Books by Nicholas H Smith
One of the most vexing questions in contemporary political philosophy and social theory concerns ... more One of the most vexing questions in contemporary political philosophy and social theory concerns the framework within which to undertake a normatively well-grounded, empirically attuned critique of capitalist society. This volume takes the debate forward by proposing a new framework that emphasizes the central anthropological significance of work (its role in constituting human subjectivity) as well as the role work has in the formation of social bonds. Drawing on the philosophy of Hegel and the post-Hegelian tradition of critical social theory, special attention is given to the significance of recognition in work, the problems of misrecognition generated in the present culture of capitalism, and the normative resources available for criticising that culture.
The volume is divided into five parts. Part one considers Mind and World’s location in the philos... more The volume is divided into five parts. Part one considers Mind and World’s location in the philosophical tradition, particularly its relation to Kant's critical project. Parts two and three cover issues in epistemology and philosophy of mind, while in part four the focus turns to problems of rationality and ethics. In part five McDowell responds to the contributors and further elaborates his own views. Contributors: J. M. Bernstein, Richard J. Bernstein, Robert Brandom, Rüdiger Bubner, Michael Friedman, Axel Honneth, Charles Larmore, Gregory McCulloch, John McDowell, Robert B. Pippin, Hilary Putnam, Nicholas Smith, Barry Stroud, Charles Taylor, Crispin Wright.
The Canadian philosopher Charles Taylor is a key figure in contemporary debates about the self an... more The Canadian philosopher Charles Taylor is a key figure in contemporary debates about the self and the problems of modernity. This book provides a comprehensive, critical account of Taylor's work. It reconstructs the ambitious philosophical project that unifies Taylor’s diverse writings and it examines in detail his specific claims about the structure of the human sciences; the link between identity, language, and moral values; democracy and multiculturalism; and the conflict between secular and non-secular spirituality. The book also includes the first sustained account of Taylor's career as a social critic and political activist.
The book reconstructs three different ways of thinking about the contingency of human identity an... more The book reconstructs three different ways of thinking about the contingency of human identity and its implications for ethics and political theory: ‘weak thought’ as exemplified by Rorty, Lyotard and postmodernism; the ‘strong hermeneutics’ of Gadamer, Ricoeur and Taylor; and the discourse ethics of Juergen Habermas. It is argued that weak thought falsely absolutizes contingency, and that discourse ethics demarcates the limits of contingency in the wrong way. A case for a strong hermeneutic framework for thinking about these and related matters (such as the debate between realism and anti-realism, and the idea of ecological responsibility) is presented.
Papers by Nicholas H Smith
Philosophy & Social Criticism, 2018
Revue internationale de philosophie, 2016
Routledge Companion to Philosophical Hermeneutics, 2015
One of the achievements of Hans-Georg Gadamer's Truth and Method was to make plausible the idea t... more One of the achievements of Hans-Georg Gadamer's Truth and Method was to make plausible the idea that hermeneutics constitutes a distinct body of thought, an intellectual tradition whose history of successes, stalemates and defeats, heroes and villains, could be recounted in a single coherent narrative (Gadamer 1993). But the popularity of this idea, both in the sense of the number of people who came to accept
Revue internationale de philosophie, 2016
The paper is a critical analysis of Paul Ricoeur’s philosophy of work as it is formulated in a nu... more The paper is a critical analysis of Paul Ricoeur’s philosophy of work as it is formulated in a number of essays from the 1950s and 60s. It begins with a reconstruction of the central theses advanced in ‘Travail et parole’ (1953) and related texts, where Ricoeur sought to outline a philosophical anthropology in which work is given its due. To give work its due, from an anthropological standpoint, is to see it as limited by counter-concept of language, according to Ricoeur. The paper then argues that this way of understanding the anthropological significance of work is not only internally problematic, but at odds with phenomenological insights to be found elsewhere in Ricoeur’s oeuvre, particularly Le Volontaire et l’involontaire (1950). The final section of the paper makes some suggestions for how the phenomenological and anthropological poles of a philosophy of work might be better integrated, and the ‘nexus between speech and work’ better described.
Analyse & Kritik, 2019
This article argues that a pragmatist ambition to transcendence undergirds Richard Rorty's metaph... more This article argues that a pragmatist ambition to transcendence undergirds Richard Rorty's metaphilosophy. That transcendence might play a positive role in Rorty's work might seem implausible given his well-known rejection of the idea that human practices are accountable to some external, Archimedean standpoint, and his endorsement of the historicist view that standards of rationality are products of time and chance. It is true that Rorty's contributions to epistemology, philosophy of mind and metaphysics have this anti-transcendentalist character. But in his metaphilosophy, Rorty shows great respect for pre-philosophical impulses aimed at transcendence of some kind, in particular the romantic (and indeed religious) experience of awe at something greater than oneself, and the utopian striving for a radically better world. These impulses do not disappear in Rorty's metaphilosophy but are reshaped in a pragmatist iteration of transcendence which, we argue, can be characterised as horizontal (rather than vertical) and weak (rather strong). We use this characterization to distinguish Rorty's metaphilosophy from other accounts that share a postmetaphysical ambition to transcendence.
Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy, 2019
The paper examines the justice of Unconditional Basic Income (UBI) through the lens of the Hegel-... more The paper examines the justice of Unconditional Basic Income (UBI) through the lens of the Hegel-inspired recognition-theory of justice. As explained in the first part of the paper, this theory takes everyday social roles to be the primary subject-matter of the theory of justice, and it takes justice in these roles to be a matter of the kind of freedom that is available through their performance, namely 'social' freedom. The paper then identifies the key criteria of social freedom. The extent to which the introduction of an UBI would meet these criteria is then examined, with a focus on the social role that stands to be most affected by an UBI, namely that of the workerearner. It is argued that while an UBI is likely to be only partially effective as an instrument of specifically social freedom, its main justification lies not here, but in securing a basis for the subjective freedom that social freedom presupposes.
European Journal of Social Theory, 2019
The aim of this article is to situate Arendt’s account of labour as a critical response to humani... more The aim of this article is to situate Arendt’s account of labour as a critical response to humanisms of labour, or put otherwise, to situate it as an anti-humanism of labour. It compares Arendt’s account of labour with that of the most prominent humanist theorist of labour at the time of the composition of The Human Condition: Georges Friedmann. Arendt’s and Friedmann’s accounts of labour are compared specifically with respect to the range of capacities, social relations, and possibilities of fulfilment at stake in the activity of labour. The comparison provides a previously unexplored context for understanding Arendt’s account of labour and her distinction between labour and work. The relevance of Arendt’s and Friedmann’s theories of labour for the contemporary debate about the meaning of work in an age of automation is also briefly discussed.
ABSTRACT After characterizing Taylor’s general approach to the problems of solidarity, we disting... more ABSTRACT After characterizing Taylor’s general approach to the problems of solidarity, we distinguish and reconstruct three contexts of solidarity in which this approach is developed: the civic, the socio-economic, and the moral. We
argue that Taylor’s distinctive move in each of these contexts of solidarity is to claim that the relationship at stake poses normatively justifi ed demands, which are motivationally demanding, but insuffi ciently motivating on their own. On
Taylor’s conception, we need some understanding of extra motivational sources which explain why people do (or would) live up to the exacting demands. Taylor accepts that our self-understanding as members of either particular communities
or humanity at large has some motivational power, but he suspects that in many cases the memberships are too thin to resonate deeply and enduringly within us. In Taylor’s view, a realistic picture of what moves people to solidarity has to
account for the extra motivation, when it happens. We propose an alternative view in which morality, democracy and socio-economic cooperation can be seen as separate spheres or relations which are normatively justified, motivationally
demanding, but also sufficiently motivating on their own.
KEYWORDS moral motivation • patriotism • political allegiance • social bond• solidarity • Charles Taylor
In this article we examine the idea of a politics of misrecognition of working activity. We begin... more In this article we examine the idea of a politics of misrecognition of working activity. We begin by introducing a distinction between the kind of recognition and misrecognition that attaches to one’s identity, and the kind of recognition and misrecognition that attaches to one’s activity. We then consider the political significance of the latter kind of recognition and misrecognition in the context of work. Drawing first on empirical research undertaken by sociologists at the Institut für Sozialforschung in Frankfurt, we argue for a differentiated concept of recognition that shows the politics of misrecognition at work to be as much a matter of conflict between modes of recognition as it is a struggle for recognition as opposed to non-recognition. The differentiated concept of recognition which allows for this empirical insight owes much to Axel Honneth’s theory. But as we argue in the section that follows, this theory is ambiguous about the normative content of the expectations of recognition that are bound up with the activity of working. This in turn makes it unclear how we should understand the normative basis of the politics of the misrecognition of what one does at work. In the final sections of the article, we suggest that the psychodynamic model of work elaborated by Christophe Dejours and others at the Conservatoire National des Arts et Métiers in Paris can shed light on this matter; that is to say, it can help to clarify the normative significance and political stakes of the misrecognition of working activity.
I argue here that the post-Hegelian tradition presents us with three contrasting normative models... more I argue here that the post-Hegelian tradition presents us with three contrasting normative models of work. According to the instrumental model, the core norms of work are those of means-ends rationality. In this model, the modern world of work is constitutively a matter of deploying the most effective means to bring about given ends. The ends for which working is the means do not themselves come from the working, they are not internal to work activity: they derive first and foremost from the material conditions of human existence and the natural necessity of securing them. The rational kernel of modern work, the core norm that has shaped its development, is on this view instrumental reason, and this very same normative core, in the shape of advanced technology and more efficient, time-saving production, can help to liberate it. The second model, by contrast, takes the core norms of work to be internal to working activity. Rather than work gaining its normativity, so to speak, from something external to it, from ends to which the work is a contingent means, on this second view the core norms of work are expressions of values or meanings that are immanent to working practices themselves. The expressive model of work, as I shall call it, regards the actual world of work to be constituted historically by work-specific norms, norms which working subjects themselves have invoked and mobilised around in the course of their struggles for emancipation. According to the third model, the core norms of work, in the double constitutive-transformative sense we are dealing with here, have to do neither with instrumental rationality nor authentic self-expression. Rather they concern norms that relate either to individual achievement or contribution through work (in the form of esteem) or to the conditions that must in place for individuals to participate in the exchange of services by which market societies reproduce themselves (in the form of mutual respect). Following Honneth, I shall call this the recognition model.
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Books by Nicholas H Smith
Papers by Nicholas H Smith
argue that Taylor’s distinctive move in each of these contexts of solidarity is to claim that the relationship at stake poses normatively justifi ed demands, which are motivationally demanding, but insuffi ciently motivating on their own. On
Taylor’s conception, we need some understanding of extra motivational sources which explain why people do (or would) live up to the exacting demands. Taylor accepts that our self-understanding as members of either particular communities
or humanity at large has some motivational power, but he suspects that in many cases the memberships are too thin to resonate deeply and enduringly within us. In Taylor’s view, a realistic picture of what moves people to solidarity has to
account for the extra motivation, when it happens. We propose an alternative view in which morality, democracy and socio-economic cooperation can be seen as separate spheres or relations which are normatively justified, motivationally
demanding, but also sufficiently motivating on their own.
KEYWORDS moral motivation • patriotism • political allegiance • social bond• solidarity • Charles Taylor
argue that Taylor’s distinctive move in each of these contexts of solidarity is to claim that the relationship at stake poses normatively justifi ed demands, which are motivationally demanding, but insuffi ciently motivating on their own. On
Taylor’s conception, we need some understanding of extra motivational sources which explain why people do (or would) live up to the exacting demands. Taylor accepts that our self-understanding as members of either particular communities
or humanity at large has some motivational power, but he suspects that in many cases the memberships are too thin to resonate deeply and enduringly within us. In Taylor’s view, a realistic picture of what moves people to solidarity has to
account for the extra motivation, when it happens. We propose an alternative view in which morality, democracy and socio-economic cooperation can be seen as separate spheres or relations which are normatively justified, motivationally
demanding, but also sufficiently motivating on their own.
KEYWORDS moral motivation • patriotism • political allegiance • social bond• solidarity • Charles Taylor
solidarity, we distinguish and reconstruct three contexts of solidarity in which this approach is developed: the civic, the socio-economic, and the moral. We argue that Taylor’s distinctive move in each of these contexts of solidarity is to claim that the relationship at stake poses normatively justified demands, which are motivationally demanding, but insufficiently motivating on their own. On Taylor’s conception, we need some understanding of extra motivational sources which explain why people do (or would) live up to the exacting demands. Taylor accepts that our self-understanding as members of either particular communities or humanity at large has some motivational power, but he suspects that in many cases the memberships are too thin to resonate deeply and enduringly within us. In Taylor’s view, a realistic picture of what moves people to solidarity has to account for the extra motivation, when it happens. We propose an alternative view in which morality, democracy and socio-economic cooperation can be seen as separate spheres or relations which are normatively justifi ed, motivationally demanding, but also suffi ciently motivating on their own.