research on mirror neurons pragmatically links action with social cognition and cultural practices. In the fourth section we see how the adoption of the dualism between rational action and mechanical routines also influenced the development of twentieth-century sociological thought, and is nowadays being reconsidered by social theory. Finally, in the fifth section of this introductory essay we provide an overview of the book and a chapter-by-chapter summary.
In the first part I will characterize Dewey’s model as a social ontology based on the notion of habit, and present it as an alternative to intentionalist approaches to social reality. In the second part I will argue that habit ontology offers us an account of social norms that is based on a peculiar understanding of the notion of ‘status’, and represents an alternative to deontic accounts. In the third part I will claim that Dewey’s notion of “public” offers us a dynamic understanding of social institutions and a ‘reactive’ notion of collective intentionality as an achievement rather than as a presupposition of social practices. In the final section I will summarize some advantages of the Deweyan over the Searlean social ontology concerning our understanding of acceptance, maintenance and transformation of statuses, and of the role played by the ‘background’.
With essays by: Fred Neuhouser, Heikki Ikäheimo, Jean-François Kervégan, Luigi Ruggiu, Robert Stern, Arto Laitinen, Francesca Menegoni, Axel Honneth, Lucio Cortella, Luca Illetterati, Emmanuel Renault, Paolo Vinci, Italo Testa, Alfredo Ferrarin, Franco Chiereghin, Leonardo Samonà, Geminello Preterossi
This essay retraces and analyzes these three moments according to the common thread of intersubjectivity: reason is thus defined as a "finding oneself in others", "recognizing oneself in every rational being". It is by this way that Hegel can also address, in a new perspective, that problem of a reform of "public relations" that had kept him occupied since the years of Stuttgart. The encounter with the ancient skepticism, in particular, pushes Hegel not to get rid of reason, but to reconstruct it at all levels in non-dualistic and relational terms. In the awareness, on the other hand, that the intersubjective translation of rationality incorporates into it, as its constitutive moment, the conflictual element. Its neecessity was revealed to Hegel under the forms of the dialectics of the Enlightenment, the Machiavelli's moment of the republic's virtue, the struggle for recognition, and the sceptical-antique antinomicity of reason.
Translated with www.DeepL.com/Translator (free version)
TABLE OF CONTENTS
1. AUFKLÄRUNG DELL’UOMO COMUNE. LA FORMAZIONE DI HEGEL A STOCCARDA
1.1. Critica dei rapporti pubblici
1.1.2. La nozione di Aufklärung negli Exzerpte
1.1.3. Religione e dominio
1.2. Aufklärung e scetticismo
2. RIFORMA DELLA SFERA PUBBLICA E RELIGIONE POPOLARE. DA TUBINGA A BERNA.
2.1. Riforma della sensibilità e intersoggettività
2.2. Iluminismo autocritico
2.3. La religione popolare e la sfera pubblica
2.4. La dialettica di ragione e sensibilità
2.4.1 Ragione, storia, dominio
2.4.2 Verstand e Vernunft
3. DIALETTICA DI RAGIONE E POSITIVITÀ. HEGEL A BERNA.
3.1. Agire comune: radicalismo politico e scetticismo religioso
3.2. Critica del dominio
3.2.1. Repubblicanesimo, Cristianesimo e dominio
3.2.2. Cristianesimo e Ragione: La Vita di Gesù
3.3. Dialettica storica del rovesciamento: La Positività della Religione Cristiana
4. DIALETTICA DELLA VIRTÙ: CRITICA DELLA MODERNITÀ E REPUBBLICANESIMO.
4.1. L’integrazione di ethos repubblicano e stato di diritto come compimento della modernità
4.2. Autocritica repubblicana della modernità. Tra Berna e Francoforte
4.3 Il momento machiavelliano e la dialettica della repubblica
4.3.1. Libertà hegeliana e apologia repubblicana del conflitto
5. LE DIALETTICHE DELL’AUFKLÄRUNG
5.1. Il destino della Ragione
5.2. Spirito d’unità e logica del dominio: Lo spirito del cristianesimo e il suo destino
5.2.1. Ragione e conflitto
5.3 Rapporti pubblici e destino: La contraddizione sempre crescente.
6. AUTORIFLESSIONE DELLA CRITICA
6.1. Il rovesciamento della ragione kantiana
6.1.1. L’autoriflessione della critica
6.1.2. Tra ethos critico e critica gnoseologica
6.2. Dialettica dell’amore
6.3. I limiti della religione e il problema conoscitivo
7. RAGIONE E ANTINOMIA
7.1. Tracce scettiche nella formazione di Hegel
7.2. Il principio scettico e la dialettica dell’intersoggettività.
7.3. Riconoscimento e razionalità
BIBLIOGRAFIA
I. OPERE DI HEGEL
II. TRADUZIONI CONSULTATE
III. FONTI
IV. LETTERATURA CRITICA
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. La rinascita novecentesca
1. Chaïm Perelman: la nuova retorica
2. Stephen Toulmin: la pratica logica e l’uso degli argomenti
3. Ragionamento e linguaggio: la logica naturale di Jean-Blaise Grize
II. La logica informale
1. Informale vs. formale?
2. Il concetto di argomento
3. La ripresa della teoria di Paul Grice
4. La ricostruzione degli argomenti
5. La valutazione degli argomenti: le fallacie
6. Il network problem
III. Dialogo e dialettica
1. La logica dialogica di Paul Lorenzen
2. Charles L. Hamblin e i sistemi dialettici
3. Else Barth e la dialettica formale
4. Jaakko Hintikka: logica interrogativa e teoria dei giochi
IV. Pragmatica e dialettica
1. La Pragma-Dialectics di van Eemeren e Grootendorst: un ideale filosofico della razionalità
2. Ricostruzione e valutazione degli argomenti
3. L’analisi delle fallacie
4. Fallacie e biases: tra argomentazione e psicologia
V. Intersoggettività e impegni dialogici
1. La New Dialectic e il ragionamento interpersonale: Douglas Walton ed Erik Krabbe
2. Contesti dialogici e commitment store
3. Teoria delle fallacie e presumptive reasoning
4. La fondazione della Informal Logic
5. Argomentazione, informatica e scienza cognitiva
VI. Razionalità e fondazione
1. Razionalità discorsiva: la pragmatica universale di Jürgen Habermas
2. Razionalità inferenziale e semantica: la pragmatica normativa di Robert B. Brandom
3. La pragmatica trascendentale di Karl O. Apel
4. Modelli di razionalità
5. Fondazione o giustificazione
VII. Argomentazione e pratiche sociali
1. Ragionamento pratico
2. Etiche del discorso
3. Diritto e politiche dell’argomentazione
TABLE OF CONTENTS
PREMESSA
di Luigi Ruggiu e Italo Testa
SEZIONE I
SPIRITO OGGETTIVO E COSTITUZIONE DELLA SOCIALITÀ
I. RAGIONE SOCIALE E OGGETTIVITÀ
di Luigi Ruggiu
II. IL PROBLEMA DELL’IDENTITÀ COLLETTIVA:
IL NOI ISTITUENTE E IL NOI ISTITUITO
di Vincent Descombes
III. HEGEL: LA SOLITUDINE DELLA RAGIONE COMUNITARIA
di Vincenzo Vitiello
IV. LA TRAGEDIA NELL’ETICO: SOCIETÀ CIVILE E STATO
IN HEGEL TRA BERNA E I PRIMI ANNI DI JENA
di Giuseppe Cantillo
V. LA MENTE E LE ISTITUZIONI:
L’OLISMO ANTROPOLOGICO DI DESCOMBES
di Diego Zucca
SEZIONE II
SPAZIO GLOBALE E WELTGESCHICHTE
I. GIUSTIZIA ANORMALE: RAGIONE SOCIALE SENZA ‘SOCIETÀ’NELL’ERA DELLA GLOBALIZZAZIONE
di Nancy Fraser
II. DALLA WELTGESCHICHTE ALLA MODERNITÀ-MONDO.
IL PROBLEMA DI UNA SFERA PUBBLICA GLOBALE
di Giacomo Marramao
III. L’IMPONDERABILITÀ DEL MONDO: FORME PLURALI
DELLA RAGIONE E GOVERNO DELLA CONTINGENZA
di Salvatore Natoli
IV. ALCUNE RIFLESSIONI SU HEGEL E L’ORIENTE MUSULMANO
di Giovanni Bonacina
SEZIONE III
RICONOSCIMENTO, PERSONA, LIBERTÀ
I. RICONOSCERE LE PERSONE
di Charles Larmore
II. PERSONA E RICONOSCIMENTO
di Heikki Ikäheimo
III. CULTURE E RICONOSCIMENTO.
UNA PROSPETTIVA ANTROPOLOGICA
di Ugo Fabietti
IV. RICONOSCIMENTO E LIBERTÀ DEI MODERNI
di Biagio De Giovanni
SEZIONE IV
NATURA, INTENZIONALITÀ E INTERAZIONE
I. LA STRUTTURA DEL DESIDERIO E DEL RICONOSCIMENTO:
AUTO-COSCIENZA E AUTO-COSTITUZIONE
di Robert. B. Brandom
II. ATTRAVERSANDO IL CONFINE: INTERNO, ESTERNO, INTENZIONALITÀ. ANCORA SU BRANDOM INTERPRETE DI HEGEL
di Stefano Poggi
III. SECONDA NATURA E RICONOSCIMENTO. HEGEL E LA TEORIA DELLO SPAZIO SOCIALE
di Italo Testa
IV. UN’ANTINOMIA DEL GIUDIZIO EMPIRICO: BRANDOM E MCDOWELL
di Danielle Macbeth
V. LA TRAMA DELLA FENOMENOLOGIA DI HEGEL
di Kenley R. Dove
SEZIONE V
ONTOLOGIA SOCIALE E ISTITUZIONI
I. SOGGETTI, NORME E ISTITUZIONI: CHE COS’È UNA VITA ETICA?
di Jean-François Kervégan
II. RAGIONI DI GRUPPO E INTENZIONALITÀ COLLETTIVA
di Raimo Tuomela
III. VINCOLI UNIVERSALI DEL LINGUAGGIO E IMPEGNI DEONTICI
NELLA COSTRUZIONE DELLA REALTÀ SOCIALE
di Francesca di Lorenzo
IV. HEGEL ERA NONEISTA? OGGETTI SOCIALI E OGGETTI FILOSOFICI
di Franca D’Agostini
V. VITA E SOCIALITÀ DEL GEIST. ALCUNE
NOTE SUL FRAMMENTO DI SISTEMA DEL 1800
di Francesco Mora
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Premessa di Luigi Ruggiu e Italo Testa
Sezione I. Pragmatismo e idealismo
Richard J. Bernstein, Hegel in America. La tradizione del pragmatismo
Valerio Verra, Alterne vicende della fortuna di Hegel
William Maker, Una lettura americana di Hegel, ovvero come Hegel salva il pragmatismo da se stesso
Stefano Poggi, Naturalismo e pluralismo vs. idealismo e monismo, ovvero William James vs. Hegel
Alessandro Bellan, Pragmatismo con metodo. Hegel, Rorty e il problema della fondazione
Sezione Il. Razionalità pratica e filosofia sociale
Robert B. Pippin;Hegel e la razionalità istituzionale
Lucio Cortella, La libertà come ethos
Terry Pinkard, Soggetti, oggetti, normatività: che cosa significa essere un agente?
Roberto Racinaro, Tragedia, ironia, comicità. Hegel e il 'nipote' di Diderot
Sezione III. Attualità della ragione oggettiva;
Richard Rorty, Alcuni usi americani di Hegel,
Luigi Ruggiu, Hegel: fine della filosofia?
Robert B. Brandom, Olismo e idealismo nella Fenomenologia di Hegel
Vittorio Hosle, Inferenzialismo in Brandom e olismo in Hegel. Una risposta a Richard Rorty e alcune domande per Robert Brandom Italo Testa, Idealismo e normatività. Robert Brandom e la ricezione americana di Hegel
Sezione IV. Linguaggio e teoria della conoscenza
Tom Rockmore, Hegel e i limiti dello hegelismo analitico
Leo Lugarini, Hegel e Heidegger: la dialettica 'impaccio filosofico'
Ardis B. Collins, Il ruolo del linguaggio nella critica hegeliana della conoscenza
Daniele Goldoni, Hegel e il linguaggio. Quale alterità?
Diego Zucca, Linguaggio e conoscenza: il neopragmatismo e Hegel contro la datità
Sezione V. La struttura dell'esperienza
John McDowell, L'idealismo di Hegel come radicalizzazione di Kant
Mario Ruggenini, Lo spirito e la parola. Dialettica di soggettività e finitezza
Paul Redding, Esplicitare l'inferenzialismo di Hegel
Franco Chiereghin, Principio e inizio in Hegel
Francesco Berto, Mediazione e immediatezza in Hegel e Wittgenstein
Sezione VI. Intersoggettività e riconoscimento
Robert R. Williams, Forme mancate di intersoggettività nella concezione hegeliana della coscienza nella "Fenomenologia dello Spirito"
Aldo Masullo, L'intersoggettività e il fondamento comunitario nella logica hegeliana
S. Houlgate, Desiderio, riconoscimento e morte nella Fenomenologia di Hegel,
Maurizio Pagano, La 'cosa stessa' e l'intersoggettività
Prefazione di Rino Genovese
1. Temi
L’immaginazione metafisica, di Italo Testa
Il fantasma della metafisica e la fallacia delle immagini, di Rino Genovese
2. Jam session
Prima giornata
Il pensiero iconico e l’espressività delle immagini
Estetizzazione e demarcazione tra metafisica e mito
Metafora e critica del concetto
Animale simbolico o metafisico?
Critica della ragione impura
Metafisica e dominio
Natura umana, totalità, pluralizzazione
Seconda giornata
Anafora, critica ricorsiva, libertà situata
Densità ed epidemicità dell’immagine
Mimetismo e riconoscimento
Arte e intensificazione dell’immagine
Perdita dell’aura e demitizzazione
Seconda naturalezza
3. Ex post
Metaforica, metafisica, imitazione, di Andrea Borsari
Prospettiva e immaginazione metafisica, di Paola Cantù
Immaginazione, percezione, comprensione, di Paolo Costa
Per una storia delle scienze inesatte, di Francesco Peri
dead line: January 20, 2017
To Date Invited Speakers:
Vittorio Gallese (University of Parma)
Richard Menary (Macquarie University)
Daniel Hutto (University of Wollongong), TBC
Teed Rockwell (Sonoma State University)
Jessica Lindblom (University of Skoevde)
Pierre Steiner (COSTECH/UTC, Paris)
Roberto Frega (IMM-CNRS, Paris)
Corrado Sinigaglia (Università di Milano)
Pentti Määttänen (University of Helsinki)
Arvi Särkelä (University of Luzern)
(downlodable here: http://fqp.luiss.it/category/numero/ns-supplementary-volume-2015-life-and-action)
The symposium on Michael Thompson's "Life and Action, is organized according to the threefold
partition of the book. As for part one, Paolo Costa focuses on
the logical and metaphysical understanding of “life-form” and
relates it to similar approaches in philosophical anthropology. As
for part two, Constantine Sandis examines the role of simple past
and progressive tenses in the naïve theory of action and contrasts
it with alternative contemporary approaches in action theory.
Matteo Bianchin questions Thompson’s rejection of folk
psychological accounts by focusing on phenomenal intentionality
and action planning. As for part three, Arto Laitinen considers
Thompson’s understanding of practices as a source of goodness
in the light of the Hegelian distinction between Moralität und
Sittlichkeit. Italo Testa discusses Thompson’s anti-individualist
account of dispositions and social practices, and assesses its
relevance for social philosophy and social ontology. Ingrid
Salvatore interrogates Thompson’s understanding of Rawls’s
“Two concepts of Rule” and rule-like practices.
Table of Contents:
Paolo Costa, "Where does our undestanding of life come from? The riddle about recognizing living things"
Constantine Sandis, "He buttered the toast while baking a fresh loaf"
Matteo Bianchin, "Intentions and Intentionality"
Arto Laitinen, "Practices as ‘actual’ sources of goodness of actions"
Italo Testa, "Some consequences of Thompson’s Life and Action for social philosophy"
Ingrid Salvatore, "Thompson on Rawls and Practices"
Alessandro Bellan e Italo Testa
Presentazione
Parte I
Genesi ed epistemologia delle scienze sociali
Gillian Rose
Hegel. Contro la sociologia
Vittorio Hösle
Sulla filosofia della storia delle scienze sociali
Parte II
Hegel e le scienze sociali. Sociologia, antropologia e psicologia evolutiva
Alessandro Bellan
Anomia e alienazione. Scienza ed epistemologia del sociale in Hegel e Durkheim
Andrea Sartori
Sull’esistenza sociale in Hegel e Gehlen
Paul Redding
G.W.F. Hegel e Pierre Bourdieu: storia, kantismo e teoria sociale
Italo Testa
Naturalmente sociali. Per una teoria generale del riconoscimento
Parte III
Paradigmi metodologici e filosofia sociale
Michael Quante e David Schweikard
“…die Bestimmung der Individuen ist, ein allgemeines Leben zu führen”. La struttura metafisica della filosofia sociale di Hegel
Frederick Neuhouser
L’idea hegeliana di ‘scienza’ della società
Cathleen Kantner e Udo Tietz
Comunità, identità e istituzioni. Hegel sull’integrazione normativa delle società moderne