Duncan Pritchard
University of California, Irvine, Philosophy, Faculty Member
According to the innovative account of the structure of rational evaluation offered by Wittgenstein in his final notebooks, published as On Certainty, our rational practices necessarily presuppose arational hinge commitments. These are... more
According to the innovative account of the structure of rational evaluation offered by Wittgenstein in his final notebooks, published as On Certainty, our rational practices necessarily presuppose arational hinge commitments. These are everyday, apparently mundane, commitments that we are optimally certain of, but which in virtue of the 'hinge' role that they play in our rational practices cannot themselves enjoy rational support. Granted that there are such hinge commitments, what is the nature of the propositional attitude in play? Many commentators have described this propositional attitude as a kind of trusting, on account of how our hinge commitments are effectively a groundless kind of presupposition. In contrast, I want to push back against this way of thinking about hinge commitments and argue instead that it is crucial to our understanding of Wittgenstein's proposal especially in terms of its implications for radical scepticism to realize that hinge commitments are not presuppositions and that the hinge propositional attitude is not one of trusting.
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One of the roles of public expertise is to spread useful knowledge throughout society. In this way, public expertise can combat ignorance. Crucially, however, it is also explained how a surprising central role of public expertise is often... more
One of the roles of public expertise is to spread useful knowledge throughout society. In this way, public expertise can combat ignorance. Crucially, however, it is also explained how a surprising central role of public expertise is often to manufacture the very ignorance that is being combatted. This is because there is more to ignorance than simply the absence of knowledge, as ignorance more specifically concerns lacking the knowledge that one should have. In this way, ignorance is never normatively neutral (in the manner that mere lack of knowledge can be). What expert-led public information does is thus create a reasonable expectation that one should know certain important truths, and hence ensures that those who remain unaware of them are now ignorant of them. Ignorance must thus often be manufactured by public experts before those same experts can combat it. This role of public expertise--informative public expertise--in responding to ignorance is contrasted with another important role of public expertise--critical public expertise--that often has an explicitly political bearing. The aim of critical public expertise is to show how members of the public ought to know truths of which they are unaware, and hence charge them with ignorance. Rather than manufacturing ignorance, as informative public expertise does, it thus instead reveals hidden ignorance. In this fashion it serves an explicitly critical social function. By appealing to the normative nature of ignorance we are thus able to capture two very different ways in which public expertise relates to, and ultimately combats, ignorance.
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Cavell famously argued that there is a deep truth in scepticism, albeit a truth that is importantly distinct from what the sceptic is herself arguing for. In previous work (Pritchard 2021), I've argued for a particular interpretation of... more
Cavell famously argued that there is a deep truth in scepticism, albeit a truth that is importantly distinct from what the sceptic is herself arguing for. In previous work (Pritchard 2021), I've argued for a particular interpretation of this claim in terms of the notion of epistemic vertigo. This is meant to capture what Cavell thought was a terrifying feature of our overall epistemic position without in the process collapsing into a version of radical scepticism. I've further suggested that epistemic vertigo is best understood in terms of appreciating the radical nature of Wittgenstein's account of hinge commitments in On Certainty-viz., that our very system of rational evaluation requires a prior visceral arational certainty in one's worldview, as manifested in one's complete conviction in a range of apparently mundane quotidian claims. In this paper I want to extend this interpretative approach to Cavell's work by considering how it enables us to capture an important variety of existential angst. This variety of angst is generated by the kind of disengagement from our ordinary practices that is prompted by philosophical reflection. It is constituted by an awareness of the contingent nature of one's worldview, and thus the fundamental values expressed by that worldview. In this way, the ultimate groundlessness of one's reasons and practices, as powerfully articulated by Wittgenstein and Cavell, is thus related to a fundamental axiological groundlessness. This is the deep truth in the idea that life is meaningless that corresponds to the deep truth in scepticism. But just as the latter deep truth can be granted without conceding the truth of scepticism, so the former deep truth can also be granted without conceding that life is thereby meaningless.
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An important kind of conversation is essentially adversarial in nature, as two parties engage in debate about a subject matter of common interest. How are such conversations to be properly conducted, from a specifically epistemic point of... more
An important kind of conversation is essentially adversarial in nature, as two parties engage in debate about a subject matter of common interest. How are such conversations to be properly conducted, from a specifically epistemic point of view? It is argued that the intellectual virtues are crucially important to answering this question. In particular, it is maintained that an intellectual virtues-based conception of good arguing is preferable to alternative ways of thinking of about good arguing in purely formal or strategic terms, in that it can capture what is attractive about these proposals while also avoiding some fundamental problems that they face.
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An account is offered of the nature and value of understanding. In particular, an explanation of the special value of understanding is presented which flows from the account given of its nature. In terms of the nature of understanding, it... more
An account is offered of the nature and value of understanding. In particular, an explanation of the special value of understanding is presented which flows from the account given of its nature. In terms of the nature of understanding, it is argued that it essentially involves a strong kind of cognitive achievement. This explains the distinctive relationship that understanding bears to epistemic luck and thus how it diverges from propositional knowledge, such that it is usually a more demanding epistemic standing but not always (as in cases of environmental epistemic luck). It is then shown how treating understanding as a strong cognitive achievement can account for its special value, both in broad terms and in terms of epistemic value specifically.
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A common phenomenon in contemporary life is the discovery of experts acting contrary to the public advice that they have given, such as an epidemiologist being found to have personally flouted a COVID lockdown that they recommended. Such... more
A common phenomenon in contemporary life is the discovery of experts acting contrary to the public advice that they have given, such as an epidemiologist being found to have personally flouted a COVID lockdown that they recommended. Such behaviour on the part of experts can naturally lead to a distrust of expertise (and certainly a distrust of their expertise), especially when the advice of experts leads to restrictions on everyday freedoms. Such is the problem of hypocritical experts. It is argued, however, that not all behaviour on the part of experts that’s contrary to their public advice is hypocritical. Moreover, it is further contended that there can even be occasions where such hypocrisy is not a reason to doubt the expert advice. The goal of this paper is thus to answer two closely related questions. First, what exactly is involved in being a hypocritical expert? Second, when does such hypocrisy make it reasonable to downgrade one’s confidence in that expert’s advice?
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An overview of epistemological disjunctivism is offered, including its relationship to metaphysical disjunctivism. Particular focus is then placed on how such a thesis might be cast specifically in terms of evidence. Two issues in... more
An overview of epistemological disjunctivism is offered, including its relationship to metaphysical disjunctivism. Particular focus is then placed on how such a thesis might be cast specifically in terms of evidence. Two issues in particular are discussed: (i) how to locate the proposal within the epistemic externalism/internalism distinction; and (ii) how one might motivate the viability of the proposal.
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The axiological account of deep disagreements is described and defended. This proposal understands this notion in terms of the existential importance of the topic of disagreement. It is argued that this account provides a straightforward... more
The axiological account of deep disagreements is described and defended. This proposal understands this notion in terms of the existential importance of the topic of disagreement. It is argued that this account provides a straightforward explanation for the main features of deep disagreements. This proposal is then compared to the contemporary popular view that deep disagreements are essentially hinge disagreements—i.e., disagreements concerning clashes of one’s hinge commitments, in the sense described by the later Wittgenstein. It is claimed that hinge disagreements are only plausibly deep disagreements insofar as there can be a specific class of hinge commitments that are axiological in nature, thereby lending further support to the axiological account of deep disagreement.
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Epistemic virtues are character traits conducive to principled ways of thinking, leading to a life of flourishing. Recent years have witnessed an emergence of theoretical accounts describing how they develop. However, few if any studies... more
Epistemic virtues are character traits conducive to principled ways of thinking, leading to a life of flourishing. Recent years have witnessed an emergence of theoretical accounts describing how they develop. However, few if any studies have conducted rigorous empirical investigation into the mechanisms of intellectual virtue development. In this study, we review several significant frameworks before utilizing a randomized, pretest/posttest control trial design to understand the impacts of a novel thinking disposition intervention on intellectual virtue growth. We ascertain the direct and indirect effects of the intervention on four key intellectual virtues: curiosity, humility, integrity, and tenacity. Additionally, we test theoretical mediators of virtue learning. Clear evidence favoring a theory-inspired mediator is observed, though we observe weaker signals of direct effects, with nuances across the virtues. For instance, tenacity and curiosity variables appear to respond more to the intervention than do humility and integrity. Findings are discussed in light of contemporary theoretical perspectives.
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Adam Carter has recently presented a novel puzzle about extended knowledge – i.e. knowledge that results from extended cognitive processes. He argues that allowing for this kind of knowledge on the face of it entails that there could be... more
Adam Carter has recently presented a novel puzzle about extended knowledge – i.e. knowledge that results from extended cognitive processes. He argues that allowing for this kind of knowledge on the face of it entails that there could be instances of knowledge that are simply ‘engineered’ into the subject. The problem is that such engineered knowledge does not look genuine given that it results from processes that bypass the cognitive agency of the subject. Carter’s solution is to argue that we need to impose an additional autonomy condition on knowledge that excludes such cases of non-autonomous knowledge. In response, two points of criticism are offered. First, that when extended knowledge is properly understood, virtue-theoretic accounts of knowledge can already exclude non-autonomous knowledge without the need of an additional epistemic condition. Second, that the cases that Carter offers of putatively non-autonomous knowledge involve the inclusive folk notion of belief rather than the more restrictive notion of belief that is relevant to epistemology (K-apt belief). Once it is recognized that the belief condition on knowledge concerns this more restrictive notion, then we
already have the means to exclude cases of non-autonomous knowledge
(regardless of which theory of knowledge one favors).
already have the means to exclude cases of non-autonomous knowledge
(regardless of which theory of knowledge one favors).
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What does it mean for truth to be a fundamental value? I outline a way of unpacking this idea that doesn't collapse under the weight of implausible implications, including the following: that one should value all truths equally (i.e., no... more
What does it mean for truth to be a fundamental value? I outline a way of unpacking this idea that doesn't collapse under the weight of implausible implications, including the following: that one should value all truths equally (i.e., no matter how trivial that truth might be); that one should prefer truth to knowledge or understanding; that the value of truth should trump all other considerations (including practical, ethical, aesthetic, and so on); and that there cannot be truths that one is unable accept or otherwise fully embrace. The discussion proceeds by way of reflections on, inter alia, Nietzsche's claim that the truth is terrible and Wittgenstein's contention that all rational evaluation presupposes an overarching groundless certainty.
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There are a class of examples that appear to show that one can gain knowledge via reasoning from a falsehood. The problem that such examples pose is to explain why knowledge can be acquired in such cases given that in general drawing... more
There are a class of examples that appear to show that one can gain knowledge via reasoning from a falsehood. The problem that such examples pose is to explain why knowledge can be acquired in such cases given that in general drawing inferences from false beliefs, even if the inferred belief is true, does not result in knowledge. A safety-based rationale is offered in this regard, along with the kind of motivation for safety offered by anti-risk epistemology. It is maintained that such a rationale is at best incomplete, however, and that for a fuller account of how knowledge can be acquired from error we need to turn to the theory of knowledge offered by anti-risk virtue epistemology.
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Abstract: This paper explores the thesis that the overarching goal of education is to cultivate virtuous intellectual character. It is shown how finally valuing the truth is central to this theory on account of how such valuing is pivotal... more
Abstract: This paper explores the thesis that the overarching goal of education is to cultivate virtuous intellectual character. It is shown how finally valuing the truth is central to this theory on account of how such valuing is pivotal to intellectual virtues. This feature of the proposal might be thought to be problematic for a number of reasons. For example, it could be argued that truth is not valuable, that insisting on valuing the truth in educational contexts could be politically dubious, or that there is something unduly prescriptive about an educational methodology that has this component. It is argued, however, that many of these grounds for concern are not sound on closer inspection. Properly understood, educating for virtuous intellectual character, even once the truth-valuing aspect of this thesis is made explicit, should not be a contentious proposal.
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Michael Bergmann (2021) has written a sophisticated monograph on radical skepticism that offers a distinctive kind of commonsense response to this difficulty. My critical concern is not with the virtues of this text, however, of which... more
Michael Bergmann (2021) has written a sophisticated monograph on radical skepticism that offers a distinctive kind of commonsense response to this difficulty. My critical concern is not with the virtues of this text, however, of which there are many, but with what I take to be a fundamental lacuna at the heart of the project, which is Bergmann’s failure to fully interrogate philosophical appeals to commonsense in the context of the sceptical problem. As I hope to show, this lacuna constitutes more than the kind of strategic decision that all monograph writers must make (one can’t cover everything, after all), but potentially undermines the positive anti-sceptical project that Bergmann develops.
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Our overarching concern is mapping out the ramifications of the Wittgensteinian conception of hinge commitments to the religious case. More specifically, our aim is to use this conception to understand certain core features of fundamental... more
Our overarching concern is mapping out the ramifications of the Wittgensteinian conception of hinge commitments to the religious case. More specifically, our aim is to use this conception to understand certain core features of fundamental religious commitment. Drawing on two important literary depictions of religious conviction--Anthony Burgess's Earthly Powers and Shusaku Endo's Silence--it is argued that a common phenomenon emerges, that of religious vertigo. This arises out of the recognition that one's religious commitment, in its most fundamental form, is not like a regular belief at all, but rather plays a fulcrum, arational role in one's worldview. Moreover, this recognition is usually occluded in everyday life. Fundamental religious commitment is thus revealed to be in a sense uncanny. It is argued that religious vertigo is a form of the more general epistemic vertigo that I have claimed is a key element of the later Wittgenstein's conception of the structure of rational evaluations.
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Can one enter into an argument with one's intellectual equals in good faith if one regards the matter in hand as already settled? Adopting such an attitude looks very much like taking a dogmatic stance, in that one is closing one's mind... more
Can one enter into an argument with one's intellectual equals in good faith if one regards the matter in hand as already settled? Adopting such an attitude looks very much like taking a dogmatic stance, in that one is closing one's mind to counterarguments in advance. Dogmatism is, of course, an intellectual vice. Moreover, such dogmatism seems morally problematic, in that one is failing to treat one's adversary with due respect. While there is clearly something correct about this line of thinking-dogmatism, like all intellectual vice, is obviously to be avoided-it is also maintained that, properly understood, there need be nothing intellectually viceful about engaging in an argument where one regards the subject matter as settled. Related to this point, it is contended that someone who possesses the intellectual virtue of intellectual humility may well engage in arguments in just this fashion. The upshot is that one can consistently and properly argue with both conviction and intellectual humility.
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An examination is offered of the nature of deep disagreements, culminating in a tripartite theoretical account of their nature. The relationship between deep disagreements and hinge epistemology is then explored. It is argued that... more
An examination is offered of the nature of deep disagreements, culminating in a tripartite theoretical account of their nature. The relationship between deep disagreements and hinge epistemology is then explored. It is argued that disagreements over one’s hinge commitments would seem to be a paradigm case of deep disagreement, though it is also pointed out that the very idea of hinge disagreement may be hard to make sense of on some versions of hinge epistemology. Nonetheless, insofar as there can be hinge disagreements, it is plausible that they count as deep disagreements. It is further claimed that deep hinge disagreements may be open to resolution—i.e., that accepting the existence of deep hinge disagreements doesn’t entail a commitment to there being epistemically incommensurable epistemic systems. It is finally argued that even if all hinge disagreements are deep disagreements, it is not obvious that all deep disagreements are hinge disagreements.
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We will be examining the relationship between sceptical themes and debates concerning the rationality of religious belief. As we will see, this relationship manifests itself not only in terms of critiques of the rationality of religious... more
We will be examining the relationship between sceptical themes and debates concerning the rationality of religious belief. As we will see, this relationship manifests itself not only in terms of critiques of the rationality of religious belief, but also in prominent defenses of the rationality of religious belief, such as Lockean evidentialism, reformed epistemology, and sceptical fideism. Particular focus will be put on a specific form of sceptical fideism that employs an epistemic parity argument with regard to the epistemological status of religious and everyday belief. In this regard, we will be considering quasi-fideism, an account of the rationality of religious belief that applies a Wittgensteinian hinge epistemology to the religious case, and which has a natural affinity with sceptical fideism.
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A three-tiered account of social cognition is set out-along with the corresponding variety of social knowledge that results from this social cognition-and applied to the special case of scientific collaboration. The first tier is... more
A three-tiered account of social cognition is set out-along with the corresponding variety of social knowledge that results from this social cognition-and applied to the special case of scientific collaboration. The first tier is socially-facilitated cognition, which results in socially-facilitated knowledge. This is a form of cognition which, while genuinely social (in that social factors play an important explanatory role in producing the target cognitive success), falls short of socially extended cognition. The second tier is socially extended cognition, which generates socially extended knowledge. This form of cognition is social in the specific sense of the information-processing of other agents forms part of the socially extended cognitive process at issue. It is argued, however, that the core notion of socially extended cognition is individual in nature, in that the target cognitive success is significantly creditable to the socially extended cognitive agency of the individual. Socially extended cognition, in its core sense, thus generates individual knowledge. Finally, there is distributed cognition, which generates distributed knowledge. This is where the cognitive successes produced by a research team are attributable to a group agent rather than to individuals within the team. Accordingly, where this form of social cognition generates knowledge (distributed knowledge), the knowledge is irreducibly group knowledge. It is argued that by making clear this threetiered structure of social scientific knowledge a prima facie challenge is posed for defenders of distributed scientific cognition and knowledge to explain why this form of social knowledge is being exhibited and not one of the two weaker (and metaphysically less demanding) forms of social knowledge.
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Contemporary epistemology has explored the notion of a hinge commitment as set out in Wittgenstein's final notebooks, published as On Certainty. These are usually understood as essentially groundless certainties that provide the necessary... more
Contemporary epistemology has explored the notion of a hinge commitment as set out in Wittgenstein's final notebooks, published as On Certainty. These are usually understood as essentially groundless certainties that provide the necessary framework within which rational evaluations can take place. John Greco has recently offered a striking account of hinge commitments as a distinctive kind of knowledge that he calls 'common knowledge'. According to Greco, this is knowledge that members of the community get to have without incurring any epistemic burden, and as such is fundamentally different from other kinds of knowledge. I offer a critique of Greco's proposal. While I agree that there is a variety of knowledge that counts as common knowledge, I contend that it is not to be understood as knowledge that one gets for free as Greco suggests. Moreover, I argue that our hinge commitments do not count as common knowledge-either in Greco's sense of the term or in the alternative manner that I set out-because properly understood they are not in the market for knowledge at all. In defence of this claim, I suggest that Greco's conception of a hinge commitment is both missing some crucial elements and also (relatedly) too broad in its extension, in that it encompasses both instances of common knowledge (in my sense of the term) and hinge commitments proper. 1 Introductory remarks John Greco's work is always a delight to read: pellucid and full of insight. It is thus a pleasure to be invited to comment on his important contributions to contemporary epistemology as part of this volume. There are many topics where we agree, but obviously the most interesting topics are those where we don't. With that in mind, I want
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An overview is presented of what I take to be (some main aspects of) the role of the intellectual virtues within the epistemological enterprise. Traditionally, the theory of knowledge has been thought to be central to the epistemological... more
An overview is presented of what I take to be (some main aspects of) the role of the intellectual virtues within the epistemological enterprise. Traditionally, the theory of knowledge has been thought to be central to the epistemological project, but since, as I explain, the intellectual virtues aren't required for knowledge, this might suggest that they have only a marginal role to play in epistemological debates. I argue against this suggestion by showing how the intellectual virtues are in fact crucial to several core (and interrelated) epistemological topics, including the nature of inquiry, epistemic axiology and our understanding of ignorance.
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According to extended cognition, a subject’s biological cognitive processes can become integrated with features of the subject’s cognitive environment (and thereby ‘extended’), such as technology. When such extended cognitive processes... more
According to extended cognition, a subject’s biological cognitive processes
can become integrated with features of the subject’s cognitive environment (and thereby ‘extended’), such as technology. When such extended cognitive processes lead to knowledge, the knowledge that results is extended knowledge. This paper explores how the phenomenon of extended cognition relates to the epistemology of ignorance. In particular, our concern will be with not only forms of extended cognition that are epistemically problematic (and which one might be expected to have negative epistemic ramifications) but also forms of extended cognition that are generally epistemically sound. As we will see, some prima facie plausible arguments for how extended cognition might lead to ignorance are not compelling on closer inspection. In addition, some other ways in which extended cognition might lead to ignorance depend on the account of ignorance that one endorses, and in particular whether one opts for a normative or non-normative account of ignorance.
can become integrated with features of the subject’s cognitive environment (and thereby ‘extended’), such as technology. When such extended cognitive processes lead to knowledge, the knowledge that results is extended knowledge. This paper explores how the phenomenon of extended cognition relates to the epistemology of ignorance. In particular, our concern will be with not only forms of extended cognition that are epistemically problematic (and which one might be expected to have negative epistemic ramifications) but also forms of extended cognition that are generally epistemically sound. As we will see, some prima facie plausible arguments for how extended cognition might lead to ignorance are not compelling on closer inspection. In addition, some other ways in which extended cognition might lead to ignorance depend on the account of ignorance that one endorses, and in particular whether one opts for a normative or non-normative account of ignorance.
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A defence is mounted of the closure principle for knowledge. It is first argued that this principle needs to be specifically understood in a diachronic fashion as a competent deduction principle in order for it to represent an intuitive... more
A defence is mounted of the closure principle for knowledge. It is first argued that this principle needs to be specifically understood in a diachronic fashion as a competent deduction principle in order for it to represent an intuitive principle that we would want to endorse. Next, it is claimed that in evaluating putative counterexamples to closure we need to differentiate between cases that employ local error-possibilities and cases that employ global error-possibilities. As regards the former, two strategies for resisting the denial of closure are expounded--in terms of background knowledge and factive reasons, respectively--both of which appeal to a distinction between favoring and discriminating epistemic support. Similarly, as regards the latter, two strategies for resisting the denial of closure are expounded. The first involves maintaining that one can know the denials of radical sceptical scenarios by appeal to factive reasons. The second-which I favor-involves appealing to the Wittgensteinian notion of a hinge commitment. As explained, such commitments are not in the market for knowledge, but neither are they the kinds of commitments that could feature in a closure-based inference. Accordingly, rather than constituting counterexamples to closure, they are instead simply inapplicable to closure-based inferences.
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Quasi-fideism accounts for the rationality of religious belief by embracing the idea that a subject's most fundamental religious commitments are essentially arational. It departs from standard forms of fideism, however, by contending that... more
Quasi-fideism accounts for the rationality of religious belief by embracing the idea that a subject's most fundamental religious commitments are essentially arational. It departs from standard forms of fideism, however, by contending that this feature of religious commitment does not set it apart from belief in general. Indeed, the quasi-fideist maintains, in keeping with the Wittgensteinian hinge epistemology that underlies the view, that it is in the nature of belief in general (i.e., religious or otherwise) that it presupposes essentially arational commitments, and hence that there can be no specific epistemic objection to religious belief due to it having this feature. This paper explores how quasi-fideism deals with the problems raised by fundamental religious disagreement. In particular, how is quasifideism to avoid the charge of epistemic relativism? It is argued that once we understand the arational nature of these fundamental commitments correctly, then quasi-fideism is able to avoid a problematic form of epistemic relativism. Relatedly, it can also explain how a subject's basic religious commitments can change over time in rational ways.
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The topic of the educational role of the intellectual virtues is explored. It is argued that the overarching epistemic goal of education is the development of intellectual character, and it is further proposed that the relevant notion of... more
The topic of the educational role of the intellectual virtues is explored. It is argued that the overarching epistemic goal of education is the development of intellectual character, and it is further proposed that the relevant notion of intellectual character is virtuous intellectual character. Virtuous intellectual character is contrasted in this regard with an alternative character-based conception of the overarching epistemic goal of education in terms of critically rational intellectual character. Finally, some of the main issues facing this conception of the educational role of the intellectual virtues are considered, especially regarding the concern that educating for the intellectual virtues is problematic because it involves inculcating in students certain core values.
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Response to Steven Bland’s ‘Interactionism, Debiasing, and the Division of Epistemic Labour’
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Response to Heather Battaly’s ‘Solidarity: Virtue or Vice?’
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The recent literature has seen a burgeoning discussion of the idea that the overarching epistemic goal of education is the cultivation of the intellectual virtues. Moreover, there have been attempts to put this idea into practice, with... more
The recent literature has seen a burgeoning discussion of the idea that the overarching epistemic goal of education is the cultivation of the intellectual virtues. Moreover, there have been attempts to put this idea into practice, with virtue-led educational interventions in schools, universities, and even prisons. This paper explores the question of whether--and, if so, to what degree--such intellectual virtue-based approaches to education are essentially social. The focus in this regard is on the role of intellectual exemplars within this approach, and in particular the extent to which direct social interaction with such exemplars is crucial to the implementation of this educational methodology.
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A case is made for a moderate version of form of epistemic externalism about knowledge. It is argued that the general structure of knowledge is along the lines set out by anti-risk virtue epistemology. Since such a proposal makes no... more
A case is made for a moderate version of form of epistemic externalism about knowledge. It is argued that the general structure of knowledge is along the lines set out by anti-risk virtue epistemology. Since such a proposal makes no essential demand that one's cognitive success be significantly supported by reflectively accessible rational support, epistemic externalism about knowledge results. Nonetheless, anti-risk virtue epistemology offers an account of knowledge that is entirely built around a conception of cognitive responsibility. This ensures that it is able to accommodate supposedly internalist intuitions about the relationship between knowledge and cognitive responsibility. Moreover, it is argued that this proposal is entirely consistent with the idea that the knowledge possessed by cognitively developed agents characteristically involves a significant level of reflectively accessible rational support. Indeed, it is claimed that not only does the knowledge possessed by cognitively developed agents enjoy such rational support but also, in line with epistemological disjunctivism, that such reflectively accessible rational support will also often include factive reasons. It is argued that far from being in tension with epistemic externalism about knowledge, epistemological disjunctivism offers a compelling way for a moderate epistemic externalism to account for the role of reasons within knowledge. The resulting account of knowledge, while essentially a form of epistemic externalism, can thus nonetheless incorporate many of the considerations that drive the adoption of epistemic internalism about knowledge.
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In the contemporary epistemological literature, ignorance is normally understood as the absence of an epistemic standing, usually either knowledge or true belief. It is argued here that this way of thinking about ignorance misses a... more
In the contemporary epistemological literature, ignorance is normally understood as the absence of an epistemic standing, usually either knowledge or true belief. It is argued here that this way of thinking about ignorance misses a crucial ingredient, which is the normative aspect of ignorance. In particular, to be ignorant is not merely to lack the target epistemic standing, but also entails that this is an epistemic standing that one ought to have. I explore the motivations for this claim, and show how it can help us make sense of a range of cases concerning ignorance that the conventional, non-normative, accounts of ignorance struggle with. I also use this normative conception of ignorance to help elucidate the specific kind of epistemic standing the lack of which is entailed by ignorance.
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The place of social epistemology within contemporary philosophy, as well as its relation to other academic disciplines, is the topic of an ongoing debate. One camp within that debate holds that social epistemology should be pursued... more
The place of social epistemology within contemporary philosophy, as well as its relation to other academic disciplines, is the topic of an ongoing debate. One camp within that debate holds that social epistemology should be pursued strictly from within the perspective of individualistic analytic epistemology. In contrast, a second camp holds that social epistemology is an interdisciplinary field that should be given priority over traditional analytic epistemology, with the specific aim of radically transforming the latter to fit the results and methodology of the former. We are rather suspicious of this apparent tension, which we believe can be significantly mitigated by paying attention to certain recent advances within philosophy of mind and cognitive science. Accordingly, we attempt to explain how extended knowledge, the result of combining active externalism from contemporary philosophy of mind with contemporary epistemology, can offer an alternative conception of the future of ...
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It has become almost a conventional wisdom to argue that Cartesian scepticism poses a far more radical sceptical threat than its classical Pyrrhonian counterpart. Such a view fails to recognise, however, that there is a species of... more
It has become almost a conventional wisdom to argue that Cartesian scepticism poses a far more radical sceptical threat than its classical Pyrrhonian counterpart. Such a view fails to recognise, however, that there is a species of sceptical concern that can only plausibly be regarded as captured by the Pyrrhonian strategy. For whereas Cartesian scepticism is closely tied to the contentious doctrine of epistemological internalism, it is far from obvious that Pyrrhonian scepticism bears any such theoretical commitments. It is argued here that by viewing the Pyrrhonian style of sceptical argument in terms of this contemporary epistemological externalist/internalist distinction one can gain a new insight into some of the more problematic elements of this variety of classical thought and also get a handle on certain contemporary worries that have been raised regarding the anti-sceptical efficacy of externalist theories of knowledge. 1. Pyrrhonian versus Cartesian Treatments of Radical Sc...
This paper explores the prospects for safety-based theories of knowledge in the light of some recent objections. Contact Details Professor Duncan Pritchard Department of Philosophy University of Edinburgh David Hume Tower, George Square,... more
This paper explores the prospects for safety-based theories of knowledge in the light of some recent objections. Contact Details Professor Duncan Pritchard Department of Philosophy University of Edinburgh David Hume Tower, George Square, Edinburgh, EH8 9JX Scotland, UK duncan.pritchard@ed.ac.uk
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Se afirma que el problema del escepticismo radical, en el que se centra gran parte de la discusión epistemológica contemporánea, se divide en dos formulaciones lógicamente distintas: una basada en el principio de clausura, y otra en... more
Se afirma que el problema del escepticismo radical, en el que se centra gran parte de la discusión epistemológica contemporánea, se divide en dos formulaciones lógicamente distintas: una basada en el principio de clausura, y otra en el principio de infradeterminación. Primero, vamos a exponer la propuesta de Wittgenstein acerca de la estructura de la evaluación racional, y mostraremos cómo puede tratar con el escepticismo radical basado en el principio de clausura, al menos cuando dicha explicación se formula adecuadamente. Sin embargo, también aseveramos que esta propuesta no logra dar cuenta del escepticismo radical basado en la infradeterminación. El antídoto para esta última forma de escepticismo radical se encuentra en otra parte, sugerimos que en el seno del disyuntivismo epistémico.
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Ignorance is a neglected issue in philosophy. For at least two reasons, this is surprising. First, contrary to what one might expect, it is not clear what ignorance is. Some philosophers say or assume that it is lack of knowledge, whereas... more
Ignorance is a neglected issue in philosophy. For at least two reasons, this is surprising. First, contrary to what one might expect, it is not clear what ignorance is. Some philosophers say or assume that it is lack of knowledge, whereas others claim or presuppose that it is absence of true belief. What is one ignorant of when one is ignorant? And how does ignorance of a specific fact relate to ignorance on some topic or to being an ignorant person (an ignoramus)?
Second, ignorance is of crucial importance in several domains of life, but the roles it plays in those domains have mostly received little attention. In the epistemic realm, ignorance might unexpectedly have some epistemic value, focusing on ignorance sheds new light on knowledge and epistemic justification, and the concept of culpable ignorance returns time and again in religious epistemology. In the moral realm, ignorance is sometimes considered as an excuse, some specific kind of ignorance seems to be implied by a moral character, and ignorance is closely related to moral risk. Finally, ignorance has certain social dimensions: it has been claimed to be the engine of science, it seems to be entailed by privacy and secrecy, and it is widely thought to constitute a legal excuse in certain circumstances. But if the nature of ignorance is more elusive than one would initially think and if ignorance plays a pivotal role in such important realms of life as the epistemic, the moral, and the social domains, then one could hardly wish for a better object of philosophical analysis and discussion.
The focus of this edited collection is on the epistemic dimension of ignorance. This volume addresses such issues as the nature of ignorance, the contextual dimension of ignorance, the epistemic value of ignorance, and social epistemological issues pertaining to ignorance. Together, these topics will add depth and insight into the question of how ignorance should be understood epistemologically. It will be the first in its kind in having as its focus exactly those problems associated with this dimension. It will draw together twelve commissioned chapters that are written by leading philosophers in the field and that represent diverse reflections on a rich topic.
Editors: Martijn Blaauw, Rik Peels
Second, ignorance is of crucial importance in several domains of life, but the roles it plays in those domains have mostly received little attention. In the epistemic realm, ignorance might unexpectedly have some epistemic value, focusing on ignorance sheds new light on knowledge and epistemic justification, and the concept of culpable ignorance returns time and again in religious epistemology. In the moral realm, ignorance is sometimes considered as an excuse, some specific kind of ignorance seems to be implied by a moral character, and ignorance is closely related to moral risk. Finally, ignorance has certain social dimensions: it has been claimed to be the engine of science, it seems to be entailed by privacy and secrecy, and it is widely thought to constitute a legal excuse in certain circumstances. But if the nature of ignorance is more elusive than one would initially think and if ignorance plays a pivotal role in such important realms of life as the epistemic, the moral, and the social domains, then one could hardly wish for a better object of philosophical analysis and discussion.
The focus of this edited collection is on the epistemic dimension of ignorance. This volume addresses such issues as the nature of ignorance, the contextual dimension of ignorance, the epistemic value of ignorance, and social epistemological issues pertaining to ignorance. Together, these topics will add depth and insight into the question of how ignorance should be understood epistemologically. It will be the first in its kind in having as its focus exactly those problems associated with this dimension. It will draw together twelve commissioned chapters that are written by leading philosophers in the field and that represent diverse reflections on a rich topic.
Editors: Martijn Blaauw, Rik Peels
Research Interests:
Inference to the best explanation—or, IBE—tells us to infer from the available evidence to the hypothesis which would, if correct, best explain that evidence. As Peter Lipton (2000, 184) puts it, the core idea driving IBE is that... more
Inference to the best explanation—or, IBE—tells us to infer from the available evidence to the hypothesis which would, if correct, best explain that evidence. As Peter Lipton (2000, 184) puts it, the core idea driving IBE is that explanatory considerations
are a guide to inference. But what is the epistemic status of IBE, itself? One issue of contemporary interest (e.g., Boyd 1985; Psillos 1999; Boghossian 2001; Enoch & Schechter 2008) is whether it is possible to provide a justification for IBE itself which is non-objectionably circular. We aim to carve out some new space in this debate. In particular, we suggest that the matter of whether a given rule-circular argument is objectionably circular itself depends crucially on some subtle distinctions which have been made in the recent literature on perceptual warrant. By bringing these debates together, a principled reason emerges for why some kinds of rule-circular justifications for IBE are considerably less objectionable than others.
are a guide to inference. But what is the epistemic status of IBE, itself? One issue of contemporary interest (e.g., Boyd 1985; Psillos 1999; Boghossian 2001; Enoch & Schechter 2008) is whether it is possible to provide a justification for IBE itself which is non-objectionably circular. We aim to carve out some new space in this debate. In particular, we suggest that the matter of whether a given rule-circular argument is objectionably circular itself depends crucially on some subtle distinctions which have been made in the recent literature on perceptual warrant. By bringing these debates together, a principled reason emerges for why some kinds of rule-circular justifications for IBE are considerably less objectionable than others.
Research Interests:
Conversation, dialogue, reasonable disagreement, and the acquisition of knowledge through the words of others, all of this has always been at the center of philosophers’ concerns since the emergence of philosophy in Ancient Greece. It is... more
Conversation, dialogue, reasonable disagreement, and the acquisition of knowledge through the words of others, all of this has always been at the center of philosophers’ concerns since the emergence of philosophy in Ancient Greece. It is also important to recognize that in contemporary philosophy, marked by the linguistic turn, there is a wealth of intellectual production on ethical (e.g. McKenna 2012), psycho-linguistic (e.g. Clark 1996), logical-linguistic (e.g. Grice 1989) and pragmatic (e.g. Walton 1992) aspects of the conversation. Despite all this, this is the first collection of texts dedicated exclusively to the strictly epistemic aspects of this phenomenon which is so decisive for the very constitution of our humanity. This book brings together the contributions of fifteen leading philosophers on some of the most relevant issues of what we could call the Epistemology of Conversation.
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A study of skepticism
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O disjuntivismo epistemológico─pelo menos como eu defendi a posição─sustenta que, em casos paradigmáticos de conhecimento perceptivo, o agente sabe em virtude de ter suporte racional que é tanto factivo (i.e. ele implica a proposição... more
O disjuntivismo epistemológico─pelo menos como eu defendi a posição─sustenta que, em casos paradigmáticos de conhecimento perceptivo, o agente sabe em virtude de ter suporte racional que é tanto factivo (i.e. ele implica a proposição alvo) quanto acessível reflexivamente. Em particular, a posição mantém que o agente pode ter conhecimento perceptivo de que p em virtude de ver que p, em que ver que p é factivo, e é acessível reflexivamente ao agente que ele vê que p.