- Department of Philosophy
Macquarie University
North Ryde
Sydney, NSW 2109
Australia - +61 2 9850 8881
Nicholas H Smith
University of Connecticut, Philosophy, Department Member
- Macquarie University, Philosophy, Department Memberadd
- I commence my new position as Visiting Professor in the Department of Philosophy at the University of Connecticut in ... moreI commence my new position as Visiting Professor in the Department of Philosophy at the University of Connecticut in January 2021.
I previously worked at Macquarie University and remain an Honorary Professor there.edit
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One of the most vexing questions in contemporary political philosophy and social theory concerns the framework within which to undertake a normatively well-grounded, empirically attuned critique of capitalist society. This volume takes... more
One of the most vexing questions in contemporary political philosophy and social theory concerns the framework within which to undertake a normatively well-grounded, empirically attuned critique of capitalist society. This volume takes the debate forward by proposing a new framework that emphasizes the central anthropological significance of work (its role in constituting human subjectivity) as well as the role work has in the formation of social bonds. Drawing on the philosophy of Hegel and the post-Hegelian tradition of critical social theory, special attention is given to the significance of recognition in work, the problems of misrecognition generated in the present culture of capitalism, and the normative resources available for criticising that culture.
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The volume is divided into five parts. Part one considers Mind and World’s location in the philosophical tradition, particularly its relation to Kant's critical project. Parts two and three cover issues in epistemology and philosophy of... more
The volume is divided into five parts. Part one considers Mind and World’s location in the philosophical tradition, particularly its relation to Kant's critical project. Parts two and three cover issues in epistemology and philosophy of mind, while in part four the focus turns to problems of rationality and ethics. In part five McDowell responds to the contributors and further elaborates his own views. Contributors: J. M. Bernstein, Richard J. Bernstein, Robert Brandom, Rüdiger Bubner, Michael Friedman, Axel Honneth, Charles Larmore, Gregory McCulloch, John McDowell, Robert B. Pippin, Hilary Putnam, Nicholas Smith, Barry Stroud, Charles Taylor, Crispin Wright.
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The Canadian philosopher Charles Taylor is a key figure in contemporary debates about the self and the problems of modernity. This book provides a comprehensive, critical account of Taylor's work. It reconstructs the ambitious... more
The Canadian philosopher Charles Taylor is a key figure in contemporary debates about the self and the problems of modernity. This book provides a comprehensive, critical account of Taylor's work. It reconstructs the ambitious philosophical project that unifies Taylor’s diverse writings and it examines in detail his specific claims about the structure of the human sciences; the link between identity, language, and moral values; democracy and multiculturalism; and the conflict between secular and non-secular spirituality. The book also includes the first sustained account of Taylor's career as a social critic and political activist.
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The book reconstructs three different ways of thinking about the contingency of human identity and its implications for ethics and political theory: ‘weak thought’ as exemplified by Rorty, Lyotard and postmodernism; the ‘strong... more
The book reconstructs three different ways of thinking about the contingency of human identity and its implications for ethics and political theory: ‘weak thought’ as exemplified by Rorty, Lyotard and postmodernism; the ‘strong hermeneutics’ of Gadamer, Ricoeur and Taylor; and the discourse ethics of Juergen Habermas. It is argued that weak thought falsely absolutizes contingency, and that discourse ethics demarcates the limits of contingency in the wrong way. A case for a strong hermeneutic framework for thinking about these and related matters (such as the debate between realism and anti-realism, and the idea of ecological responsibility) is presented.
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One of the achievements of Hans-Georg Gadamer's Truth and Method was to make plausible the idea that hermeneutics constitutes a distinct body of thought, an intellectual tradition whose history of successes, stalemates and defeats, heroes... more
One of the achievements of Hans-Georg Gadamer's Truth and Method was to make plausible the idea that hermeneutics constitutes a distinct body of thought, an intellectual tradition whose history of successes, stalemates and defeats, heroes and villains, could be recounted in a single coherent narrative (Gadamer 1993). But the popularity of this idea, both in the sense of the number of people who came to accept
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The paper is a critical analysis of Paul Ricoeur’s philosophy of work as it is formulated in a number of essays from the 1950s and 60s. It begins with a reconstruction of the central theses advanced in ‘Travail et parole’ (1953) and... more
The paper is a critical analysis of Paul Ricoeur’s philosophy of work as it is formulated in a number of essays from the 1950s and 60s. It begins with a reconstruction of the central theses advanced in ‘Travail et parole’ (1953) and related texts, where Ricoeur sought to outline a philosophical anthropology in which work is given its due. To give work its due, from an anthropological standpoint, is to see it as limited by counter-concept of language, according to Ricoeur. The paper then argues that this way of understanding the anthropological significance of work is not only internally problematic, but at odds with phenomenological insights to be found elsewhere in Ricoeur’s oeuvre, particularly Le Volontaire et l’involontaire (1950). The final section of the paper makes some suggestions for how the phenomenological and anthropological poles of a philosophy of work might be better integrated, and the ‘nexus between speech and work’ better described.
This article argues that a pragmatist ambition to transcendence undergirds Richard Rorty's metaphilosophy. That transcendence might play a positive role in Rorty's work might seem implausible given his well-known rejection of the idea... more
This article argues that a pragmatist ambition to transcendence undergirds Richard Rorty's metaphilosophy. That transcendence might play a positive role in Rorty's work might seem implausible given his well-known rejection of the idea that human practices are accountable to some external, Archimedean standpoint, and his endorsement of the historicist view that standards of rationality are products of time and chance. It is true that Rorty's contributions to epistemology, philosophy of mind and metaphysics have this anti-transcendentalist character. But in his metaphilosophy, Rorty shows great respect for pre-philosophical impulses aimed at transcendence of some kind, in particular the romantic (and indeed religious) experience of awe at something greater than oneself, and the utopian striving for a radically better world. These impulses do not disappear in Rorty's metaphilosophy but are reshaped in a pragmatist iteration of transcendence which, we argue, can be characterised as horizontal (rather than vertical) and weak (rather strong). We use this characterization to distinguish Rorty's metaphilosophy from other accounts that share a postmetaphysical ambition to transcendence.
The paper examines the justice of Unconditional Basic Income (UBI) through the lens of the Hegel-inspired recognition-theory of justice. As explained in the first part of the paper, this theory takes everyday social roles to be the... more
The paper examines the justice of Unconditional Basic Income (UBI) through the lens of the Hegel-inspired recognition-theory of justice. As explained in the first part of the paper, this theory takes everyday social roles to be the primary subject-matter of the theory of justice, and it takes justice in these roles to be a matter of the kind of freedom that is available through their performance, namely 'social' freedom. The paper then identifies the key criteria of social freedom. The extent to which the introduction of an UBI would meet these criteria is then examined, with a focus on the social role that stands to be most affected by an UBI, namely that of the workerearner. It is argued that while an UBI is likely to be only partially effective as an instrument of specifically social freedom, its main justification lies not here, but in securing a basis for the subjective freedom that social freedom presupposes.
The aim of this article is to situate Arendt’s account of labour as a critical response to humanisms of labour, or put otherwise, to situate it as an anti-humanism of labour. It compares Arendt’s account of labour with that of the most... more
The aim of this article is to situate Arendt’s account of labour as a critical response to humanisms of labour, or put otherwise, to situate it as an anti-humanism of labour. It compares Arendt’s account of labour with that of the most prominent humanist theorist of labour at the time of the composition of The Human Condition: Georges Friedmann. Arendt’s and Friedmann’s accounts of labour are compared specifically with respect to the range of capacities, social relations, and possibilities of fulfilment at stake in the activity of labour. The comparison provides a previously unexplored context for understanding Arendt’s account of labour and her distinction between labour and work. The relevance of Arendt’s and Friedmann’s theories of labour for the contemporary debate about the meaning of work in an age of automation is also briefly discussed.
ABSTRACT After characterizing Taylor’s general approach to the problems of solidarity, we distinguish and reconstruct three contexts of solidarity in which this approach is developed: the civic, the socio-economic, and the moral. We... more
ABSTRACT After characterizing Taylor’s general approach to the problems of solidarity, we distinguish and reconstruct three contexts of solidarity in which this approach is developed: the civic, the socio-economic, and the moral. We
argue that Taylor’s distinctive move in each of these contexts of solidarity is to claim that the relationship at stake poses normatively justifi ed demands, which are motivationally demanding, but insuffi ciently motivating on their own. On
Taylor’s conception, we need some understanding of extra motivational sources which explain why people do (or would) live up to the exacting demands. Taylor accepts that our self-understanding as members of either particular communities
or humanity at large has some motivational power, but he suspects that in many cases the memberships are too thin to resonate deeply and enduringly within us. In Taylor’s view, a realistic picture of what moves people to solidarity has to
account for the extra motivation, when it happens. We propose an alternative view in which morality, democracy and socio-economic cooperation can be seen as separate spheres or relations which are normatively justified, motivationally
demanding, but also sufficiently motivating on their own.
KEYWORDS moral motivation • patriotism • political allegiance • social bond• solidarity • Charles Taylor
argue that Taylor’s distinctive move in each of these contexts of solidarity is to claim that the relationship at stake poses normatively justifi ed demands, which are motivationally demanding, but insuffi ciently motivating on their own. On
Taylor’s conception, we need some understanding of extra motivational sources which explain why people do (or would) live up to the exacting demands. Taylor accepts that our self-understanding as members of either particular communities
or humanity at large has some motivational power, but he suspects that in many cases the memberships are too thin to resonate deeply and enduringly within us. In Taylor’s view, a realistic picture of what moves people to solidarity has to
account for the extra motivation, when it happens. We propose an alternative view in which morality, democracy and socio-economic cooperation can be seen as separate spheres or relations which are normatively justified, motivationally
demanding, but also sufficiently motivating on their own.
KEYWORDS moral motivation • patriotism • political allegiance • social bond• solidarity • Charles Taylor
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In this article we examine the idea of a politics of misrecognition of working activity. We begin by introducing a distinction between the kind of recognition and misrecognition that attaches to one’s identity, and the kind of recognition... more
In this article we examine the idea of a politics of misrecognition of working activity. We begin by introducing a distinction between the kind of recognition and misrecognition that attaches to one’s identity, and the kind of recognition and misrecognition that attaches to one’s activity. We then consider the political significance of the latter kind of recognition and misrecognition in the context of work. Drawing first on empirical research undertaken by sociologists at the Institut für Sozialforschung in Frankfurt, we argue for a differentiated concept of recognition that shows the politics of misrecognition at work to be as much a matter of conflict between modes of recognition as it is a struggle for recognition as opposed to non-recognition. The differentiated concept of recognition which allows for this empirical insight owes much to Axel Honneth’s theory. But as we argue in the section that follows, this theory is ambiguous about the normative content of the expectations of recognition that are bound up with the activity of working. This in turn makes it unclear how we should understand the normative basis of the politics of the misrecognition of what one does at work. In the final sections of the article, we suggest that the psychodynamic model of work elaborated by Christophe Dejours and others at the Conservatoire National des Arts et Métiers in Paris can shed light on this matter; that is to say, it can help to clarify the normative significance and political stakes of the misrecognition of working activity.
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I argue here that the post-Hegelian tradition presents us with three contrasting normative models of work. According to the instrumental model, the core norms of work are those of means-ends rationality. In this model, the modern world of... more
I argue here that the post-Hegelian tradition presents us with three contrasting normative models of work. According to the instrumental model, the core norms of work are those of means-ends rationality. In this model, the modern world of work is constitutively a matter of deploying the most effective means to bring about given ends. The ends for which working is the means do not themselves come from the working, they are not internal to work activity: they derive first and foremost from the material conditions of human existence and the natural necessity of securing them. The rational kernel of modern work, the core norm that has shaped its development, is on this view instrumental reason, and this very same normative core, in the shape of advanced technology and more efficient, time-saving production, can help to liberate it. The second model, by contrast, takes the core norms of work to be internal to working activity. Rather than work gaining its normativity, so to speak, from something external to it, from ends to which the work is a contingent means, on this second view the core norms of work are expressions of values or meanings that are immanent to working practices themselves. The expressive model of work, as I shall call it, regards the actual world of work to be constituted historically by work-specific norms, norms which working subjects themselves have invoked and mobilised around in the course of their struggles for emancipation. According to the third model, the core norms of work, in the double constitutive-transformative sense we are dealing with here, have to do neither with instrumental rationality nor authentic self-expression. Rather they concern norms that relate either to individual achievement or contribution through work (in the form of esteem) or to the conditions that must in place for individuals to participate in the exchange of services by which market societies reproduce themselves (in the form of mutual respect). Following Honneth, I shall call this the recognition model.
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This paper examines a neglected but crucial feature of Honneth’s critical theory: its use of a concept of recognition to articulate the norms that are apposite for the contemporary world of work. The paper shows that from his first... more
This paper examines a neglected but crucial feature of Honneth’s critical theory: its use of a concept of recognition to articulate the norms that are apposite for the contemporary world of work. The paper shows that from his first writings on the structure of critical social theory in the early 1980s to the recent exchange with Nancy Fraser on recognition and redistribution, the problem of grounding a substantive critique of work under capitalism has been central to Honneth’s enterprise. This answers the routine objection that the recognition paradigm fails to take into account economic or material realities. At the same time, Honneth’s approach to the critique of work has undergone significant shifts, and it is yet to be fully developed. The paper traces these changes in direction, and it proposes an expressivist conception of work that builds upon the ‘normative content’ of the concept of work described by Honneth in his 1980 essay ‘Work and Instrumental Action’.
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The paper attempts to situate Sennett philosophically by placing him in the tradition of ontological hermeneutics. This way of reading Sennett is justified not only by the core principles that govern Sennett’s social anthropology. It is... more
The paper attempts to situate Sennett philosophically by placing him in the tradition of ontological hermeneutics. This way of reading Sennett is justified not only by the core principles that govern Sennett’s social anthropology. It is also useful for tracing the trajectory of Sennett’s philosophically informed diagnoses of the times. These diagnoses focus on the role of work in shaping subjectivity. After reconstructing the basic conceptual shape of Sennett’s diagnoses of the work-related maladies of the “old” and the “new” capitalism, the paper presents some broader reflections on the philosophical presuppositions of social criticism that takes its departure from the centrality of work.
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After characterizing Taylor’s general approach to the problems of solidarity, we distinguish and reconstruct three contexts of solidarity in which this approach is developed: the civic, the socio-economic, and the moral. We argue that... more
After characterizing Taylor’s general approach to the problems of
solidarity, we distinguish and reconstruct three contexts of solidarity in which this approach is developed: the civic, the socio-economic, and the moral. We argue that Taylor’s distinctive move in each of these contexts of solidarity is to claim that the relationship at stake poses normatively justified demands, which are motivationally demanding, but insufficiently motivating on their own. On Taylor’s conception, we need some understanding of extra motivational sources which explain why people do (or would) live up to the exacting demands. Taylor accepts that our self-understanding as members of either particular communities or humanity at large has some motivational power, but he suspects that in many cases the memberships are too thin to resonate deeply and enduringly within us. In Taylor’s view, a realistic picture of what moves people to solidarity has to account for the extra motivation, when it happens. We propose an alternative view in which morality, democracy and socio-economic cooperation can be seen as separate spheres or relations which are normatively justifi ed, motivationally demanding, but also suffi ciently motivating on their own.
solidarity, we distinguish and reconstruct three contexts of solidarity in which this approach is developed: the civic, the socio-economic, and the moral. We argue that Taylor’s distinctive move in each of these contexts of solidarity is to claim that the relationship at stake poses normatively justified demands, which are motivationally demanding, but insufficiently motivating on their own. On Taylor’s conception, we need some understanding of extra motivational sources which explain why people do (or would) live up to the exacting demands. Taylor accepts that our self-understanding as members of either particular communities or humanity at large has some motivational power, but he suspects that in many cases the memberships are too thin to resonate deeply and enduringly within us. In Taylor’s view, a realistic picture of what moves people to solidarity has to account for the extra motivation, when it happens. We propose an alternative view in which morality, democracy and socio-economic cooperation can be seen as separate spheres or relations which are normatively justifi ed, motivationally demanding, but also suffi ciently motivating on their own.
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The essay examines the idea of expressivism as it is presented and defended in the work of Robert Brandom and Charles Taylor. Two features of what we ordinarily mean by the term ‘expression’ are distinguished, one of which provides an... more
The essay examines the idea of expressivism as it is presented and defended in the work of Robert Brandom and Charles Taylor. Two features of what we ordinarily mean by the term ‘expression’ are distinguished, one of which provides an intuitive basis for understanding Brandom’s expressivist program, the other of which provides an interpretive key for understanding Taylor’s version of expressivism. After looking briefly at the main tenets of these expressivisms, the essay concludes by considering their relation to Romanticism on the one hand, and to the Enlightenment project (and Brandom’s proposed renewal of it) on the other.
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The chapter shows how the theme of meaning-constitution in relation to human subjectivity runs like a red thread through Taylor’s work on epistemology, philosophy of language and ethics. It draws attention to issues that are commonly... more
The chapter shows how the theme of meaning-constitution in relation to human subjectivity runs like a red thread through Taylor’s work on epistemology, philosophy of language and ethics. It draws attention to issues that are commonly regarded as weak points for the hermeneutic tradition Taylor identifies with and it considers whether Taylor is any more successful when dealing with these issues himself.
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Charles Taylor's opposition to representationalist conceptions of the tasks of philosophy is shared by several other philosophical movements, most notably pragmatism and contemporary advocates of Hegelian Idealism strongly influenced by... more
Charles Taylor's opposition to representationalist conceptions of the tasks of philosophy is shared by several other philosophical movements, most notably pragmatism and contemporary advocates of Hegelian Idealism strongly influenced by pragmatism (eg Robert Pippin, Robert Brandom).The article considers what, if anything, the particular anti-representationalist strategy adopted by Taylor adds to these other forms of non-representationalism. In this way it attempts to throw new light on the significance of Taylor's project today.
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This article examines Levinas as if he were a participant in what Habermas has called ‘the philosophical discourse of modernity’. It begins by comparing Levinas’ and Habermas’ articulations of the philosophical problems of modernity. It... more
This article examines Levinas as if he were a participant in what Habermas has called ‘the philosophical discourse of modernity’. It begins by comparing Levinas’ and Habermas’ articulations of the philosophical problems of modernity. It then turns to how certain key motifs in Levinas’ later work give philosophical expression to the needs of the times as Levinas diagnoses them. In particular it examines how Levinas interweaves a modern, post-ontological conception of ‘the religious’ or ‘the sacred’ into his account of subjectivity. Finally, the article looks at some problems that arise for Levinas once his position in the philosophical discourse on modernity is made explicit.
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The paper contrasts two approaches to the analysis of hope: one that takes its departure from a view broadly shared by Hobbes, Locke and Hume, another that fits better with Aquinas’s definition of hope. The former relies heavily on a... more
The paper contrasts two approaches to the analysis of hope: one that takes its departure from a view broadly shared by Hobbes, Locke and Hume, another that fits better with Aquinas’s definition of hope. The former relies heavily on a sharp distinction between the cognitive and conative aspects of hope. It is argued that while this approach provides a valuable source of insights, its focus is too narrow and it rests on a problematic rationalistic psychology. The argument is supported by a discussion of hope understood as a stance and by a consideration of the phenomenological contrast between expectation and anticipation.The paper concludes with some reflections on the relation between hope and illusion and the idea of responsible hope.
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The paper distinguishes two kinds of philosophical reflection on hope. The first is concerned with analysing the concept of hope. Conceptual analysis seeks to identify the core elements of a concept, and the central features of the... more
The paper distinguishes two kinds of philosophical reflection on hope. The first is concerned with analysing the concept of hope. Conceptual analysis seeks to identify the core elements of a concept, and the central features of the concept of hope (as they have been distinguished by philosophers who have reflected on hope in this way) are discussed in section two of the paper. The paper then turns to a consideration of the value of hope. My thesis here is that when we reflect on hope, we unavoidably bring along background, tacit assumptions regarding its worth. In the third section of the paper I attempt to make explicit some of these assumptions, particularly those I believe lie behind the negative evaluation of hope implicit in much western philosophical culture. Finally the paper identifies a second kind of philosophical reflection on hope, which is concerned not so much with the logic or value of hope as with hope inderstood as a ‘principle.’
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In the first part of the paper I consider the relative neglect of hope in the tradition of critical theory. I attribute this neglect to a low estimation of the cognitive, aesthetic, and moral value of hope, and to the strong - but, I... more
In the first part of the paper I consider the relative neglect of hope in the tradition of critical theory. I attribute this neglect to a low estimation of the cognitive, aesthetic, and moral value of hope, and to the strong - but, I argue, contingent - association that holds between hope and religion. I then distinguish three strategies for thinking about the justification of social hope; one which appeals to a notion of unfulfilled or frustrated natural human capacities, another which invokes a providential order, and a third which questions the very appropriateness of justification, turning instead to a notion of ungroundable hope. Different senses of ungroundable hope are distinguished and by way of conclusion I briefly consider their relevance for the project of critique today.
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The article considers how Richard Rorty’s writings on religion dovetail with his views on the philosophical significance of hope. It begins with a reconstruction of the central features of Rorty’s philosophy of religion, including its... more
The article considers how Richard Rorty’s writings on religion dovetail with his views on the philosophical significance of hope. It begins with a reconstruction of the central features of Rorty’s philosophy of religion, including its critique of theism and its attempt to rehabilitate religion within a pragmatist philosophical framework. It then presents some criticisms of Rorty’s proposal. It is argued first that Rorty’s ‘redescription’ of the fulfilment of the religious impulse is so radical that it is hard to see what remains of its specifically religious content. This casts doubt on Rorty’s claim to have made pragmatism and religion compatible. The article then offers an analysis of Rorty’s key notion of ‘unjustifiable hope’. Different senses of unjustifiable hope are distinguished, in the course of which a tension between the ‘romantic’ and ‘utilitarian’ aspects of Rorty’s pragmatist philosophy of religion comes into view.
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In contemporary debates the term pluralism is often used as shorthand for a commitment to a non-teleological ideal of human flourishing – one in which ‘human development in its richest diversity’ plays a crucial role. Pluralists, in this... more
In contemporary debates the term pluralism is often used as shorthand for a commitment to a non-teleological ideal of human flourishing – one in which ‘human development in its richest diversity’ plays a crucial role. Pluralists, in this sense, are suspicious of the thought that human beings share a single nature or essence the fulfilment of which defines the goal of life. Rather than supposing that there is one true way of being human to which we should all aspire, or one particular form of life that ranks above all others, the pluralist has a vision in which many norms and values peacefully co-exist. Mill and Humboldt gave powerful expression to this kind of pluralism in the nineteenth century, and one of its most eloquent advocates today is Richard Rorty.
My paper offers some reflections on how Rorty situates religion in his pluralist vision. Like Mill (and others) before him, Rorty draws on utilitarian considerations, and in particular a version of the ‘harm principle’, to argue for the separation of church and state and the need for religious toleration. At the same time, however, he holds that monotheism is intrinsically at odds with pluralism, amongst other reasons because it embroils the believer in a notion of ‘redemptive truth’. Thus, alongside the familiar liberal arguments for toleration, we find a critique of religion as an appropriate framework for articulating this tolerance, and as a suitable framework for articulating the pluralist vision more generally. I argue here that while there is something important to be learned from Rorty’s critique, his neo-pragmatist alternative to redemptive truth is unstable in its own way.
My paper offers some reflections on how Rorty situates religion in his pluralist vision. Like Mill (and others) before him, Rorty draws on utilitarian considerations, and in particular a version of the ‘harm principle’, to argue for the separation of church and state and the need for religious toleration. At the same time, however, he holds that monotheism is intrinsically at odds with pluralism, amongst other reasons because it embroils the believer in a notion of ‘redemptive truth’. Thus, alongside the familiar liberal arguments for toleration, we find a critique of religion as an appropriate framework for articulating this tolerance, and as a suitable framework for articulating the pluralist vision more generally. I argue here that while there is something important to be learned from Rorty’s critique, his neo-pragmatist alternative to redemptive truth is unstable in its own way.
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Many progressives about work have been oriented in their thinking by the distinction, famously made by Marx in Volume Three of Capital, between 'the realm of necessity' and 'the true realm of freedom'. 1 The point of the distinction, at... more
Many progressives about work have been oriented in their thinking by the distinction, famously made by Marx in Volume Three of Capital, between 'the realm of necessity' and 'the true realm of freedom'. 1 The point of the distinction, at least as interpreted by many of Marx's...
This chapter takes a critical look at universities from the perspective of the neopragmatist philosophy of education outlined by Richard Rorty. The chapter begins with a discussion of Rorty's view of the ends that educational institutions... more
This chapter takes a critical look at universities from the perspective of the neopragmatist philosophy of education outlined by Richard Rorty. The chapter begins with a discussion of Rorty's view of the ends that educational institutions properly serve in a liberal democracy. It then considers the kind of culture that Rorty takes to be conducive to those ends and the kind that is antithetical to them. Rorty sometimes characterizes the latter as a culture of 'egotism'. After describing the main aspects of such a culture, the chapter uses it as an interpretive key for understanding the 'dark side' of the contemporary university. Our thesis is that within a Rortyan, neo-pragmatist philosophy of higher education, the ends that universities are meant to serve in a liberal democracy are vulnerable to frustration and corruption by a culture of egotism.