EPISTEMOLOGICAL DISJUNCTIVISM AND EVIDENCE

For Routledge Companion to Evidence, (eds.) M. Lasonen-Aarnio & C. Littlejohn, (Routledge). EPISTEMOLOGICAL DISJUNCTIVISM AND EVIDENCE DUNCAN PRITCHARD University of California, Irvine dhpritch@uci.edu ABSTRACT. An overview of epistemological disjunctivism is offered, including its relationship to metaphysical disjunctivism. Particular focus is then placed on how such a thesis might be cast specifically in terms of evidence. Two issues in particular are discussed: (i) how to locate the proposal within the epistemic externalism/internalism distinction; and (ii) how one might motivate the viability of the proposal. KEYWORDS: Disjunctivism; Epistemic Externalism/Internalism; Epistemological Disjunctivism; Epistemology; Evidence. BIO: Duncan Pritchard is UC Distinguished Professor of Philosophy and Director of the Center for Knowledge, Technology & Society at the University of California, Irvine. His monographs include Epistemic Luck (Oxford UP, 2005), The Nature and Value of Knowledge (co-authored, Oxford UP, 2010), Epistemological Disjunctivism (Oxford UP, 2012), and Epistemic Angst (Princeton UP, 2015). 1. INTRODUCTORY REMARKS Disjunctivist views about the content of perceptual experience have been defended for some time, often as part of a broadly naïve realist account of perception. Very roughly, such views hold that there is no common metaphysical component of both ordinary veridical experience (the ‘good case’), and corresponding indistinguishable experiences involving hallucination, such as when one is brain-in-a-vat (BIV) being ‘fed’ one’s experiences by supercomputers (the ‘bad case’).1 Rather, such experiences are on this view different in kind, in that the content of the former experience is at least partly determined by it being a veridical perception in a way that the content of the latter experience cannot be determined. (Of course, there is a negative epistemological property that is in common to both experiences, which is that they are indistinguishable, but the point is that this 2 property doesn’t pick out a significant metaphysical property). Call disjunctivism of this kind metaphysical disjunctivism. Given that the content of one’s experiences can have a bearing on the evidential or rational support that is available for one’s perceptual beliefs, then there is a direct connection between metaphysical disjunctivism and the epistemic support one’s perceptual beliefs enjoy. In particular, we should not conclude that just because a pairing of good/bad case experiences are indistinguishable to the agent concerned that the epistemic support offered by the experience in the good case can be no better than the epistemic support offered by the experience in the bad case. Instead, if metaphysical disjunctivism is true, then it may well be that the epistemic support one’s experiences generate in the good case is significantly better than the epistemic support generated by the indistinguishable experiences had in the corresponding bad case.2 In what follows, we will focus our attention not on metaphysical disjunctivism, but rather on its sister position, epistemological disjunctivism. The core difference between the two is that whereas metaphysical disjunctivism offers a metaphysical position from which one might be able to extract some surprising epistemological consequences, epistemological disjunctivism offers an epistemological position that delivers those surprising epistemological consequences directly. With the two proposals differentiated, we can then ask what the logical relationships are between metaphysical and epistemological disjunctivism. Does the former entail the latter? Does the latter entail the former? Or is the relationship between the two views less a matter of logical entailment and more one of dialectical affiliation? For example, one might plausibly contend that it is hard to make sense of the philosophical motivation for epistemological disjunctivism without a prior commitment to metaphysical disjunctivism. In any case, these further questions are largely orthogonal to the purposes of this piece. On the one hand, if metaphysical disjunctivism doesn’t have interesting epistemological consequences, then it’s bearing on evidence won’t be of concern to us. On the other hand, if epistemological disjunctivism is true, then it has ramifications for the nature of evidence regardless of whether this position entails (or otherwise leads to) metaphysical disjunctivism. It follows that our proper concern here is directly with the evidential ramifications of epistemological disjunctivism. 2. EPISTEMOLOGICAL DISJUNCTIVISM There is a standard version of epistemological disjunctivism in the contemporary epistemological literature. It is derived from earlier work by John McDowell (e.g., 1995), but the main presentation of the view is due to myself.3 According to this proposal, in epistemically paradigm cases of 3 perceptual knowledge, one’s knowledge is supported by rational support that is both factive and reflectively accessible. In particular, in such cases one’s reflectively accessible rational support for knowing that p is that one sees that p, where seeing that p entails p (and hence is factive). We can see why the position is an epistemological form of disjunctivism by seeing how it plays out in a pairing of experiences in a good case (i.e., a scenario where the conditions are epistemically paradigmatic) and a corresponding indistinguishable bad case (e.g., a radical sceptical scenario, such as the BIV case). One might naturally suppose that since one is unable to distinguish between the experiences had in the good and the bad case, then the rational support enjoyed by one’s beliefs in the good case can be no better than the rational support enjoyed by one’s belief in the bad case.4 After all, for all one can tell, one might be in the bad case, so how is one to have rational support for one’s beliefs that would be unavailable in the bad case? Epistemological disjunctivism runs directly counter to this thought, however, since it maintains that there is rational support reflectively available to the subject that is unavailable to the subject’s counterpart in the bad case. After all, since the subject is radically deceived in the bad case, she can hardly be in a position to see that p, not least because p is almost certainly false, but even if it does happen to be true, the subject in our bad case is not going to stand in the robust epistemic relationship to p of seeing that p.5 At best, the rational support reflectively available to the subject in the bad case is going to be that of seeming to see that p, which is obviously a non-factive rational standing.6 The upshot is that rather than one’s rational support in the good case being no better than it is in the corresponding bad case, it can instead be significantly superior. Moreover, proponents of epistemological disjunctivism maintain that there is no common rational core to the rational standing of the subject’s belief in the good and bad cases, as if one could simply understand the rational standing in the good case as being the rational standing available in the bad case supplemented by some additional rational support. Rather, the difference in rational support is one of kind. Seeing that p cannot be decomposed into, say, merely seeming to see that p plus some other additional rational support. The difference between the two rational standings is thus one of kind and not merely of degree. We thus have the disjunctive aspect of epistemological disjunctivism: either one is in the good case and enjoys factive rational support, or one is in the bad case and enjoys, at best, non-factive rational support (with there being no significant common core of rational support which applies to both cases).7 There are a few things to note about our characterization of epistemological disjunctivism. First, in common with metaphysical disjunctivism, the thesis is primarily about perception. That said, the view might well be extendable to other sources of knowledge—such as memory, testimony, and so on—though we will not be exploring these possibilities here.8 Second, this is a 4 thesis only about epistemically paradigm cases of perceptual knowledge, and not a thesis about perceptual knowledge in general.9 Third, epistemological disjunctivism is explicitly cast in terms of rational support rather than evidence. This last point requires further discussion, given the evidential focus of this piece. Can we straightforwardly translate claims about reasons into claims about evidence? I think many in contemporary epistemology would regard such a replacement as largely harmless. Aren’t one’s reasons one’s evidence? That is, if my reason for believing that my car has been stolen is that the policewoman testified to this effect, then isn’t such testimony also the evidence I have for believing that my car is stolen? Moreover, doesn’t one’s evidence have to be available to one in order for it to count as one’s evidence? If so, then isn’t it as available to one as one’s reasons are? For example, the policewoman’s testimony is only your evidence because you are aware of it; had you not been, then it wouldn’t be your evidence at all. But, insofar as you are aware of it, then it can also function as your reasons for believing the target proposition. For what it is worth, my own view on these matters is that reasons and evidence play such different roles in our epistemic economy that replacements of this kind are usually far from harmless. But it will take us too far afield to explore these issues here.10 Accordingly, I will follow the mainstream and straightforwardly translate the rational support in play in epistemological disjunctivism into evidential terms. We thus get the view that in epistemologically paradigm cases of perceptual knowledge one’s belief in the target proposition is supported by reflectively accessible factive evidence.11 We also get a corresponding account of what is disjunctive about epistemological disjunctivism, so characterized. Either one is in the good case, and hence enjoys reflectively accessible factive evidence (provided by one seeing that p), or one is in the corresponding indistinguishable bad case and only enjoys, at best, reflectively accessible nonfactive evidence (e.g., provided by one seeming to see that p). Moreover, there is no significant common core to the evidential standing in the good case and the corresponding evidential standing in the bad case, such that one cannot decompose the factive evidential standing in the good case into the non-factive evidential standing in the bad case supplemented by additional evidence. Rather, the evidential difference in play here is one of kind rather than degree. 3. CLASSICAL AND NON-CLASSICAL FORMS OF EPISTEMIC INTERNALISM One can best appreciate the radical nature of epistemological disjunctivism by seeing how it constitutes a non-classical form of epistemic internalism. Classical forms of epistemic internalism tend to endorse the following three theses (here expressed, given our current concerns, in terms of 5 evidence rather than reasons or some other epistemic standing): Accessibilism S’s internalist epistemic support for believing that j is constituted solely by facts that S can know by reflection alone.12 Mentalism S’s internalist epistemic support for believing that j is constituted solely by S’s mental states.13 The New Evil Genius (NEG) S’s internalist epistemic support for believing that j is constituted solely by properties that S has in common with her recently envatted physical duplicate.14 There are debates amongst epistemic internalists regarding which of these theses holds the ‘whip hand’ when it comes to determining the nature of epistemic internalism, but one can easily see why a commitment to all three theses would tend to go together.15 Plausibly, after all, the reason why one’s mental states play the role in determining the evidential standing of one’s beliefs that mentalism describes is that one has the kind of reflective access to one’s mental states that is at issue in accessibilism. Conversely, one could argue, in line with accessibilism, that we are interested in that which is reflectively accessible when it comes to evidential standing precisely because that relation picks out one’s mental states and they are key to determining evidential standing, in line with accessibilism. Moreover, the path from accessiblism and mentalism to (NEG) is also fairly straightforward. If evidential support is to be understood in terms of one’s reflectively accessible mental states, as accessibism and mentalism maintain, then it is hard to see how the evidential support one’s beliefs enjoys in the good case can be any better than the evidential support enjoyed by one’s beliefs in the corresponding bad case. After all, the experiences in play in these two scenarios are ex hypothesi indistinguishable to the subject concerned, and so presumably there cannot be evidence that is reflectively accessible to the subject in the good case that is not also reflectively accessible to one’s counterpart in the bad case. Classical forms of epistemic externalism, in contrast, reject all three theses. Take process reliabilism, for example.16 According to this proposal, it is the reliability of one’s belief-forming processes that determine epistemic standing, and hence would be relevant to determining the strength of one’s evidence. Such a proposal would not satisfy any of the three conditions for classical epistemic internalism just set out. It would not satisfy accessibilism, since whether or not a process is reliable is not something that will usually be reflectively accessible to the subject. It would not satisfy mentalism, since the evidential support one’s beliefs enjoys is determined by the reliability of the processes in play, and does not have anything essentially to do with one’s mental states. And it would not satisfy (NEG), because one’s beliefs in the good case, where the beliefforming processes in play will tend to be highly reliable, will enjoy stronger levels of evidential 6 support than the beliefs of one’s counterpart in the bad case, where few, if any, of the beliefforming processes in play will be reliable. Classical epistemic internalism thus accepts all three of these theses, while classical epistemic externalism rejects all three. Epistemological disjunctivism is a non-classical form of epistemic internalism in that it accepts at least one and rejects at least one of these classical epistemic internalist theses. In particular, whereas epistemological disjunctivism explicitly endorses accessibilism, and is compatible with mentalism, it rejects (NEG). Before explaining why this is the case, there is an important caveat we need to add here. Recall that epistemological disjunctivism is only a thesis about perceptual knowledge in epistemically paradigm conditions. As such, when one says that the view endorses, for example, accessibilism, this is to be understood only in terms of what the view is committed to with regard to epistemically paradigm cases of perceptual knowledge. In particular, there is nothing to prevent a proponent of epistemological disjunctivism from being an epistemic externalist about knowledge in general (and thus also about evidence, specifically).17 With this caveat in play, we can easily see why epistemological disjunctivism is committed to accessibilism, since it holds that one’s factive evidential support in the good case should be reflectively accessible. Moreover, we can also see the consistency with mentalism, so long as we allow that seeing that p is a mental state. Note, however, that this move is much more controversial, since proponents of mentalism usually assume a conception of mental states that involves only narrow content, and hence which would exclude factive mental states like seeing that p.18 Still, we can at least say this much: that epistemological disjunctivism is compatible with mentalism to the extent that we do not add this further restriction regarding types of mental state that qualify. What epistemological disjunctivism is committed to denying is precisely (NEG). This is because, as seen above, it is a fundamental commitment of the proposal that one’s evidential support in the good case is factive, and hence clearly superior to the evidential support available to one’s counterpart in the bad case, which is at most non-factive.19 Epistemological disjunctivism thus constitutes a non-classical form of epistemic internalism, in that while it endorses at least one core epistemic internalist thesis, it also rejects at least one core epistemic internalist thesis.20 4. THE VIABILITY OF EPISTEMOLOGICAL DISJUNCTIVISM One of the big questions facing epistemological disjunctivism is whether it is a viable position. Indeed, until relatively recently it was a view that was not explicitly considered by mainstream 7 epistemologists since it was held to be completely untenable. Part of the reason for this is the supposed inherent plausibility of (NEG), a claim that even epistemic externalists will usually grant is constitutive of epistemic internalism.21 In particular, epistemological disjunctivism seems to be trying to do something that is simply impossible, which is to fuse core elements of epistemic internalism and epistemic externalism. On the one hand, epistemological disjunctivism is meant to capture epistemic internalist insights by demanding that one’s evidential support is reflectively accessible. But, on the other hand, the view also tries to capture epistemic externalist insights by arguing that such reflectively accessible evidential support can nonetheless have worldly import, in virtue of being factive. According to traditional ways of understanding the epistemic externalism/internalism distinction, such an intermediate position is not credible¾either the evidential support is reflectively accessible, in which case it can’t have worldly import (much less be factive), or the evidential support is factive, in which case it can’t be reflectively accessible. The way that proponents of epistemological disjunctivism have gone about demonstrating the viability of this proposal is via a three-stage process. First, to show that our everyday epistemic practices are shot-through with appeals to factive evidence. Second, to demonstrate that epistemological disjunctivism is a view that we would want to endorse were it available.22 Finally, third, to argue to the effect that the reasons offered for rejecting epistemological disjunctivism are unsound, where this can be shown without appealing to anything independently controversial (much less anything that would already commit one to epistemological disjunctivism). Note that this is an essentially negative way of defending the view. That is, it is shown that the arguments against epistemological disjunctivism are dubious and hence, since it is part of our everyday epistemic practices and an otherwise attractive position to hold, that we should endorse it.23 Let’s take these three stages in turn. That our everyday epistemic practices naturally involve appeal to factive evidence ought to be relatively unproblematic. Suppose I am on the phone to my boss, who expresses scepticism that a colleague is in work today (perhaps because she tends to skip work whenever the boss is away). I might well naturally respond to such scepticism by saying that I know that she’s in work because I can see that she’s here—she’s right in front of me. Indeed, in the circumstances it would be very odd if I backed up my claim to know by appealing to something that fell short of this factive evidence, such as by saying that it merely seems to me as if she in front of me right now. The more qualified latter claim would only be appropriate in very special kinds of conditions¾such as when one has been offered grounds for thinking that what one sees is not to be relied upon (e.g., an hallucinogenic has been slipped into one’s coffee)¾and would make no sense at all in conditions which one takes to be epistemically paradigm. Of course, even the opponent of epistemological disjunctivism can accept this point 8 about our everyday epistemic practices. But they will contend that we shouldn’t take such practices at face-value. Second, the claim that epistemological disjunctivism is an attractive position, if true. Again, I take this to be relatively uncontroversial, in that even opponents of epistemological disjunctivism will likely grant this claim (in that they will focus instead on whether the position is true, rather than whether it is attractive). Part of the attraction of the view resides in the fact already noted that it offers a way of accommodating both epistemic externalist and internalist insights. Classical epistemic internalism seems to cut-off evidential standing from worldly import, in that, in line with (NEG), the best kind of evidential standing that our beliefs can enjoy is nonetheless entirely compatible with massive error in our beliefs (i.e., of a kind that would hold in a radical sceptical bad case, such as a BIV scenario). In contrast, classical epistemic externalism ensures that the evidential standing of our beliefs can have genuine worldly import, but does so by making such evidence opaque to us, in that it is no longer by its nature reflectively accessible. Epistemological disjunctivism steers a midway course between both views by ensuring that our reflectively accessible evidence can have worldly import (indeed, worldly import of the strongest kind, in virtue of being factive). Moreover, if we can make sense of such a position, then it has the potential to offer new ways of approaching age-old epistemological problems. Consider, for example, the problem of radical scepticism, which has bedeviled philosophy for millennia (or, at least, centuries anyway, if we confine our attention to the specifically Cartesian variety of this problem). Radical sceptical arguments essentially trade on the fact that the evidential support our beliefs enjoy, even in the very best cases, can be no better than that enjoyed by the beliefs held by our counterparts who are subject to radical sceptical scenarios, such as the BIV scenario. With this claim in place, it becomes relatively easy for proponents of radical scepticism to leverage their radical sceptical conclusions. And yet epistemological disjunctivism, if true, offers a way of cutting off this sceptical line of argument at source, via its rejection of (NEG).24 The case for epistemological disjunctivism thus ultimately turns on whether it can block the arguments against its viability. It would take us too far afield to consider all of the objections one can put to epistemological disjunctivism, so let me instead focus on what I take to be the most serious objection.25 All parties to this debate, including epistemological disjunctivists, will grant that good and bad cases are, ex hypothesi, indistinguishable to the subject concerned. And yet, if epistemological disjunctivism is true, then there is something reflectively accessible to the subject in the good case¾viz., the factive reason¾that is unavailable to the subject in the bad case. Given that this is so, why can’t the subject in the good case reflectively access the factive reason and on this basis come to know that she is in the good case rather than the bad case? The problem is that, 9 if this is so, then it seems that the subject in the good case can come to know that she is in the good case rather than the bad case, and hence can in a sense distinguish between good and bad cases, something which, ex hypothesi, she is meant to be unable to do. Call this the distinguishability problem for epistemological disjunctivism. The way epistemological disjunctivists respond to this problem is by arguing that there can be ways of knowing the difference which aren’t thereby ways of telling the difference, where the latter involves a specific discriminative capacity. Moreover, they contend that this is a distinction that all epistemologists should accept, and hence that it is dialectically available to the epistemological disjunctivist (i.e., it is not a thesis that in any way already presupposes a commitment to epistemological disjunctivism). Set aside epistemological disjunctivism for a moment, and consider a case where a subject comes to know, via perception, that there is a zebra in the enclosure before her at the zoo. In normal circumstances, the kind of perceptual abilities needed to identify a zebra as such are fairly limited. In particular, one would not need to possess the rather special perceptual ability to discriminate between zebras and cleverly disguised mules. Now imagine that someone raises the possibility that the creature might be a cleverly disguised mule. Note that they are not offering evidence in support of this alternative scenario, but merely raising it as an alternative scenario. Given that one cannot discriminate between zebras and cleverly disguised mules, does one still know that the creature before one is a zebra? Well, if this is still known, it is not in virtue of one’s perceptual abilities alone, since they are, by stipulation, entirely silent about this possibility. But notice that this is not the only epistemic support that one has available in this case. In particular, at least as far as most mature subjects go, there will be a wealth of background evidence that one can bring to bear which collectively excludes this error-possibility, such as what one knows about well-run zoos, the plausibility of such a deception, the likelihood that such a deception would be spotted before long, the costs involved in undertaking such a deception, and so on.26 With this background evidence suitably marshaled, one is in an evidential position to enable one to know that the creature before one is a zebra rather than a cleverly disguised mule even though one cannot perceptually discriminate between zebras and cleverly disguised mules.27 The point is that with this distinction in play, the epistemological disjunctivist can appeal to this distinction to explain why one might be able to know that one is in the good case rather than the bad case. Just as in the scenario we have described, the error-possibility at issue is not evidentially motivated, but merely raised as a possibility. Moreover, with epistemological disjunctivism in play the subject has available to her a distinctive form of evidential support that is factive. Putting these two points together, the subject in the good case has a reflective route 10 available to her where she can rationally conclude that she is in the good case rather than the bad case. But this is entirely compatible with the undeniable fact that one lacks a discriminative faculty that enables one to distinguish between good and bad cases. 5. CONCLUDING REMARKS Of course, merely showing how epistemological disjunctivism might deal with a core objection that it faces is not the same as offering a full defence of the view. But at least it demonstrates that epistemological disjunctivism has resources available to meet objections (and recall also that the objection just considered is claimed to be the most difficult one facing the view). We have, then, at least a prima facie case for the viability of the position. Given the points made above about the way in which such a position seems rooted in our everyday epistemic practices, and the attraction of such a position if it were true, this makes the view very worthy of our further consideration, particularly given that it occupies such a distinctive and unorthodox position in the normal taxonomy of epistemological proposals.28 11 REFERENCES BonJour, L. (1985). The Structure of Empirical Knowledge, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Dretske, F. (1969). Seeing and Knowing, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Cassam, Q. (2007). ‘Ways of Knowing’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 107, 339–58. Chisholm, R. M. (1977). 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Chakrabarti, 195–224, Dordrecht: Kluwer. ¾¾ (1995). ‘Knowledge and the Internal’, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 55, 877-93. Neta, R. (2016). ‘How Holy is the Disjunctivist Grail?’, Journal of Philosophical Research 41, 193-200. Neta, R., & Pritchard, D. H. (2007). ‘McDowell and the New Evil Genius’ Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 74, 381-96. Pritchard, D. H. (2007). ‘How to be a Neo-Moorean’, Internalism and Externalism in Semantics and Epistemology, (ed.) S. Goldberg, 68-99, Oxford: Oxford University Press. ¾¾ (2008). ‘McDowellian Neo-Mooreanism’, Disjunctivism: Perception, Action, Knowledge, (eds.) A. Haddock & F. Macpherson, 283-310, Oxford: Oxford University Press. ¾¾ (2010). ‘Relevant Alternatives, Perceptual Knowledge, and Discrimination’, Noûs 44, 24568. ¾¾ (2011a). ‘Epistemological Disjunctivism and the Basis Problem’, Philosophical Issues 21, 43455. ¾¾ (2011b). ‘Evidentialism, Internalism, Disjunctivism’, Evidentialism and its Discontents, (ed.) T. 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Doyle, J. Milburn & D. H. Pritchard, 41-58, London: Routledge. ¾¾ (2023). ‘Moderate Knowledge Externalism’, Externalism About Knowledge, (ed.) L R. G. Oliveira, 131-49, Oxford: Oxford University Press. ¾¾ (Forthcoming). ‘Shadowlands’, The New Evil Demon: New Essays on Knowledge, Justification and Rationality, (eds.) F. Dorsch & J. Dutant, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Pritchard, D. H., & Ranalli, C. (2017). ‘Scepticism and Disjunctivism’, Skepticism: From Antiquity to the Present, (eds.) D. Machuca & B. Reed, 652-67, London: Bloomsbury. Schönbaumsfeld, G. (2015). ‘Epistemological Disjunctivism, by Duncan Pritchard’, Analysis 75, 604-15. ¾¾ (2016). The Illusion of Doubt, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Snowdon, P. (1980–1). ‘Perception, Vision and Causation’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society (new series) 81, 175–92. ¾¾ (1990–1). ‘The Objects of Perceptual Experience’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society (suppl. vol.) 64, 121–50. Soteriou, M. (2014). ‘The Disjunctive Theory of Perception’, Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, (ed.) E. Zalta, http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/perception-disjunctive/. Turri, J. (2010). ‘Does Perceiving Entail Knowing?’, Theoria 76, 197–206. Vogel, J. (1990). ‘Cartesian Skepticism and Inference to the Best Explanation’, Journal of Philosophy 87, 658-66. Williamson, T. (2000a). Knowledge and its Limits, Oxford: Oxford University Press. ¾¾ (2000b). ‘Scepticism and Evidence’, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 60, 613–28. Wittgenstein, L. (1969). On Certainty, (eds.) G. E. M. Anscombe & G. H. von Wright, (tr.) D. Paul & G. E. M. Anscombe, Blackwell, Oxford. Zalabardo, J. (2015). ‘Epistemic Disjunctivism and the Evidential Problem’ Analysis 75, 615-27. 13 NOTES Note that for convenience I have immediately opted for an illustrative instance of the bad case that involves a radical sceptical scenario. Bad cases needn’t be so radical, however¾a localised hallucination, for example, where one’s perception is disturbed only in some specific respect, could also count as a bad case. 2 For some of the key defences of metaphysical disjunctivism, see Hinton (1967a; 1967b; 1973), Snowdon (1980–1; 1990–1), and Martin (2002; 2004; 2006). For an excellent survey of the range of metaphysical disjunctivist positions on offer in the literature, see Soteriou (2014). See also Pritchard & Ranalli (2017) for a survey of disjunctivist views as they bear on the problem of radical scepticism. 3 See especially Prichard (2012). See also Neta & Pritchard (2007), Pritchard (2007; 2008; 2011a; 2011b; 2015a; 2018a; 2018b). For two recent symposia on Pritchard (2012), see: Littlejohn (2015), Pritchard (2015b; 2015c), Schönbaumsfeld (2015), and Zalabardo (2015); and Goldberg (2016), Littlejohn (2016), Neta (2016), and Pritchard (2016a; 2016b). See also Williamson’s (2000a; 2000b) knowledge-first account, which has some parallels with epistemological disjunctivism, but which is also sufficiently dissimilar that it is best to keep apart from the view (e.g., in that it is explicitly cast as a form of epistemic externalism rather than epistemic internalism). I briefly discuss this proposal at several junctures below¾see endnotes 11, 19 and 20. See also Pritchard (2011b). 4 Note that we are here setting aside the possibility that there might be independent rational support that could be brought to bear which enables one to rationally conclude that one is in the good case rather than the bad case, such as abductive reasons. See Vogel (1990) for a sophisticated defence of such a proposal. See Pritchard (2015, part 1) for a general critique of this sort of proposal, particularly as it might function in the context of a radical sceptical bad case. 5 Indeed, on standard views of seeing that p¾see Dretske (1969), Williamson (2000a, ch. 1), and Cassam (2007), for instance¾seeing that p actual entails knowing that p. But even on proposals that reject this entailment thesis¾e.g., Pritchard (2011a; 2012, part 1)¾it is still maintained that seeing that p is a robustly epistemic notion in that it necessarily puts one in an objectively good position to know that p. For further critical discussion of the putative entailment between seeing that p and knowing that p, see Turri (2010) 6 It’s actually far from clear what the epistemological disjunctivist should say about the subject’s rational standing in the bad case. See Pritchard (forthcoming) for discussion of this point. 7 The point about there being no significant common core of rational support which applies to both cases is to accommodate the point noted above with regard to metaphysical disjunctivism, which is that there is undeniably a negative epistemological property that is common to both cases¾i.e., that the cases are indistinguishable to the subject. 8 McDowell (1994; 1995) certainly seems amenable to this approach, even going so far as to suggest that it might work for inductive knowledge (which is arguably the least plausible domain to introduce epistemological disjunctivism). 9 See Pritchard (2011a; 2012, part 1) for an account of what makes a scenario epistemically paradigm. 10 Part of the issue here is that I think we in any case need a more nuanced conception of rational support, something which a straightforward translation between reasons and evidence will obscure. See Pritchard (forthcoming) for more on this point. 11 Interestingly, Williamson’s (2000a; 2000b) knowledge-first account¾which as noted above (see endnote 3) has some similarities to epistemological disjunctivism¾is directly expressed in terms of evidence rather than reasons. 12 For two key defences of accessibilism, see Chisholm (1977) and Bonjour (1985, ch. 2). 13 The locus classicus when it comes to defences of mentalism is Conee & Feldman (2004). 14 For two key defences of the new evil genius intuition, see Lehrer & Cohen (1983) and Cohen (1984). See also the excellent survey article of work on this topic by Littlejohn (2009). 15 Much of the debate is concerned with the relative merits of accessibilism or mentalism as the overarching account of epistemic internalism. See, for example, Conee & Feldman (2004). 16 Such a position is, of course, most closely associated with Goldman’s (1976; 1979; 1986; 1988) work. 17 Indeed, that is in fact my own position. See Pritchard (2019; 2023). 18 See, for example, Conee & Feldman (2004). 19 This is yet another juncture on which epistemological disjunctivism diverges from Williamson’s (2000a; 2000b) knowledge-first account¾which as noted above (see endnote 3) bears some noteworthy similarities¾in that the latter always treats evidence as factive (since it has probability 1), whereas epistemological disjunctivism is not committed to this claim. 20 Interestingly, Williamson’s (2000a; 2000b) knowledge-first approach, which as noted above (see endnote 3) bears some similarities to epistemological disjunctivism, is in fact a non-classical form epistemic externalism. This is because, unlike process reliabilism, it is at least consistent with one core epistemic internalist thesis, that of mentalism (at least on a liberal construal of this thesis). See Pritchard (2011b) for discussion of this point. 21 That is, standard forms of epistemic externalism often treat the intuitions behind (NEG) as something that needs to be accommodated by their own proposals. Consider, for example, how Goldman (1986; 1988) modifies his process reliabilism in order to account for why there might be a sense in which a subject’s epistemic position is no better than that enjoyed by her envatted counterpart. 1 14 22 As I rather provocatively put the point in Pritchard (2012, 1), epistemological disjunctivism is the “holy grail” of epistemology. 23 See Pritchard (2012) for just such a negative defence of epistemological disjunctivism along this three-stage line. See also McDowell (1995) for a similarly negative defence of the view, though as I explain in Pritchard (2012, part 3), McDowell’s defence is allied to a broader philosophical quietism. 24 For more details regarding how epistemological disjunctivism might be marshaled against radical scepticism, see Pritchard (2007; 2008; 2012). Note, however, that in more recent work I have argued that epistemological disjunctivism fares much better as an anti-sceptical strategy when it is paired with the kind of hinge epistemology outlined by Wittgenstein (1969). See, for example, Pritchard (2015a; 2018a; 2018b). 25 For a fuller list of objections against epistemological disjunctivism, and the development of counterarguments, see Pritchard (2012, passim). 26 If such background evidence is lacking, then I think we should allow that the mere raising of this error-possibility could defeat knowledge. After all, if one really has no evidential basis for preferring the zebra scenario over the competing cleverly disguised mule scenario, then it is hard to see how one can have a sufficient evidential basis for knowing the former. 27 See Pritchard (2010) for a more detailed defence of this claim, and why it undermines various kinds of epistemological revisionism, such as certain arguments against the closure principle, epistemic contrastivism, epistemic contextualism, and so on. 28 Thanks to Giada Fratantonio, John Greco, Ram Neta, and Michael Williams for some useful discussions about epistemological disjunctivism and evidence/reasons.