Papers by Zsolt Kapelner
Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, 2023
Democracy is the form of government in which citizens have an equal say in political decision-mak... more Democracy is the form of government in which citizens have an equal say in political decision-making. But what does this mean precisely? Having an equal say is often defined either in terms of equal power to influence political decision-making or in terms of appropriate consideration, i.e., as a matter of attributing appropriate deliberative weight to citizens’ judgement in political decision-making. In this paper I argue that both accounts are incomplete. I offer an alternative view according to which having an equal say is having a say as an equal. That is, having an equal say is to be defined in terms of citizens’ occupying a role of political decision-makers, i.e., the political office of the democratic co-ruler of the polity, such that no citizen is a secondary or auxiliary decision-maker; they rule together as equals. This view aligns with the traditional understanding of democracy as rule by the people while providing a coherent conceptual framework for specifying what it means for democratic citizens to have an equal say which incorporates the strengths of alternative accounts and overcomes some of their challenges.
Episteme, 2022
In this paper we discuss an often-neglected topic in the literature on the ethics of voting. Our ... more In this paper we discuss an often-neglected topic in the literature on the ethics of voting. Our aim is to provide an account of what states are obligated to do, so that voters may fulfil their role as public decision-makers in an epistemically competent manner. We argue that the state ought to provide voters with what we call a substantive opportunity for competence. This entails that the state ought to actively foster the epistemic capabilities that are necessary to achieve competent participation in political decision-making practices.
Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, 2022
In recent years the view that the non-instrumental value of democracy is a relational value, part... more In recent years the view that the non-instrumental value of democracy is a relational value, particularly relational equality, gained prominence. In this paper I challenge this relational egalitarian version of non-instrumentalism about democracy’s value by arguing that it is unable to establish a strong enough commitment to democracy. I offer an alternative view according to which democracy is non-instrumentally valuable for it establishes relationships of mutual service among citizens by enlisting them in the collective project of ruling the polity justly together which is a self-standing source of value for them. Relating in the mode of mutual service is not a species of relating as equals; it is a distinct relational value. Democracy is uniquely suited to realize this relational value, for it renders citizens co-authors of the fundamental rules of the system of social cooperation under which they live, and only as co-authors of these rules are they able to mutually serve each other in a way that is appropriate within their relationship as citizens of the same polity. For this reason, a strong commitment to democracy can be based on the relational value of mutual service, which therefore better fits the theoretical purposes of non-instrumentalism than relational equality.
Social Theory and Practice
Structural injustice is injustice produced by largescale social structures and processes that cre... more Structural injustice is injustice produced by largescale social structures and processes that create systemic disadvantages for large groups of people. Individuals have duties to counteract structural injustice. These duties are more demanding for people privileged by unjust social structures than for non-privileged individuals, even when the latter have equal ability to contribute. What explains this? I review and reject two common explanations, i.e. the Reparation Account and the Restitution Account. I offer a third view, the Domination Account; it holds that the privileged have more demanding duties because they pose a constant threat of domination to non-privileged individuals by virtue of their structural positions.
Res Publica, 2019
Oppressive governments that use violence against citizens, e.g. murder and torture, are usually t... more Oppressive governments that use violence against citizens, e.g. murder and torture, are usually thought of as liable to armed revolutionary attack by the oppressed population. But oppression may be non-violent. A government may greatly restrict political rights and personal autonomy by using surveillance, propaganda, manipulation, strategic detention and similar techniques without ever resorting to overt violence. Can such regimes be liable to revolutionary attack? A widespread view is that the answer is ‘no’. On this view, unless a government is or is likely to turn violent, revolution against it is disproportional. After all, revolution would involve launching potentially lethal attacks against oppressors who do not threaten the lives and bodily integrity of their subjects but pose only lesser threats. I argue that this claim of disproportionality is false. Armed revolution against Stably Non-violent Oppressive Regimes (which are neither violent, nor are likely to become violent) can be proportional under some circumstances, thus they may be liable to revolutionary attack. My argument relies on the Responsibility-Sensitive Account of Proportionality. This account holds that responsibility for posing threats renders agents liable to greater defensive harms than the harms with which they threaten. Even if non-violent oppressive regimes do not threaten citizens with murder, serious physical injury, or enslavement, their responsibility for creating an environment in which citizens’ political rights and personal autonomy are extremely restricted may loosen the proportionality requirement of inflicting defensive harm and render them liable to revolutionary attack.
Ethics and Global Politics , 2020
In this paper I defend the view that the democratic legitimacy of refugee admission policies requ... more In this paper I defend the view that the democratic legitimacy of refugee admission policies requires the democratic inclusion of asylum seekers. I argue that this includes not only granting them formal participation rights, but also ensuring that they have a sufficient level of participatory capabilities to exercise these rights. This leads to the specific problem of asylum seekers with vulnerable minority backgrounds. Their participatory capabilities may be hindered by social injustice stemming from their state of origin which the receiving state, one might argue, has no duty to redress. Redressing inequalities that stem from social injustice in other states may be thought of as being beyond the limits of refuge, and therefore unreasonable to demand from receiving states. I propose a defence of what I call the Inclusion Thesis against this objection based on the idea that the democratic inclusion of asylum seekers is necessary for making sure that they can enjoy their basic right to have a say. Receiving states do not generally have a duty to rectify unjust inequalities among asylum seekers that stem from their states of origin. However, when this is necessary for making sure that they can enjoy their basic rights, they may be required to do so. Therefore, since receiving states have a duty to ensure that asylum seekers with vulnerable minority backgrounds can enjoy their basic right to have a say, they also have a duty to make sure that their participatory capabilities are equalized.
Res Publica, 2020
Rainer Bauböck is among the most renowned scholars in the field of citizenship and democracy. In... more Rainer Bauböck is among the most renowned scholars in the field of citizenship and democracy. In a recent volume, Democratic Inclusion, he—together with other authors—addresses the so-called democratic boundary problem. This book is an extremely valuable resource for anyone working on this problem; Bauböck presents a complex and sophisticated theory of the principles of democratic citizenship while his respondents put forward crucial questions not only about his theory, but also about the debate in general. At the same time, the volume also points to the limitations of this discourse and the formidable obstacles to reaching conclusive theoretical results about democratic inclusion.
Lee Ward (ed) Cosmopolitanism and its Discontents. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books., 2020
Ethical Theory and Moral Practice
In recent years the view that the non-instrumental value of democracy is a relational value, part... more In recent years the view that the non-instrumental value of democracy is a relational value, particularly relational equality, gained prominence. In this paper I challenge this relational egalitarian version of non-instrumentalism about democracy’s value by arguing that it is unable to establish a strong enough commitment to democracy. I offer an alternative view according to which democracy is non-instrumentally valuable for it establishes relationships of mutual service among citizens by enlisting them in the collective project of ruling the polity justly together which is a self-standing source of value for them. Relating in the mode of mutual service is not a species of relating as equals; it is a distinct relational value. Democracy is uniquely suited to realize this relational value, for it renders citizens co-authors of the fundamental rules of the system of social cooperation under which they live, and only as co-authors of these rules are they able to mutually serve each other in a way that is appropriate within their relationship as citizens of the same polity. For this reason, a strong commitment to democracy can be based on the relational value of mutual service, which therefore better fits the theoretical purposes of non-instrumentalism than relational equality.
Syllabi by Zsolt Kapelner
The goal of the course is to introduce students to key philosophical debates in contemporary demo... more The goal of the course is to introduce students to key philosophical debates in contemporary democratic theory. By the end of the course, students will be able to: • analyse the concept of democracy, understand the distinction between aggregative and deliberative models of democracy or representative and direct democracy • understand and map possible solutions for key philosophical problems regarding democracy, e.g., the value of democracy, the authority of democracy, the problem of persistent minorities, etc. • apply philosophical analysis to contemporary problems regarding democracy, e.g., representation, constitutionalism, or democratic backsliding Students will develop the following skills: • Conceptual analysis and critical thinking, particularly regarding contemporary politics • Research and argumentation in empirically informed political theory • Abstract analysis of current affairs. Subject content: The course has two main components. The first module which encompasses classes 1 to 6 discuss general theoretical problems in the philosophy of democracy, i.e., the definition of democracy, its instrumental (dis)value, its political epistemology, its non-instrumental worth, and the source and limits of democratic authority. The second module (classes 7-11) uses the theoretical foundations established in the first module to address particular problems within democratic theory, namely representation, constitutionalism, militant democracy, the boundaries of the demos, and global democracy. The last class addresses what may be called the contemporary crisis of democracy and the possibilities of further democratization as well as the role of philosophical reflection in real-world politics. The course does not presuppose any prior knowledge of political philosophy, however, some familiarity with current affairs is useful.
Hungarian by Zsolt Kapelner
Politikatudományi szemle, 2021
A bevándorlásról szóló jelenkori diskurzusok egyik központi témája a kizárás joga: jogában áll-e ... more A bevándorlásról szóló jelenkori diskurzusok egyik központi témája a kizárás joga: jogában áll-e az államnak egyoldalúan kizárni potenciális bevándorlókat a területéről? A szakirodalom három fő érvtípust ismer a kizárás joga mellett: az önrendelkezésből vett érvet, a funkcionalista érveket és az úgynevezett joghatósági érvet. Tanulmányomban amellett érvelek, hogy egyik érvtípus sem képes igazolni a kizárás jogát. Ez a gondolatmenet egy a posteriori érvet nyújt a kizárás joga ellen. Nem azt mutatja meg, hogy a kizárás jogának igazolása lehetetlen, hanem hogy a kortárs szakirodalom legerősebb érvei kudarcot vallanak. Bár e végkövetkeztetés nem zárja ki teljes bizonyossággal a kizárás jogának igazolhatóságát, mégis alapos indokot nyújt annak elvetésére. Mindez fontos következményekkel jár a bevándorlás politikaelméletére nézve.
Budapesti könyszemle, 2020
Magyar filozófiai szemle, 2019
Antal Attila (szerk.), Neoliberális hegemónia Magyarországon. Budapest, Noran Libro, 2019
Antal Attila et al. (szerk.) Marx... Interpretációk, irányzatok, iskolák. Budapest, Napvilág. 2018.
Elpis, 2018
Žižek és Adorno kritikai elméleti munkásságában egyaránt központi szerepet játszik a di... more Žižek és Adorno kritikai elméleti munkásságában egyaránt központi szerepet játszik a dialektika hegeli fogalmának újraértelmezése, annak alkalmazása a modern társadalom és az emancipáció lehetőségeinek elemzésére. Mindkét szerző a negativitás fogalmát helyezi dialektikafelfogása középpontjába. E lényegi párhuzamok ellenére – melyeket a szakirodalom ritkán tárgyal – Žižek és Adorno politikai cselekvésről vallott nézetei homlokegyenest szemben állnak egymással. Tanulmányomban azt a kérdést vizsgálom, mi magyarázza, hogy a két szerző munkáinak központi eleme – a dialektika értelmezése – közti olykor igen közeli párhuzamok ellenére szélsőségesen eltérő álláspontra jutnak a politikai cselekvés kérdésében. Amellett érvelek, hogy az ellentétet Žižek és Adorno eltérő negativitásfogalma magyarázza. Žižeknél a dialektika középpontjában álló negativitás tartalom nélküli, abszolút negativitás, amely gyökeres ellentétben áll a Negatív dialektikában leírt, konkrét tartalommal bíró meghatározott negativitással. E két negativitásfogalom és a hozzájuk kapcsolódó két dialektikafelfogás a politikai cselekvés eltérő elméleteit teszik elérhetővé a két filozófus számára.
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Papers by Zsolt Kapelner
Syllabi by Zsolt Kapelner
Hungarian by Zsolt Kapelner