Karl Popper

The purpose is to highlight the theoretical process from Popper's application of the Münchhausen trilemma to the recognition of the inter-subjective character of science and the
establishment of falsifiability as the paradigm of scientific process.

O propósito deste texto é abordar as diferenças (e semelhanças, pois é claro que elas também existem) entre jornalismo científico e divulgação científica. Não se pretende especificar uma mídia, pois é premissa que as ideias aqui apresentadas valem tanto para meio impresso como para TV ou multimídia.

Prevailing views about what constitutes organisational knowledge need to be systematically evaluated at deep epistemological levels. We argue there is a need is to establish a new paradigm comprising of both a theoretical and an ontological foundation for thinking about knowledge epistemologies. We think, along with Bill McKelvey, (1997, 2002) that the “science of management” as it relates to organisations seems to be greatly wanting.Our approach is based on an evolutionary theory of knowledge contained within Karl Popper’s later epistemological works beginning with his 1972 “Objective Knowledge – an evolutionary approach” and a framework of organisational theory based on Maturana and Varela's concept of self-producing complex systems ("autopoiesis"). We have drawn upon this combined approach in order to understand how best to integrate understandings of personal and objective knowledge and the notion of “living organisations” into a new paradigm of organisational know...

Starting from Karl Löwith’s Mitanthropologie, my paper aims to put forward a principle disappointability conceived as a “trust gradient” for the interhuman dimension.
Löwith’s Mitanthropologie develops a taxonomy of the different binary
bonds, at the top of which emerges the “absolute relationship between an I self and a you self”. The peculiarity of this bond is based on trust and responsibility. In order to prove the responsible and trust-based intentionality of the two relata, I propose the principle disappointability, inspired by Popper’s principle of falsification. The authenticity of a relationship depends on the fact that each relatum responds entirely for itself within the space of Miteinandersein. In other words, I can show my trust (in my co-relatum) only if I en-trust (to it). Such a total entrusting can be attested only by the fact that I am “falsifiable”, namely “disappointable”. The principle disappointability emerges therefore as a natural “trust gradient”.

Course Description & Aim
The rise of National Socialism to power prompted an unprecedented large-scale exodus of Central European scholars who have had an enormous impact on American cultural life in particular, and the post-World War II world of politics in general. The primary aim of the course is to introduce students to the key ideas and classical writings of these figures, and to examine their responses to and analysis of the age of extremes. We will begin our journey with the writings of Theodor Adorno, Herbert Marcuse and Erich Fromm – the founders of the Frankfurt School – and will continue with the analyses of totalitarianism and " political Messianism " offered by Hannah Arendt, Gershom Scholem, Jacob L. Talmon, and Karl Popper, which we will then compare and contrast with the evaluation of liberalism one finds in the writings of Leo Strauss, Isaiah Berlin, and Arthur Koestler. We shall examine these thinkers' analyses of enlightenment, nationalism, socialism, and totalitarianism, their life stories, and their direct and indirect role in creating a transatlantic political discourse in postwar years. We will try to ask ourselves to what extent were their political and philosophical writings designed as a response to the maladies of the twentieth century, and to what extent did their Jewishness notify their writings, if at all. By doing so we shall be able to contextualize historically the fundamental features of Jewish intellectual activity after 1945.
*No prior knowledge of political science, philosophy and/or Jewish studies are required.

En el presente ensayo haré una breve semblanza de la impotencia metafísica y teológica y el positivismo como alternativa para la revolución en el trabajo de Auguste Comte 1 , así como una del racionalismo e irracionalismo como lo delimita Popper en el capítulo 24 de la Sociedad Abierta y sus Enemigos 2 , para posteriormente analizar la relación que tiene el primero en el marco del segundo 3. Comte comienza diciendo que las escuelas teológica y metafísica que formaron al mundo moderno, sufrían irrevocablemente de una disolución, junto con el poder político que de ellas emanó. Mientas que ambos sistemas surgieron de la institución universitaria, se convirtió ésta última en el depositario de la crítica contra dichas escuelas. Se ve, durante el siglo XVIII del movimiento de la actividad revolucionaria de los doctores y jueces a los literatos y abogados. Asegura que dicha decadencia se hace sistemática 4 por influjo de todas las clases sociales, necesitadas de un orden nuevo. Dicho cambio, que se ha convertido en orgánico, no ha podido completarse debido a la falta de un sistema filosófico intrínseco a él que procurara una base intelectual autónoma. Sin ello, fue la escuela metafísica la que tiene la preeminencia en la reorganización del modelo social.

Rene Descartes (1596 – 1650) is considered the founder of modern philosophy. Profoundly influenced by the new physics and astronomy of Kepler and Galileo, Descartes was a scientist and mathematician whose most long-lasting contributions in science were the invention of Cartesian coordinates, the application of algebra to geometry, and the discovery of the law of refraction, what we now call Snell’s law. His most important books on philosophy were The discourse on method(1637) and The meditations (1642). Descartes’ writings display an exemplary degree of clarity and an aversion to pedantry. I explore Descartes' break with Aristotle, but also shine a light on the intellectual continuity Descartes had with Aristotle's thought. I also draw attention to some overlooked but interesting possibilities for an experimental test of a dualistic theory of mind.

Karl Popper’s conception of methodology and its relationship to epistemology is examined, and found wanting. Popper argues that positivist criteria of demarcation fail because they are attempts to discover a difference in the natures of empirical science and metaphysics. His alternative to naturalism is that a plausible criterion of demarcation is a proposal for an agreement, or convention. But this conventionalism about methodology is misplaced. Methodological rules are conventions, but which methodological rules are followed by scientists it is not itself a matter of convention. This casts doubt upon the status of Popper’s famous criterion of demarcation.

Le falsificationnisme dogmatique accepte la falsifiabilité de toutes les théories scientifiques sans réserve, mais conserve une base empirique infaillible. Il est strictement empirique sans être inductif : il nie que la certitude de la base empirique puisse être transmise aux théories. Ainsi, le falsificationnisme dogmatique est donc la marque de justification la plus faible. Le signe distinctif de la falsification dogmatique est la reconnaissance du fait que toutes les théories sont également conjecturales. La science ne peut prouver aucune théorie, mais elle peut les rejeter.
DOI: 10.13140/RG.2.2.26963.32807

Da Pirrone a Rorty, passando per Socrate, Carneade, Cicerone, Giovanni di Salisbury, Guicciardini, Montaigne, Sorbière, Pascal, Bayle, Hume, Nietzsche, Russell, Rensi, Oakeshott e Popper: il volume offre per la prima volta un quadro completo della storia dello scetticismo politico, rappresentato da alcune delle figure intellettuali più influenti del pensiero occidentale ma ritenute politicamente “scomode” per la loro incessante critica alle ideologie, ai dogmatismi dei partiti, ai paradigmi normativi e ai mezzi di persuasione diversi da quelli improntati al buon senso, alla prudenza e alla moderazione. L’autore dimostra che a unire tutti gli scettici politici è uno “stile” che privilegia il saggio al trattato, l’ipotesi alla certezza infallibile, il pluralismo al monismo, la verità conversazionale alla soluzione finale. Benché quasi tutti siano stati additati dai loro contemporanei come infedeli, reprobi, esiliati e gretti, le loro posizioni si sono rivelate essenziali non solo per la teoria politica in senso proprio, ma anche per l’affermazione di idee “altre” di libertà, tolleranza e convivenza civile.

Monográfico "Una nueva mirada sobre Karl Popper", Ápeiron, 6, 2017, publicado también como libro. Incluye estudio bibliográfico exhaustivo sobre fuentes primarias de Popper (junto con sus traducciones al inglés, alemán y español), la traducción crítica de un texto de Popper de 1981 que sólo se había publicado en un periódico suizo, más diez estudios que abordan diferentes aspectos de su pensamiento.

SUMARIO

Estudio bibliográfico de Karl Popper: Contribuciones filosóficas enmarcadas en cuatro etapas
Wenceslao J. González

Ciencia: conocimiento e ignorancia
Karl Popper (traducción de Julio Ostalé)

Popper en España
Julio Ostalé

Karl Popper y los filósofos presocráticos
Javier Aguirre Santos

En defensa del racionalismo crítico: El criticismo popperiano como actitud vital
Sergio García Rodríguez

Popper, Tarski y la verdad
Luis Fernández Moreno

Archaeological Researches on Popper’s Philosophy of Science: Lights and Shadows
Andrés Rivadulla

La recepción de la teoría darwiniana de la evolución en Karl R. Popper
Ana María Alonso Rodríguez

Popper y Hayek sobre explicación y predicción en las Ciencias Sociales
José Fco. Martínez Solano

La cosmovisión emergentista de Karl Popper
Josep Corcó

Filosofía política de la ciencia: El caso Popper
Alfredo Marcos

El modelo de racionalidad de Popper y la relación entre epistemología y filosofía política
Ángeles J. Perona

"Understanding Scientific Progress constitutes a potentially enormous and revolutionary advancement in philosophy of science. It deserves to be read and studied by everyone with any interest in or connection with physics or the theory of science. Maxwell cites the work of Hume, Kant, J.S. Mill, Ludwig Bolzmann, Pierre Duhem, Einstein, Henri Poincaré, C.S. Peirce, Whitehead, Russell, Carnap, A.J. Ayer, Karl Popper, Thomas Kuhn, Imre Lakatos, Paul Feyerabend, Nelson Goodman, Bas van Fraassen, and numerous others. He lauds Popper for advancing beyond verificationism and Hume’s problem of induction, but faults both Kuhn and Popper for being unable to show that and how their work could lead nearer to the truth." —Dr. Lloyd Eby teaches philosophy at The George Washington University and The Catholic University of America, in Washington, DC

The main purpose of this paper is to provide a critical analysis of Luc Boltanski’s account of the multifaceted relationship between mysteries, conspiracies, and inquiries in modern societies. It is striking that, although this important aspect of Boltanski’s oeuvre has been commented on by several scholars, his principal contributions to this area of investigation have been largely overlooked and received hardly any serious attention by researchers in the humanities and social sciences. This paper is an attempt to fill this noticeable gap in the literature. Thus, rather than covering the entire breadth and depth of Boltanski’s writings, the paper will focus on the valuable insights his work offers into the relationship between mysteries, conspiracies, and inquiries. To this end, the analysis is divided into two parts. The first part comprises an overview of Boltanski’s central theoretical contributions to our understanding of mysteries, conspiracies, and inquiries. The second part offers some critical reflections on important issues arising from Boltanski’s examination of the relationship between mysteries, conspiracies, and inquiries – especially with regard to its limitations and shortcomings.

In a recent blog-post Massimo Pigliucci discussed the case of philosophical counselling and addressed some criticisms that it was a pseudo-science. Pigliucci addressed these criticisms in a balanced manner and his responses were largely convincing. Basically he argued that philosophical counselling could be thought of in two ways (1) As a type of therapy and (2) As a type of life coaching. Pigliucci argues once it is understood that philosophical counselling is not a form of therapy but a form of life coaching; criticisms of it for being a pseudoscience dissolve. While I found a lot to agree with in Pigluicci's analysis, I felt his demarcation between therapy and life coaching was a bit too quick and blurred some important conceptual distinctions. However before discussing these conceptual distinctions I will first address Pigliucci discussion of the nature of therapy and his comparison of psychoanalysis and cognitive behavioural science. When discussing two forms of therapy he distinguishes between Freudian Psychoanalysis and Cognitive Behavioural Therapy. He makes the claim that while Cognitive Behavioural Therapy is well supported scientifically some philosophers think that Freudian Psychoanalysis is a pseudoscience. A couple of points need to be made about this claim. Firstly while the cliché still exists that psychoananalysis is unsupported by empirical evidence while Cbt is not; there is not as much substance to this cliché as some believe. While it is true that CBT has historically been subject to more empirical testing than Psychoanalysis this is changing; a lot of long term studies exist which demonstrate that Psychoanalysis is as effective as CBT. In this utube clip https://youtu.be/IQBx5TONHac 'The Case for Psychoanalysis' Dr John Thor Cornelius brings a lot of impressive comparative studies of the long term treatment with CBT and Psychoanalysis. And Cornelius finds that both forms of therapy perform at a par, except in the long term where psychoanalysis out performs CBT. In the paper by 'The Efficacy of Psychodynamic Psychotherapy Dr Johathan Shedler again offers compelling evidence of the comparative effectiveness https://www.apa.org/pubs/journals/releases/amp-65-2-98.pdf. In the website of The Neuropsychoanalytic Association further evidence for the utility of psychoanalytic psychotherapy is provided. https://npsa-association.org/education-training/ suggested-reading/the-efficacy-of-psychoanalyticpsychodynamic-therapies-reading-list/. Now this evidence is obviously only the tip of the iceberg and there is some dispute about the various different studies that have been done. I present it just to counterbalance the implicit suggestion by Pigluicci that psychoanalytic psychotherapy is not evidence based. Pigluicci's claim that some philosophers think that psychoanalysis is a pseudoscience is certainly true. A prominent proponent of this view was the philosopher Karl Popper whose criticism of psychoanalysis was that it was not falsifiable. Popper noted that the core sciences made precise claims that were falsifiable in principle. Thus he noted the falsifiable aspect of the theory of relativity where light bending around the moon in a particular way at a particular time was a potential way of disproving the theory of relativity. Popper went on to note that a theory is never totally confirmed to be correct it is just becomes better corroborated as it passes more tests. Popper contrasted this scientific behaviour with the behaviour of psychoanalysts and Marxists who claimed to engaging in science. Popper argued that no possible empirical evidence could possibly refute either psychoanalysis or Marxism. It was this supposed dogmatic resistance to refutation that Popper believed stopped psychoanalysis from being a science. Now two points need to be made here. The first is to do with Popper's falisificationist principle. The principle has come under heavy attack from philosophers such as Kuhn, Feyerabend and Quine. Most philosophers today do not accept Popper's so called gold standard to distinguish between science and pseudoscience. Furthermore practicing scientists today have serious disagreements about the importance of Popper's gold standard to distinguish science from pseudoscience. In linguistics critics of Generative Grammar note how the theory is shielded from falisification by ad-hoc reasoning. The defenders of generative grammar note that Poppers criterion is at odds with actual scientific practice. Thus defenders of generative grammar argue that they are simply adopting the Galilean method which has no use for naive falsification. Now this debate gets very heated and I we don't have time to go into it here. I mention it to illustrate that Popper's philosophy of science is not accepted both by a lot of philosophers and by a lot of scientists. So his falsification argument cannot be assumed to be an automatic defeater of the scientific status of psychoanalysis.

ARKA KAPAK YAZISI

Özgürlük nedir ve bugün özgürlüğün karşılaştığı başlıca tehditler nelerdir? Bu sorular ve daha fazlası, Svendsen'in çağdaş toplumda özgürlüğün doğasına ilişkin bu kapsamlı incelemesinde tartışılmaktadır. Konuya geniş bir çerçeveden yaklaşan Svendsen, merceğini özgürlüğün günümüzde karşılaştığı sorunlara çeviriyor. Sonuçta özgürlük, ontolojik ve metafizik yönlerinden politik ya da kişisel yönlerine kadar çok boyutlu bir olgudur.

Özgürlüğün anlaşılmasında ve uygulanmasında temel zorluk, birbirleriyle çatışan anlayışların ve politikaların varlığıdır. İşte Svendsen, özgürlüğü metafizik, politik ve etik düzeyde ele alan çeşitli düşünürleri ve teorileri ustalıkla kateden bu çalışmasında, özgürlük anlayışlarının birbirleriyle nasıl ilişkili olduğunu ve çatıştığını tartışıyor. Özgürlüğün imkânını araştırıyor ve yaşadığımız hayatın gerçek değerini anlamak için kişisel özgürlüğün gerçek tanımının, her şeyden önce kendimizi, bizim için gerçekten önemli olan şeylere adama özgürlüğü olduğu sonucuna varıyor.

Bu kitap bir özgürlük savunmasıdır. Özgürlük kavramını kuşatan zengin külliyata dair genel ve geniş bir bakış sunan, özgürlüğün gerçek doğasına dair tekrar düşünebilmek için bize yeni bir fırsat sağlayan Özgürlüğün Felsefesi, hem akademisyenler hem de genel okur için anlaşılır ve aydınlatıcı bir çalışma.

Özellikler
Cilt Durumu : Ciltsiz
Basım Tarihi : Mayıs 2021
Basım Yeri : Türkiye
Boyutlar : 13,00 x 19,50 cm
Basım Dili : Türkçe
Orijinal Dil : Norveççe
Kağıt Tipi : 2. Hamur
Sayfa Sayısı : 392
Barkod : 9786056911958
Kategoriler
Felsefe / Diğer
Katkıda Bulunanlar
Çevirmen
Murat Erşen

Kapak Tasarım
Tarık Kirpi

Hazırlayan
Ahmet Yurtkul

Dies ist keine Welt der Bestätigung von Wahrheiten, sondern eine Welt der Widerlegung von Irrtümern. Aber es gibt die Welt, und es gibt auch die Wahrheit; nur Sicherheit über Welt und Wahrheit kann es nicht geben. Kreuzer: Ich möchte auf ein Grundproblem verweisen, das in den letzten Jahrzehnten bei allen ernstzunehmenden Forschern in den Vordergrund tritt: das Problem der Orthogenese, die Frage, wieso und warum die Evolution gerichtet ist, die Frage auch insbesondere, wie ihr Tempo zu erklären ist; denn würde die Evolution nur aus Zufall und Notwendigkeit, aus Mutation und Selektion im einfachsten erklärt werden müssen, dann wären ja nicht vier Milliarden Jahre, sondern jedenfalls Hunderte Milliarden Jahre notwendig gewesen, um die heutige lebende Erdoberfläche hervorzubringen. In diesem Sinne bemerkt man etwas, was ich den "Lamarckschen Dämon" in der Darwinschen Theorie nennen würde, nämlich die Vermutung, daß sie ein Richtungselement, ein kreativ gestaltendes Element enthält. Ich erinnere mich, daß Popper Bergson zitiert und dessen " 'élan vital", die Lebenskraft, ich beziehe mich auf Prigogine mit seiner Bifurkationstheorie, auf Manfred Eigen mit den Spielbedingungen, die das alles ermöglichen. Ich beziehe mich auf Campbell mit der Idee der "downward causation", daß etwas "von oben" her wirkt. Bei Ihnen, Herr Professor Lorenz, heißt es "Fulguration die blitz-schlagartige Erhellung des Entwicklungshorizonts. Lorenz: Die Fulguration, das Auftreten von total Neuem, von nie Dagewesenem, ist eine Vorbedingung des Entwicklungstempos. Das muß da sein, weil es sonst viel zu langsam ginge; auch die Rückkoppelung des Erfolges muß da sein, schon beim Hyperzyklus von Manfred Eigen muß sie da sein. Was aber das Wesentliche des Höherentwickelns, des Kreativen ist, das wissen wir nicht.

"In this book, the words ‘science’ and ‘social science’ are used in their limited sense that refer to experience-based knowledge. This should not indicate that experience is being used in a positivistic sense. Rather, the important insights of all kinds of post-positivist views are embraced to give an extensive meaning to experience. However, the most important characteristic of experience and science that should never be excluded is its dependence on observation and observational evidence.
Thus, when ‘science’ is used in combination with ‘religion’, it should not be confused by religious knowledge. The latter might refer to, perhaps, a certain kind of knowledge that could be found in religious texts and might be different from other kinds of knowledge. However, when the phrase of ‘religious science’ is used, it refers to a scientific knowledge, even though because of its religious presuppositions it is called religious. And this relation between religion and science is exactly the point that is at issue in this book."

Esta es la segunda de dos entradas donde estamos proponiendo lo que consideramos pueden ser componentes del pensamiento computacional.  Con ello pretendemos realizar una redefinición de un dominio teórico específico dentro de las teorías del aprendizaje. Y desde luego hacer una descripción somera, en un primer acercamiento, de un currículum adecuado a esos dominios conceptuales para las distintas etapas educativas y para la capacitación de maestros y profesores.

Lo tratamos de hacer con las limitaciones de un post. Después será tratado y ampliado en documentos con más extensión y documentación. En un primer repaso y en la búsqueda correspondiente hemos intentamos conectar estos temas con las conceptualizaciones y modalidades del pensamiento según las teorías del aprendizaje.

In this unit, students will be introduced to the basic concepts, questions, thinkers, and history of philosophy of science. The unit begins with the historical background. In this section of the unit, students will learn about various changes that science has undergone, particularly in the shift from European medieval science to early modern science. Students will then confront a series of classic questions in philosophy of science, including: How do we go from specific observations to general scientific claims? What is reality? Does science describe reality? Is there such a thing as scientific progress (if so, how does it work)? What are the limits to science? Is science value-neutral? Does science have a male bias?
Throughout, students will learn that there are many ways of thinking about science, and that there is no consensus on the way it works, the nature of the claims it makes, or its value. They will also have opportunities to connect their understanding of science and philosophy of science to their own lives, especially in the lesson on feminist critiques of science. The other lessons have practical import as well, particularly when it comes to gaining a better understanding of common conversations around science – for example, conversations on claims about scientific discoveries; the relationship between science and other ways of knowing (such as religion); and the relationship between science, society, and their personal lives. Students will also have opportunities to develop their philosophical research skills, particularly in a research workshop and a work period.

Karl Popper, as a critical rationalist, was an opponent of all forms of skepticism, conventionalism and relativism in science. A major argument of Popper is Hume's critique of induction, arguing that induction should never be used in science. But he disagrees with the skepticism associated with Hume, nor with the support of Bacon and Newton's pure "observation" as a starting point in the formation of theories, as there are no pure observations that do not imply certain theories. Instead, Popper proposes falsifiability as a method of scientific investigation.
DOI: 10.13140/RG.2.2.11481.36967

1. Einleitung .............................................................................................2
1.1 Managementlehre ....................................................................3
1.2 System-Methodik ............................................................................3
1.3 Komplexe Systeme ....................................................................4
1.4 Zwei Theorietypen .....................................................................5
1.4.1 konstruktivistisch-technomorpher Theorietyp ....................5
1.4.2 Systemisch-evolutionärer Theorietyp .....................................6
1.5 Aufbau des Buchs .....................................................................8
2. Das Modell lebensfähiger Systeme von Stafford Beer ............8
2.1 Die Gesamtstruktur des lebensfähigen Systems. ....................9
2.2 Das Prinzip der Rekursion ..........................................................11
2.3 Das Prinzip der Lebensfähigkeit ..........................................13
2.3.1 Komplexitätsbeherrschung ..................................................15
2.3.2 Das Gesetz der erforderlichen Varietät ..................................17
2.3.3 Das Bremerman’sche Limit ..................................................18
2.3.4 Das Prinzip der Ordnung ...........................................................19
3. Das Problem der Komplexität ...................................................23
3.1 Die allgemeinen Evolutionstheorie ...........................................24
3.2  Die Lenkung des Problemlösungsprozesses ...........................28
3.3 Varietätsbewältigung ....................................................................31
3.4 Grundprinzipien kognitiver Prozesse ....................................32
3.5 Prozessmerkmale des evolutionären Problemlösens ............34
4. Umgang mit Komplexität ............................................................38
4.1 Spiralenförmiges Vorgehen ....................................................40
4.2 Evolutionärer Problemlösungsprozeß ....................................40
4.3 Das Rückkoppelungsprinzip ....................................................41
4.4 Das Prinzip der Homöostase ....................................................43
5. Metasystemische Steuerung ....................................................44
6. Strategien zur Komplexitätsbewältigung ....................................48
7. Zusammenfassung ....................................................................56

Por "cientificismo" refiro-me à tese de que todos os problemas cognitivos são melhores resolvidos adotando uma abordagem científica, também chamada de "método científico", "espírito da ciência" e "atitude científica". Embora a maioria dos filósofos contemporâneos rejeite o cientificismo, é provável que todos os cientistas o pratiquem, mesmo aqueles que nunca se depararam com a palavra. Este artigo oferece uma defesa de um tipo particular de cientificismo: a visão de que a ciência é o tipo mais verdadeiro e profundo de conhecimento da natureza e da sociedade.

I am planning a history of the notion of philosophical nonsense and naturally difficult historical and exegetical questions have come up.  Charles Pigden has argued that the notion goes back at least as far as Hobbes and that Locke, Berkeley, Hume, Kant (on some interpretations) and pragmatists such as William James, as well as numerous Twentieth-Century philosophers make use of it.  In this ‘paper’ I put forward for general discussion such questions as whether Hobbes was the first 'nonsensicalist', whether Kant was a 'nonsensicalist' at all, which philosophers if any have considered contradictions to be meaningless and whether Wittgenstein thought that his concept of criterion could legitimately be used verificationistically.  I shall continue to add further questions as they occur to me.

Karl R. Popper, 20. Yüzyılın Britanyalı bilim felsefecisidir. Viyana’da doğmuş ve düşünce yapısının temelleri burada atılmıştır. Entelektüel bir ailede yetişmesinin yanı sıra şahit olduğu dünya savaşlarının getirdiği krizler fikirlerinin oluşmasında önemli yer tutmuştur. Üniversite hayatından farklı alanlarda ders seçmesi onu her alanda geliştirirmiştir. Doğa bilimleri kökenli olmasına karşın sosyal bilim kuramları oldukça ses getirmiştir.
Bu çalışmanın amacı, pozitivist ve Marksistlerin ağır eleştirilerine tutulmasına neden olan Popper’ın bilim, siyaset ve tarih felsefesinin kuramlarını özetle tek kaynakta sunulması hedeflenerek yazılmıştır. Çalışmanın ilk bölümünde 19. yüzyılın sonlarından itibaren hızla gelişen bilimle beraber ortaya çıkan bilim-sahte-bilim tartışmasının getirisi olan yanlışmacılık teorisi incelenmiştir. Popper’a gelen eleştiriler de bu kısımda ele alınmıştır. İkinci bölümde savaş dönemini derinden hisseden Popper’ın siyaset felsefesinden bahsedilmiştir. Açık ve toplum kavramları açıklanarak detaylandırılmıştır. Son bölümde, temelini bilim ve siyaset felsefesinin kuramlarının oluşturduğu tarih felsefesi ve tarihsiciliğin açıklanması amaçlanmıştır.
Popper’ın Bilimsel Araştırmanın Mantığı ve Açık Toplum ve Düşmanları, Tarihselliğin Sefaleti,  Bir Entelektüelin Yaşam Öyküsü-Bitmeyen Arayış ve Hayat Problem Çözmektir isimli eserleri son derece önemli referans olmuştur. Akademik literatüre bakıldığında oldukça kapsamlı çalışmalar mevcuttur. Bu çalışmada ise başlıca kendi eserleri eleştirel bir gözle değerlendirilmiştir.

This verbose reflection began as a letter of apologia to my friend and mentor Bob Merton, just before his death in 2003.  As such letters go, it is no OTSOG;  but it may be of some general interest as a period piece describing what it was like to try and fail at an academic career toward the end of the 20th c.  And it may offer some insight into the generality of such failures.  Are there only downsides?  Can there be upward failures as well as Pyrrhic victories?  Can lost opportunities also rescue?  Can succeeding badly prevent one from failing well?  Can professional death have advantages over actual death?

En el presente artículo se estudia el falsacionismo de Karl Popper, como metodología de contrastación de hipótesis, prestando vital importancia a su carácter demarcativo en lo que es ciencia y lo que no. Para ello también se ha hecho un recorrido por el confirmacionismo, y verificacionismo, amén de contextualizar su metodología. Y una vez estudiados estos criterios, ejemplificar por medio del creacionismo los criterios para determinar su carácter seudocientífico.

En este artículo atendemos al patente desencanto con la democracia en nuestras democracias liberales y señalamos algunas paradojas a las que se enfrentan nuestras democracias. Se concentran en una paradoja intuida por John Stuart Mill y formulada por Karl Popper: es posible democráticamente elegir la tiranía. Esta paradoja, a la que llamamos «paradoja contrademocrática», enfrenta a la democracia a una de sus debilidades internas: un exceso democrático puede eliminar a la propia democracia. Por ende, defendemos, atendiendo a las sugerencias de Pierre Rosanvallon, algunos mecanismos contrademocráticos para hacer frente a la paradoja contrademocrática: vigilancia, transparencia, control de constitucionalidad y coaliciones partidistas.

O objetivo do presente artigo é apresentar, sucintamente, uma possível consequência da solução de Popper para o Problema da Demarcação da Ciência. Como contraposição, apresentamos algumas ideias de Ernst Mayr, famoso e respeitado biólogo, que propõe que a grande maioria das filosofias da ciência são construídas com embasamento nas ciências físicas, não contemplando, dessa maneira, as particularidades da biologia.