The global method safety account of knowledge states that an agent’s true belief that p is safe a... more The global method safety account of knowledge states that an agent’s true belief that p is safe and qualifies as knowledge if and only if it is formed by method M, such that her beliefs in p and her beliefs in relevantly similar propositions formed by M in all nearby worlds are true. This paper argues that global method safety is too restrictive. First, the agent may not know relevantly similar propositions via M because the belief that p is the only possible outcome of M. Second, there are cases where there is a fine grained belief that is unsafe and a relevantly similar coarse-grained belief (with looser truth conditions) that is safe and where both beliefs are based on the same method M. Third, the reliability of conditional reasoning, a basic belief-forming method, seems to be sensitive to fine-grained contents, as suggested by the wide variation in success rates for thematic versions of the Wason selection task.
Hilary Putnam has famously argued that “we are brains in a vat” is necessarily false. The argumen... more Hilary Putnam has famously argued that “we are brains in a vat” is necessarily false. The argument assumes content externalism (also known as semantic externalism and anti-individualism), that is, the view that the individuation conditions of mental content depend, in part, on external or relational properties of the subject’s environment. Recently content externalism has given rise to the hypothesis of the extended mind, whereby mental states are not only externally individuated but also externally located states. This paper argues that when content externalism is combined with the extended mind hypothesis it is robbed of its anti-skeptical power. Given the extended mind hypothesis, the supercomputer and the envatted brain can be regarded as aspects of the extended mind of the evil scientist. On this view, the thought contents of the coupled brain-computer-scientist system do not differ from those of a normal human. But without a difference in thought contents Putnam’s anti-skeptical argument crumbles.
This paper argues for an overlooked dimension in the metaphysical microstructure of knowledge. Th... more This paper argues for an overlooked dimension in the metaphysical microstructure of knowledge. The connection between knowledge and truth is even deeper than generally acknowledged. Knowledge, I argue, supervenes not only on a specific (namely modal) relation between the proposition p’s truth and an agent’s belief that p, but also on specific relations between the proposition’s truthmaker and the belief’s justification-maker. S knows that p only if the states of affairs referred to by S’s reasons for believing that p are identical with, causally related to, or grounded in the states of affairs that make p true.
Given how epistemologists conceive of understanding, to what degree do we understand the hypothes... more Given how epistemologists conceive of understanding, to what degree do we understand the hypothesis of extended mind? If the extended mind debate is a substantive dispute, we have only superficial understanding of the extended mind hypothesis. And granted that we have deep understanding of extended mind hypothesis, the debate over this hypothesis is nothing but a verbal dispute.
Wie der Titel des Aufsatzes bereits signalisiert, werde ich dafür argumentieren, dass das Gettier... more Wie der Titel des Aufsatzes bereits signalisiert, werde ich dafür argumentieren, dass das Gettier-Problem ein genuines Problem ist, keines, das sich lediglich einer falschen Fragestellung verdankt. Versuche, das Gettier-Problem aufzulösen statt zu lösen, sind zum Scheitern verurteilt. In den ersten beiden Abschnitten wird eine Typologisierung von Gettier-Fällen vorgenommen und zwischen zwei Lesarten des Gettier-Problems unterschieden. Im dritten Abschnitt werden einige Auflösungsversuche des Gettier-Problems der kritischen Prüfung unterzogen. Der vierte Abschnitt diskutiert die reliabilistische Antwort auf das Gettier-Problem. Es wird gezeigt, dass sich mit Hilfe des Reliabilismus nicht alle Gettier-Fälle ausschließen lassen. Im fünften Abschnitt wird eine neue Lösung des Gettier-Problems entwickelt.
It is widely thought that if knowledge requires sensitivity, knowledge is not closed because sens... more It is widely thought that if knowledge requires sensitivity, knowledge is not closed because sensitivity is not closed. This paper argues that there is no valid argument from sensitivity failure to non-closure of knowledge. Sensitivity does not imply non-closure of knowledge. Closure considerations cannot be used to adjudicate between safety and sensitivity accounts of knowledge.
This paper argues that for someone to know proposition p inferentially it is not enough that his ... more This paper argues that for someone to know proposition p inferentially it is not enough that his belief in p and his justification for believing p covary with the truth of p through a sphere of possibilities. A further condition on inferential knowledge is that p's truth-maker is identical with, or causally related to, the state of affairs the justification is grounded in. This position is dubbed 'identificationism.'
Das Ziel dieses Aufsatzes ist es erstens, die Unterscheidung zwischen dem direkten und indirekten... more Das Ziel dieses Aufsatzes ist es erstens, die Unterscheidung zwischen dem direkten und indirekten Realismus hinsichtlich der Wahrnehmung zu erläutern und zweitens, die weit verbreitete Ansicht, der direkte Realismus sei mit der Kausaltheorie der Wahrnehmung unvereinbar, zu widerlegen. Es lassen sich fünf Argumente für die Inkompatibilität des direkten Realismus mit der Kausaltheorie der Wahrnehmung unterscheiden. Keines dieser Argumente ist stichhaltig.
This paper argues that John Greco's agent reliabilism fails in its attempt to meet the double req... more This paper argues that John Greco's agent reliabilism fails in its attempt to meet the double requirement of accounting for the internalist intuition that knowledge requires sensitivity to the reliability of one's evidence and evading the charge of psychological implausibility.
Thema dieses Aufsatzes sind die Bedingungen für den Erwerb und die Speicherung von Begriffen, die... more Thema dieses Aufsatzes sind die Bedingungen für den Erwerb und die Speicherung von Begriffen, die auf sekundäre Eigenschaften – und zwar speziell auf Farbeigenschaften – referieren. Der in der zeitgenössischen Philosophie vorherrschende Empirismus hinsichtlich des Erwerbs von Farbbegriffen besagt: S erwirbt den Farbbegriff F nur dann, wenn S phänomenale Erlebnisse gemacht hat, die von einem Gegenstand, der die durch den Farbbegriff F bezeichnete Farbe aufweist, auf geeignete Weise kausal verursacht sind. Der Empirismus hinsichtlich des Erwerbs von Farbbegriffen geht Hand in Hand mit dem Empirismus hinsichtlich der Speicherung von Farbbegriffen: S hat zum Zeitpunkt t2 den zum Zeitpunkt t1 erworbenen Farbbegriff F nur dann gespeichert, wenn S zum Zeitpunkt t2 persönliche Erinnerungen an das phänomenale Erlebnis haben kann, welches von einem Gegenstand, der die durch den Farbbegriff F bezeichnete Farbe aufweist, zum Zeitpunkt t1 auf geeignete Weise kausal verursacht wurde. Gegen den Empirismus hinsichtlich des Erwerbs von Farbbegriffen wird ins Feld geführt, daß man einen Farbbegriff erwerben kann, auch ohne die bezeichnete Farbe gesehen zu haben. Der Besitz des Begriffes rot erfordert kein Wissen hinsichtlich der phänomenalen Qualität eines Roteindrucks. Gegen den Empirismus hinsichtlich der Speicherung von Farbbegriffen wird gezeigt, daß visuelle Erinnerungen an die phänomenalen Qualitäten von Farbeindrücken keine notwendige Bedingung für die Speicherung von Farbbegriffen darstellen.
This paper argues that Sosa's virtue perspectivism fails to combine satisfactorily internalist an... more This paper argues that Sosa's virtue perspectivism fails to combine satisfactorily internalist and externalist features in a single theory. Internalism and externalism are reconciled at the price of creating a Gettier problem at the level of ''reflective'' or second-order knowledge. The general lesson to be learned from the critique of virtue perspectivism is that internalism and externalism cannot be combined by bifurcating justification and knowledge into an object-level and a meta-level and assigning externalism and internalism to different levels.
This paper argues that there is a tension between the two components of Davidson’s anomalous moni... more This paper argues that there is a tension between the two components of Davidson’s anomalous monism -- the supervenience of the mental on the physical and the anomalism of the mental. While the anomalism of the mental denies the possibility of strict psychophysical laws, the principle of supervenience sometimes suggests that such laws do exist and that they are responsible for the dependence of the mental on the physical.
This paper examines Quine’s dismissal of external world skepticism. Quine maintains that since sk... more This paper examines Quine’s dismissal of external world skepticism. Quine maintains that since skeptical doubts are scientific doubts we can neutralize the skeptical challenge empirically without begging the question. On closer inspection, it becomes apparent that Quine’s only argument against skepticism is his naturalism. Naturalism states that because we cannot adopt an external perspective onto our beliefs about the world the skeptic’s mistake is to demand that we gain an objective understanding of human knowledge. Given naturalism, skeptical challenges, though not incoherent, are idle, artificial, and neurotic. Since Quine’s dismissal of skepticism is grounded on his naturalism the question arises: what are the grounds for naturalism? Quine’s only reason for adopting naturalism is his confidence in the natural sciences. Probably he refuses to argue for naturalism because the skeptic would reject the argument in any case. Yet since Quine doesn’t even try to justify his naturalistic anti-skepticism he robs himself of the possibility to understand the deeper significance of skepticism.
The global method safety account of knowledge states that an agent’s true belief that p is safe a... more The global method safety account of knowledge states that an agent’s true belief that p is safe and qualifies as knowledge if and only if it is formed by method M, such that her beliefs in p and her beliefs in relevantly similar propositions formed by M in all nearby worlds are true. This paper argues that global method safety is too restrictive. First, the agent may not know relevantly similar propositions via M because the belief that p is the only possible outcome of M. Second, there are cases where there is a fine grained belief that is unsafe and a relevantly similar coarse-grained belief (with looser truth conditions) that is safe and where both beliefs are based on the same method M. Third, the reliability of conditional reasoning, a basic belief-forming method, seems to be sensitive to fine-grained contents, as suggested by the wide variation in success rates for thematic versions of the Wason selection task.
Hilary Putnam has famously argued that “we are brains in a vat” is necessarily false. The argumen... more Hilary Putnam has famously argued that “we are brains in a vat” is necessarily false. The argument assumes content externalism (also known as semantic externalism and anti-individualism), that is, the view that the individuation conditions of mental content depend, in part, on external or relational properties of the subject’s environment. Recently content externalism has given rise to the hypothesis of the extended mind, whereby mental states are not only externally individuated but also externally located states. This paper argues that when content externalism is combined with the extended mind hypothesis it is robbed of its anti-skeptical power. Given the extended mind hypothesis, the supercomputer and the envatted brain can be regarded as aspects of the extended mind of the evil scientist. On this view, the thought contents of the coupled brain-computer-scientist system do not differ from those of a normal human. But without a difference in thought contents Putnam’s anti-skeptical argument crumbles.
This paper argues for an overlooked dimension in the metaphysical microstructure of knowledge. Th... more This paper argues for an overlooked dimension in the metaphysical microstructure of knowledge. The connection between knowledge and truth is even deeper than generally acknowledged. Knowledge, I argue, supervenes not only on a specific (namely modal) relation between the proposition p’s truth and an agent’s belief that p, but also on specific relations between the proposition’s truthmaker and the belief’s justification-maker. S knows that p only if the states of affairs referred to by S’s reasons for believing that p are identical with, causally related to, or grounded in the states of affairs that make p true.
Given how epistemologists conceive of understanding, to what degree do we understand the hypothes... more Given how epistemologists conceive of understanding, to what degree do we understand the hypothesis of extended mind? If the extended mind debate is a substantive dispute, we have only superficial understanding of the extended mind hypothesis. And granted that we have deep understanding of extended mind hypothesis, the debate over this hypothesis is nothing but a verbal dispute.
Wie der Titel des Aufsatzes bereits signalisiert, werde ich dafür argumentieren, dass das Gettier... more Wie der Titel des Aufsatzes bereits signalisiert, werde ich dafür argumentieren, dass das Gettier-Problem ein genuines Problem ist, keines, das sich lediglich einer falschen Fragestellung verdankt. Versuche, das Gettier-Problem aufzulösen statt zu lösen, sind zum Scheitern verurteilt. In den ersten beiden Abschnitten wird eine Typologisierung von Gettier-Fällen vorgenommen und zwischen zwei Lesarten des Gettier-Problems unterschieden. Im dritten Abschnitt werden einige Auflösungsversuche des Gettier-Problems der kritischen Prüfung unterzogen. Der vierte Abschnitt diskutiert die reliabilistische Antwort auf das Gettier-Problem. Es wird gezeigt, dass sich mit Hilfe des Reliabilismus nicht alle Gettier-Fälle ausschließen lassen. Im fünften Abschnitt wird eine neue Lösung des Gettier-Problems entwickelt.
It is widely thought that if knowledge requires sensitivity, knowledge is not closed because sens... more It is widely thought that if knowledge requires sensitivity, knowledge is not closed because sensitivity is not closed. This paper argues that there is no valid argument from sensitivity failure to non-closure of knowledge. Sensitivity does not imply non-closure of knowledge. Closure considerations cannot be used to adjudicate between safety and sensitivity accounts of knowledge.
This paper argues that for someone to know proposition p inferentially it is not enough that his ... more This paper argues that for someone to know proposition p inferentially it is not enough that his belief in p and his justification for believing p covary with the truth of p through a sphere of possibilities. A further condition on inferential knowledge is that p's truth-maker is identical with, or causally related to, the state of affairs the justification is grounded in. This position is dubbed 'identificationism.'
Das Ziel dieses Aufsatzes ist es erstens, die Unterscheidung zwischen dem direkten und indirekten... more Das Ziel dieses Aufsatzes ist es erstens, die Unterscheidung zwischen dem direkten und indirekten Realismus hinsichtlich der Wahrnehmung zu erläutern und zweitens, die weit verbreitete Ansicht, der direkte Realismus sei mit der Kausaltheorie der Wahrnehmung unvereinbar, zu widerlegen. Es lassen sich fünf Argumente für die Inkompatibilität des direkten Realismus mit der Kausaltheorie der Wahrnehmung unterscheiden. Keines dieser Argumente ist stichhaltig.
This paper argues that John Greco's agent reliabilism fails in its attempt to meet the double req... more This paper argues that John Greco's agent reliabilism fails in its attempt to meet the double requirement of accounting for the internalist intuition that knowledge requires sensitivity to the reliability of one's evidence and evading the charge of psychological implausibility.
Thema dieses Aufsatzes sind die Bedingungen für den Erwerb und die Speicherung von Begriffen, die... more Thema dieses Aufsatzes sind die Bedingungen für den Erwerb und die Speicherung von Begriffen, die auf sekundäre Eigenschaften – und zwar speziell auf Farbeigenschaften – referieren. Der in der zeitgenössischen Philosophie vorherrschende Empirismus hinsichtlich des Erwerbs von Farbbegriffen besagt: S erwirbt den Farbbegriff F nur dann, wenn S phänomenale Erlebnisse gemacht hat, die von einem Gegenstand, der die durch den Farbbegriff F bezeichnete Farbe aufweist, auf geeignete Weise kausal verursacht sind. Der Empirismus hinsichtlich des Erwerbs von Farbbegriffen geht Hand in Hand mit dem Empirismus hinsichtlich der Speicherung von Farbbegriffen: S hat zum Zeitpunkt t2 den zum Zeitpunkt t1 erworbenen Farbbegriff F nur dann gespeichert, wenn S zum Zeitpunkt t2 persönliche Erinnerungen an das phänomenale Erlebnis haben kann, welches von einem Gegenstand, der die durch den Farbbegriff F bezeichnete Farbe aufweist, zum Zeitpunkt t1 auf geeignete Weise kausal verursacht wurde. Gegen den Empirismus hinsichtlich des Erwerbs von Farbbegriffen wird ins Feld geführt, daß man einen Farbbegriff erwerben kann, auch ohne die bezeichnete Farbe gesehen zu haben. Der Besitz des Begriffes rot erfordert kein Wissen hinsichtlich der phänomenalen Qualität eines Roteindrucks. Gegen den Empirismus hinsichtlich der Speicherung von Farbbegriffen wird gezeigt, daß visuelle Erinnerungen an die phänomenalen Qualitäten von Farbeindrücken keine notwendige Bedingung für die Speicherung von Farbbegriffen darstellen.
This paper argues that Sosa's virtue perspectivism fails to combine satisfactorily internalist an... more This paper argues that Sosa's virtue perspectivism fails to combine satisfactorily internalist and externalist features in a single theory. Internalism and externalism are reconciled at the price of creating a Gettier problem at the level of ''reflective'' or second-order knowledge. The general lesson to be learned from the critique of virtue perspectivism is that internalism and externalism cannot be combined by bifurcating justification and knowledge into an object-level and a meta-level and assigning externalism and internalism to different levels.
This paper argues that there is a tension between the two components of Davidson’s anomalous moni... more This paper argues that there is a tension between the two components of Davidson’s anomalous monism -- the supervenience of the mental on the physical and the anomalism of the mental. While the anomalism of the mental denies the possibility of strict psychophysical laws, the principle of supervenience sometimes suggests that such laws do exist and that they are responsible for the dependence of the mental on the physical.
This paper examines Quine’s dismissal of external world skepticism. Quine maintains that since sk... more This paper examines Quine’s dismissal of external world skepticism. Quine maintains that since skeptical doubts are scientific doubts we can neutralize the skeptical challenge empirically without begging the question. On closer inspection, it becomes apparent that Quine’s only argument against skepticism is his naturalism. Naturalism states that because we cannot adopt an external perspective onto our beliefs about the world the skeptic’s mistake is to demand that we gain an objective understanding of human knowledge. Given naturalism, skeptical challenges, though not incoherent, are idle, artificial, and neurotic. Since Quine’s dismissal of skepticism is grounded on his naturalism the question arises: what are the grounds for naturalism? Quine’s only reason for adopting naturalism is his confidence in the natural sciences. Probably he refuses to argue for naturalism because the skeptic would reject the argument in any case. Yet since Quine doesn’t even try to justify his naturalistic anti-skepticism he robs himself of the possibility to understand the deeper significance of skepticism.
It is a mistake to think that we cannot be morally responsible for forgetting because, as a matte... more It is a mistake to think that we cannot be morally responsible for forgetting because, as a matter of principle, forgetting is outside of our control. Sometimes we do have control over our forgetting. When forgetting is under our control there is no question that it is the proper object of praise and blame. But we can also be morally responsible for forgetting something when it is beyond our control that we forget that thing. The literature contains three accounts of the blameworthiness of forgetting over which the agent has no control—the tracing account, the liberalized awareness condition, and attributionism. Even though these are competing accounts of the blameworthiness of harmful forgetting they are compatible with one another. In particular, it is possible to come up with a position that endorses the tracing account for certain kinds of harmful forgetting and attributionism for other kinds of harmful forgetting.
This paper provides a novel argument for granting memory the status of a generative source of jus... more This paper provides a novel argument for granting memory the status of a generative source of justification and knowledge. Memory can produce justified output beliefs and knowledge on the basis of unjustified input beliefs alone. The key to understanding how memory can generate justification and knowledge, memory generativism, is to bear in mind that memory frequently omits part of the stored information. The proposed argument depends on a broadly reliabilist approach to justification.
This paper attempts to answer the question of what defines mnemonic confabulation vis-à-vis genui... more This paper attempts to answer the question of what defines mnemonic confabulation vis-à-vis genuine memory. The two extant accounts of mnemonic confabulation as " false memory " and as ill-grounded memory are shown to be problematic, for they cannot account for the possibility of veridical confabulation, ill-grounded memory, and well-grounded confabulation. This paper argues that the defining characteristic of mnemonic confabulation is that it lacks the appropriate causal history. In the confabulation case, there is no proper counterfactual dependence of the state of seeming to remember on the corresponding past representation.
It has long been known that memory need not be a literal reproduction of the past but may be a co... more It has long been known that memory need not be a literal reproduction of the past but may be a constructive process. To say that memory is a constructive process is to say that the encoded content may differ from the retrieved content. At the same time, memory is bound by the authenticity constraint which states that the memory content must be true to the subject's original perception of reality. This paper addresses the question of how the constructive nature of visual memory can be reconciled with the authenticity constraint. In what respect and to what extent may the content of a visual memory differ from the original perceptual state while still adequately reflecting the subject's original perception?
This is a response to three critical discussions of my book Memory: A Philosophical Study (Oxford... more This is a response to three critical discussions of my book Memory: A Philosophical Study (Oxford University Press 2010):
This paper challenges the standard conception of memory as a form of knowledge. Unlike knowledge,... more This paper challenges the standard conception of memory as a form of knowledge. Unlike knowledge, memory implies neither belief nor justification.
Content externalism about memory says that the individuation of memory contents depends on relati... more Content externalism about memory says that the individuation of memory contents depends on relations the subject bears to his past environment. I defend externalism about memory by arguing that neither philosophical nor psychological considerations stand in the way of accepting the context dependency of memory that follows from externalism.
According to the standard view, the causal process connecting a past representation and its subse... more According to the standard view, the causal process connecting a past representation and its subsequent recall involves intermediary memory traces. Yet Bertrand Russell and Ludwig Wittgenstein held that since the physiological evidence for memory traces isn’t quite conclusive, it is prudent to come up with an account of memory causation–referred to as mnemic causation--that manages without the stipulation of memory traces. Given mnemic causation, a past representation is directly causally active over a temporal distance. I argue that the stipulation of memory traces is indeed indispensable for analyzing memory causation.
In diesem Aufsatz stelle ich eine neue Interpretation der Reinhold’schen Sprachphilosophie vor. M... more In diesem Aufsatz stelle ich eine neue Interpretation der Reinhold’schen Sprachphilosophie vor. Mein Ziel ist es zu erklären, wie Reinhold der Meinung sein konnte, seine Sprachphilosophie stelle, ebenso wie seine Elementarphilosophie, den Versuch dar, Kants Kritische Philosophie zu fundieren. Außerdem möchte ich zeigen, worin die philosophische Bedeutung von Reinholds Ansatz gegenüber den Sprachphilosophien seiner Zeitgenossen besteht.
This paper develops a novel interpretation of Kant's argument from incongruent counterparts to th... more This paper develops a novel interpretation of Kant's argument from incongruent counterparts to the effect that the representations of space and time are intuitions rather than concepts. When properly understood, the argument anticipates the contemporary position whereby the meaning of indexicals cannot be captured by descriptive contents.
This paper explains and defends Reinhold’s epistemology of disagreement. The concept of agreement... more This paper explains and defends Reinhold’s epistemology of disagreement. The concept of agreement is of central importance for Reinhold’s philosophy. He attempts to settle the most basic disputes among post-Kantian philosophers by offering intermediate positions that reconcile the seemingly incompatible views. Moreover, Reinhold argues for epistemic objectivism, that is, the thesis that a group of philosophers sharing the same information and respecting each other’s opinion may not reasonably disagree. If the members of such a group search for truth then they must converge toward consensus. Disagreement is irrational.
Kants Position zur moralischen Selbsterkenntnis liegt zwischen den beiden Polen des Cartesianismu... more Kants Position zur moralischen Selbsterkenntnis liegt zwischen den beiden Polen des Cartesianismus und des Behaviorismus. Hinsichtlich des Wissens um die eigenen Maximeninhalte vertritt Kant die cartesische Direktheitsthese und m.E. auch die Unfehlbarkeitsthese. Die beiden anderen Aspekte der moralischen Selbsterkenntnis – das Wissen um die Pflichtgemäßheit der Maximen und das Wissen um die Handlungsmotive – sind Kant zufolge allerdings weder infallibel, noch unbezweifelbar, noch direkt. Und obgleich Überzeugungen hinsichtlich der eigenen Handlungsmotive in Zweifel gezogen werden und sich als falsch erweisen können, sind sie dennoch verläßlicher als Überzeugungen hinsichtlich der Handlungsmotive anderer.
This paper argues that, given the representational theory of mind, one cannot know a priori that ... more This paper argues that, given the representational theory of mind, one cannot know a priori that one knows that p as opposed to being incapable of having any knowledge states; but one can know a priori that one knows that p as opposed to some other proposition q.
This paper criticizes the widespread view whereby a second-order judgment of the form 'I believe ... more This paper criticizes the widespread view whereby a second-order judgment of the form 'I believe that p' qualifies as self-knowledge only if the embedded content, p, is of the same type as the content of the intentional state reflected upon and the self-ascribed attitude, belief, is of the same type as the attitude the subject takes towards p. Rather than requiring identity of contents across levels of cognition self-knowledge requires only that the embedded content of the second-order thought be an entailment of the content of the intentional state reflected upon. And rather than demanding identity of attitudes across levels of cognition self-knowledge demands only that the attitude of the intentional state reflected upon and the attitude the subject self-attributes share certain features such as direction of fit and polarity. Since propositional attitudes have a propositional as well as an attitudinal component knowing of one's propositional attitudes requires knowing of both components. Self-knowledge of propositional attitudes consists in a twofold classification. The bulk of the philosophical literature on self-knowledge focuses on the authoritative nature of the access we have to the contents of our propositional attitudes and pays little or no attention to the attitudinal aspect. Moreover, the literature is almost exclusively concerned with knowledge of current propositional attitudes, for presumably it is only our current states that we can have authoritative access to. Counterbalancing the one-sidedness of the literature, this paper addresses the knowledge we have of both the contents and attitudes of both our present and past propositional attitudes. Knowledge is factive in the sense that an utterance of 'I know that p' is true only if p is the case. Similarly, knowing that I believe that p entails that I believe that p.
Este artigo critica a arraigada visão segundo a qual um juízo de segunda ordem da f... more Este artigo critica a arraigada visão segundo a qual um juízo de segunda ordem da forma “Eu creio que p” qualifica-se como autoconhecimento apenas se o conteúdo encaixado, p, é do mesmo tipo que o conteúdo do estado intencional refletido e a atitude autoatribuída, crença, é do mesmo tipo que a atitude que o sujeito tem com respeito a p. Em vez de exigir identidade de conteúdos ao longo dos níveis de cognição, o autoconhecimento requer apenas que o conteúdo encaixado do pensamento de segunda ordem seja uma consequência do conteúdo do estado intencional refletido. E em vez de exigir identidade de atitude ao longo dos níveis de cognição, o autoconhecimento requer apenas que a atitude do estado intencional refletido e a atitude que o sujeito se autoatribui partilhem certas características tais como a direção de ajuste e a polaridade.
Es wird gezeigt, dass unter Voraussetzung des semantischen Externalismus die WW These entweder fa... more Es wird gezeigt, dass unter Voraussetzung des semantischen Externalismus die WW These entweder falsch oder entbehrlich ist. Semantischer Externalismus und epistemischer Internalismus sind unverträglich.
This paper argues that anti-skeptical arguments from semantic externalism are inconsistent or, at... more This paper argues that anti-skeptical arguments from semantic externalism are inconsistent or, at best, ineffective, since non-empirically knowledge of whether we have beliefs or are zombies is incompatible with semantic externalism.
This paper addresses the question whether introspection plus externalism about mental content war... more This paper addresses the question whether introspection plus externalism about mental content warrant an a priori refutation of external-world skepticism and ontological solipsism. The suggestion is that if thought content is partly determined by affairs in the environment and if we can have non-empirical knowledge of our current thought contents, we can, just by reflection, know about the world around us – we can know that our environment is populated with content-determining entities. After examining this type of transcendental argument and discussing various objections found in the literature, I argue that the notion of privileged self-knowledge underlying this argument presupposes that we can learn, via introspection, that our so-called thoughts are propositional attitudes rather than contentless states. If, however, externalism is correct and thought content consists in the systematic dependency of internal states on relational properties, we cannot know non-empirically whether or not we have propositional attitudes. Self-knowledge (a propos-itional attitude) is consistent with us lacking the ability to rule out, via introspection, the possibility that we don't have any propositional attitudes. Self-knowledge provides us with knowledge of what is in our minds, but not that we have minds. Hence, the combination of externalism with the doctrine of privileged self-knowledge does not allow for an a priori refutation of skepticism and is therefore unproblematic.
In this paper I argue in favor of the compatibility of semantic externalism with privileged self-... more In this paper I argue in favor of the compatibility of semantic externalism with privileged self-knowledge by showing that an argument for incompatibilism from switching scenarios fails. Given the inclusion theory of self-knowledge, the hypothesis according to which I am having twater thoughts while thinking that I have water thoughts simply isn't a (entertainable) possibility. When I am on Earth thinking earthian concepts, I cannot believe that I am thinking that twater is wet for I don't have the concept of twater available; so this concept cannot figure in any of my mental states. Analogously, when I am on Twin Earth, I cannot mistakenly believe that I am entertaining water thoughts. No matter how often I am switched between Earth and Twin Earth, I will never erroneously think that I am having water thoughts while in fact I am having twater thoughts and vice versa. Privileged self-knowledge is therefore immune to skeptical arguments from switching and twinning scenarios.
It is argued that the doctrine of privileged self-knowledge compatible with psychosemantic extern... more It is argued that the doctrine of privileged self-knowledge compatible with psychosemantic externalism about mental content is considerably weaker than the Cartesian doctrine of privileged self-knowledge. Firstly, although externalism is compatible with privileged access to one's particular thought contents (P vs. Q), it is consistent with us lacking privileged access to the modes (e.g., believing doubting) in which our thought contents are realized. Secondly, externalism is inconsistent with privileged access to the fact that one's so-called thoughts really are thoughts, rather than purely physical events with no content at all.
Tyler Burge and other externalists about mental content have tried to accommodate privileged self... more Tyler Burge and other externalists about mental content have tried to accommodate privileged self-knowledge and to neutralize scepticism about one's ability to authoritatively know one's present thoughts. I show that, though Burgean compatibilism explains knowing it is P I believe, it doesn't explain how I can have privileged knowledge that the state I occupy is a state of believing rather than, say, a state of doubting. Moreover, given externalism, self-knowledge of attitudinal component is vulnerable to a certain kind of error and so doesn't have the same kind of privilege as self-knowledge of current content.
Incompatibilism is the view that privileged knowledge of our own mental states cannot be reconcil... more Incompatibilism is the view that privileged knowledge of our own mental states cannot be reconciled with externalism regarding the content of mental states. Davidson has recently developed two arguments that are supposed to disprove incompatibilism and establish the consistency of privileged access and externalism. One argument criticizes incompatibilism for assuming that externalism conflicts with the mind-body identity theory. Since mental states supervene on neurological events, Davidson argues, they are partly 'in the head' and are knowable just by reflection. Another argument rejects incompatibilism by repudiating the object perception model of introspection. Once externalism is freed from the internalist idea that thoughts take objects which are inner epistemological intermediaries, Davidson maintains, it poses no threat to privileged self-knowledge. It is argued that neither of these arguments is successful, since both disprove assumptions irrelevant to incompatibilism. Moreover, it is indicated how Davidson would have to go about defending his positive account of privileged self-knowledge against the principal incompatibilist arguments.
Philosophy of medicine has traditionally examined two issues: the scientific ontology for medicin... more Philosophy of medicine has traditionally examined two issues: the scientific ontology for medicine and the epistemic significance of the types of evidence used in medical research. In answering each question, philosophers have typically brought to bear tools from traditional analytic philosophy. In contrast, this volume explores medical knowledge from the perspective offered by social epistemology. While many of the same issues are addressed, the approach to these issues generates both fresh questions and new insights into old debates. In addition, the broader purview offered by social epistemology opens up opportunities to address new topics such as the role of consensus conferences, epistemic injustice, the value of medical knowledge, continuing medical education, and industry funding. This article situates and summarizes the contributions to this special issue.
Knowledge can be subdivided according to the sources from which it arises. Among the basic source... more Knowledge can be subdivided according to the sources from which it arises. Among the basic sources of knowledge and justification are perception, testimony, reason and inference. Whether memory is a basic source of knowledge is a controversial issue. Some philosophers maintain that memory only retains or preserves knowledge but doesn’t produce new knowledge. Others insist that there are cases where a person first comes to know by remembering. In what follows I will begin in section 1 by characterizing the standard taxonomy of memory. Following this, I will explain the distinction between direct and representative realism about memory (section 2). Section 3 concerns the question of whether memory implies knowledge. Section 4 examines whether memory is merely a preservative source of justification and knowledge or whether it can also function as a generative source. Finally, section 5 discusses responses to skepticism about memory knowledge.
I wish to argue that the problem of rule-following rests on semantic internalism and that semanti... more I wish to argue that the problem of rule-following rests on semantic internalism and that semantic externalism makes the problem evaporate. Given that the rule-following problem is a version of the general problem that the reference of an intentional phenomenon is underdetermined by its meaning, semantic externalism solves the problem by reducing meaning to reference. Since both Kripke and Wittgenstein are proponents of semantic externalism, the problem of rule-following is not a problem for either Kripke or Wittgenstein, but only for Wittgenstein"s internalist interlocutor.
Critique de la conception cartesienne de la connaissance de soi privilegiee au nom de l'asyme... more Critique de la conception cartesienne de la connaissance de soi privilegiee au nom de l'asymetrie epistemologique entre la premiere et la troisieme personne, d'une part, et au nom de l'anti-individualisme externaliste, d'autre part. Examinant la these compatibiliste de T. Burge, l'A. montre que la conception externaliste de la connaissance de soi ne legitime pas l'auto-attribution d'etats propositionnels, ni ne rend compte du contenu des modes de pensee (point de vue, conviction)
Memory Causation.- Setting the Stage.- The Motivation of the Causal Theory of Memory.- An Argumen... more Memory Causation.- Setting the Stage.- The Motivation of the Causal Theory of Memory.- An Argument for Memory Traces.- From Traces to Recall.- Objects of Memory.- The Primary Objects of Memory.- Against Representative Realism.- Skepticism, Externalism, and Closure.- Truth in Memory.- The Factivity Constraint.- Diachronic Content Similarity.- The Pragmatic Dimension of Memory.
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Epistemology General by Sven Bernecker