Books by Catarina Dutilh Novaes
Throughout his career, Stephen Read has been at the forefront of research in the history and phil... more Throughout his career, Stephen Read has been at the forefront of research in the history and philosophy of logic. Distinctive of his work is his effort both to bring ideas from the history of logic into contemporary debates, and to apply formal logic in his historical analyses. He has made decisive contributions to the study of medieval logic, paradoxes, proof-theoretic semantics, relevant logic, logical consequence, and many other topics. On the occasion of his retirement, friends and colleagues join forces to honor him with a collection of papers reflecting his wide range of interests. Topics covered are: modern treatments of medieval solutions to the Liar paradox, reflections on logical consequence, proof-theoretic semantics, logical pluralism, studies in the history of logic (Latin and Arabic medieval logic in particular), among others. The collection reflects both the breadth and the depth of Read's unique approach to the history and philosophy of logic, containing papers by prominent researchers in these areas. As a whole, it strives to live up to the quality of Stephen's own work.
Papers by Catarina Dutilh Novaes
Throughout his career, Stephen Read has been at the forefront of research in the history and phil... more Throughout his career, Stephen Read has been at the forefront of research in the history and philosophy of logic. Distinctive of his work is his effort both to bring ideas from the history of logic into contemporary debates, and to apply formal logic in his historical analyses. He has made decisive contributions to the study of medieval logic, paradoxes, proof-theoretic semantics, relevant logic, logical consequence, and many other topics. On the occasion of his retirement, friends and colleagues join forces to honor him with a collection of papers reflecting his wide range of interests. Topics covered are: modern treatments of medieval solutions to the Liar paradox, reflections on logical consequence, proof-theoretic semantics, logical pluralism, studies in the history of logic (Latin and Arabic medieval logic in particular), among others. The collection reflects both the breadth and the depth of Read's unique approach to the history and philosophy of logic, containing papers by prominent researchers in these areas. As a whole, it strives to live up to the quality of Stephen's own work.
In the Tractatus (6.1251), Wittgenstein (in?)famously said: “Hence, there can never be surprises ... more In the Tractatus (6.1251), Wittgenstein (in?)famously said: “Hence, there can never be surprises in logic.” One way of understanding this claim is to view Wittgenstein as embracing one of the horns of what is often referred to as the ‘paradox of inference’ (which is in fact a dilemma rather than a paradox properly speaking): the tension between the validity and the usefulness of logic, and of deductive reasoning more generally.1
Informal Logic, 2020
Argumentation is important for sharing knowledge and information. Given that the receiver of an a... more Argumentation is important for sharing knowledge and information. Given that the receiver of an argument purportedly engages first and foremost with its content, one might expect trust to play a negligible epistemic role, as opposed to its crucial role in testimony. I argue on the contrary that trust plays a fundamental role in argumentative engagement. I present a realistic social epistemological account of argumentation inspired by social exchange theory. Here, argumentation is a form of epistemic exchange. I illustrate my argument with two real-life examples: vaccination hesitancy, and the undermining of the credibility of traditional sources of information by authoritarian politicians.
Theoria, 2016
A range of formal models of human reasoning have been proposed in a number of fields such as phil... more A range of formal models of human reasoning have been proposed in a number of fields such as philosophy, logic, artificial intelligence, computer science, psychology, cognitive science, etc.: various logics (epistemic logics; non‐monotonic logics), probabilistic systems (most notably, but not exclusively, Bayesian probability theory), belief revision systems, neural networks, among others. Now, it seems reasonable to require that formal models of human reasoning be (minimally) empirically adequate if they are to be viewed as models of the phenomena in question. How are formal models of human reasoning typically put to empirical test? One way to do so is to isolate a number of key principles of the system, and design experiments to gauge the extent to which participants do or do not follow them in reasoning tasks. Another way is to take relevant existing results and check whether a particular formal model predicts these results. The present investigation provides an illustration of t...
History and Philosophy of Logic, 2016
Philosophical Studies, 2016
Unity, Truth and the Liar
Vivarium, 2007
I propose to examine the issue of whether the ancient tradition in logic continued to be develope... more I propose to examine the issue of whether the ancient tradition in logic continued to be developed in the later medieval period from the vantage point of the relations between two specific groups of theories, namely the medieval theories of supposition and the (originally) ancient theories of fallacies. More specifically, I examine whether supposition theories absorbed and replaced theories of fallacies, or whether the latter continued to exist, with respect to one particular author, William of Ockham. I compare different parts of Ockham's Summa Logicae, namely III-4 (on fallacies), and the final chapters of part I and first chapters of part II (on supposition). I conclude that there is overlap of conceptual apparatus and of goals (concerning propositions that must be distinguished) in Ockham's theories of supposition and of fallacies, but that the respective conceptual apparatuses also present substantial dissimilarities. Hence, theories of supposition are better seen as an...
Philosophia Scientae, 2012
History and Philosophy of Logic, 2008
CEUR Workshop TAP-2009 Genoa
Table of Contents Modality, Intentionality and Discursive Practice Pragmatism, Inferentialism and... more Table of Contents Modality, Intentionality and Discursive Practice Pragmatism, Inferentialism and Modality in Sellars's Arguments against Empiricism Robert Brandom p. 6 Brandom's Five-Step Program for Modal Health Fredrik Stjernberg p. 18 The Status of Intentional Vocabulary in Discursive Practice: Reading Making it Explicit in the Light of" Between Saying and Doing" David Lauer p. 23 Logic, Semantics and the Theory of Meaning Inferentialism and the Normativity of Meaning Jaroslav Peregrin p.
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Books by Catarina Dutilh Novaes
Papers by Catarina Dutilh Novaes
Explication is the conceptual cornerstone of Carnap’s approach to the
methodology of scientific analysis. From a philosophical point of view, it gives rise
to a number of questions that need to be addressed, but which do not seem to have
been fully addressed by Carnap himself. This paper reconsiders Carnapian explication
by comparing it to a different approach: the ‘formalisms as cognitive tools’ conception
(Formal languages in logic. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2012a). The
comparison allows us to discuss a number of aspects of the Carnapian methodology, as
well as issues pertaining to formalization in general. We start by introducing Carnap’s
conception of explication, arguing that there is a tension between his proposed criteria
of fruitfulness and similarity; we also argue that his further desideratum of exactness is
less crucial than might appear at first. We then bring in the general idea of formalisms
as cognitive tools, mainly by discussing the reliability of so-called statistical prediction
rules (SPRs), i.e. simple algorithms used to make predictions across a range of areas.
SPRs allow for a concrete instantiation of Carnap’s fruitfulness desideratum, which is
arguably the most important desideratum for him. Finally, we elaborate on what we
call the ‘paradox of adequate formalization’, which for the Carnapian corresponds to
the tension between similarity and fruitfulness. We conclude by noting that formalization
is an inherently paradoxical enterprise in general, but one worth engaging in
given the ‘cognitive boost’ it affords as a tool for discovery.
The paper argues that much of the difficulty with making progress on the issue of the normativity of logic for thought, as discussed in the literature, stems from a misapprehension of what logic is normative for. The claim is that, rather than mono-agent mental processes, (deductive) logic in fact comprises norms for quite specific situations of multi-agent dialogical interactions, in particular special forms of debates. This reconceptualization is inspired by historical developments in logic and mathematics (briefly surveyed in the paper), in particular the pervasiveness of such dialogical conceptions in the early days of logic in ancient Greece. The multi-agent, dialogical perspective then allows for the formulation of compelling ‘bridge principles’ between the relation of logical consequence and dialogical normative principles, something that is notoriously difficult to achieve in a mono-agent setting pertaining exclusively to thought and belief. The upshot is also that the truth-preserving rules of logic generally do not have a primary normative bearing on mono-agent mental processes, and in this sense the paper sides with Harman’s (1986, 2009) critique of the idea that logic has a normative import for thought and belief.