John Searle

Artificial intelligence (AI) research now strongly focuses on special purpose "narrow AI". Artificial general intelligence (AGI) research has stalled. One suggested reason is that current concepts used to understand general intelligence are inadequate and new ones are needed. But AGI has two subjects: (1) general intelligence, (2) the digital computer. AI including AGI accepts Turing's concept of the electronic device as a practical version of his abstract Turing machine design. I show why this account is inadequate for understanding the intrinsic machine, as AGI must, and conclude that to progress, AGI must abandon Turing. Further, I show that if Searle's Chinese room argument is correct, this means only that Turing's conception of the computer does not allow semantic content. It doesn't mean computers will never think. There are other conceptions. The CRA fails to address whether any of these are both true to the hardware and allow semantic content, and one of them may.

Yaklaşık iki yüzyıldır köklü bir medeniyet buhranı ile karşı karşıyayız.  Sarsıcı olan bu buhran hala varlığını devam ettirirken yaşananları daha iyi anlamak için evrensel ölçekte medeniyet teorilerini irdelemeye ihtiyaç vardır. Bu çalışmada tarihsel gelişimin evrensel yasalara uygun olarak gerçekleştiğini göstermeyi hedefleyen İngiliz tarihçi ve düşünür Henry Thomas Buckle’ın (1821-1862) “İngiltere’de Medeniyet Tarihi” adlı eseri özelinde medeniyet teorisi incelenmektedir. Bu çalışmamızda tarihi bir bilim haline getirme girişiminde bulunan Buckle’ın medeniyet teorisinin yanısıra İbn Haldun, Norbert Elias, Arnold J. Toynbee, Ebu'l-Hasan Habib el-Maverdi, François Guizot ve John Searl’ün medeniyet teorilerine de karşılaştırmalı bir perspektifle yer verilmektedir. Bu çalışma ile ulaşmaya çalıştığımız husus, medeniyet teorilerini “iyi”, “kötü”, “başarılı” veya “başarısız” olarak tanımlamaktan ziyade bir medeniyet teorisinin doğuşu, gelişimi ve tekamül sürecini anlamaya çalışmak, evrensel ölçekte kapsayıcı bir medeniyet tasavvuru sunup sunmadıklarını çok yönlü bir şekilde irdelemektir.

I reconstruct a plot in the twentieth-century Anglo-Saxon ethical discussion. I discuss first the reasons why in the first half of the twentieth  century the claim of a neutral character of metaethics vis-a-vis normative ethics was generally accepted; then I discuss the reasons for a U-turn that took place in 1958, which brought back to the forefront two traditional schools of normative ethics, Kantian and Utilitarian, and the reasons for criticism from the new school of virtue ethics. I end by claiming that intuitionism and Kantian ethics will still be on the agenda for some time.

1. Fog on the Channell
2. 1903-1949: when people believed that philosophy needed to be depurated from cant 2.1. Cognitivism and non-cognitivismo 2.2. The naturalistic fallacy  2.3  Hume’ss law 2.4 Hume’s fork 2.5 Intuitionism, naturalism, emotivism
3. 1949-1958: when ethics was depurated from the ‘third person’
3.1 Hampshire’s diagnosis  3.2. Criticism to the The naturalistic fallacy  3.3. Criticism to Hume’s law
4. 1958-1980:  Kantian elements
4.1 The Kantian element in the good reasons approach: Kurt Baier  4.2. The Kantian element in pragmatism: Clarence Lewis  4.3. The Kantian element in utilitarianism: Harrod, Hare, Brandt  4.4. The Kantian element in post-intuitionism
5. 1971-2002: Kantian normative ethics
5.1 Reasons for the normative-ethics revival5.2 Gewirth  5.3 Donagan  5.4 Nagel  5.5 Kantian constructivism 5.6 Kantian contractualism
6. The recent Kant and Aristotle rediscovery and the forthcoming Price and Whewell rehabilitation
7. Provisional concluding remarks: analytic philosophy from Hume to Kant

Judith Jarvis Thomson and others contend that rights are pro-tanto rather than absolute, that is, that rights may permissibly be infringed in some circumstances. Alan Gewirth maintains that there are some rights that are absolute because infringing them would amount to unspeakable evil. However, there seem to be possible circumstances in which it would be permissible to infringe even those rights. Specificationists, such as Gerald Gaus, Russ Shafer-Landau, Hillel Steiner and Kit Wellman, argue that all rights are absolute because they have implicit exceptions, the exceptions being either right-voiding or right-compatible. Specificationists have charged pro-tantoism with preventing rights from being action-guiding, and pro-tantoists have levelled the same charge against specificationism. I show that both charges are mistaken. Pro-tantoists claim that specificationists cannot account for the moral remainder that we recognise in some circumstances and which can be explained by reference to a permissible right-infringement. Specificationists retort that the moral remainder can be explained by invoking compensation-rights. I show that the pro-tantoist claim is true and that the specificationist retort is false on two counts: explanation in terms of compensation-rights is not applicable to all cases; and it fails to account for the moral dynamic in the cases to which it is applicable. The contention that rights are pro-tanto does not conflict with the substance of the contention that rights are trumps, despite claims of specificationists to the contrary.

Dewey’s social ontology could be characterized as a habit ontology, an ontology of habit qua second nature that offers us an account of intentionality, social statuses, institutions, and norms in terms of habituations. Such an account offers us a promising alternative to contemporary intentionalist and deontic approaches to social ontology such as Searle’s. Furthermore, it could be the basis of a social ontology better suited to explain both the maintenance and the transformation of social reality.
In the first part I will characterize Dewey’s model as a social ontology based on the notion of habit, and present it as an alternative to intentionalist approaches to social reality. In the second part I will argue that habit ontology offers us an account of social norms that is based on a peculiar understanding of the notion of ‘status’, and represents an alternative to deontic accounts. In the third part I will claim that Dewey’s notion of “public” offers us a dynamic understanding of social institutions and a ‘reactive’ notion of collective intentionality as an achievement rather than as a presupposition of social practices. In the final section I will summarize some advantages of the Deweyan over the Searlean social ontology concerning our understanding of acceptance, maintenance and transformation of statuses, and of the role played by the ‘background’.

הטיעון שלי הוא שטבלת הכוונות (הרציונליות, התודעה , הנפש, המחשבה, השפה, האישיות וכדומה) שתכונות בולטת כאן מתארות פחות או יותר מדויק, או לפחות משמשת כיוריסטיל, כיצד אנו חושבים ומתנהגים, ולכן היא כוללת לא רק פילוסופיה ופסיכולוגיה, אלא כל דבר אחר (היסטוריה הערה במיוחד כי הכוונות והרציונליות כפי שאני (יחד עם סריל, Wittgenstein ואחרים) להציג אותו, כולל מערכת לשונית מודעת מודע 2 מודע אוטומטי prelinguistic מערכת 1 פעולות או רפלקסים.

אני מספק סקר קריטי של חלק מהממצאים העיקריים של שניים מהתלמידים הבולטים ביותר של התנהגות הזמנים המודרניים, לודוויג ויטגנשטיין וג סריל, על המבנה הלוגי של הכוונות (המוח, שפה, תודעה,  התנהגות), שלוקחים כנקודת המוצא של התגלית הבסיסית של ויטגנשטיין – שכל הבעיות הפילוסופיות הקיימות הן זהות – בלבולים לגבי אופן השימוש בשפה בהקשר מסוים, ולכן כל הפתרונות זהים – בהסתכלות בשפה שניתן להשתמש בהם בהקשר בנושא, כך שתנאי האמת (תנאי ש הבעיה הבסיסית היא שאפשר לומר  כל דבר , אבל אחד לא יכול להתכוון (המדינה ברורה כי) כל אמירה שרירותית ומשמעות אפשרית רק בהקשר ספציפי מאוד. אני מנתח כתבים שונים על ידי ועליהם מנקודת המבט המודרנית של שתי מערכות מחשבה (לפופולרי כמו "חשיבה מהירה, חשיבה איטית"), העסקת שולחן חדש של כוונות הכוונות החדש של מערכות כפולות מינוח. אני מראה שזוהי היוריסטירבת עוצמה לתיאור התנהגות.

לכן, כל ההתנהגות קשורה באופן אינטימי אם האדם מקבל את נקודת המבט הנכונה. האשליה הפנומנולוגית (השכחה למערכת האוטומטית שלנו 1) היא אוניברסלית והיא מתרחבת לא רק במהלך הפילוסופיה, אלא במהלך החיים. אני בטוח שחומסקי, אובמה, צוקרברג והאפיפיור היו מאוד בטוחים אם אמרו שהם סובלים מאותה בעיה כמו הגל, Husserl והיידגר, (או כי הם נבדלים רק במידה מסמים ומכורים למין בלהיות מונעים על ידי גירוי של מערבולות הקדמית שלהם על ידי משלוח של דופמין (ויותר מ 100 כימיקלים אחרים) דרך tegmentum והגרעין האקומבדים), אבל זה נכון בבירור. בעוד שphenomenologists בזבזו הרבה זמן של אנשים, הם מבזבזים את האדמה ואת עתידו של הצאצא שלהם.

Tous les juristes connaissent la distinction entre les décisions administratives et les actes administratifs non décisoires. Cette distinction détermine, en principe, la recevabilité du recours contentieux. Elle a fait l'objet de nombreux travaux. Les distinctions entre les actes non décisoires restent en revanche très largement méconnues. Or, la prise en compte des actes non décisoires par les instances juridictionnelles, aussi bien administratives que judiciaires, incite à repenser la place reconnue à ces actes, à la fois dans la pratique et dans la théorie du droit.

En effet, certains de ces actes - comme les recommandations de bonnes pratiques médicales - peuvent faire l'objet d'un recours pour excès de pouvoir et sont pleinement invocables devant le juge. Les autres - comme les voeux, ou les circulaires - échappent le plus souvent à toute contestation, et ne peuvent pas être utilement invoqués en justice. D'autres enfin - comme les actes préparatoires, ou les "lignes directrices" - sont soumis à un régime juridique intermédiaire : insusceptibles de faire l'objet d'une contestation directe, ces actes font l'objet d'une exception d'illégalité et les justiciables peuvent s'en prévaloir à l'appui de leurs prétentions. Comment expliquer ces différences ?

En tentant de répondre à cette question, l'auteur constate que l'hétérogénéité actuelle du droit souple n'est pas toujours justifiée. D'où l'idée d'une simplification possible, qui consisterait à soumettre les actes non décisoires à un régime juridique plus homogène, et qui permettrait de leur réserver un traitement juridictionnel plus uniforme. Cette simplification n'est pourtant envisageable que si l'on franchit au préalable les barrières théoriques qui séparent le droit "souple" et le droit "dur". En s'appuyant sur les acquis de la philosophie générale du langage, l'auteur propose ainsi une systématisation des connaissances, en intégrant les actes non décisoires dans la famille des actes unilatéraux, traditionnellement considérés comme nécessairement contraignants. La simplification de la pratique jurisprudentielle suppose donc une sorte d'unification théorique. Tels sont les principaux objectifs de la présente thèse.

It is often thought that consciousness has a qualitative dimension that cannot be tracked by science. Recently, however, some philosophers have argued that this worry stems not from an elusive feature of the mind, but from the special nature of the concepts used to describe conscious states. Marc Champagne draws on the neglected branch of philosophy of signs or semiotics to develop a new take on this strategy. 

The term “semiotics” was introduced by John Locke in the modern period – its etymology is ancient Greek, and its theoretical underpinnings are medieval. Charles Sanders Peirce made major advances in semiotics, so he can act as a pipeline for these forgotten ideas. Most philosophers know Peirce as the founder of American pragmatism, but few know that he also coined the term “qualia,” which is meant to capture the intrinsic feel of an experience. Since pragmatic verification and qualia are now seen as conflicting commitments, Champagne endeavors to understand how Peirce could (or thought he could) have it both ways. The key, he suggests, is to understand how humans can insert distinctions between features that are always bound.

Recent attempts to take qualities seriously have resulted in versions of panpsychism, but Champagne outlines a more plausible way to achieve this. So, while semiotics has until now been the least known branch of philosophy ending in –ics, his book shows how a better understanding of that branch can move one of the liveliest debates in philosophy forward.

Je suis d'avis que la table de l'intentionnalité (rationalité, esprit, conscience, pensée, langage, personnalité, etc.) qui figure en bonne place ici décrit plus ou moins précisément, ou du moins sert d'heuristique pour, comment nous pensons et nous nous comportions, et donc il n'englobe pas simplement la philosophie et la psychologie, mais tout le reste (histoire, littérature, mathématiques, politique, etc.). Notez en particulier que l'intentionnalité et la rationalité que je (avec Searle, Wittgenstein et d'autres) le voir, comprend à la fois conscient délibératif système linguistique 2 et inconscient automatisé système prélinguistique 1 actions ou réflexes.

Je fournis une enquête critique de quelques-unes des principales conclusions de deux des plus éminents étudiants du comportement des temps modernes, Ludwig Wittgenstein et John Searle, sur la structure logique de l'intentionnalité (esprit, langue, comportement), en prenant comme point de départ La découverte fondamentale de Wittgenstein, à savoir que tous les problèmes véritablement « philosophiques » sont les mêmes, les confusions sur la façon d'utiliser la langue dans un contexte particulier, et donc toutes les solutions sont les mêmes— en regardant comment la langue peut être utilisée dans le contexte en cause afin que sa vérité (Conditions de satisfaction ou COS) sont claires. Le problème fondamental est que l'on peut dire n'importe quoi, mais on ne peut pas signifier (état clair COS pour) toute déclaration arbitraire et le sens n'est possible que dans un contexte très spécifique. J'analyse divers écrits par et à leur sujet du point de vue moderne des deux systèmes de pensée (popularisés comme «penser vite, penser lentement»), en utilisant une nouvelle table de l'intentionnalité et de nouvelles nomenclatures de systèmes doubles.  Je montre que c'est un puissant heuristique pour décrire le comportement.

Ainsi, tout comportement est intimement lié si l'on prend le point de vue correct. L'illusion phénoménologique (oubli de notre système automatisé 1) est universelle et s'étend non seulement à travers la philosophie, mais tout au long de la vie. Je suis sûr que Chomsky, Obama, Zuckerberg et le pape serait incrédule si on leur dit qu'ils souffrent du même problème que Hegel, Husserl et Heidegger, (ou qu'ils diffèrent seulement dans le degré de la drogue et les toxicomanes du sexe en étant motivés par la stimulation de leur cortices frontaux par la livraison de dopamine (et plus de 100 autres produits chimiques) via le tegmentum ventral et le noyau accumbens), mais c'est clairement vrai.  Alors que les phénoménologues ne gaspillaient que beaucoup de temps, ils gaspillent la terre et l'avenir de leur descendant.

È mia contesa che la tabella dell'intenzionalità (razionalità, coscienza,  mente, pensiero, linguaggio, personalità, ecc.) che figura in primo piano qui descrive più o meno accuratamente, o almeno serve come euristica per, come pensiamo e ci comportiamo, e quindi comprende non solo la filosofia e la psicologia, ma tutto il resto (storia, letteratura, matematica, politica ecc.). Si noti in particolare che l'intenzionalità e la razionalità come io (insieme a Searle, Wittgenstein e altri) lo vedono, include sia il sistema linguistico deliberativo cosciente 2 e l'inconscio sistema prelinguistico automatizzato 1 azioni o riflessi.

Fornisco un'indagine critica di alcuni dei principali risultati di due dei più eminenti studenti di comportamento dei tempi moderni, Ludwig Wittgenstein e John Searle, sulla struttura logica dell'intenzionalità (mente, linguaggio, coscienza,  comportamento), prendendo come punto di partenza la scoperta fondamentale di Wittgenstein -che tutti i problemi veramente 'filosofici' sono gli stessi - confusioni su come usare il linguaggio in un particolare contesto, e quindi tutte le soluzioni sono le stesse, guardando a come il linguaggio può essere utilizzato nel contesto in questione in modo che le sue condizioni di verità (Condizioni di soddisfazione o COS) siano chiare. Il problema di base è che si può dire qualsiasi cosa,  ma non si può significare (dichiarare chiaro COS per) qualsiasi espressione arbitraria e significato è possibile solo in un contesto molto specifico. Analizzo vari scritti da e su di loro dalla prospettiva moderna dei due sistemi di pensiero (popolari come 'pensare veloce, pensare lentamente'), impiegando una nuova tabella di intenzionalità e nuova nomenclatura di sistemi duali. Vi mostro che questa è una potente euristica per descrivere il comportamento.

Così, tutti i comportamenti sono intimamente connessi se si prende il punto di vista corretto. L'Illusione Fenomenologica (oblio al nostro Sistema automatizzato 1) è universale e si estende non solo per tutta la filosofia, ma per tutta la vita. Sono sicuro che Chomsky, Obama, zuckerberg e il Papa sarebbero increduli se gli venisse detto che soffrono dello stesso problema di Hegel, Husserl e Heidegger, (o che si differenziano solo in grado dai tossicodipendenti e dai tossicodipendenti di sesso nell'essere motivati dalla stimolazione delle loro cortice frontali dalla consegna della dopamina (e oltre 100 altre sostanze chimiche) attraverso il tegmentum ventrale e il nucleus e il nucleus èevidente, ma è vero. Mentre i fenomenologi hanno sprecato solo un sacco di tempo delle persone, stanno sprecando la terra e il futuro del loro discendente.

我的论点是，这里突出的故意表（理性、思想、思想、语言、个性等）或多或少地准确地描述了我们思考和行为的方式，因此它不包括仅仅是哲学和心理学，但一切（历史，文学，数学，政治等）。特别要注意，故意和理性，因为我（连同西尔，维特根斯坦和其他人）认为它，包括有意识的审议语言系统2和无意识的自动前语言系统1的动作或反射。

我提供了一个关键的调查，两个最杰出的学生的行为在现代的一些主要发现， 路德维希·维特根斯坦和约翰·西尔，关于故意的逻辑结构（思想、语言、行为），以维特根斯坦的基本发现为出发点——所有真正的"哲学"问题都是一样的——关于在特定上下文中使用语言的困惑，因此所有解决方案都是相同的——研究如何在问题语境中使用语言，使其真理条件（满意条件或 COS） 是明确的。基本问题是，一个人可以说什么，但一个人不能意味着（状态明确的COS）任何任意的话语和意义只有在非常具体的上下文中才可能。我从现代两种思想体系（被推广为"思维快，思维慢"）的角度分析各种著作，采用新的意向表和新的双系统命名法。我表明，这是一个强大的启发式描述行为。

因此，如果一个人采取正确的观点，所有行为都是密切相关的。现象幻象（遗忘我们的自动化系统1）是通用的，不仅延伸到整个哲学，而且贯穿整个生命。我确信，如果乔姆斯基、奥巴马、扎克伯格和教皇被告知他们患有与黑格尔、胡塞尔和海德格尔同样的问题，他们将会难以置信（或者，他们只与毒品和性瘾君子在程度上有所不同，他们的动机是通过心室和核积体来刺激他们的前皮质（和其他100种化学品），这显然是事实。虽然现象学家只浪费了很多人的时间，但他们却在浪费地球和他们后代的未来。

Reflexive monism is, in essence, an ancient view of how consciousness relates to the material world that has, in recent decades, been resurrected in modern form. In this paper I discuss how some of its basic features differ from both dualism and variants of physicalist and functionalist reductionism, focusing on those aspects of the theory that challenge deeply rooted presuppositions in current Western thought. I pay particular attention to the ontological status and seeming “out-thereness” of the phenomenal world and to how the “phenomenal world” relates to the “physical world”, the “world itself”, and processing in the brain. In order to place the theory within the context of current thought and debate, I address questions that have been raised about reflexive monism in recent commentaries and also evaluate competing accounts of the same issues offered by “transparency theory” and by “biological naturalism”. I argue that, of the competing views on offer, reflexive monism most closely follows the contours of ordinary experience, the findings of science, and common sense.

وزعمي أن جدول التعمد (العقلانية، والوعي،  والعقل، والفكر، واللغة، والشخصية، وما إلى ذلك) الذي يتميز بشكل بارز هنا يصف بشكل أكثر أو أقل دقة، أو على الأقل بمثابة مُهَرَق، كيف نفكر ونتصرف، وبالتالي فهو لا يشمل الفلسفة وعلم النفس فحسب، بل كل شيء آخر (التاريخ، الأدب، الرياضيات، السياسة إلخ). لاحظ بشكل خاص أن التعمد والعقلانية كما أنا (جنبا إلى جنب مع سيرل، فيتغنشتاين وغيرها) نرى ذلك، ويشمل كل من النظام اللغوي التداولي واعية 2 واللاوعي الآلي قبل اللغوية نظام 1 الإجراءات أو ردود الفعل.

أقدم مسحاً نقدياً لبعض النتائج الرئيسية لاثنين من أبرز طلاب السلوك في العصر الحديث، لودفيغ فيتغنشتاين وجون سيرل، على البنية المنطقية للقصدي (العقل، اللغة، الوعي،  السلوك)، مع الأخذ كنقطة انطلاق اكتشاف فيتغنشتاين الأساسي – أن جميع المشاكل "الفلسفية" حقا هي نفسها - الالتباسات حول كيفية استخدام اللغة في سياق معين، وبالتالي فإن جميع الحلول هي نفسها - تبحث في كيفية استخدام اللغة في السياق المعني بحيث تكون ظروف هاهي (شروط الرضا أو COS) واضحة. المشكلة الأساسية هي أن المرء يمكن أن يقول أي شيء ولكن لا يمكن للمرء أن يعني (الدولة واضحة COS ل) أي النطق التعسفي والمعنى هو ممكن فقط في سياق محدد جدا. أنا تحليل الكتابات المختلفة من قبل وعنها من المنظور الحديث من نظامي الفكر (شعبية بأنها "التفكير السريع، والتفكير البطيء")، وتوظيف جدول جديد من التعمد وتسميات النظم المزدوجة الجديدة. أظهر أن هذا هو الاستدلال قوية لوصف السلوك.

وهكذا، يتم ربط جميع السلوك بشكل وثيق إذا كان أحد يأخذ وجهة النظر الصحيحة. الوهم الظاهري (النسيان لنظامنا الآلي 1) هو عالمي ويمتد ليس فقط في جميع أنحاء الفلسفة ولكن طوال الحياة. أنا متأكد من أن تشومسكي، أوباما، زوكربيرج والبابا سيكون متشككا إذا قيل لهم أنهم يعانون من نفس المشكلة هيغل، هوسرل وهايدغر، (أو أنها تختلف فقط في درجة من مدمني المخدرات والجنس في أن يكون الدافع من خلال تحفيز القشريات الأمامية من خلال تسليم الدوبامين (وأكثر من 100 المواد الكيميائية الأخرى) عن طريق تيمنتوم البطني ونواة accumbens)،ولكن هذا صحيح بشكل واضح. في حين أن علماء الظواهر لم يضيعوا سوى الكثير من وقت الناس ، إلا أنهم يضيعون الأرض ومستقبل ذريتهم.

This paper suggests that reference to phenomenal qualities is best understood as involving iconicity, that is, a passage from sign-vehicle to object that exploits a similarity between the two. This contrasts with a version of the ‘phenomenal concept strategy’ that takes indexicality to be central. However, since it is doubtful that phenomenal qualities are capable of causally interacting with anything, indexical reference seems inappropriate. While a theorist like David Papineau is independently coming to something akin to iconicity, I think some of the awkwardness that plagues his account would be remedied by transitioning to a more inclusive philosophy of signs.

According to Searle's theory of collective intentionality, the fundamental structure of any society can be accounted for in terms of cooperative mechanisms that create deontic relations. This paper criticizes Searle's standpoint on the ground that, while his social ontology can make sense of simple systems of interaction like symphony orchestras and football teams, the whole coordinative structure of the modern market society cannot be explained solely in terms of we-intentional collaboration and deontic relations. As clarified by Hayek, because of its complexity, this society is a self-organizing system. It results not only from micro-level agreed constraints, but also from an unintended cybernetic mechanism that affects and shapes both its micro and macro dynamics via a circular causality. Searle ignores the coordination problem posed by complexity and provides strawman arguments against the theory of action underpinning the invisible hand explanation of social phenomena.

این مشاجره من است که جدول معنایی (عقلانیت ، آگاهی ،  ذهن ، فکر ، زبان ، شخصیت و غیره) که ویژگی های برجسته در اینجا توصیف بیشتر یا کمتر با دقت ، و یا حداقل به عنوان یک اکتشافی برای ، چگونه ما فکر می کنیم و رفتار ، و پس از آن شامل نه صرفا فلسفه و روانشناسی ، اما هر چیز دیگری (تاریخ ، ادبیات ، ریاضیات ، سیاست و غیره). توجه داشته باشید به خصوص که قصدمندی و عقلانیت به عنوان من (همراه با سرل ، ویتگنشتاین و دیگران) آن را مشاهده کنید ، شامل هر دو آگاهانه سیستم زبانی ، 2 و ناخودآگاه خودکار سیستم پیش زبانی 1 اقدامات یا رفلکس.

من ارائه یک بررسی انتقادی از برخی از یافته های عمده ای از دو نفر از دانش آموزان برجسته ترین رفتار دوران مدرن ، لودویگ ویتگنشتاین و جان سرل ، در ساختار منطقی از قصدمندی (ذهن ، زبان ، آگاهی ،  رفتار) ، به عنوان نقطه شروع من کشف بنیادی ویتگنشتاین-که همه مشکلات واقعا "فلسفی" مشابه هستند-ابهامات در مورد چگونگی استفاده از زبان در یک چارچوب خاص ، و به همین ترتیب تمام راه حل ها یکسان هستند-به دنبال چگونگی استفاده از زبان در زمینه در موضوع به طوری که شرایط حقیقت آن (شرایط رضایت یا COS) روشن است. مشکل اساسی این است که می توان  هر چیزی می گویند ، اما یکی نمی تواند به معنای (دولت روشن COS برای) هر گفته های خودسرانه و معنی تنها در یک زمینه بسیار خاص ممکن است. من تجزیه و تحلیل نوشته های مختلف توسط و در مورد آنها از دیدگاه مدرن از دو سیستم اندیشه (به عنوان "تفکر سریع ، تفکر آهسته ') ، به کارگیری یک جدول جدید از قصدمندی و سیستم های جدید دوگانه نامگذاری. من نشان می دهم که این یک اکتشافی قدرتمند برای توصیف رفتار است.

بنابراین ، تمام رفتار تنگاتنگی متصل است اگر یک نقطه نظر درست طول می کشد. توهم پدیدارشناسی (فراموشی به سیستم خودکار ما 1) جهانی است و نه تنها در سراسر فلسفه بلکه در طول زندگی گسترش می دهد. من مطمئن هستم که چامسکی ، اوباما ، زوکربرگ و پاپ خواهد بود incredulous اگر گفت که آنها از همان مشکل به عنوان هگل رنج می برند ، Husserl و هایدگر, (یا این که آنها تنها در درجه از مواد مخدر و معتادان جنسی در حال با تحریک از قشر پیشانی خود را از طریق تحویل دوپامین متفاوت (و بیش از ۱۰۰ مواد شیمیایی دیگر) از طریق کلاهک شکمی و هسته اکومبنس), اما به وضوح درست است. در حالی که پدیده شناسان تنها زمان زیادی از مردم را تلف می کنند ، آنها زمین و آینده نسل خود را به هدر خواهند بردند.

John Searle, in several articles and books, has contended that institutions incorporating status functions with deontic powers are created by collective acceptance that is not analysable into individual acceptance. I point out three self-contradictions in Searle’s exposition.

The author traces the theory of meaning in relation to speech acts from John Austin to John Searle and those who reacted to the latter.  He agrees with Searle that the study of the meaning of sentences is not distinct from the study of speech acts since the same sentences are used to perform certain speech acts.  However, the author believes that the logical term proposition is superfluous and argues that in asserting a compound or molecular constative  like {P or Q}, we likewise assert the simple or atomic constatives alternatively, like P or Q, albeit the illocutionary force of each is suppressed or only implied.  Moreover, if we take into consideration most if not all elements of contextual sentential meaning, then we will notice that constatives may share family resemblances with each other and even with some performatives.  Hence, in view of the fact that John Searle believes the act of predication partakes of the nature of the illocutionary force, then Searle’s proposition cannot be force-neutral and, consequently, it can be replaced with any constative—such as a statement in the sense of what is stated, a prediction in the sense of  what is predicted, etc.—depending upon the context.

帮助我们近亲的遗传倾向（"利他主义"）对于我们几万至数千万年前在非洲平原上祖先的生存至关重要，在拥挤不堪的世界里是一个致命的缺陷，我们的邻居不再关系密切，正在为生存而进行生死斗争。 我称之为"一个大幸福家庭妄想"，它是政治左派自杀的乌托邦妄想的核心，这种妄想是由于地球无情地强奸而带来的暂时丰富的资源和相对和平。 过去有意义的自由政治观点正在导致现代民主社会的崩溃，或许也带来了文明本身的崩溃。 虽然这是显而易见的任何明亮的10岁，访问网络，甚至卫星电视， 它完全不透明的自由/民主/新马克思主义/新法西斯主义/第三世界至上主义/20，30，40的东西Googloids和iPhoners，谁将很快接管和破坏繁荣与和平在美国和英国，然后世界，无论是直接，并通过开放它由墨西哥卡特尔，伊斯兰圣战者和超越，统治中国的七个社会路径。美国和世界正处于人口过度增长的崩溃过程中，大部分都发生在上个世纪，现在由于第三世界人民，这一切都在崩溃。资源消耗和增加20亿美元，将使工业文明崩溃，造成饥饿、疾病、暴力和战争。地球每年至少损失1%的表土，因此，随着接近2100，大部分粮食生长能力将不复存在。数十亿人将死去，核战争几乎可以肯定。在美国，大规模移民和移民再生产，加上民主带来的滥用，正在大大加速这一速度。堕落的人性无情地把民主和多样性的梦想变成犯罪和贫穷的噩梦。对基本生物学和心理的无知导致部分受过教育的人的社会工程错觉，他们控制着民主社会。很少有人明白，如果你帮助一个人，你伤害了别人——没有免费的午餐，任何人消费的每一件物品都会破坏地球，无法修复。因此，世界各地的社会政策都是不可持续的，如果不严格控制自私，所有社会都会陷入无政府状态或独裁。几乎从未提及的最基本事实是，美国或世界没有足够的资源来使相当一部分穷人摆脱贫困，并让他们留在贫困中。这样做的企图使美国破产，毁灭世界。地球生产食物的能力每天都在下降，我们的遗传质量也是如此。现在，一如既往，穷人的最大敌人是其他穷人，而不是富人。如果不立即作出戏剧性改变，就没有希望阻止美国或任何遵循民主制度的国家的崩溃。

我的论点是，这里突出的故意表（理性、思想、思想、语言、个性等）或多或少地准确地描述了我们思考和行为的方式，因此它不包括仅仅是哲学和心理学，但一切（历史，文学，数学，政治等）。特别要注意，故意和理性，因为我（连同西尔，维特根斯坦和其他人）认为它，包括有意识的审议语言系统2和无意识的自动前语言系统1的动作或反射。

我提供了一个关键的调查，两个最杰出的学生的行为在现代的一些主要发现， 路德维希·维特根斯坦和约翰·西尔，关于故意的逻辑结构（思想、语言、行为），以维特根斯坦的基本发现为出发点——所有真正的"哲学"问题都是一样的——关于在特定上下文中使用语言的困惑，因此所有解决方案都是相同的——研究如何在问题语境中使用语言，使其真理条件（满意条件或 COS） 是明确的。基本问题是，一个人可以说什么，但一个人不能意味着（状态明确的COS）任何任意的话语和意义只有在非常具体的上下文中才可能。我从现代两种思想体系（被推广为"思维快，思维慢"）的角度分析各种著作，采用新的意向表和新的双系统命名法。我表明，这是一个强大的启发式描述行为。

因此，如果一个人采取正确的观点，所有行为都是密切相关的。现象幻象（遗忘我们的自动化系统1）是通用的，不仅延伸到整个哲学，而且贯穿整个生命。我确信，如果乔姆斯基、奥巴马、扎克伯格和教皇被告知他们患有与黑格尔、胡塞尔和海德格尔同样的问题，他们将会难以置信（或者，他们只与毒品和性瘾君子在程度上有所不同，他们的动机是通过心室和核积体来刺激他们的前皮质（和其他100种化学品），这显然是事实。虽然现象学家只浪费了很多人的时间，但他们却在浪费地球和他们后代的未来。

Este artigo compara as teses do fisicalismo e do funcionalismo – sobretudo o computacionalista – com o naturalismo biologico de John Searle quanto a possibilidade do livre-arbitrio. Em tal contraposicao, cada corrente e decomposta em seus enunciados para que os mesmos possam ser analisados criticamente. Defende-se que o naturalismo biologico searleano consegue esclarecer mais do que as outras duas correntes filosoficas como pode a acao livre ter a origem da sua motivacao no que e externo ao estado mental que a faz ser realizada. Enfim, mesmo que a questao do livre-arbitrio ainda fique em aberto, verifica-se que o livre-arbitrio nao encontra espaco no cenario apresentado pelas correntes do fisicalismo e do funcionalismo.

Bu yazı, kişisel özdeşlik problemi bağlamında aydınlanma döneminin öncü filozoflarından David Hume'un bundle teorisini ve bu teorinin çağdaş zihin felsefesi tartışmalarına etkisini ortaya koymayı amaçlamaktadır. İlk olarak kişisel özdeşlik problemi hakkında genel bir çerçeve çizilecektir. İkinci olarak kişi, özdeşlik, kendilik, gibi kavramlar üzerinden Hume epistemolojisinde problemin nasıl anlaşıldığı izah edilecektir. Daha sonra Hume epistemolojisinin yol açtığı felsefi etkilerin görülebilmesi için zihin felsefesinin çağdaş tartışmaları, benin varlığı ve bilgisi özelinde, filozofların zihin-beden anlayışları üzerinden örneklenecektir. Benlik, bilinç ve madde ilişkisi özelinde teorileri olan Daniel Dennet, John Searle, David Chalmers ve Thomas Metzinger çağdaş dönem başlığı altında ele alınacak isimlerdir. Son olarak Hume ve teorileri sunulan dört ismin benlik konusundaki pozisyonlarının yol açtığı felsefi sorunlara dair birtakım değerlendirmeler sunulacaktır. D. Hume ile çağdaş zihin felsefecilerinin, benin varlığı ve bilgisi özelindeki benzerliklerini ortaya koymayı amaçlayan bu yazı, değerlendirme ve sonuç bölümü haricinde söz konusu yaklaşımlara dair tanıcı nitelikte bir çalışma ortaya koymayı hedeflemektedir.

The paper is devoted to the interpretation of one of the most important passages in modern Anglophon philosophy: III.1.3 of Treatise of Human Nature by David Hume. The author considers the problem of its meaning at an angle of the standard interpretation, which can be summed up in a dictum: ‘no ought from is’ (so called “Hume’s Guillotine”). The author outlines four possible approaches to this putative meaning of the Treatise passage and weighs arguments for them. The investigation, based mainly on the strategies by Arthur Prior, Charles Pigden and John Searle, allows to defend two approaches regarding Hume’s putative proposal of is/ought gap: /1/ the idea of logical autonomy of moral discourse, making strong rationality of deduction from is to (non-trivial) ought invalid, together with /2/ the possibility of weak rational (justified) inference from is to ought. However, the comparison of these two accounts with the guts of Humean philosophy as such (critical skepticism, fallibilism, ethical noncognitivism) makes the author prone to give a priority to the latter.

Последняя проповедь из Церкви фундаменталистского натурализма пастора Хофштадтера. Как и его гораздо более известный (или печально известный своими неустанными философскими ошибками) работа Годеля, Эшера, Баха, он имеет поверхностную правдоподобность, но если понять, что это безудержный саентизм, который смешивает реальные научные вопросы с философскими (т.е. единственными реальными вопросами являются то, что языковые игры мы должны играть), то почти все его интерес исчезает. Я предоставляю основу для анализа, основанного на эволюционной психологии и работе Витгенштейна (с тех пор, как он был обновлен в моих последних работах).
Те, кто желает всеобъемлющего до современных рамок для человеческого поведения из современных двух systEms зрения могут проконсультироваться с моей книгой"Логическая структура философии, психологии, Минd иязык в Людвиг Витгенштейн и Джон Сирл" второй ред (2019). Те, кто заинтересован в более моих сочинений могут увидеть "Говоря обезьян - Философия, психология, наука, религия и политика на обреченной планете

In his latest book Seeing Things as They Are (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2015) John Searle presents a comprehensive theory of human visuality that is aligned with and further develops his theory of human intentionality. Searle advocates direct realism, the view that we perceive objects themselves and not their images or representations created by the brain. The book discusses a series of positions and problems about human visuality that have been attracting the attention of art historians ever since Ernst Gombrich’s Art and Illusion, including the role of conceptualization and recognition in visual perception, perspective, constancies and the perception of colours. The review pays particular attention to the implications of Searle’s positions for the theory and history of architecture.

여기서 눈에 띄게 특징인 의도적(합리성, 생각, 생각, 언어, 성격 등)의 표가 다소 정확하게 묘사되거나 적어도 우리가 어떻게 생각하고 행동하느냐에 대한 추론적인 역할을 한다는 것이 제 주장입니다. 단지 철학과 심리학, 하지만 다른 모든 것 (역사, 문학, 수학, 정치 등). 특히 I (Searle, Wittgenstein 및 다른 사람들과 함께)가 볼 때 의의적 심의 언어 시스템 2와 무의식적 인 사전 언어 시스템 1 행동 또는 반사 신경을 모두 포함합니다.

저는 현대의 가장 저명한 두 학생들의 주요 연구 결과에 대한 비판적 인 설문 조사를 제공합니다. Ludwig Wittgenstein과 존 시얼, 의도의 논리적 구조에 (마음, 언어, 행동), 내 출발점 으로 복용 Wittgenstein의 근본적인 발견 – 모든 진정으로 '철학적'문제는 동일하다 - 특정 맥락에서 언어를 사용하는 방법에 대한 혼란, 그래서 모든 솔루션은 동일 - 언어가 문제의 맥락에서 사용할 수있는 방법을 보고 (만족 조건 또는 COS)는 분명합니다. 기본적인 문제는 anything  임의의 발언과 의미는 매우 구체적인 맥락에서만 가능하다는 것을 의미할 수 밖에 없다는 것입니다. 두 가지 사상 체계('빠른 사고, 느린 생각'으로 대중화됨)의 현대적 관점에서 다양한 저술을 분석하고, 새로운 의도적 테이블과 새로운 이중 시스템 명명법으로 분석합니다. 나는 이것이 행동을 설명하기위한 강력한 추론임을 보여준다.

따라서 올바른 관점을 취하면 모든 동작이 밀접하게 연결됩니다. 현상론적 환상(자동화된 시스템 1에 대한 망각)은 보편적이며 단순히 철학을 통해서가 아니라 평생 동안 확장됩니다. 나는 켐스키가 확신합니다. 오바마, 주커버그와 교황은 헤겔, 후셀, 하이데거와 같은 문제로 고통받고 있다고 말한다면 믿을 수 없을 것입니다 (또는 도파민의 전달에 의해 전두엽 피질의 자극에 의해 동기를 부여받는 약물 및 섹스 중독자에서만 다르다는 것을 (그리고 100 개 이상의 다른 화학 물질) 도파민의 전달에 의해 동기를 부여받는 약물과 섹스 중독자에서만 다르다는 것을 알면 (그리고 100 개 이상의 다른 화학 물질) 도파민의 전달에 의해 자극에 의해 동기부여되는 것은 (그리고 100 개 이상의 다른 화학 물질) 복부 테멘텀과 핵을 통해 도파민 (그리고 100 개 이상의 다른 화학 물질)을 통해 도파민 (그리고 100 개 이상의 다른 화학 accumbens물질)을 통해 도파민과 핵을 통해 도파민 (그리고 100 개 이상의 다른 화학 물질)을 전달함으로써 동기부여가되는 것은 믿을 수 없을 것입니다. 현상학자들은 많은 사람들의 시간을 낭비했지만, 그들은 지구와 그들의 후손의 미래를 낭비하고 있습니다.

Dans « La bouche qui nous dit "nous" », nous nous proposons d’introduire aux enjeux transversaux du dossier et de poser à nouveaux frais la question de l’autorité en première personne du pluriel. S’inspirant librement de la réflexion d'Elias sur les transformations de l'équilibre entre l'identité en « je » et l'identité en « nous » , nous établissons dans l’élaboration des différents paradigmes d’intentionnalité collective que la disproportion entre l’attention qui a été portée à la dimension - ontologique - d’être « nous » et la place qu’on a accordée à la dimension - linguistique et grammaticale - du dire « nous » est significative. Pour ce faire, nous mettons ici à l’épreuve trois modèles d’intentionnalité (celui de John Searle, de Margaret Gilbert et de Vincent Descombes) collective à partir de l’attention qu’ils ont respectivement porté à l’énonciation en « nous ». La discussion du holisme structural du dernier modèle pose la question de l’autorité en première personne dont l’unité se constitue dans la prise de parole qui est plus ambiguë que celle qui est le plus souvent retenue par les modèles phares de la We-intentionality. Car cette parole commune garde une part d’événementialité et d’opacité qui en est constitutive. C’est ce qu’indique le statut du « nous » qui apparaît dans La prise de parole de Michel de Certeau. Nous concluons sur la distinction entre un « nous » fort, tonique, qui se dit en position de sujet et d’un « nous » quasi-élidé, qui s’interroge ici ce qui lui est arrivé avant de pouvoir se dire en position de sujet. Ces élisions de la parole exigent d’être prises en compte si l’on entend restituer l’autorité particulière qui y est mise en jeu.

ÖZET Bu çalışma heykel sanatında anlam sorununu dil felsefesi bağlamında ele almayı amaçlamaktadır. Anlam sorunu heykelin yer aldığı mekâna ve heykelin yapım sürecine ilişkin iki ayrı düzlemde ele alınabilmektedir. Heykel sanatında mekânın anlam oluşturması üzerine pek çok araştırma yapılmış ancak yapım sürecinin heykelin anlamlandırılmasında nasıl bir etkisi olduğuna çok az değinilmiştir. Bu araştırma Richard Serra'nın heykelleri ile yapım süreçleri arasında kurulan anlamsal ilişkiye odaklanmaktadır. Process Art (Süreç Sanatı) akımına dahil edilen, hatta belki de bu akımın en önemli sanatçısı olduğu ileri sürülebilecek olan Serra, özellikle ilk dönem yapıtlarında heykelin yapım sürecinin onun anlamı konusunda büyük bir önem arz ettiğini açıkça gözler önüne sermektedir. Heykel sanatında neyin yapıldığından nasıl yapıldığına doğru yaşanan dönüşüme odaklanarak, Serra tarafından vurgulanan anlamının sadece bir eyleme indirgenmesinin anlamsal karşılığı sorgulanmaya çalışılacaktır. Bu bağlamda, 20. Yy'ın en önemli felsefecilerinden olan Ludwig Wittgenstein, J. L. Austin ve özellikle de California Üniversitesi Felsefe Profesörü John R. Searle'ün 50'li yılların ortalarından 70'li yılların sonuna dek sürdürdüğü dil felsefesi çalışmaları Serra'nın heykellerinin anlamlandırılmasında yol gösterici olmaktadır.

This is my last book about the Mind-Body Problem approaching the issue both from historical and theoretical point of view. The book has been published by Thedotcompany in 2018 and 2019 (2nd edition with typos fixed)

https://www.edizionithedotcompany.it/categoria-prodotto/uomini-scienze-tecnologie/

A rewiev  in academia.edu by U. Maionchi in
https://unifi.academia.edu/AlbertoPeruzzi/Drafts

A rewiev  in academia.edu by S. Zani in
https://www.academia.edu/43520661/Dagli_antichi_allintelligenza_artificiale._Che_cosa_ne_è_del_rapporto_mente-corpo

In questo estratto di tesi magistrale vengono illustrate quelle caratteristiche dell'intenzionalità husserliana che hanno giocato un ruolo nella riflessione più recente sull'intenzionalità, in particolare nei lavori di Searle, Bratman e Tomasello.

Ini adalah pendapat saya bahwa tabel intensionality (rasionalitas, kesadaran,  pikiran, pikiran, bahasa, kepribadian dll) yang menonjol di sini menggambarkan lebih atau kurang akurat, atau setidaknya berfungsi sebagai heuristic untuk, bagaimana kita berpikir dan berperilaku, dan sehingga mencakup tidak hanya filsafat dan psikologi, tetapi segala sesuatu yang lain (sejarah, sastra, matematika, politik dll). Perhatikan terutama bahwa intensionalitas dan rasionalitas sebagai I (bersama dengan Searle, Wittgenstein dan lain-lain) melihatnya, mencakup baik sistem linguistik pertimbangan sadar 2 dan tidak disadari otomatis sistem prelinguistik 1 tindakan atau refleks.

Aku memberikan survei kritis dari beberapa temuan utama dari dua siswa yang paling terkemuka perilaku zaman modern, Ludwig Wittgenstein dan John Searle, pada struktur Logis intensionality (pikiran, bahasa, kesadaran,  perilaku), mengambil sebagai titik awal saya adalah penemuan fundamental Wittgenstein-bahwa semua benar ' filosofis ' masalah adalah sama-kebingungan tentang bagaimana menggunakan bahasa dalam konteks tertentu, dan sehingga semua solusi yang sama-melihat bagaimana bahasa dapat digunakan dalam konteks di masalah sehingga kondisi kebenarannya (kondisi kepuasan atau cos) yang jelas. Masalah dasar adalah bahwa seseorang dapat mengatakan  apa-apa  kecuali satu tidak bisa berarti (negara yang jelas cos untuk) sembarang ucapan dan makna yang hanya mungkin dalam konteks yang sangat spesifik. Saya menganalisis berbagai tulisan oleh dan tentang mereka dari perspektif modern dari dua sistem pemikiran (Dipopulerkan sebagai ' berpikir cepat, berpikir lambat '), mempekerjakan sebuah meja baru intensionality dan baru sistem ganda nomenklatur. Saya menunjukkan bahwa ini adalah heuristic kuat untuk menggambarkan perilaku.

Dengan demikian, Semua perilaku yang erat terhubung jika salah satu mengambil sudut pandang yang benar. The fenomenologis Illusion (terlupakan untuk sistem otomatis kami 1) adalah universal dan meluas tidak hanya di seluruh filsafat tetapi sepanjang hidup. Saya yakin bahwa Chomsky, Obama, Zuckerberg dan Paus akan menjadi tidak percaya jika diberitahu bahwa mereka menderita masalah yang sama seperti Hegel, Husserl dan Heidegger, (atau bahwa mereka hanya berbeda dalam derajat dari obat dan pecandu seks dalam menjadi termotivasi oleh stimulasi dari Coral frontal mereka dengan pengiriman dopamin (dan lebih dari 100 bahan kimia lainnya) melalui tegmentum ventral dan inti accumbens), tapi itu jelas benar. Sementara fenomenolog hanya menyia-nyiakan banyak waktu orang, mereka membuang-buang bumi dan masa depan keturunan mereka.

This is a survey and critique of Searle's thinking about social norms and collective intentionality up to 1999 or so, and provides an account of why his views evolved as they did. The essay also argues against the account of normativity that Searle espouses at this point and later revises.