Self-Knowledge

This paper responds to continuing commentary on Velmans (2002a) “How could conscious experiences affect brains,” a target article for a special issue of JCS. I focus on the final question dealt with by the target article: how free will relates to preconscious and conscious mental processing, and I develop the case for preconscious free will.  Although “preconscious free will” might appear to be a contradiction in terms, it is consistent with the scientific evidence and provides a parsimonious way to reconcile the commonsense view that voluntary acts are freely chosen with the evidence that conscious wishes and decisions are determined by preconscious processing in the mind/brain.  I consider alternative interpretations of how “conscious free will” might operate by Libet and by Mangan and respond to doubts about the extent to which the operations of mind are revealed in consciousness, raised by Claxton and Bouratinos. In reconciling commonsense attributions of freedom and responsibility with the findings of science, preconscious free will can be shown to have practical consequences for adjudications in law.

Recent discussions about the conception of self-knowledge in analytic philosophy have been concerned mainly with the distinctive way in which we know certain of our own properties. The flipside of this focus is that a sort of self-knowledge that requires effort in order to be achieved was rarely examined; and, as a consequence, it has been rarely discussed what reasons there are for individuals to strive for improving their self-assessment. It is against this background that I propose in this paper a working definition of the kind of self-knowledge that is also considered a personal achievement. Drawing some lessons from a few historical examples, I discuss what conditions have to be met for a subject to qualify as having this sort self-knowledge. I will close with a few considerations concerning the value this sort of self-knowledge has for the individual acquiring it.

RESUMO Desde a antiguidade, até a filosofia contemporânea, os filósofos têm enfrenta do questões relacionados ao conhecimento e ao ceticismo. Como obter a certeza diante de tantas dúvidas epistemológicas? Santo Agostinho enfrentou as questões céticas, tomando o caminho do autoconhecimento a partir de uma reflexão epistemológica sobre o cogito. Este artigo visa analisar a posição de Santo Agostinho diante do ceticismo. Ele enfrentou os céticos e, para isso, reconheceu a importância do autoconhecimento. A filosofia cristã de Santo Agostinho pode mostrar possibilidades para repensar o papel filosófico do autoconhecimento e a importância da superação do ceticismo.
Palavras-chave: Ceticismo. Agostinho. Autoconhecimento.

ABSCTRACT From ancient times to contemporary philosophy, philosophers have faced questions of knowledge and skepticism. How to get certainty in the face of so many epistemological doubts? St. Augustine faced the skeptical questions, taking the path of self-knowledge from an epistemological reflexion on the cogito. This paper aims to analyze the position of Saint Augustine in the face of skepticism. He confronted the skeptics and he recognized the importance of self-knowledge. The Christian philosophy of St. Augustine may show possibilities for rethinking the philosophical role of self-knowledge and the importance of overcoming skepticism.
Keywords: Skepticism. Augustine. Self-knowledge.

Existential brain research investigates different parts of human's life including issues of freedom and self-comprehension, which are of the specific significance. The paper presents the investigation of key parts of individual freedom and selfcomprehension and spotlights on how these two marvels are interconnected as far as existential brain research. The accompanying viewpoints were validated: selfinformation, as the way toward getting oneself, one's own mental activities and states of mind, turns into the reason for the advancement of self-comprehension from the snapshot of entering the time of pre-adulthood; self-comprehension is coordinated into the structure of self-reflection; self-comprehension suggests the accomplishment of another implication of existential self-information got during self-investigation; interconnection of freedom and self-understanding cultivates the high pace of both mental and physical action of a subject, just as their capacity to change themselves, right now satisfy themselves and sort out their own future. Inventive work can fill in as an instrument that opens new abilities and individual characteristics, guarantee one's freedom to communicate for oneself and increment self-comprehension. Selfunderstanding helps with satisfying one's own credibility on the planet: an individual acknowledges themselves as they seem to be, in the mean time changing themselves as far as their life purposes and as per their actual nature (securing of inward freedom)

Afdal al-Dīn Kāshānī (Bābā Afdal) lived and thought in times in which philosophy was in a precarious state due to Gazāllī's well-known criticisms. The former thought that this situation is caused by addressing the Metaphysica Specialis as the proper object of philosophical investigations. He did not interest in many of the issues that other philosophers (especially Peripatetics) addressed, so that one can say he did not follow the pattern of the great authorities. For him, to live a virtuous life is a part and parcel of the traditional philosophy. In short, Bābā Afdal can be regarded as an innovator Islamic-Persian philosopher who changed the traditional philosophy formally as well as materially. Among the Iranian philosophers, Bābā Afdal is first that he wrote his works mainly in Persian. Moreover, among those who wrote in Persian, he is set apart by the remarkable beauty and clarity of his prose. When reading his writings, we realized that the author implicitly tries to exclude knowledge of God from the realm of philosophy and replace knowledge of self with it. For Bābā Afdal, the heart of the issue in philosophy is self-knowledge that voiced in the Delphic maxim "know thyself".

[AMAZON LINK BELOW TO BOOK ITSELF -- TOC and book intro in downloadable .pdf] 

"It is a common experience that a problem difficult at night is resolved in the morning after the committee of sleep has worked on it." --John Steinbeck Scientific research confirms what people have always known: answers, ideas, and inspiration do come to us in dreams. Harvard psychologist and world-renowned dream specialist Deirdre Barrett, Ph.D., offers this rich collection of examples of how the world's most creative practitioners in art, music, film, science, literature and other fields have used the revelations of their dream life to inform their work. Dr. Barrett offers insights showing us how to encourage lucid, meaningful dreaming, and how to apply the meanings of our dreams to solving problems--from the everyday to the extraordinary. This is the stuff dreams are made of. In the visual arts, Jasper Johns couldn't find his unique artistic vision until he dreamed it in the form of a large American flag. Salvador Dali and his colleagues built the startling new genre of surrealism out of dreams. Kubla Kahn dreamed the design for his stately pleasure dome; thousands of years later, Lucy Davis, chief architect at a major firm, continues the tradition of dreaming designs into life in her extraordinary buildings. Film is a fertile avenue for dreams: "Twice I have transferred dreams to film exactly as I had dreamed them," confides director Ingmar Bergman, as have Federico Fellini, Orson Welles, Akira Kurosawa, Robert Altman, and John Sayles. From Mary Shelley's terrible nightmare, which became Frankenstein, to Stephen King's haunting dream as a little boy, which led to his first bestseller, countless writers have consulted the Committee. Musicians from Beethoven to Billy Joel and Paul McCartney have whistled the Committee's tunes. In science, physiologist Otto Loewi dreamed the medical experiment that earned him the Nobel Prize. In sports, Marion Jones dreamed she'd broken a world record, then brought the dream to life. Gandhi translated his dream of resistance into a movement that changed the world. Since Freud, we take it for granted that our dreams reflect our past. In The Committee of Sleep, Barrett reveals how dreams can also tell us about our future potential--and how to reach it.

This chapter explores the implications of performance metrics as a source of self-knowledge and self-presentation. It does so through the figure of the contemporary musician. As performers on-stage and online, musicians are constantly assessed and evaluated by industry actors, peers, music fans, and themselves. The impact of powerful modes of quantification on personal experiences, understandings, and practices of artistic creation provides insight into the wider role that metrics play in shaping how we see ourselves and others; and how we present ourselves to others. Through in-depth interviews with emerging musicians, this chapter thus uses the artist as a lens through which to understand everyday life within the "performance complex."

In this paper I examine the relation between intentional action and morality from the perspective of practical epistemology. In other words I study the relation between knowledge of one’s own intentional actions (knowledge in action) and knowledge of what is good to do or what one ought to do in particular circumstances (knowledge in the circumstances).  If practical knowledge in the former sense (knowledge in action) and practical knowledge in the latter sense (knowledge in the circumstances) turn out to constitute exercises of one and the same capacity for knowledge, as I will argue they do, this will give us strong reason to believe that what is known in the two cases (i.e. intentional action and the moral fabric of the world) is in some sense the same.

In examining the relation between practical knowledge of one’s own intentional actions and practical knowledge of what is good to do I draw from two traditions of thought on practical epistemology.  The first is the tradition of Anscombe’s conception of knowledge in action and the second is the tradition of Murdoch’s conception of knowledge in the circumstances.  What is striking about these traditions is that they tend to understand practical knowledge by reference to the possible involvement therein of perception.  Thus Anscombe claims in her Intention[1] that knowledge in action is specified as knowledge without observation; a claim to the effect that the epistemological status of knowledge in action is determined by reference to the lack of a certain sort of involvement therein of perception.  And Iris Murdoch in her Sovereignty of the Good[2] proposes that what makes knowledge in the circumstances knowledge is a form of sensitivity to particular features or aspects of the circumstances in which the agent finds herself.  Thus, for Murdoch, knowledge in the circumstances owes its status as knowledge to the capacity of the agent to perceive what she ought to do in particular circumstances.

In this paper I will argue that both of these forms of knowledge are instances of the exercise of one and the same capacity for knowledge.  But the question now arises.  How can we both claim that the two forms of practical knowledge are instances of the exercise of one and the same capacity for knowledge and that perception plays such a diverse role in their epistemological grounding?  In the main body of this paper I will show how to interpret the Murdochian and the Anscombean claims so as to provide the materials with which we can answer this question.  If the argument of this paper works, it will transpire that both of these forms of knowledge are instances of the exercise of our capacity for self-knowledge.  This account of practical knowledge opens the way for understanding intentional action and the moral fabric of the world as knowable as the self.  And it is thus that what is known in the two forms of knowing (i.e. intentional action and the moral fabric of the world) is in some sense the same.
[1] Anscombe, 1957.
[2] Murdoch, 1970.

A proposta do curso é ler e debater atentamente o livro ​ The varieties of self-knowledge ​ , de Annalisa Coliva (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016). Coliva constata que várias teorias monistas quanto ao método de autoconhecimento se mostram limitadas até mesmo para seus defensores. Ainda assim, há relutância, entre seus proponentes, em aceitar outros métodos para tipos de conhecimento dos próprios estados mentais não abrangidos pelos seus métodos prediletos. Trata-se de um preconceito monista. Coliva propõe o ​ pluralismo ​ quanto aos métodos de autoconhecimento, de modo que a novidade do livro é defender que o autoconhecimento é variado, e que não cabe reduzir certos tipos de eventos mentais a outros tipos de eventos mentais. Ou seja, para Coliva, é preciso ser pluralista com respeito à explicação do conhecimento dos próprios estados mentais. Sensações, emoções, crenças e desejos têm um perfis fenomenológicos próprios – a fenomenologia dos estados mentais é variada. Por conta disso, é de se esperar que haja variedade no conhecimento dos estados mentais. O curso funcionará no formato de seminário, com os alunos partilhando com o professor a tarefa de apresentar trechos do livro de Coliva. Os alunos serão avaliados pelas atividades e produções semanais (slides + handouts) e por uma tarefa final.

Для В.А.Роменця, одного з фундаторів сучасної психології в Україні, 80-річчя якого є справжньою науковою, культурною, суспільною подією, у центрі уваги завжди була і залишалася жива конкретна людина, людина з її душею,  її життям, внутрішніми станами, поведінкою, вчинками. Ця людина може пізнавати і пристосовуватися, спілкуватися і страждати,  але вона ніколи не стає голою абстракцією,  лабораторним піддослідним,  середньостатистичною  істотою.

Know Thyself: The Value and Limits of Self-Knowledge takes the reader on tour of the nature, value, and limits of self-knowledge. Mitchell S. Green calls on classical sources like Plato and Descartes, 20th-century thinkers like Freud, recent developments in neuroscience and experimental psychology, and even Buddhist philosophy to explore topics at the heart of who we are. The result is an unvarnished look at both the achievements and drawbacks of the many attempts to better know one’s own self.

Key topics in this volume include:

    Knowledge – what it means to know, the link between wisdom and knowledge, and the value of living an "examined life"

    Personal identity – questions of dualism (the idea that our mind is not only our brain), bodily continuity, and personhood

    The unconscious — including the kind posited by psychoanalysis as well as the form proposed by recent research on the so-called adaptive unconscious

    Free will – if we have it, and the recent arguments from neuroscience challenging it

    Self-misleading – the ways we willfully deceive ourselves, and how this relates to empathy, peer disagreement, implicit bias, and intellectual humility

    Experimental psychology – considerations on the automaticity of emotion and other cognitive processes, and how they shape us

This book is designed to be used in conjunction with the free ‘Know Thyself’ MOOC (massive open online course) created through collaboration of the University of Connecticut's Project on Humility and Conviction in Public Life, and the University of Edinburgh’s Eidyn research centre, and hosted on the Coursera platform (www.coursera.org/course/knowthyself). The book is also suitable as a text for interdisciplinary courses in the philosophy of mind or self-knowledge, and is highly recommended for anyone looking for a short overview of this fascinating topic.

This essay concerns the origin of the idea of self-knowledge in the Western tradition, and the earliest content of that idea, an idea which, despite have been largely obscured by later developments, remains, I believe, plausible and fruitful. I put forward a sequence of claims. (1) The idea of “self-knowledge” was once novel. (2) In particular, it started as a universalization, to the status of a sage maxim, of the occasional charge “know yourself,” which served as a rebuke for people who apparently failed to blame their frustrations on avoidable mismatches between their capacities and commitments. (3) The sage maxim got promoted to Delphic inscription, a vaunting which may have contributed to a novel theoretical appreciation of the concept – that we always need to work at knowing ourselves. (4) For Heraclitus of Ephesus (late fifth century BCE), evidently our first theorist of self-knowledge, “knowing oneself” constitutes our basic capacity to know anything, to be a knower, to be responsive to the way the world really is, which is the privilege and burden of being human. (5) There are two ways to consider the contemporary relevance of this study of the origins of the idea of self-knowledge – academic and public; in both cases, more sensitive and deeper reflection on the idea of self-knowledge would serve their respective audiences.

This paper is in press.

This collection contains seventeen articles on the self and related subjects. All are published here for the first time. The collection covers a wide range of topics: metaphysics, philosophy of mind, philosophy of science, philos- ophy of language, history of philosophy (modern and ancient, eastern and western), aesthetics and ethics. This variety explains the title - Perspectives on the Self.
The occasion for the volume was a conference on The Self held on March 31 and April 1 2016 at The Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences in Rijeka, Croatia. This collection is the end product of the activities of a group of philosophers from the Rijeka Department of Philosophy and colleagues who have worked with them. The activity of this group started in the autumn of 2010 as an informal weekly seminar on identity. Philosophers made up the core of the group, although colleagues from the departments of Psychology and Literature also took part.

Regarding the problem of self-knowledge in Kierkegaard’s philosophy, it is common to relate it to the discussion of despair in Anti-Climacus’s The Sickness Unto Death but not to the limit of reason in Climacus’s Philosophical Fragments. Indeed, it is possible to see both the limit of reason and despair as the failure of self-knowledge and how these two works complement each other in discussing such problem through the cases of Socrates. These two works share the view that the failure of self-knowledge is due to the misrelation between oneself and the divine. Moreover, an entry from Anti-Climacus puts himself and Climacus as a pair of dialectical twins who share the common concern on “how to be a genuine Christian”. So this dissertation aims to demonstrate the dialectical complementary relationship between Climacus’s Fragments and Anti-Climacus’s Sickness, by illustrating that paradoxical rationality (the mutual relationship between reason and paradox) is necessary to overcome the failure of self-knowledge. In addition, this dissertation suggests the potential in examining the dialectical reading between Climacus and Anti-Climacus that is commonly neglected among current studies.

Autoras(e): Adriana Barbosa dos Santos, Beatriz Acampora S. de Oliveira, Bianca Isabela Acampora S. Ferreira, Adriana Fantoni Naurath Colares, João Batista de Oliveira Filho.

Este livro é um presente para pais, educadores e crianças de todas as idades, pois trata da inteligência emocional através dos Guardiões das emoções.  Os autores convidam a todos para uma jornada rumo ao conhecimento das emoções, à autopercepção e ao autoconhecimento, aprendendo a lidar com suas emoções, a se amar cada dia mais, melhorando sua autoestima.

Editora: Pimenta Cultural (2019)

ISBN: 
978-85-7221-044-7(eBook)

DOI: 10.31560/pimentacultural/2019.477

The literature within the field of corporate social responsibility (CSR) and sustainability is broad and can be classified in a variety of approaches. What remains constant in these various models is that leadership and specifically authentic leadership, is key to going beyond compliance oriented sustainability to achieve genuine implicit, sustainability. This study thus seeks to explore the construct of authentic leadership from the perspective of practicing managers. To achieve this, a group of 210 MBA students were asked to write on authentic leadership from their own experiences. This body of leadership assignments was analyzed through the use of open and axial coding, grounded theory and content analysis. Through this process, a series of family codes emerged which can be grouped into factors which, either, enable or hinder authentic leadership. Self-knowledge emerged as the main enabler, and the influence of others is the main hindrance, to authenticity.

Talking about Cogito as a candidate for the foundation of the whole human knowledge, Schlick said that: “Such a statement, which does not express anything itself, cannot in any sense serve as the basis of anything.” (Schlick 1934: 218) He argued that it was a mere pseudostatement. Hans Reichen- bach believed that Cogito “is one of the landmarks on the blind alley of traditional philosophy.” (Reichenbach 1938: 261). No other philosophical movement ever criticized Descartes’ Cogito so fiercely as logical positivists did. They criticized it on every occasion they could. (Schlick 1918: 85, 161; Carnap 1928: 261; Carnap 1932: 74; Schlick 1934: 218; Ayer 1936: 62, 187; Weinberg 1936: 184; Schlick 1936: 166; 184; Reichenbach 1938: 261; Von Mises 1939: 173; Reichenbach 1951: 35) This is understandable because they were radical empiricists. They firmly believed that no factual knowledge can be obtained a priori, by reason alone, and Descartes’ Cogito was seen as a raw model of rationalistic philosophy, perhaps of philosophy in general.

A familiar puzzle about self-deception concerns how self-deception is possible in light of the paradoxes generated by a plausible way of defining it. A less familiar puzzle concerns how a certain type of self-deception–being self-deceived about one’s own intentional mental state–is possible in light of a plausible way of understanding the nature of self-knowledge. According to this understanding, we ordinarily do not infer our mental states from evidence, but then it’s puzzling how this sort of self-deception could occur given that self-deception arises from the mistreatment of evidence. This article argues that to accommodate this kind of self-deception we should accept that sometimes ordinary self-knowledge is inferential, but that this idea needn’t be so unappealing. In particular, by showing that such inferential self-knowledge can be both ‘transparent’ and ‘direct’, the article argues that it need not imply having an abnormal, ‘alienated’ relation to the mental state.

Osborne argues against the idea that Aristotle thinks that friends are useful for assisting us towards self-knowledge, and defends instead the idea that friends provide an extension of the self which enables one to obtain a richer view of the shared world that we view together. She then examines similar questions about why the good person would gain from encountering fictional characters in literature, and what kinds of literature would be beneficial to the good life.

Our journey to God really is one of being stripped down and approaching in our vulnerability and weakness, in our disgrace (lack of grace). The important thing to understand is that, when we feel “in control” we are inevitably putting up barriers, making it more difficult for us to be aware of graciousness of God. It is when we are conscious of our own shortcomings and fragility, not a morbid self-pitying way but consciously acknowledging the totality of our personality that we tend to be mostly receptive to the promptings and presence of God’s spirit. This is a personal account of one such journey.

PART I PRAYER (has only one question) Using the following from my " Ratio, Preces, Intuitus: Prayer's Mediation in Boethius' Consolation " [posted both on the Brightspace and Academia.edu] to outline what must be considered, explain the nature (or natures), role (or roles), and purpose (or purposes) of prayer in in Boethius' Consolation of Philosophy.

Work is changing profoundly in new digital age. The whole world of work is in evolution. The old employment system of secure, lifelong jobs with predictable advancement and stable pay is dead. For some time now we’ve observed a greater focus on flexibility, mobility, and the ability of quick adaptation of workers. The new era of Work 2.0 is coming driven by: work virtualisation, nonroutine creativity, hyperspecialisation, and reduction of communication, coordination and interactions costs. This calls for a different approach to management and work. However, technology is a double-edged sword, with the power to both liberate and enslave.

The recession is said to be over, but you’ll never get your old job back – it’s disappeared and you can’t even blame the Chinese! Your job no longer exists – it’s been automated. Book "Work 2.0” isn’t just a description of what is happening to the labor market, how we're working nowadays, it’s a complete how-to guide for successfully navigating today’s treacherous jobs environment, mitigating the risks of job loss, job insecurity, and increasing automation. Book is discussing the repercussions of automation, changes in the economic balance between East and West in terms of work, the growing importance of innovation and creativity for creating value, how companies can take advantage of the new situation and how can individuals stay competitive on the labour market.

How do you survive and thrive in the new labour market? How can workers cope in an economy which doesn’t generate stable lifelong careers? How can companies remain competitive and manage armies of dispersed hyperspecialists? You’ve become the newest victim of Work 2.0, a force you can’t possibly fight – but you can join it! If you are looking for a job – why not create one for yourself? If your company is losing its best talent – why not listen to what your workers are saying. Let them work anywhen. After all, there is nowhere to hide from the wave of creative destruction.

A true life story of facing war time conflict internally and externally to overcome extreme trauma, focusing on post lobotomy coping mechanisms and empowerment through reframing dynamics situations and sculpting the situation into your favor.

Resumen: Ya desde 1925 la Física Cuántica nos muestra que todo es básicamente energía, y consecuentemente está todo conectado. No hay una real separación neta entre sujetos, otros sujetos y objetos, como describe la Física Newtoniana. Desde tiempos inmemorables se habla de la UNIDAD, que somos todos uno, y ahora este concepto tiene fundamento científico y debemos entender las implicancias que esto conlleva. Nuestra sola existencia influencia al medio y somos influenciados por él. Lo que calificamos como objetos no son sólo partículas sino también ondas, pero son ondas de posibilidades, en el dominio de la potencialidad fuera del espacio/tiempo, que se manifiestan como partícula en presencia de un observador, nosotros. Y aquí existe una jerarquía entrelazada en donde no hay objeto sin observador, y no hay observador sin objeto. Ambos existen simultáneamente. Debemos integrar estos y otros conocimientos que aporta la Física Cuántica para mejorar la relación médico-paciente, para entender mejor el desarrollo de la psique humana, y ver desde otra perspectiva a las enfermedades o trastornos mentales, y físicos. De esta manera, con una visión integral del ser humano, comprenderemos cómo abordar de mejor manera los síntomas y cuadros clínicos a los que nos enfrentamos en la práctica diaria, prestando atención a los desbalances energéticos que originaron una situación determinada, y qué es necesario hacer para recuperar la armonía, para reestablecer el poder que todo ser humano tiene para crear y modificar su propia realidad, para hacernos responsables de nuestra existencia.

Emotional knowledge is a form of self-knowledge which holds great interest for ordinary individuals. It is not obtained by any obligation but rather because we think it is crucial to obtain (Cassam 2017). In this article it is a matter of demonstrating that emotional knowledge holds an instrumental and a prudential value. By arguing that it can allow a control over our emotions, I shall maintain that emotional knowledge affects individual marginalization or acceptance in society. In addition, this type of knowledge is revealing of our personality by allowing us to identify our affective identities. Finally, I shall defend the idea that emotional knowledge contributes to the conduct of a good life. As such, my hypothesis could be viewed as incompatible with widespread ideas (Montaigne 2019), according to which the knowledge of our own emotions can trigger negative emotional states, e.g. mental rumination, anxiety, that do not contribute to our well-being.

Il report seguente è il risultato di ricerche e ipotesi circa il trend tecnologico denominato Quantified Self (QS). Gli obiettivi della ricerca sono stati tre: comprendere il fenomeno e darne una definizione, analizzarlo dal punto di vista, antropologico, economico e tecnologico e infine, fare delle predizioni su quali possano essere gli eventuali sviluppi futuri. Le risposte a tali questioni si sono quindi tradotte nel presente report.
Nella sezione due, si spiega immediatamente cosa sia il QS, dandone una definizione il più possibile attuale e puntualizzandone le differenze con fenomeni simili. Le sezioni successive, dalla terza alla sesta trattano il fenomeno dal punto di vista antropologico: dopo aver descritto le origini e la community dei membri, si indagano sia i motivi che spingono l’individuo a diventare self-quantifier (SQ) sia la gestione della conoscenza applicata al fenomeno. La settima sezione è dedicata all’analisi del QS dal punto di vista economico. Non essendovi ancora un vero modello di business, la questione è stata affrontata soprattutto a livello qualitativo. L’analisi tecnologica del fenomeno, sviluppata nell’ottava sezione, si articola su tre livelli: driver tecnologici, ecosistema individuale di QS e progetto di self-tracking (ST). Nell’ultima sezione sono infine presenti alcune ipotesi su quanto ci si possa aspettare in futuro da questo trend tecnologico.
Il motivo che mi ha spinto ad indagare sul QS è principalmente personale: mi sono reso conto di aver iniziato ,inconsciamente, a tenere traccia di moltissimi aspetti della mia vita utilizzando ,a volte, tali dati come spinta per un cambiamento. Mi sono reso conto di essere diventato, se non un SQ, perlomeno un self tracker. Una volta compreso ciò, mi sono quindi interessato al fenomeno e ho immediatamente colto l’occasione per poterlo approfondire.

У навчальному посібнику приверне увагу проблема життєвого світу та життєвого вибору, розгляд життєвих домагань та життєвих завдань як способу моделювання майбутнього. Знайдуть свого читача і розділи посібника, присвячені часу і простору людського життя, індивідуальній своєрідності, можливостям життєтворчості особистості. 
Для психологів-практиків корисними будуть методичні додатки, що супроводжують кожний розділ. Запропоновані партитури авторських тренінгів, способи організації інших видів групової роботи, прийоми самодопомоги та поглиблення самопізнання сприятимуть розробці спеціалістами власних методик надання психологічної допомоги різним категоріям населення.

Kants Position zur moralischen Selbsterkenntnis liegt zwischen den beiden Polen des Cartesianismus und des Behaviorismus. Hinsichtlich des Wissens um die eigenen Maximeninhalte vertritt Kant die cartesische Direktheitsthese und m.E. auch die Unfehlbarkeitsthese. Die beiden anderen Aspekte der moralischen Selbsterkenntnis – das Wissen um die Pflichtgemäßheit der Maximen und das Wissen um die Handlungsmotive – sind Kant zufolge allerdings weder infallibel, noch unbezweifelbar, noch direkt. Und obgleich Überzeugungen hinsichtlich der eigenen Handlungsmotive in Zweifel gezogen werden und sich als falsch erweisen können, sind sie dennoch verläßlicher als Überzeugungen hinsichtlich der Handlungsmotive anderer.