According to the innovative account of the structure of rational evaluation offered by Wittgenste... more According to the innovative account of the structure of rational evaluation offered by Wittgenstein in his final notebooks, published as On Certainty, our rational practices necessarily presuppose arational hinge commitments. These are everyday, apparently mundane, commitments that we are optimally certain of, but which in virtue of the 'hinge' role that they play in our rational practices cannot themselves enjoy rational support. Granted that there are such hinge commitments, what is the nature of the propositional attitude in play? Many commentators have described this propositional attitude as a kind of trusting, on account of how our hinge commitments are effectively a groundless kind of presupposition. In contrast, I want to push back against this way of thinking about hinge commitments and argue instead that it is crucial to our understanding of Wittgenstein's proposal especially in terms of its implications for radical scepticism to realize that hinge commitments are not presuppositions and that the hinge propositional attitude is not one of trusting.
One of the roles of public expertise is to spread useful knowledge throughout society. In this wa... more One of the roles of public expertise is to spread useful knowledge throughout society. In this way, public expertise can combat ignorance. Crucially, however, it is also explained how a surprising central role of public expertise is often to manufacture the very ignorance that is being combatted. This is because there is more to ignorance than simply the absence of knowledge, as ignorance more specifically concerns lacking the knowledge that one should have. In this way, ignorance is never normatively neutral (in the manner that mere lack of knowledge can be). What expert-led public information does is thus create a reasonable expectation that one should know certain important truths, and hence ensures that those who remain unaware of them are now ignorant of them. Ignorance must thus often be manufactured by public experts before those same experts can combat it. This role of public expertise--informative public expertise--in responding to ignorance is contrasted with another important role of public expertise--critical public expertise--that often has an explicitly political bearing. The aim of critical public expertise is to show how members of the public ought to know truths of which they are unaware, and hence charge them with ignorance. Rather than manufacturing ignorance, as informative public expertise does, it thus instead reveals hidden ignorance. In this fashion it serves an explicitly critical social function. By appealing to the normative nature of ignorance we are thus able to capture two very different ways in which public expertise relates to, and ultimately combats, ignorance.
Cavell famously argued that there is a deep truth in scepticism, albeit a truth that is important... more Cavell famously argued that there is a deep truth in scepticism, albeit a truth that is importantly distinct from what the sceptic is herself arguing for. In previous work (Pritchard 2021), I've argued for a particular interpretation of this claim in terms of the notion of epistemic vertigo. This is meant to capture what Cavell thought was a terrifying feature of our overall epistemic position without in the process collapsing into a version of radical scepticism. I've further suggested that epistemic vertigo is best understood in terms of appreciating the radical nature of Wittgenstein's account of hinge commitments in On Certainty-viz., that our very system of rational evaluation requires a prior visceral arational certainty in one's worldview, as manifested in one's complete conviction in a range of apparently mundane quotidian claims. In this paper I want to extend this interpretative approach to Cavell's work by considering how it enables us to capture an important variety of existential angst. This variety of angst is generated by the kind of disengagement from our ordinary practices that is prompted by philosophical reflection. It is constituted by an awareness of the contingent nature of one's worldview, and thus the fundamental values expressed by that worldview. In this way, the ultimate groundlessness of one's reasons and practices, as powerfully articulated by Wittgenstein and Cavell, is thus related to a fundamental axiological groundlessness. This is the deep truth in the idea that life is meaningless that corresponds to the deep truth in scepticism. But just as the latter deep truth can be granted without conceding the truth of scepticism, so the former deep truth can also be granted without conceding that life is thereby meaningless.
An important kind of conversation is essentially adversarial in nature, as two parties engage in ... more An important kind of conversation is essentially adversarial in nature, as two parties engage in debate about a subject matter of common interest. How are such conversations to be properly conducted, from a specifically epistemic point of view? It is argued that the intellectual virtues are crucially important to answering this question. In particular, it is maintained that an intellectual virtues-based conception of good arguing is preferable to alternative ways of thinking of about good arguing in purely formal or strategic terms, in that it can capture what is attractive about these proposals while also avoiding some fundamental problems that they face.
Understanding and Conscious Experience: Philosophical and Scientific Perspectives
An account is offered of the nature and value of understanding. In particular, an explanation of ... more An account is offered of the nature and value of understanding. In particular, an explanation of the special value of understanding is presented which flows from the account given of its nature. In terms of the nature of understanding, it is argued that it essentially involves a strong kind of cognitive achievement. This explains the distinctive relationship that understanding bears to epistemic luck and thus how it diverges from propositional knowledge, such that it is usually a more demanding epistemic standing but not always (as in cases of environmental epistemic luck). It is then shown how treating understanding as a strong cognitive achievement can account for its special value, both in broad terms and in terms of epistemic value specifically.
Overcoming the Myth of Neutrality: Expertise for a New World (Routledge)
A common phenomenon in contemporary life is the discovery of experts acting contrary to the publi... more A common phenomenon in contemporary life is the discovery of experts acting contrary to the public advice that they have given, such as an epidemiologist being found to have personally flouted a COVID lockdown that they recommended. Such behaviour on the part of experts can naturally lead to a distrust of expertise (and certainly a distrust of their expertise), especially when the advice of experts leads to restrictions on everyday freedoms. Such is the problem of hypocritical experts. It is argued, however, that not all behaviour on the part of experts that’s contrary to their public advice is hypocritical. Moreover, it is further contended that there can even be occasions where such hypocrisy is not a reason to doubt the expert advice. The goal of this paper is thus to answer two closely related questions. First, what exactly is involved in being a hypocritical expert? Second, when does such hypocrisy make it reasonable to downgrade one’s confidence in that expert’s advice?
An overview of epistemological disjunctivism is offered, including its relationship to metaphysic... more An overview of epistemological disjunctivism is offered, including its relationship to metaphysical disjunctivism. Particular focus is then placed on how such a thesis might be cast specifically in terms of evidence. Two issues in particular are discussed: (i) how to locate the proposal within the epistemic externalism/internalism distinction; and (ii) how one might motivate the viability of the proposal.
The axiological account of deep disagreements is described and defended. This proposal understand... more The axiological account of deep disagreements is described and defended. This proposal understands this notion in terms of the existential importance of the topic of disagreement. It is argued that this account provides a straightforward explanation for the main features of deep disagreements. This proposal is then compared to the contemporary popular view that deep disagreements are essentially hinge disagreements—i.e., disagreements concerning clashes of one’s hinge commitments, in the sense described by the later Wittgenstein. It is claimed that hinge disagreements are only plausibly deep disagreements insofar as there can be a specific class of hinge commitments that are axiological in nature, thereby lending further support to the axiological account of deep disagreement.
Epistemic virtues are character traits conducive to principled ways of thinking, leading to a lif... more Epistemic virtues are character traits conducive to principled ways of thinking, leading to a life of flourishing. Recent years have witnessed an emergence of theoretical accounts describing how they develop. However, few if any studies have conducted rigorous empirical investigation into the mechanisms of intellectual virtue development. In this study, we review several significant frameworks before utilizing a randomized, pretest/posttest control trial design to understand the impacts of a novel thinking disposition intervention on intellectual virtue growth. We ascertain the direct and indirect effects of the intervention on four key intellectual virtues: curiosity, humility, integrity, and tenacity. Additionally, we test theoretical mediators of virtue learning. Clear evidence favoring a theory-inspired mediator is observed, though we observe weaker signals of direct effects, with nuances across the virtues. For instance, tenacity and curiosity variables appear to respond more to the intervention than do humility and integrity. Findings are discussed in light of contemporary theoretical perspectives.
Adam Carter has recently presented a novel puzzle about extended knowledge – i.e. knowledge that ... more Adam Carter has recently presented a novel puzzle about extended knowledge – i.e. knowledge that results from extended cognitive processes. He argues that allowing for this kind of knowledge on the face of it entails that there could be instances of knowledge that are simply ‘engineered’ into the subject. The problem is that such engineered knowledge does not look genuine given that it results from processes that bypass the cognitive agency of the subject. Carter’s solution is to argue that we need to impose an additional autonomy condition on knowledge that excludes such cases of non-autonomous knowledge. In response, two points of criticism are offered. First, that when extended knowledge is properly understood, virtue-theoretic accounts of knowledge can already exclude non-autonomous knowledge without the need of an additional epistemic condition. Second, that the cases that Carter offers of putatively non-autonomous knowledge involve the inclusive folk notion of belief rather than the more restrictive notion of belief that is relevant to epistemology (K-apt belief). Once it is recognized that the belief condition on knowledge concerns this more restrictive notion, then we already have the means to exclude cases of non-autonomous knowledge (regardless of which theory of knowledge one favors).
Practices of Truth in Philosophy: Historical and Comparative Perspectives, (eds.) P. Gori & L. Serini, (London: Routledge)., 2023
What does it mean for truth to be a fundamental value? I outline a way of unpacking this idea tha... more What does it mean for truth to be a fundamental value? I outline a way of unpacking this idea that doesn't collapse under the weight of implausible implications, including the following: that one should value all truths equally (i.e., no matter how trivial that truth might be); that one should prefer truth to knowledge or understanding; that the value of truth should trump all other considerations (including practical, ethical, aesthetic, and so on); and that there cannot be truths that one is unable accept or otherwise fully embrace. The discussion proceeds by way of reflections on, inter alia, Nietzsche's claim that the truth is terrible and Wittgenstein's contention that all rational evaluation presupposes an overarching groundless certainty.
Illuminating Errors: New Essays on Knowledge from Non-Knowledge
There are a class of examples that appear to show that one can gain knowledge via reasoning from ... more There are a class of examples that appear to show that one can gain knowledge via reasoning from a falsehood. The problem that such examples pose is to explain why knowledge can be acquired in such cases given that in general drawing inferences from false beliefs, even if the inferred belief is true, does not result in knowledge. A safety-based rationale is offered in this regard, along with the kind of motivation for safety offered by anti-risk epistemology. It is maintained that such a rationale is at best incomplete, however, and that for a fuller account of how knowledge can be acquired from error we need to turn to the theory of knowledge offered by anti-risk virtue epistemology.
Abstract: This paper explores the thesis that the overarching goal of education is to cultivate v... more Abstract: This paper explores the thesis that the overarching goal of education is to cultivate virtuous intellectual character. It is shown how finally valuing the truth is central to this theory on account of how such valuing is pivotal to intellectual virtues. This feature of the proposal might be thought to be problematic for a number of reasons. For example, it could be argued that truth is not valuable, that insisting on valuing the truth in educational contexts could be politically dubious, or that there is something unduly prescriptive about an educational methodology that has this component. It is argued, however, that many of these grounds for concern are not sound on closer inspection. Properly understood, educating for virtuous intellectual character, even once the truth-valuing aspect of this thesis is made explicit, should not be a contentious proposal.
Michael Bergmann (2021) has written a sophisticated monograph on radical skepticism that offers a... more Michael Bergmann (2021) has written a sophisticated monograph on radical skepticism that offers a distinctive kind of commonsense response to this difficulty. My critical concern is not with the virtues of this text, however, of which there are many, but with what I take to be a fundamental lacuna at the heart of the project, which is Bergmann’s failure to fully interrogate philosophical appeals to commonsense in the context of the sceptical problem. As I hope to show, this lacuna constitutes more than the kind of strategic decision that all monograph writers must make (one can’t cover everything, after all), but potentially undermines the positive anti-sceptical project that Bergmann develops.
According to the innovative account of the structure of rational evaluation offered by Wittgenste... more According to the innovative account of the structure of rational evaluation offered by Wittgenstein in his final notebooks, published as On Certainty, our rational practices necessarily presuppose arational hinge commitments. These are everyday, apparently mundane, commitments that we are optimally certain of, but which in virtue of the 'hinge' role that they play in our rational practices cannot themselves enjoy rational support. Granted that there are such hinge commitments, what is the nature of the propositional attitude in play? Many commentators have described this propositional attitude as a kind of trusting, on account of how our hinge commitments are effectively a groundless kind of presupposition. In contrast, I want to push back against this way of thinking about hinge commitments and argue instead that it is crucial to our understanding of Wittgenstein's proposal especially in terms of its implications for radical scepticism to realize that hinge commitments are not presuppositions and that the hinge propositional attitude is not one of trusting.
One of the roles of public expertise is to spread useful knowledge throughout society. In this wa... more One of the roles of public expertise is to spread useful knowledge throughout society. In this way, public expertise can combat ignorance. Crucially, however, it is also explained how a surprising central role of public expertise is often to manufacture the very ignorance that is being combatted. This is because there is more to ignorance than simply the absence of knowledge, as ignorance more specifically concerns lacking the knowledge that one should have. In this way, ignorance is never normatively neutral (in the manner that mere lack of knowledge can be). What expert-led public information does is thus create a reasonable expectation that one should know certain important truths, and hence ensures that those who remain unaware of them are now ignorant of them. Ignorance must thus often be manufactured by public experts before those same experts can combat it. This role of public expertise--informative public expertise--in responding to ignorance is contrasted with another important role of public expertise--critical public expertise--that often has an explicitly political bearing. The aim of critical public expertise is to show how members of the public ought to know truths of which they are unaware, and hence charge them with ignorance. Rather than manufacturing ignorance, as informative public expertise does, it thus instead reveals hidden ignorance. In this fashion it serves an explicitly critical social function. By appealing to the normative nature of ignorance we are thus able to capture two very different ways in which public expertise relates to, and ultimately combats, ignorance.
Cavell famously argued that there is a deep truth in scepticism, albeit a truth that is important... more Cavell famously argued that there is a deep truth in scepticism, albeit a truth that is importantly distinct from what the sceptic is herself arguing for. In previous work (Pritchard 2021), I've argued for a particular interpretation of this claim in terms of the notion of epistemic vertigo. This is meant to capture what Cavell thought was a terrifying feature of our overall epistemic position without in the process collapsing into a version of radical scepticism. I've further suggested that epistemic vertigo is best understood in terms of appreciating the radical nature of Wittgenstein's account of hinge commitments in On Certainty-viz., that our very system of rational evaluation requires a prior visceral arational certainty in one's worldview, as manifested in one's complete conviction in a range of apparently mundane quotidian claims. In this paper I want to extend this interpretative approach to Cavell's work by considering how it enables us to capture an important variety of existential angst. This variety of angst is generated by the kind of disengagement from our ordinary practices that is prompted by philosophical reflection. It is constituted by an awareness of the contingent nature of one's worldview, and thus the fundamental values expressed by that worldview. In this way, the ultimate groundlessness of one's reasons and practices, as powerfully articulated by Wittgenstein and Cavell, is thus related to a fundamental axiological groundlessness. This is the deep truth in the idea that life is meaningless that corresponds to the deep truth in scepticism. But just as the latter deep truth can be granted without conceding the truth of scepticism, so the former deep truth can also be granted without conceding that life is thereby meaningless.
An important kind of conversation is essentially adversarial in nature, as two parties engage in ... more An important kind of conversation is essentially adversarial in nature, as two parties engage in debate about a subject matter of common interest. How are such conversations to be properly conducted, from a specifically epistemic point of view? It is argued that the intellectual virtues are crucially important to answering this question. In particular, it is maintained that an intellectual virtues-based conception of good arguing is preferable to alternative ways of thinking of about good arguing in purely formal or strategic terms, in that it can capture what is attractive about these proposals while also avoiding some fundamental problems that they face.
Understanding and Conscious Experience: Philosophical and Scientific Perspectives
An account is offered of the nature and value of understanding. In particular, an explanation of ... more An account is offered of the nature and value of understanding. In particular, an explanation of the special value of understanding is presented which flows from the account given of its nature. In terms of the nature of understanding, it is argued that it essentially involves a strong kind of cognitive achievement. This explains the distinctive relationship that understanding bears to epistemic luck and thus how it diverges from propositional knowledge, such that it is usually a more demanding epistemic standing but not always (as in cases of environmental epistemic luck). It is then shown how treating understanding as a strong cognitive achievement can account for its special value, both in broad terms and in terms of epistemic value specifically.
Overcoming the Myth of Neutrality: Expertise for a New World (Routledge)
A common phenomenon in contemporary life is the discovery of experts acting contrary to the publi... more A common phenomenon in contemporary life is the discovery of experts acting contrary to the public advice that they have given, such as an epidemiologist being found to have personally flouted a COVID lockdown that they recommended. Such behaviour on the part of experts can naturally lead to a distrust of expertise (and certainly a distrust of their expertise), especially when the advice of experts leads to restrictions on everyday freedoms. Such is the problem of hypocritical experts. It is argued, however, that not all behaviour on the part of experts that’s contrary to their public advice is hypocritical. Moreover, it is further contended that there can even be occasions where such hypocrisy is not a reason to doubt the expert advice. The goal of this paper is thus to answer two closely related questions. First, what exactly is involved in being a hypocritical expert? Second, when does such hypocrisy make it reasonable to downgrade one’s confidence in that expert’s advice?
An overview of epistemological disjunctivism is offered, including its relationship to metaphysic... more An overview of epistemological disjunctivism is offered, including its relationship to metaphysical disjunctivism. Particular focus is then placed on how such a thesis might be cast specifically in terms of evidence. Two issues in particular are discussed: (i) how to locate the proposal within the epistemic externalism/internalism distinction; and (ii) how one might motivate the viability of the proposal.
The axiological account of deep disagreements is described and defended. This proposal understand... more The axiological account of deep disagreements is described and defended. This proposal understands this notion in terms of the existential importance of the topic of disagreement. It is argued that this account provides a straightforward explanation for the main features of deep disagreements. This proposal is then compared to the contemporary popular view that deep disagreements are essentially hinge disagreements—i.e., disagreements concerning clashes of one’s hinge commitments, in the sense described by the later Wittgenstein. It is claimed that hinge disagreements are only plausibly deep disagreements insofar as there can be a specific class of hinge commitments that are axiological in nature, thereby lending further support to the axiological account of deep disagreement.
Epistemic virtues are character traits conducive to principled ways of thinking, leading to a lif... more Epistemic virtues are character traits conducive to principled ways of thinking, leading to a life of flourishing. Recent years have witnessed an emergence of theoretical accounts describing how they develop. However, few if any studies have conducted rigorous empirical investigation into the mechanisms of intellectual virtue development. In this study, we review several significant frameworks before utilizing a randomized, pretest/posttest control trial design to understand the impacts of a novel thinking disposition intervention on intellectual virtue growth. We ascertain the direct and indirect effects of the intervention on four key intellectual virtues: curiosity, humility, integrity, and tenacity. Additionally, we test theoretical mediators of virtue learning. Clear evidence favoring a theory-inspired mediator is observed, though we observe weaker signals of direct effects, with nuances across the virtues. For instance, tenacity and curiosity variables appear to respond more to the intervention than do humility and integrity. Findings are discussed in light of contemporary theoretical perspectives.
Adam Carter has recently presented a novel puzzle about extended knowledge – i.e. knowledge that ... more Adam Carter has recently presented a novel puzzle about extended knowledge – i.e. knowledge that results from extended cognitive processes. He argues that allowing for this kind of knowledge on the face of it entails that there could be instances of knowledge that are simply ‘engineered’ into the subject. The problem is that such engineered knowledge does not look genuine given that it results from processes that bypass the cognitive agency of the subject. Carter’s solution is to argue that we need to impose an additional autonomy condition on knowledge that excludes such cases of non-autonomous knowledge. In response, two points of criticism are offered. First, that when extended knowledge is properly understood, virtue-theoretic accounts of knowledge can already exclude non-autonomous knowledge without the need of an additional epistemic condition. Second, that the cases that Carter offers of putatively non-autonomous knowledge involve the inclusive folk notion of belief rather than the more restrictive notion of belief that is relevant to epistemology (K-apt belief). Once it is recognized that the belief condition on knowledge concerns this more restrictive notion, then we already have the means to exclude cases of non-autonomous knowledge (regardless of which theory of knowledge one favors).
Practices of Truth in Philosophy: Historical and Comparative Perspectives, (eds.) P. Gori & L. Serini, (London: Routledge)., 2023
What does it mean for truth to be a fundamental value? I outline a way of unpacking this idea tha... more What does it mean for truth to be a fundamental value? I outline a way of unpacking this idea that doesn't collapse under the weight of implausible implications, including the following: that one should value all truths equally (i.e., no matter how trivial that truth might be); that one should prefer truth to knowledge or understanding; that the value of truth should trump all other considerations (including practical, ethical, aesthetic, and so on); and that there cannot be truths that one is unable accept or otherwise fully embrace. The discussion proceeds by way of reflections on, inter alia, Nietzsche's claim that the truth is terrible and Wittgenstein's contention that all rational evaluation presupposes an overarching groundless certainty.
Illuminating Errors: New Essays on Knowledge from Non-Knowledge
There are a class of examples that appear to show that one can gain knowledge via reasoning from ... more There are a class of examples that appear to show that one can gain knowledge via reasoning from a falsehood. The problem that such examples pose is to explain why knowledge can be acquired in such cases given that in general drawing inferences from false beliefs, even if the inferred belief is true, does not result in knowledge. A safety-based rationale is offered in this regard, along with the kind of motivation for safety offered by anti-risk epistemology. It is maintained that such a rationale is at best incomplete, however, and that for a fuller account of how knowledge can be acquired from error we need to turn to the theory of knowledge offered by anti-risk virtue epistemology.
Abstract: This paper explores the thesis that the overarching goal of education is to cultivate v... more Abstract: This paper explores the thesis that the overarching goal of education is to cultivate virtuous intellectual character. It is shown how finally valuing the truth is central to this theory on account of how such valuing is pivotal to intellectual virtues. This feature of the proposal might be thought to be problematic for a number of reasons. For example, it could be argued that truth is not valuable, that insisting on valuing the truth in educational contexts could be politically dubious, or that there is something unduly prescriptive about an educational methodology that has this component. It is argued, however, that many of these grounds for concern are not sound on closer inspection. Properly understood, educating for virtuous intellectual character, even once the truth-valuing aspect of this thesis is made explicit, should not be a contentious proposal.
Michael Bergmann (2021) has written a sophisticated monograph on radical skepticism that offers a... more Michael Bergmann (2021) has written a sophisticated monograph on radical skepticism that offers a distinctive kind of commonsense response to this difficulty. My critical concern is not with the virtues of this text, however, of which there are many, but with what I take to be a fundamental lacuna at the heart of the project, which is Bergmann’s failure to fully interrogate philosophical appeals to commonsense in the context of the sceptical problem. As I hope to show, this lacuna constitutes more than the kind of strategic decision that all monograph writers must make (one can’t cover everything, after all), but potentially undermines the positive anti-sceptical project that Bergmann develops.
Ignorance is a neglected issue in philosophy. For at least two reasons, this is surprising. First... more Ignorance is a neglected issue in philosophy. For at least two reasons, this is surprising. First, contrary to what one might expect, it is not clear what ignorance is. Some philosophers say or assume that it is lack of knowledge, whereas others claim or presuppose that it is absence of true belief. What is one ignorant of when one is ignorant? And how does ignorance of a specific fact relate to ignorance on some topic or to being an ignorant person (an ignoramus)?
Second, ignorance is of crucial importance in several domains of life, but the roles it plays in those domains have mostly received little attention. In the epistemic realm, ignorance might unexpectedly have some epistemic value, focusing on ignorance sheds new light on knowledge and epistemic justification, and the concept of culpable ignorance returns time and again in religious epistemology. In the moral realm, ignorance is sometimes considered as an excuse, some specific kind of ignorance seems to be implied by a moral character, and ignorance is closely related to moral risk. Finally, ignorance has certain social dimensions: it has been claimed to be the engine of science, it seems to be entailed by privacy and secrecy, and it is widely thought to constitute a legal excuse in certain circumstances. But if the nature of ignorance is more elusive than one would initially think and if ignorance plays a pivotal role in such important realms of life as the epistemic, the moral, and the social domains, then one could hardly wish for a better object of philosophical analysis and discussion.
The focus of this edited collection is on the epistemic dimension of ignorance. This volume addresses such issues as the nature of ignorance, the contextual dimension of ignorance, the epistemic value of ignorance, and social epistemological issues pertaining to ignorance. Together, these topics will add depth and insight into the question of how ignorance should be understood epistemologically. It will be the first in its kind in having as its focus exactly those problems associated with this dimension. It will draw together twelve commissioned chapters that are written by leading philosophers in the field and that represent diverse reflections on a rich topic.
Inference to the best explanation—or, IBE—tells us to infer from the available evidence to the hy... more Inference to the best explanation—or, IBE—tells us to infer from the available evidence to the hypothesis which would, if correct, best explain that evidence. As Peter Lipton (2000, 184) puts it, the core idea driving IBE is that explanatory considerations
are a guide to inference. But what is the epistemic status of IBE, itself? One issue of contemporary interest (e.g., Boyd 1985; Psillos 1999; Boghossian 2001; Enoch & Schechter 2008) is whether it is possible to provide a justification for IBE itself which is non-objectionably circular. We aim to carve out some new space in this debate. In particular, we suggest that the matter of whether a given rule-circular argument is objectionably circular itself depends crucially on some subtle distinctions which have been made in the recent literature on perceptual warrant. By bringing these debates together, a principled reason emerges for why some kinds of rule-circular justifications for IBE are considerably less objectionable than others.
Conversation, dialogue, reasonable disagreement, and the acquisition of knowledge through the wor... more Conversation, dialogue, reasonable disagreement, and the acquisition of knowledge through the words of others, all of this has always been at the center of philosophers’ concerns since the emergence of philosophy in Ancient Greece. It is also important to recognize that in contemporary philosophy, marked by the linguistic turn, there is a wealth of intellectual production on ethical (e.g. McKenna 2012), psycho-linguistic (e.g. Clark 1996), logical-linguistic (e.g. Grice 1989) and pragmatic (e.g. Walton 1992) aspects of the conversation. Despite all this, this is the first collection of texts dedicated exclusively to the strictly epistemic aspects of this phenomenon which is so decisive for the very constitution of our humanity. This book brings together the contributions of fifteen leading philosophers on some of the most relevant issues of what we could call the Epistemology of Conversation.
O disjuntivismo epistemológico─pelo menos como eu defendi a posição─sustenta que, em casos paradi... more O disjuntivismo epistemológico─pelo menos como eu defendi a posição─sustenta que, em casos paradigmáticos de conhecimento perceptivo, o agente sabe em virtude de ter suporte racional que é tanto factivo (i.e. ele implica a proposição alvo) quanto acessível reflexivamente. Em particular, a posição mantém que o agente pode ter conhecimento perceptivo de que p em virtude de ver que p, em que ver que p é factivo, e é acessível reflexivamente ao agente que ele vê que p.
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already have the means to exclude cases of non-autonomous knowledge
(regardless of which theory of knowledge one favors).
already have the means to exclude cases of non-autonomous knowledge
(regardless of which theory of knowledge one favors).
Second, ignorance is of crucial importance in several domains of life, but the roles it plays in those domains have mostly received little attention. In the epistemic realm, ignorance might unexpectedly have some epistemic value, focusing on ignorance sheds new light on knowledge and epistemic justification, and the concept of culpable ignorance returns time and again in religious epistemology. In the moral realm, ignorance is sometimes considered as an excuse, some specific kind of ignorance seems to be implied by a moral character, and ignorance is closely related to moral risk. Finally, ignorance has certain social dimensions: it has been claimed to be the engine of science, it seems to be entailed by privacy and secrecy, and it is widely thought to constitute a legal excuse in certain circumstances. But if the nature of ignorance is more elusive than one would initially think and if ignorance plays a pivotal role in such important realms of life as the epistemic, the moral, and the social domains, then one could hardly wish for a better object of philosophical analysis and discussion.
The focus of this edited collection is on the epistemic dimension of ignorance. This volume addresses such issues as the nature of ignorance, the contextual dimension of ignorance, the epistemic value of ignorance, and social epistemological issues pertaining to ignorance. Together, these topics will add depth and insight into the question of how ignorance should be understood epistemologically. It will be the first in its kind in having as its focus exactly those problems associated with this dimension. It will draw together twelve commissioned chapters that are written by leading philosophers in the field and that represent diverse reflections on a rich topic.
Editors: Martijn Blaauw, Rik Peels
are a guide to inference. But what is the epistemic status of IBE, itself? One issue of contemporary interest (e.g., Boyd 1985; Psillos 1999; Boghossian 2001; Enoch & Schechter 2008) is whether it is possible to provide a justification for IBE itself which is non-objectionably circular. We aim to carve out some new space in this debate. In particular, we suggest that the matter of whether a given rule-circular argument is objectionably circular itself depends crucially on some subtle distinctions which have been made in the recent literature on perceptual warrant. By bringing these debates together, a principled reason emerges for why some kinds of rule-circular justifications for IBE are considerably less objectionable than others.